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THE PONTIFICAL INSTITUTE OF MEDIAEVAL STUDIES
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The Case of Gilbert de la Porrée Bishop of Poitiers (1142-1154)

N. M. HARING S.A.C.

FOR the annals of the Church, the case of Gilbert de la Porrée was closed at the council of Rheims in the spring of 1148, when Gilbert, in the presence of Pope Eugenius III (1145-1153), expressed his full agreement with a *Profession of Faith* which, as John of Salisbury relates, was promulgated at the archbishop's Palace fifteen days after the official closing of the Council.[1] John of Salisbury who copied this *Profession of Faith* from a *Libellus* written against Gilbert by St. Bernard's secretary, Geoffrey of Auxerre, observes that its form, as recorded, was "perhaps" known to the Pope but not inserted in the conciliar Acts or in the *regestum* of Pope Eugenius.[2] Geoffrey's claim that the errors or *capitula* charged against Gilbert were condemned by the Pope himself, after Gilbert had freely and solemnly renounced each of them,[3] is not confirmed by John of Salisbury, a far more impartial eye-witness in the papal service.[4] Originally six in number,[5] the charges were reduced to four when it was shown that two of them were derived from another scholar's work, most probably the *Sententiae Divinitatis*.[6] The accused strongly insisted on being judged on the evidence of his published works and indignantly refused to identify himself with the *quaternum* summarizing the charges against him.[7] According to Otto of Freising,[8] who was on a crusade at the time of the Council, Pope Eugenius defined only that no distinction must be made between nature and person in God and that the word *essentia*, predicated of God, should be used not only in the ablative but also in the nominative case.[9]

While Gilbert promised Pope Eugenius to amend any doctrines contrary to the *Profession of Faith*, "should they be found in his book", *i.e.* his commentary on Boethius' *De Trinitate*, no amendment is known, probably because it was never made.[10] Instead, Gilbert composed a *Prologue* claiming that, if properly understood, his own faith and doctrine were not at variance with the *Profession of Faith.*[11] He ends this *Prologue* by saying that what he had written is to well-educated readers not only *rationibus firma* but also in accordance with "the authentic scriptures".[12]

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[1] John of Salisbury, *Historia Pontificalis* c. 11; ed. R. L. Poole (Oxford, 1927), p. 26. Cf. Hefele-Leclercq, *Histoire des Conciles* V, 1 (Paris, 1912), p. 832 ff.

[2] *Hist. Pontif.*, c. 11; ed. Poole, p. 24.

[3] *Ep. ad H(enricum), Cardinalem Albanensem*, n. 8; PL 185,592AB.

[4] The chronicler Helinand, O. Cist., who was born in 1160 and died after 1229, relates that another eye-witness, magister Stephanus de Aluierra, told him: Bernardum nostrum nihil adversus Gislebertum praevaluisse (*Chronicon*; PL 186,1038B). At a later date, this remark entered the *Chronicle* of Alberic of Trois Fontaines, O. Cist., Gilbert's contemporary, whose personal view is summed up in the words: In magistro tamen Gisleberto illud commendatur, quod correctus est et quod fecit Minorem Glossaturam (MGH, SS XXIII, 840). Quite unfavourable to Gilbert is Vincent of Beauvais, *Speculum Historiale* XXVIII, 86 (Cologne, 1494), fol. 364.

[5] *Gesta Friderici* I, 50; MGH, SS XX, 379.

[6] See Gilbert's angry protest in *Hist. Pontif.*, c. 10; ed. Poole, p. 23. Cf. B. Geyer, *Die Sententiae Divinitatis, ein Sentenzenbuch der Gilbertschen Schule.* Beiträge 7(1909), 48.

[7] *Hist. Pontif.*, c. 10; ed. Poole, p. 23: De quaterno illo ait nichil ad se.

[8] *Gesta Frid.* I, 50; MGH, SS XX, 379.

[9] P. Fournier, *Etudes sur Joachim de Flore et ses doctrines* (Paris, 1909), p. 64, n. 1 cites the *Historia Pontificalis* against Otto. However, the *capitula* of which John of Salisbury speaks are not the errors charged against Gilbert but the *Profession of Faith*, divided into four chapters, which, as he insists, was not to be considered an official document of faith.

[10] *Hist. Pontif.*, c. 11; ed. Poole, p. 25. Geoffrey, *Libellus*, n. 5; PL 185,579B speaks of the "amendment" as follows: Quod quidem nec factum audivimus nec speramus aliquando faciendum. See also *Libellus*, n. 11, PL 185,605A and St. Bernard, *Serm. in Cant.* LXXX, 9; PL 183,1170D. A statement to the contrary is found in the continuation of Sigebert's *Chronicle;* MGH, SS VI, 454. Gilbert could hardly correct his works without destroying his whole system of thought. The errors charged against him were not copied *ad litteram* from his works, but formulated by his opposition.

For the history of intellectual achievement, both theological and philosophical, the case of Gilbert is still a wide open question some seven centuries after his death. Inspired by B. Hauréau's admiration for Gilbert,[13] A. Berthaud wrote his *Gilbert de la Porrée, Evêque de Poitiers, et sa philosophie* (1070-1154),[14] but failed to discover the fundamental principles in Gilbert's system. Discouraged by the deplorable condition in which Gilbert's published works are found (PL 64, 1255-1412), historians are still compelled to express their views in terms of reserved caution. René Silvain's list of corrections is, under present conditions, an excellent help in ascertaining a more accurate text, though, on closer examination of *Ms* Paris, B. N. *Lat.* 18093 which he used in addition to *Ms* Paris, B. N. *Lat.* 16341, I detected too many not unimportant omissions to consider it fully reliable.[15] Rather than wait for a critical edition, the need of which cannot be overstressed, it would at present seem more urgent to present Gilbert's case in order to arouse a greater interest in this exceptionally great scholar.

The publication of his commentaries on the Psalms and the Epistles of St. Paul would add immeasurably to a better understanding, for it is very significant that Gilbert's contemporary and severe critic, Gerhoh of Reichersberg, attributes to St. Augustine a long passage from Gilbert's comment on *Ephesians* iv, 10 without even suspecting its authenticity.[16]

He wrote intricate, but excellent Latin which requires very attentive and careful reading. Once his basic principles are properly understood, Gilbert is generally neither vague nor obscure,[17] and he was no less a creative genius than St. Thomas, though the latter enjoyed historical advantages which were denied to the former. Compared to Gilbert, Abelard was not much more than a skilful compiler and analyser of texts. To say that Gilbert knew "his Boethius"[18] and

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[11] *Hist. Pontif.*, c. 13; ed. Poole, p. 29 ff.

[12] See the edition in M. Grabmann, *Geschichte der scholastichen Methode* II (Freiburg i.B., 1911), p. 419.

[13] *Histoire de la philosophie scolastique* I (Paris, 1872), p. 470.

[14] Poitiers, 1892.

[15] René Silvain, 'Le texte des commentaires sur Boèce de Gilbert de la Porrée', *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire* 15 (1946), 175-189. I have also collated *Ms.* Paris, B. N. *Lat.* 2178 and *Ms.* Valenciennes, Bibl. Publ. 197.

[16] Compare Gerhoh, *Comm. in Ps. XXXVIII;* PL 193,1412BD with Gilbert's *Commentary* in *Ms* Bruges, Ville 78, fol. 35. Note the beginning: Hic dicendum quod inter personam et ejus substantiam ratio dividit. Or the sentence: divinitas qua ipse (Christus) est Deus. A. Hayen, 'Le Concile de Reims et l'erreur théologique de Gilbert de la Porrée', *Arch. d'hist. doctr. et litt.* 10-11 (1935/6), 93 has "no doubt" that Gilbert's scriptural commentaries are *oeuvres de jeunesse.* This may perhaps be true of the earlier work, his *Commentary on the Psalms.* His *Commentary on the Pauline Epistles,* written before 1140, appears to be a very mature work. If we suppose that Gilbert wrote it between 1130-1140, he composed it as a man between fifty and sixty years of age. His contemporaries praised *both* commentaries. The chronicler Alberic (MGH, SS XXIII, 840) recommends Gilbert's *Minorem glossaturam continuam in Psalterium et Epistolas Pauli,* and Robert de Monte observes that Gilbert interpreted both *luculenter* (MGH, SS VI, 504). Their great popularity is well attested by the numerous manuscripts. Cf. H. Denifle, *Die abendländ. Schriftausleger* (Mainz, 1905), p. 30 ff.

[17] Th. de Régnon, *Etudes de théol. positive sur la s. Trinité,* deuxième série (Paris, 1892), p. 95 ff. devotes too many pages to Gilbert's obscurity and sees in Geoffrey *un précieux auxiliaire* to remove it. Similarly, J. Schwane, *Hist. des Dogmes* IV (Paris, 1903), p. 190 ff. uses Geoffrey's *capitula* to prove Gilbert's tritheism and other errors. This rather dubious method of judging Gilbert by the "evidence" of his accusers is by no means rare. F. Vernet (*D.T.C.* VI,2 (Paris, 1925), col. 1353) does not quote a single sentence from Gilbert's works and assures us: En philosophie, Gilbert n'est ni un esprit très originel ni "un esprit *entier...* M. de Wulf, on whom Vernet relied, changed his judgement considerably in Gilbert's favour. Compare the fifth edition of his *Hist. de la philosophie médiévale* I (Louvain, 1924), p. 158 with the sixth edition (Louvain 1934), p. 211 ff.

[18] Cf. *Hist. Pontif.*, c. 13; ed. Poole, p. 29.

Chalcidius is only to state the obvious, but despite his vast learning, he very rarely cites passages from scriptural, patristic, theological or philosophical sources.[19] Grammar and logic were powerful factors in his every approach to philosophy and theology, yet he did not waste his time in sterile dialectics and sophistry. Although his library was more limited than that of his adversary, St. Bernard, he was very familiar with the writings of Sts. Hilary of Poitiers, Augustine and Jerome, but he frankly told St. Bernard to procure a better education *in disciplinis liberalibus* and other preliminary requirements before he would follow the Saint's suggestion to discuss, in peace and without animosity, some *dicta* of St. Hilary which caused a great deal of speculation in the middle of the twelfth century.[20]

Gilbert had decidedly more admirers than capable exponents, and the enormous range of his influence, especially through his scriptural commentaries, is undeniable.[21] Yet the answer to the question whether the so-called *Gilbertini* or *Porretani* were true and genuine representatives of his thought and thus legitimate members of his "school", will depend on a much more adequate knowledge of Gilbert's teaching than is available in printed form. A school whose author spent the last years in silence and under suspicion of heresy might have asserted itself like the Abelardian school, but Gilbert produced no *Summa* or *Sententiae* to guide his followers and we have seen that the very first attempt, made in this direction by another scholar, was publicly "anathematized" by Gilbert himself and torn to pieces before the approving eyes of the Council of Rheims.[22] To give these *Sententiae divinitatis* the subtitle *Ein Sentenzenbuch der Gilbertschen Schule* is, accordingly, not fully justified, unless we agree to burden Gilbert with errors committed by others. In both Paris and Rheims, Gilbert's own students gave contradictory evidence on his teaching and, as John of Cornwall relates, some thirty years later Gilbert's *auditores* disagreed among themselves concerning his doctrine on the hypostatic union.[23] Such contradictory "oral tradition" reflects on the students rather than on their teacher. Great caution should therefore be exercised in the evalutation of the numerous doctrines attributed to Gilbert by later writers, since the final word on their accuracy cannot be spoken until all of Gilbert's writings have been duly examined.[24]

It is only just not to blame Gilbert for errors, unless they can be proven to be his own or to result directly from his doctrines. Since mediaeval scholars often refrain from naming contemporary authors with whom they disagreed, historians must proceed with great care in identifying them. A case in point is the *magni nominis magister* of Angers who, according to Abelard,[25] taught that all the divine attributes are derived *ex quibusdam formis diversis essentialiter ab ipso Deo*. The original assumption that Abelard refers to Gilbert[26] has gradually been abandoned with good reasons.[27] The same can definitely be said of another error mentioned by Abelard that the three divine *proprietates* distinguishing the three persons are three different *essentiae* or three *res* distinct from both the persons and from God.[28] Gilbert explicitly denies a plurality of *essentiae* and rejects any *rerum unio* in God, though he does describe the trinitarian Persons as numerically distinct *res*. Its meaning is to be judged by its context, for the word *res* is admittedly ambiguous. Robert of Melun, Lombard and others[29] speak of *tres res* in God and, using it in this sense, they did not mean three substances. The Fourth Lateran Council (1215), on the other hand, considered *res* synonymous with "substance, essence or divine nature" when it defended Peter Lombard's *summa res* against Joachim.[30] Yet without pausing to prove it, modern authors accuse Gilbert of tritheism, as if three *res* signified three Gods.[31]

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[19] Some of Gilbert's admirers soon began collecting patristic texts to corroborate his doctrine. Cf. F. Pelster, 'Die anonyme Verteidigungsschrift der Lehre Gilberts von Poitiers', *Studia Mediaevalia* (Bruges, 1948), 145. Gilbert considered his own doctrine as "stolen" from, rather than found in, the "authentic scriptures". *Prologus*, ed. Grabmann, p. 419.

[20] *Hist. Pontif.*, c. 12; ed. Poole, p. 27. Consulted by Philip of Harveng, Gilbert cited entire paragraphs from Hilary by heart. *Ep V;* PL 203,45CD. Cf. Lombard, *Sent.* III, d. 15, c. 3; ed. Quaracchi II (1916), p. 617.

[21] Cf. A. M. Landgraf, *Einführung in die Gesch. der theol. Lit. der Frühscholastik* (Regensburg, 1948), p. 79 ff. J. de Ghellinck, *Le mouvement théol. du XIIe siècle* (Bruges, 1948), p. 176 speaks carefully of a tenacious group *de partisans combatifs, en France et ailleurs, qui peut s'appeller son école.* Equally cautious is E. Gilson, *La Philosophie au moyen âge* (Paris, 1944), p. 267 whose summary of Gilbert's doctrine is excellent.

[22] *Hist. Pontif.*, c. 10; ed. Poole, p. 23.

[23] *Eulogium ad Alexandrum III*, c. 3; PL 199,1051A.

[24] Many such attributions have been collected and published by A. M. Landgraf in various valuable articles listed in *op. cit.*, p. 79 f.

[25] *Theol. christiana* IV; PL 178, 1285B.

[26] S. M. Deutsch, *Peter Abaelard* (Leipzig, 1883), p. 260. E. Vacandard, *La vie de saint Bernard* II (Paris, 1927), p. 341.

That efforts were made to trace certain errors back to Gilbert is well attested, but, since Gilbert's denials were likewise supported by eminent witnesses,[32] his extant works must speak for themselves. For this purpose, we are fortunate in possessing Gilbert's original text, expecially his comment on Boethius' *De Trinitate* on which the attacks were centred.[33]

When Gilbert faced Pope Eugenius, he was a man well-advanced in age who had spent some sixty years *in legendo et tritura litterarum*.[34] To beginners, we are told, his doctrine appeared obscure, but solid to advanced scholars.[35] At the Council of Rheims no one "boasted of having read something that he had not read" and he used his vast learning to make it "serve theology".[36] One thought or one principle dominates in his writings and is truly the key to Gilbert's system, namely, that there is no true knowledge of a concrete material object or *id quod,* unless the mind succeeds in establishing the cause or *id quo* of each and every reality in the *id quod* and classifies it according to the ten Aristotelian categories. When these categories are applied to the divine *id quod,* "all is changed".[37] Yet, *ne devotio muta sit,*[38] the mind must accept the rules of human language and express itself in terms of categories and logical or mental distinctions.

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[27] Cf. A. Hayen, *art. cit.*, 47, n. 3. J. G. Sikes, *Peter Abailard* (Cambridge, 1932), p. 265.

[28] *Introd. ad Theol.* II, 7; PL 178,1056D. Cf. J. Cottiaux, 'La conception de la théol. chez Abélard', *RHE* 28 (1932), 258 f. M. Chossat, *La Somme des Sentences*, (Spic. Sacr. Lov., *fasc.* 5, Louvain, 1932) deals at length (pp. 91-114) with *Le Porrétanisme et la "Somme"* without a quotation from Gilbert (not listed in bibliography) and attributes the above error to him with the words: Et nous savons par ailleurs que telle fut l'opinion de Gilbert de la Porrée et des Porrétains. See also E. Lesne, *Hist. de la propriété éccl. en France* V (Lille, 1940), p. 644.

[29] Robert of Melun, *Summa* I, p. 2, c. 5; ed. R. M. Martin (Louvain, 1947), p. 275: Nam haec tria Deum esse et Deum esse haec tria, beatus asserit Augustinus, qui etiam tres res tres personas esse dicit. Lombard, *Sent.* I, d. 25, c. 2; ed. Quaracchi I (1916), p. 161: Ita tres res dicimus, ut easdem esse unam quandam summam rem. St. Thomas, *S. theol.* I, qu. 30, a. 1 describes the divine Persons as plures res subsistentes in divina natura.

[30] Cf. Denzinger - Bannwart, *Enchiridion Symbolorum* (Freiburg i.B., 1937), n. 431 f.

[31] Fr. Foberti, *Gioacchino da Fiore e il Gioacchinismo antico e moderno* (Padova, 1942), p. 70 speaks of la tesi del triteista Gilberto. According to C. Ottaviano, *Joachim Abbatis Liber contra Lombardum* (Roma, 1934), p. 45, the *Liber de vera philosophia* belongs indubbiamente alla scuola triteistica di Gilberto. Incredibly false is the same author's assertion (p. 82) that, according to Gilbert, la *divinitas* non è Dio, essendo un puro accidente estrinseco. Not even in the heat of controversy did Gilbert's adversaries stoop to such falsehoods. Even P. Fournier, *op. cit.*, p. 52 speaks of Gilbert's système que l'on accusa à bon droit d'être trithéiste, sinon en un certain sense polythéiste. L. De Simone, *Storia della filosofia medievale* I (Naples, 1949), p. 239 asserts that in theology Gilbert produced "a heap of heresies" such as "Nestorianism, adoptionanism and other heretical propositions".

[32] Cf. Geoffrey, *Ep. ad H.*, n. 2; PL 185,588C.

[33] Cf. A. Hayen, *art. cit.*, 94 f.

[34] *Hist. Pontif.*, c. 8; ed. Poole, p. 17.

[35] *Op cit.*, c. 12; ed. Poole, p. 28.

[36] *Op. cit.*, c. 10 and c. 12; ed. Poole, p. 22 and p. 28. Most members of the Council of Rheims could not conceal their admiration for Gilbert's learning. The *Chronicle of Tours* (*Recueil des. hist. de la France* XII [Paris, 1877], p. 472) calls him doctor eximius et fere incomparabiliter eruditus. The continuator of Sigebert's *Chronicle* (*MGH*, SS VI, 454) and Robert de Monte (*ibid.*, 504) speak of him as magister nominatissimus and—what is more remarkable—as vir religiosus et multiplicis doctrinae. The *Planctus Laurentii* (*Recueil des hist.* XIV [Paris,1877], p. 379 ff.) may appear too sentimental, but it is hardly insincere. Both John of Salisbury (*Hist. Pontif.*, c. 8; ed. Poole, p. 17 f.) and an epitaph on Gilbert (*Gallia Christ.* II, 1178) agree that he surpassed all *magistri* of his time in all seven arts, with the exception of astronomy. C. Ottaviano, (*op. cit.*, p. 52) and others credit Gilbert with "a Greek doctrine on the Trinity", but his trinitarian theory is a rigid application of his doctrine on the categories rather than the result of his apparently extensive study of Greek authors available in Latin. Admitting that Gilbert was not familiar with Greek, the author of *Liber de diversitate nature*, cited by C. H. Haskin, *Studies in Mediaeval Science* (Cambridge, 1924), p. 211, claims that Gilbert often read "Theoderitus", Sophronius and, especially, Athanasius and Hilary of Poitiers

I. THE *ID QUO* AS CAUSE OF THE CREATED *ID QUOD*

In order to understand Gilbert's system and method of argumentation, it is indispensable to begin with a grammatical rule which, in and before Gilbert's time, caused occasional embarrassment to the theologians, for "if we neglect the grammatical theory, we are cutting ourselves off from an important source for understanding the thought of the eleventh and twelfth centuries."[1] In their study of grammar, the students were told that a *nomen* signifies both substance and quality.[2] Accordingly, the difficulty was raised that even the word God signifies substance and quality. Rigorously applied, this grammatical rule would have forced theology into silence. Abelard refused to submit to the "rules of Donat" and Hugh of Rouen declared that he would still speak of God "against the laws of philosophical disputation", while Robert Pulleyn was clearly at a loss as to how to cope with the objection.[3] We learn from John of Salisbury that Gilbert acknowledged the principle as laid down *in rationali facultate* (logic) and defended the right to follow it in theology.[4] It seems that his teacher, Bernard of Chartres, had already transformed its meaning and raised it to a higher level of philosophical speculation.[5]

A cursory glance at Gilbert's system of sciences will reveal how the originally grammatical rule was transformed from a logical principle of speech and "law of philosophical disputation" into a formula expressing what may be called the metaphysical constitution of "concrete", composite beings, both material and spiritual. Once established in logic, it was also adapted to the particular requirements of theology.

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all of whom he used "*cum gloria*" at the Council of Rheims. Gilbert (PL 64,1305BD) explicitly refers to Epiphanius (of Salamis) and Philaster (of Brescia) in a brief summary of trinitarian heresies for which his source was no other than Augustine, *De Haeresibus* XLIX ff; PL 42,39-41. However, Otto of Freising, *Gesta Frid.* I, 56; MGH, SS XX, 363 cites a text from Theodoret supposedly quoted by Gilbert at the Council to justify his distinction between *natura* and *persona* in God. The text is actually found in *De Trinitate,* preserved in Latin only and published as a work of Theodoret in PG 83,1170AB which proves that either Gilbert or, at least, Otto used the work.

[37] Boethius, *De Trinitate,* c. 4; ed. Stewart-Rand (London, 1926), p. 16 and Gilbert's comment in PL 64,1283A. Cf. Alanus of Lille, *De Virtutibus;* ed. O. Lottin, *Med. Studies* XII (1950), 25.

[38] *Hist. Pontif.,* c. 13; ed. Poole, p. 37. Since all references to, and texts from, Gilbert's works occurring in this article are found in PL 64, the following abbreviations, succeeded by the respective column in PL 64, will be used: (1) *De Tr.* 1255B designating Gilbert's *Commentary on Boethius De Trinitate;* PL 64,1255B. (2) *De Pr.* 1301D referring to the title *De Praedicatione trium Personarum.* (3) *De Hb.* 1313C which is a reference to his commentary on Boethius, *Quomodo substantiae etc.,* commonly cited under the title *De Hebdomadibus.* (4) *C. Eut.* 1337D designing Gilbert's *Commentary on Boethius, Contra Eutychen et Nestorium.*

[1] R. W. Hunt, 'Studies on Priscian', *Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies* 1 (1942/3), 194.

[2] Priscian, *Inst. gramm.* II, 5,25; ed. M. Hertz I (Leipzig, 1855) p. 58. Remigius of Auxerre, *In Artem Donati Minorem commentum;* ed. W. Fox (Leipzig, 1902) p. 8 ff. Cf. St. Anselm, *Quomodo grammaticus sit substantia et qualitas;* ed. F. S. Schmitt, *Op. Omnia* I (Secovii, 1938), p. 145 ff.

[3] Abelard, *Introductio ad theol.* II, 10; *Theol. christiana* IV; PL 178,1062C and 1285B. Hugh of Rouen, *De Fide catholica;* PL 192,1327CD. Robert Pulleyn, *Sent.* I, 1; PL 186,675AB. Cf. M.-D. Chenue, 'Grammaire et *théologie* aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles', *Arch. d'hist. doctr. et litt.* 10-11 (1935/6), 5 ff.

[4] *Hist. Pontif.,* c. 13; ed. Poole, p. 35.

[5] Cf. John of Salisbury, *Metalogicon* III, 2; ed. C. C. I. Webb (Oxford, 1929), p. 125. In a letter to Bernard of Chartres, Gilbert writes: Quicquidsum, tibi post Deum attribuo. L. Merlet, *Bibl. de l'ecole des chartes* 16 (1855), 461.

Natural science, a subdivision of theoretical or speculative sciences, considers its object, the *nativum*, in its concrete material state.[6] Looking at an object as it exists, the philosopher proceeds first "rationally", for the word *ratio*, derived from *reri*, signifies the power of the human mind to consider a sensible thing with the previous aid of senses and "imaginations".[7] Trained in logic, where he learned what the *id quo* and *quod* of a *nomen* means, he has to be careful not to step into the fields of other sciences.[8] Since he also learned in logic what the *forma* of a thing is,[9] he may then proceed to "mathematical science" where he deals with his object *disciplinaliter, i.e.*, in his mind he separates the *forma* from the concrete being and studies it "abstractly", though it is not *actu* separable from the object.[10] Conceived as such, the *forma* is a "mathematical abstraction". The purpose of this abstraction is to penetrate into the reason why an object is what it is. If natural science states that a thing is a body and that it is coloured and broad, rational speculation does not perfectly grasp it, unless it obtains a firm hold on what causes it to be a body and coloured and broad. To perceive that *corporalitas* makes it a body, that colour makes it coloured, that breadth makes it broad, is not possible, unless the mind separates each of them from the concrete thing and separately studies their proper nature.[11]

It is very important to note that natural and mathematical sciences deal with concrete, composite beings only, while "theological science" transcends all the *nativa* and studies each of their three principles, namely their *opifex* or author, their exemplary idea and prime matter or *hyle*.[12] Its object is *not only* "abstract" by mathematical abstraction but also in reality (*re ipsa*), since it has no material element to make it concrete. In order to reach it, we must proceed "intellectually", by judging it according to properly theological reasons and not according to the findings of the natural and mathematical sciences.[13] But especially these two sciences provide the theological terminology and, with proper discretion,[14] theological science transfers "the usage of human speech" to God *aliqua rationis proportione* or *proportionali transumptione*.[15] .This is, as we shall see, also true of terms which theologians and *ethici* (moral theologians) know to be denominations such as *essentia, forma, bonitas*, for in their full sense they apply only to God.[16] God and prime matter are "incomprehensible" because the human mind cannot even find fictitious causes to aid the understanding, yet they are "somehow intelligible" *per remotionem*.[17]

Though unable to assign causes, the theologian is not deprived of the possibility of assigning "some proportionate reasons" for his statements and conclusions.[18] But he must always realize that he argues with "theological reasons".[19] The indiscriminate transfer to theology of "natural" rules is as detrimental to true theology[20] as the complete denial that any natural or mathematical knowledge is accepted in theology.[21]

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[6] *De Tr.;* 1265B and 1267A.

[7] *De Tr.;* 1267A and 1268B.

[8] *De Tr.;* 1268B.

[9] *C. Eut.;* 1367BC.

[10] *De Tr.;* 1265B and *De Hb.* 1326D.

[11] *De Tr.;* 1267C and 1283B.

[12] *De Tr.;* 1267D.

[13] *De Tr.;* 1268C.

[14] *C. Eut.;* 1381D.

[15] *De Tr.;* 1283ABD. Instead of *proportio*, Abelard used *similitudo. Theol. christ.* III; PL 178,1246D: Aliqua similitudine de creaturis ad Creatorem vocabula transferimus.

[16] *De Tr.;* 1283C; 1269A; 1274C. *C. Eut.;* 1377B. *De Hb.;* 1323C; 1328D.

[17] *C. Eut.;* 1361A. This statement is very important in view of the all too common contention that Gilbert taught *divinitas* to be the distinct cause of God.

[18] *De Pr.;* 1303C; 1306B.

[19] *De Tr.;* 1265A.

[20] *De Tr.;* 1265B; 1257A.

[21] *C. Eut.;* 1381D. A theologian who denies all "mathematical abstraction" in theology is bound to disagree with Gilbert. Gerhoh of Reichersberg, *Liber de novitatibus hujus temporis*, c. 20; ed. O. J. Thatcher, 'Studies concerning Adrian IV', *The Decennial Publications of the Univ. of Chicago*, first series, IV (Chicago, 1903), 215 excludes it from theology on the authority of Boethius: Cum ergo prohibeat auctoritas (*i.e.*, Boethius) in divinis mathematice versandum, quare tu (*i.e.*, Gilbert) mathematica consideratione abstractim consideras vel proprietates . . . vel personas? In this fundamental issue, Clarenbaldus is vague and ambiguous, but he concedes: theologia duos habet propriae

The full and far reaching significance of these principles of science becomes more transparent if we return to the originally grammatical doctrine on the *nomen*. Gilbert states the following universal rule governing its use:

> Omne vero nomen diversa significat, substantiam videlicet et qualitatem: ut album (significat) *id quod* appellatur album — quod est substantia nominis—et *id quo* appellatur album—quod est ejusdem nominis qualitas.[22]

To illustrate this rule, Gilbert proposes two sentences: (1) *homo est risibilis* and (2) *homo est individuorum forma.* In the first sentence, he explains, the word man signifies an *id quod* "which the grammarians call substance". In the second sentence, the word man signifies an *id quo* which "they call quality in every faculty of learning, no matter to what genus it belongs". Not the *id quo* or *forma* of man, but man as *is qui* or substance is "able to laugh". On the other hand, not the *is qui* of man but the *id quo* or quality of man is said to be the *forma* of individuals.[23] It is quite obvious that, in this general rule, the word quality does not mean accidental quality which it may have designated originally, but comprises every genus or each of the ten categories, including substance, since no statement can be made in any faculty of learning without the ten categories which, as Gilbert observes, have been handed down to us especially by Aristarch and Aristotle.[24] If we state *album est corpus* and *album est accidens,* the meaning of *album* differs in each sentence. In the first case, an *id quod,* a body or substance, is called *album;* in the second case, *album* signifies an *id quo,* an accidental quality, called whiteness (*albedo*) which causes the *id quod* to be white.[25] Whiteness itself is caused by the substance of the body.[26]

It is therefore imperative to use a *nomen* with the utmost care[27] and we may now be able to see more clearly why Gilbert warns natural science to avoid confusion, for it deals only with the *id quod,* while it is the task of mathematical science to investigate the *id quo* and establish its relationship to the *id quod.* A rather casual, but very fundamental, remark conveys Gilbert's idea of this relationship with regard to true intellectual knowledge: *Nihil enim naturalium nisi per causam et nihil mathematicorum nisi per efficiendi potestatem concipi potest.*[28]

In terms of *id quod* and *quo,* this means that nothing in the created *id quod* can be understood without the understanding of its cause or *id quo*. The *id quo,* reached by mathematical abstraction, cannot be understood without understanding its abiliy to produce a certain effect. Confronted with a white *id quod,* we only understand it properly as white if we realize that whiteness is the cause or *id quo* which makes the *id quod* white. We reach whiteness through its ability to produce this particular effect. This ability or causality is described by Gilbert as *potestas* or *proprietas efficiens* or *efficiendi* based on the *natura* of whiteness.[29] That the effect of whiteness is not due to the *id quo* which, for instance, causes the *id quod* to be a body or quantitative becomes known to us by way of mathematical abstraction. In the order of *naturalia, i.e.* the created order, the principle holds: ***Aliud est quod est et aliud quo est.***[30]

This does not mean, as is now evident, that the *id quo* is one substance and the *id quod* another. And by saying that this causal relationship and distinction applies to the "natural" order, Gilbert implies that it does not apply to God.

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considerationis modos. However, he does not fully approve of Gilbert's exposition of *scientia mathematica.* W. Jansen, *Der Kommentar des Clarenbaldus von Arras zu Boethius De Trinitate* (Breslau, 1926), p. 28* f. and 55* ff.

[22] *C. Eut.;* 1382D.

[23] *C.Eut.;* 1382C.

[24] *De Tr.;* 1281C.

[25] *C. Eut.;* 1382D and *De Tr.* 1292B.

[26] *C. Eut.;* 1404D-1405A.

[27] *C. Eut.;* 1406AB.

[28] *C. Eut.;* 1360B.

[29] *C. Eut.;* 1360B.

[30] *De Tr.;* 1278D.

If, nevertheless, Gilbert speaks of God in terms of *id quod* and *quo*, he transfers to theology the general rule of human language and thought as he conceived it. The divine *id quod* is Boethian terminology and, where Boethius speaks of God's substance as *qua est*,[31] Gilbert could easily discover the *id quo*. We shall see that a similar terminology was occasionally used by St. Augustine. Neither in St. Augustine nor in Gilbert is this terminology based on a belief that God is a being composed of *id quo* and *id quod* one of which is not God, though Gilbert is frequently accused of teaching it. Gilbert often insists on the *proportionalis transumptio* of terminology by which he conveys an idea of analogy, commonly ignored by his accusers. When he states that the transfer is done *aliqua rationis proportione*, he intends to say that there is "some proportion of reason", no proportion of cause, in our doctrine on God. This reason is God himself, but, somehow conceived as *id quo* by the human mind, it is expressed as *id quo* in human language.

A thorough study of the *id quo* and *quod* with all its ramifications in Gilbert's writings is as vital as a proper understanding of act and potency in the works of St. Thomas. In his doctrine on the universals, on individuation, person, substance and accidents, to name a few instances, Gilbert constantly leads the solution of a problem to an *id quo*. Though definable as cause (in created beings), the *id quo* includes and surpasses the range of substantial and accidental forms outlined by Gilbert in his commentary on Boethius, *De Trinitate*[32] for it comprises such transcendentals as *unitas*, the "companion of all categories".[33] In an attempt to define it, it is almost impossible to go beyond defining the created *id quo* as cause, but occasional remarks enable us to add to this rather general definition. On one occasion, Gilbert observes that, properly speaking, only bodies (*id quod*) can be "mixed" (*misceri*) and their natures can be "fused" (*confundi*). Thus whiteness and blackness, each an *id quo*, cannot be mixed, "because they are incorporeal", but they are fused by mixing black and white bodies. In other words, only their *id quod* can be mixed and their *id quo* is fused.[34] Gilbert's observation that whiteness and blackness are incorporeal allows us to conclude that, for instance, *humanitas* or *corporalitas* as *id quo* are incorporeal forms. To say, then, that such an *id quo* is real seems a legitimate conclusion, though it could not be described as *res*, "that equivocal word", as Gilbert once remarks[35] and even less as *aliquid* which, in the most general fashion, signifies both an *id quo* and *quod*.[36]

We have seen that, where Gilbert speaks of *proprietas* and *potestas efficiens* or *efficiendi*, he had what we would call a formal cause in mind.[37] Yet the *id quo* is neither restricted to one of the four causes nor to the ten categories.

A negative approach to the *id quo* will prove to be more helpful than a positive definition. Gilbert states, for instance, that, *separated* from a body (*id quod*), *corporalitas* as its *id quo* is nothing *actu*;[38] in the mind, it is a mathematical abstraction like every other *id quo*; though inseparable from the body,[39] it is *not* nothing in the body. It is not the body nor a body but the incorporeal form of the body, generally called subsistence or, more specifically, body-subsistence (*corporalitas*).

In the material order, the *id quo* is not the *id quod*, neither in thought nor in reality, because the *id quo* and *quod* have neither a common genus nor a common *ratio*. To use Gilbert's example: man's body and soul are of a different genus but have the common *ratio* of being *supposita* and for that reason they can enter into the *composition* of man.[40] Being without both a common genus and a common *ratio*, the union of *id quo* and *quod* is not a composition but a *conjunctio*[41] and, being a union, presupposes numerical distinction.[42]

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[31] *De Tr.*; 1290B. Clarenbaldus, *op. cit.*, p. 37* classifies God, the *id quod est*, as one of Boethius' *nova verba*.

[32] *De Tr.*; 1266AB.

[33] *De Pr.*; 1309A.

[34] *C. Eut.*; 1396C.

[35] *C. Eut.*; 1379B.

[36] *C. Eut.*; 1362B.

[37] *C. Eut.*; 1360B and 1393A.

[38] *C. Eut.*; 1374D.

[39] *De Hb.*; 1326D. Cf. Clarenbaldus, *op. cit.*, p. 56*.

Speaking in terms of categories, Gilbert describes this union, not as a *naturalis*, but as "a certain *rationalis habitus*."[43] He tells us that matter and form are united by a certain *rationalis habitus*, whereas parts are united to parts either by a *naturalis* or by a *rationalis habitus*.[44] With Boethius he derives *habitus* from *habere*, offering *vestitus* as example in man, *cuncta possidens* as example in God.[45] As such, however, *habitus* obviously designates something very exterior and is perhaps only loosely classifiable as *naturalis*. Examples of a *naturalis habitus*, offered by Gilbert, are *animatus, capitatus, manutus* which express that the subject *has* (*habere*) a soul united to the body and a head or hand joined to the body.[46] We learn from Gilbert that many philosophers taught that, in such cases, a *naturalis habitus* is the substance itself, since it affects generation and corruption.[47] Without going into a detailed analysis of the given examples, Gilbert declares that, as far as they are united to one another, body and soul are *extrinseci habitus* and from their union results the single form of man or *humanitas* as man's *id quo*.[48] But neither man nor body are in themselves *habitus*, for man is not a man because he *has* a man nor is the soul a spirit because it *has* a spirit.[49] It seems, therefore, that, according to Gilbert, a *naturalis habitus* (*extrinsecus*) presupposes an *id quod* and, being extrinsic to it, belongs to the seven extrinsic categories.[50] It is equally important to note Gilbert's remark that *habitus* excludes any notion of inherence.[51]

No *naturalis habitus* exists between the *id quo* and *quod* and, since the former is the *ratio* of the latter, Gilbert himself may have coined the expression *rationalis habitus*. They constitute an *unum quiddam*, and in this *unum* the *id quod has* its *id quo* including the intrinsic accidents of quality and quantity which, likewise as *id quo*, adhere to the *id quo* of the substance, before they inhere in the *id quod*. On the other hand, the *id quo* and what adheres to it *have* the *id quod*. Hence one is a *habitus* with regard to the other.[52]

The *id quo* thus described appears as either substantial or accidental, intrinsic incorporeal form comprising the categories of substance, quality and quantity as *id quo*. The other seven categories also act as *id quo*, but in a more extrinsic fashion and are, therefore, not classifiable as forms in the same sense as the first three categories. Moreover, when Gilbert stated that the *id quod* is an *unum*, he had a transcendental *id quo*, namely *unitas*, in mind which as the "companion of all categories" causes an *id quod*, i.e. its substance as well as its quantity and quality, to be one.[53] Gilbert's concept of *id quo* is consequently not strictly synonymous with a concept of categorical (substantial or accidental) form. Categories may overlap. If, for instance, an *id quo* is a *principium* of action (category of *actio*), its *id quo* as *principium* is *principalitas* expressing a relation.[54] Similarly, if an *id quod* or *is qui* (person) is an *auctor*, the *id quo* of being an

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[40] *C. Eut.;* 1381AB and 1359C. Cf. Otto of Freising, *Gesta Frid.* I, 5; MGH, SS XX, 356.

[41] *Ibidem.*

[42] *De Hb.;* 1322A. Another word for this union is "companionship": Esse et id quod est cujusdam consortii ratione sine se esse non possunt, ut corporalitas et corpus. *C. Eut.;* 1374D.

[43] *C. Eut.;* 1381A.

[44] *C. Eut.;* 1322A. Cf. *De Tr.;* 1289D:

[45] *De Tr.;* 1289B. Cf. Gilbert (?), *Liber de Sex Principiis;* ed. A. Heysse (Münster, 1929), p. 27 ff. Clarenbaldus, *op. cit.*, p.95* f.

[46] *De Tr.;* 1289D.

[47] *De Tr.;* 1289C. Cf. Boethius, *In Cat. Arist.* II; PL 64,234C. Abelard, *Logica 'Ingredientibus';* ed. B. Geyer, *Beiträge* 22 (1919), 227 ff. and 258 ff.

[48] *C. Eut.;* 1393B.

[49] *De Tr.;* 1290A.

[50] *De Tr.;* 1287C and 1289BC.

[51] *De Tr.;* 1290A.

[52] *C. Eut.;* 1381BC.

[53] *De Pr.;* 1309A.

[54] *C. Eut.;* 1378C and *De Pr.;* 1307A.

auctor is *auctoritas.*[55] If we speak of a divine person as being one, the *id quo* of one is oneness or *unitas;*[56] if we speak of two and more things or persons, the *id quo* is *dualitas* and *pluralitas.* Thus, speaking of three in the Holy Trinity, the *id quo* of three is *Trinitas qua ipsi dicuntur tres.*[57]

It should be noted finally that, properly speaking, not the *id quod* which is individual, but only the *id quo* as the basis of universals is predicable.[58] This is but another reason why Gilbert prefers abstract nouns. Properly speaking, not the individual *bonum,* but *bonitas,* its *id quo,* is predicable.[59] Transferred to God, not God as individual *id quod,* but *deitas* is predicable.[60] When Gilbert was accused of teaching: *Quod theologicae personae in nulla praedicarentur propositione*[61] he was supported by a number of *magistri* who contended that such was also the case *in naturalibus.*[62] It means, for instance, that not the Father as individual is predicated but His *id quo* or *paternitas.* Just as a thing is *unum* by its *unitas,* the first divine Person is Father by His *paternitas* which alone is predicable. The matter was controversial, however, and the Pope suppressed the problem.

While Gilbert felt that in philosophy there was not as great an *inopia nominum* as in theology,[63] it is still obvious that the Latin language did not always provide him with abstract terms sufficient to discriminate between the *id quo* and the concrete, individual *id quod.* Word-pairs such as *homo* and *humanitas* or *corpus* and *corporalitas* or *album* and *albedo* fit well into his frame of thought, but the terminology of the Boethian texts did not always conform to Gilbert's rigorous grammatical and logical demands.[64] We have seen that any *nomen,* abstract or concrete, signifies a substance or *id quod* and a quality or *id quo.* Thus the one word *corpus* signifies body as substance or *id quod* and as form or *id quo* which is called the subsistence of the body or *corporalitas.*[65] *Homo* likewise signifies an *id quod* or rather *is qui* as person and an *id quo.* Where Boethius speaks of Christ as *homo,* Gilbert warns us that Christ is not a man in the sense of *is qui,* which would lead to a duality of persons, but in the sense of *id quo,* i.e. by His *humanitas.*[66] Even abstract nouns such as *humanitas* or *corporalitas* may designate the *id quod* in a concrete man or body which makes them a *humanitas quae* (*est homo*) or *corporalitas quae* (*est corpus*) while, considered as *id quo,* they are *humanitas qua* (*est homo*) *or corporalitas qua* (*est corpus*).[67]

This complexity is increased by a lack of philosophical terms and a weakness inherent in the endings of certain Latin nouns. As to the former, for example, *substantia* as the most universal genus signifies substance as *id quo* and *quod* like any other *nomen.* The Latin language, as Gilbert observes, has no special word to express the subsistence or *id quo* of the genus common to its closest species, *viz.* corporeal and incorporeal substances.[68] He uses *substantialitas* in a later work,[69] yet may have considered it too novel. A relative clause often supplies for linguistic insufficiency. Thus the *id quo* of the soul is *illa* (*subsistentia*) *qua anima est et dicitur genere spiritus.*[70] The reader of Gilbert's works must therefore carefully note whether a relative clause is in the nominative or ablative case. The divine *essentia* as *id quo* is expressed in such sentences: *Essentia quoque qua ipse est* or *simplex essentia qua sola quisque illorum* (the three Divine Persons) *est id quod est* or *essentia qua aeternus ipse fuit, est, erit Deus.* Similarly, God's eternity is an *aeternitas qua Deus ipse fuit, est et erit aeternus*[71], and numerous other instances.

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[55] *De Tr.;* 1296D. To *persona* corresponds *personalitas. De Tr.;* 1295D; 1297D.

[56] *De Pr.;* 1309BC.

[57] *De Pr.;* 1310C.

[58] *C. Eut.;* 1381AB. Cf. Boethius, *In Categ. Arist.* I; PL 64,174C.

[59] Cf. *De Hb.;* 1325B.

[60] *De Pr.;* 1308B; 1310C. Cf. *De Tr.;* 1280B.

[61] Otto of Freising, *Gesta Frid.* I, 51; MGH, SS XX, 379.

[62] *Ibidem,* 384.

[63] *De Pr.;* 1306B.

[64] Word formations such as *leonitas* or *bovitas* used by Gerhoh of Reichersberg, *De Gloria et honore,* c. 11,3; PL 194,1110C are not found in Gilbert's works.

[65] *C. Eut.;* 1306A.

[66] *C. Eut.;* 1382D-1383B.

[67] Cf. *De Tr.;* 1266A: Corporalitas quae est esse corporis in quo est et qua ipsum (corpus) est aliquid. It may be noted here that, in order to differentiate between the use of a noun as *id quo* or *quod,* words such as *essentia quae* or *qua* will be used in this article, although they occur in Gilbert's works only as parts of sentences.

[68] *De Tr.;* 1281C.

[69] *De Pr.;* 1306C.

[70] *C. Eut.;* 1393C.

In view of the relative clause, Gilbert's argument may be lucid enough, at least grammatically speaking, but the fact that the noun itself may be in the nominative or ablative case increases the difficulties for which Gilbert became a notorious object of criticism. Gilbert's *Deus est essentia* can and does have two meanings: God exists or is what He is by *essentia* (*id quo*) and God is *essentia* (*id quod*)[72]. Of Christ he writes: *Sed sicut ipse est Deus essentia, ita est homo subsistentia.*[73] Sometimes doubt is removed by an adjective as in the sentence: *Deus ea, qua fuit et est et erit essentia simplici. . .*[74]

These examples should be sufficient to show that, as a principle of grammar and logical speech, Gilbert's distinction of *id quo* and *quod* is of universal application, including theology. In philosophy which, according to Gilbert, deals with created reality it is also a principle expressing a real distinction, as previously explained. Since Gilbert is generally accused of teaching such a real distinction in God, we shall now turn to Gilbert, the theologian.

II. THE DIVINE *ID QUOD*

Gilbert's trial was not only a clash between a scholar and a Saint or between speculative and mystical theology; it was a conflict between the outstanding theologians of his time. Apart from the human element of pride and prestige which inevitably increased with the growing publicity of Gilbert's case, we may not sufficiently realize that the new trend in theology, occasionally called the dawn of scholasticism, had not yet established a common logical foundation enabling the contestants to meet on common ground and associate the same sense with the same words. Still more marked was the absence of a common philosophical outlook which was bound to obscure theological controversies. When theology refused to yield to "the rules of Donat", it could not escape the fact that theological speculation was not independent of the tools forged in the process of training from grammar to the *divina pagina.* An acknowledged master in all faculties of learning, "except astronomy", Gilbert had developed a coherent system of thought in which, as we have seen, an originally grammatical principle provided, as it were, the frame for a relatively well defined system of philosophy. This system was not a metaphysical one in the sense that it was based on being as such. True to its object, as conceived by Gilbert, it was only "metaphysical" in the sense that its entire structure rested on the *id quo* as distinct and causal root source of what the theologian Gilbert knew to be *created* reality. For that reason, we entirely misinterpret Gilbert if we use his philosophy to prove that, according to him, the divine *id quo* is really and causally distinct from the divine *id quod.*[1] There is no evidence to show that Gilbert believed in a conflicting *ratio fidei* and *ratio humanae philosophiae*, as did the author of the *Sententiae divinitatis.*[2] But, although he knew that God is incomprehensible, he approached God, the object of theology, not only *intellectualiter* but also by using "mathematical abstractions" in order to speak of God not against, but in accordance with, the rules of philosophical disputation. Many of his adversaries shared neither his philosophical views nor his "mathematical" approach to God in theology and there is, unfortunately, too much proof that many condemned, and still condemn, him without familiarizing themselves with his full doctrine. Abelard had commenced the tremendous task of "harmonizing" the patristic teachings, and Gilbert was too advanced for his age in his own attempt at uniting all sciences without confusing their particular objects. With his critics he undoubtedly shared errors which, as we know, only later generations were able to remove and, revolutionary as it was, his system led to trinitarian speculations which, quoted in isolated sentences, could hardly be above suspicion of heresy. Even Lombard, by no means a "daring" theologian, suffered long under suspicion of heresy and Peter of Poitiers did not escape the fate of his master. Yet, with the exception of Gilbert, posterity treated them with kind consideration, viewing their errors as a passing phase in a gradual process of clarification.

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[71] *De Pr.;* 1305D. *De Tr.;* 1286CD and 1288C.

[72] *C. Eut.;* 1377B.

[73] *C. Eut.;* 1382B. Both *essentia* and *subsistentia* are in the ablative case expressing a divine and human *id quo* in the constitution of Christ.

[74] *De Tr.;* 1289A.

[1] This is actually done by A. H. Hayen, *art. cit.,* 64, attempting to prove a real, not causal, distinction in God *en fonction des principes fondamentaux de la philosophie porrétaine.* After describing Gilbert's system without a single reference to his works, A. Clerval, *Les écoles de Chartres au moyen âge* (Chartres, 1895), p. 163 reaches a similar conclusion with the same method.

[2] Ed. Geyer, p. 69*.

It is a peculiar irony that the *substantia qua* (*Deus est*) was singled out as the fundamental error in Gilbert's theology, for it was written, not by Gilbert, but by Boethius: *Qui homo est vel Deus refertur ad substantiam qua est aliquid, i.e. homo vel Deus.*

After exemplifying *homo* by Plato, Cicero and Tryphon, and *Deus* by Father, Son and Holy Ghost, Gilbert commented:

> Quod dicitur illorum quilibet esse homo vel illorum quilibet esse Deus, refertur ad substantiam, non quae est, sed qua est.[3]

Concerning the meaning of this distinction, the context presupposes and exemplifies Gilbert's theory on the *id quo* as basis of the universals. He states that the word man or God, used of Plato, Cicero and Tryphon or Father, Son and Holy Ghost, respectively, refers to substance, *non quae est, sed qua est.* This means that, if Plato, Cicero and Tryphon are called man, the word common to them does not designate the same *id quod* or *substantia quae,* because they are three numerically distinct individual substances. Hence they are called man in view of their *id quo* or *substantia qua* which is, as previously shown, inseparable and yet distinct from the *id quod* or *substantia quae* in created, material beings. In speaking of God, a similar distinction is made *aliqua rationis proportione*: If Father, Son and Holy Ghost are each called God in the sense of *substantia quae,* we triplicate the divine *id quod* or *substantia quae.* Consequently, each of Them is called God in view of Their one and common *substantia qua.* The *substantia qua* of Plato is numerically distinct from the *substantia qua* of Cicero and Tryphon, while with regard to the three Divine Persons such a numerical distinction of *substantia qua* does not exist.

It appears that St. Bernard did not have the time or opportunity to study the passage in its context when he made the inaccurate statement:

> Dicente auctore (Boethius): "Cum dicitur Deus, Deus, Deus, pertinet ad substantiam", noster commentator (Gilbert) intulit: "Non quae est, sed qua est".[4]

The inaccuracy of this assertion probably stems from a compilation of texts as we find it in Geoffrey's *Libellus* where this allegedly Boethian text follows immediately after Gilbert's supposed comment.[5] The words *Cum dicitur Deus, Deus, Deus,* do not occur in Boethius, but are Gilbert's own, and the words *qua est,* attributed to Gilbert, belong to Boethius. In addition, they are far apart in Gilbert's commentary and serve to illustrate two entirely different problems.[6] This makes it understandable why Gilbert insisted on being judged by a proper analysis of his own statements, not by a *quaternum* of accusations.[7] Gilbert does not differentiate between a *res* or substance *qua Deus sit et quae non sit Deus,* as St. Bernard accuses him of saying[8] and which was rightly rejected by Gilbert.[9] St. Bernard's remark that the accusation is not raised against Gilbert who "humbly acquiesced", but against those who still copied and read his works, hardly excuses an even more inaccurate description, according to which Gilbert taught *esse aliquid quo Deus sit et quod Deus non sit.*[10] Gilbert never made such an assertion and, in the mind of his readers, St. Bernard's use of *aliquid* evoked the idea of a nature or substance which is not God but the distinct *id quo* of God. This somehow explains St. Bernard's contention that Gilbert taught a *duplex Deus,* though he concedes that, while attributing many forms to creatures, Gilbert was content with one form in God.[11] We may agree with St. Bernard's refusal to adore that "fourth divinity" *quae Deus non est,*[12] but we shall see that Gilbert cannot rightly be accused of teaching it. He does speak of the divine essence as *forma,* mainly in dependence on its occurrence in the Boethian text, and he must have used the term in his public debates. As *forma Dei* it occurs in St. Paul's *Letter to the Philippians* (ii, 6) to which John of Salisbury duly refers in his exposition of Gilbert's *Prologue*[13] and it is not without importance to note that the word God is in the genitive case: *form of God.* If therefore St. Bernard's argument: *Nulla forma est id cujus est forma*[14] proved what it is supposed to prove, the Pauline *forma Dei* could hardly escape censure, unless the principle is restricted to created beings. With this restriction, Gilbert would have accepted the argument, but it was up to his adversaries to show that Gilbert did *not* restrict it to creatures. He would have agreed with St. Bernard's own statement: *Non est formatus Deus: forma est*[15] for the causal and real distinction of *id quo* and *quod* in its many variations is only to be understood *de rebus creatis*[16] or only applicable *in naturalibus.*[17] Without mentioning Gilbert, Robert of Melun, one of Gilbert's opponents, formulates a similar accusation: *Secundum istos Deus et deitas sunt sicut formatum et forma,*[18] but, whoever used such terminology, a *Deus formatus* does not occur in Gilbert's commentaries.

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[3] *De Tr.;* 1253C and 1290B.

[4] *Serm. in Cant.* LXXX, 8; PL 183,1170CD. The passage is cited by Walter of St. Victor, *Contra IV Labyrinthos Franciae* II; ed. B. Geyer, *Beiträge* 7 (1909), 179*. Its accuracy is also taken for granted by M. Bergeron, 'La structure du concept latin de personne', *Etudes d'hist. litt. et doctr.* II (Paris, 1932), p. 145.

St. Bernard had a zealous supporter in his secretary, Geoffrey of Auxerre[19] who, after Gilbert's death in 1154, completed a *Libellus* against Gilbert which, some forty years later, he sent along with a letter to H., Cardinal of Albano.[20] He cites Gilbert's most controversial text correctly[21] and insists that Gilbert dared to make the statement: *Forma Dei et divinitas, qua Deus est, ipsa non est Deus.*[22] It is difficult to ascertain what Gilbert actually said for, describing the same incident, Otto of Freising states that Gilbert answered negatively the Pope's question if he truly believed the divine *essentia* to be God. To excuse Gilbert, Otto observes that the accused was tired after a long debate,[23] yet it was no dialectic evasion when, on the next day, Gilbert declared that the accuracy of such a sentence as *divinitatem esse Deum* depended on the meaning of the word God. It may designate the divine nature and only in this sense did he consider the statement correct. The word God, as Scripture proves, may also designate any one of the three Divine Persons and in this sense the statement would logically lead to such "absurdities" as Sabellianism. Accordingly, Gilbert maintained that the distinction between nature and person in God is not just a mathematical abstraction but is based on "theological consideration" to avoid the Arian error of triplicating the divine *essentia* or the Sabellian heresy which destroys the plurality of persons by identifying them with the divine *essentia.*[24] Although Gilbert assured the Council that he did not mean a distinction of *hoc et hoc* between the Persons and the divine substance, the Pope disagreed with him and defined *ne aliqua ratio in theologia inter naturam et personam divideret*[25] which was to avoid the error of a quaternity in God.[26] St. Bernard's insinuation that Gilbert taught *Divinitas non est Deus*[27] seems to refer to the debate just described and should be judged according to Gilbert's distinction. Gilbert even denied having said it[28] and his works certainly support his denial.

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[5] PL 185,598D.

[6] *De Tr.;* 1290B and 1278D. Geoffrey, *Libellus,* n. 12; PL 185,598D offers a slightly abbreviated version of the second text in which *qua* should be corrected to *quo.*

[7] *Hist. Pontif.,* c. 10; ed. Poole, p. 23. Gerhoh, *De Novitatibus,* c. 21; ed. Thatcher, p. 67, cites both texts more accurately but claims that Boethius is clearer than his expositor.

[8] *Serm. in Cant.* LXXX, 8; PL 183,1170D.

[9] Cf. Geoffrey, *Ep. ad H.;* PL 185,588C.

[10] *De Consideratione* V, 7, 15; PL 182,797A. J. B. Beddie, 'Libraries in the Twelfth Century', *Anniversary Essays* (Boston, 1929), observes that Gilbert's works "spread widely in spite of doubts cast upon his doctrine."

[11] *De Consideratione* V, 7, 16; PL 182,797C-798B.

[12] *De Cons.* V, 7, 15; PL 182,797B. No less sarcastic is the remark in *Serm. in Cant.* LXXX, 6; PL 183,1169C: Forsitan non dignatur Deus esse, quae tanta (divinitas) est ut faciat Deum.

[13] *Hist. Pontif.,* c. 14; ed. Poole, p. 38.

[14] *Serm. in Cant.* LXXX, 5; PL 183,1169A. In interpreting *forma Dei* as *rectitudo,* St. Bernard, *Serm. in Cant.* LXXX, 2; PL 183,1167AB skillfully avoided contradiction, but the interpretation is by no means traditional.

[15] *De Cons.* V, 7, 17; PL 182,798B.

[16] *C. Eut.;* 1382D.

[17] *De Tr.;* 1278D. Raoul Ardens, *Hom.* I, 12; PL 155,1708D advises: Causam transumptionis sapienter investiget (theologus) nec ipsa transumptione absolutam similitudinem vel proportionem esse existimet, quoniam comparatio creaturarum ad Creatorem nulla est. Gilbert, *De Tr.;* 1265B declares: Diversis speculandi modis aspiciamus unumquodque, i.e. naturalia et theologica, prout potest intelligi atque capi, i.e. naturalia suo modo et theologica suo.

[18] See the full text in B. Hauréau, *Hist. de la philosophie scolastique* I (Paris, 1872), p. 473 f.

[19] Cf. *Vita S. Bernardi;* PL 185, 312AD.

Geoffrey often fails to define Gilbert's position with the precision necessary to do justice to his doctrine. He sums up "the beginning of all evils" in the sentence: *Forma ponebatur in Deo qua Deus esset et quae non esset Deus.*[29] As example he cites: *humanitas hominis forma est, non quae sit, sed qua sit homo.* To this corresponds the accusation against Gilbert formulated at the Council of Rheims:

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[20] PL 185,595A.

[21] *Ep. ad H.*, n. 4; PL 185,589D.

[22] PL 185.590A.

[23] *Gesta Frid.* I, 56; MGH, SS XX, 382.

[24] *Op. cit.*, p. 382 f. That the problems were logical rather than theological is well illustrated by Gerhoh, *Lib. de novitatibus*, c. 12; ed. Thatcher, p. 205: Est quidem veritas in propositione qua dicitur "deus est Pater", sed est inconsequentia in locutione. Inconsequentia tamen locutionum non aufert veritatem dictorum. It was, however, Gilbert's constant endeavour to avoid, if possible, an *inconsequentia in locutione.* According to the *Liber de vera philosophia* (P. Fournier, *Etudes sur Joachim de Flore* [Paris, 1909], p. 62), the axiom *Quicquid est in Deo, Deus est* was debated at Rheims and denied by Gilbert. One of Gilbert's admirers, Adhemar of St. Ruf (Valence), spent some 30 years studying the Latin and Greek sources available in France, Spain, Italy and even Greece, to discover the author of the axiom which he considered to be the *causa et origo fere omnium novitatum, e quibus videbatur heresis Sabelliana procul dubio resuscitari* (Cited by Fr. Pelster, *art. cit.*, 118). Attributed to various patristic authorities, it was apparently first formulated in the school of Anselm of Laon. Cf. *Sent. div. paginae;* ed. F. Bliemetzrieder, *Beiträge* 18 (1919), 5. The author of the *Sent. divinitatis*, Tr. IV; ed. B. Geyer, *Beiträge* 7 (1909), 160*, discusses it at length in connection with the divine *proprietates*, but it is not mentioned in Gilbert's commentaries.

[25] MGH, SS XX, 384. To the contrary, Gilbert quoted a text from Theodoret.

[26] For the same reason, St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* VII, 6, 11; PL 41,943 teaches: Non enim aliud est Deo esse, aliud personam esse. In stating that the distinction does not signify a *hoc et hoc* in God, Gilbert denied a real distinction between (divine) nature and person.

[27] *Serm. in Cant. LXXX*, 6; PL 183,1169C. St. Bernard rarely mentions Gilbert by name, but his readers could hardly help thinking of Gilbert.

[28] Geoffrey, *Ep. ad H.*, n. 2; PL 185,588C. A Parisian master of theology turned to Hildegard of Bingen: Plurimi contendunt quod paternitas et divinitas Deus non sit. After being taught "in a true vision", Hildegard replied cryptically: "Whoever affirms it, names the point without the circle." *Ep. CXXVII;* PL 197,352B.

[29] *Libellus*, n. 6; PL 185,597C.

> Quod divina natura, quae divinitas dicitur, Deus non sit, sed forma qua Deus est, quemadmodum humanitas homo non est, sed forma qua homo est.[30]

The weight of this accusation lies in the comparison of *divinitas* and *humanitas* and the question could be raised whether the comparison was made in this form by Gilbert himself or whether it resulted from his exposition of doctrine at the Council. The available records of the trial suggest that the debate centred on the first part, though it is quite possible that, in expounding his view, Gilbert proceeded from the created form to the divine form. Even if the comparison was made by Gilbert in such a brief form, the meaning depends on its interpretation and explanation for which Gilbert's doctrine on the *id quo* and *quod* as applied to Creator and creature is the only legitimate background. Since, as we have seen, "theological science" does not completely exclude the approach to its object, *viz.* God, by way of mathematical abstraction to study the various divine names and attributes separately, both sentences convey the idea that, *as mathematical abstractions* made by mental separation, the *id quo* and *quod* or *forma qua* and *quae* are distinct in the sense that, at least in the mind, one is not the other, even if they are completely identical in reality. On principle, there is no difference whether Gilbert speaks of *forma qua, bonitas qua, aeternitas qua, unitas qua, Trinitas qua* or any other divine attribute presented by him as *id quo,* unless it can be shown that *forma qua* means a *real* distinction, while any other *id quo* does not mean such a distinction in God. If *both* sentences are understood to reflect two distinct realities one of which is a *forma qua* and not God or man, respectively, whereas the second is a *forma quae* and God or man, respectively, the comparison confuses Creator and creature or the object of theology and philosophy and is not in accordance with Gilbert's teaching. He states clearly that the *id quo* defined as distinct cause of the *id quod* is only understood *de rebus creatis* and, at the same time he often affirms that, in transferring such terminology to God, a certain *rationis proportio* must be kept in mind. In contemplating God, the *id quod* itself or *substantia quae,* the human mind does not cease the natural process of reasoning, though it must remain fully aware that its object is God, not a created, composite being. In approaching this object by a "mathematical method" Gilbert progresses from the *forma quae* to the *forma qua* or from the divine *id quod* to the *id quo* of any divine attribute. He never describes the *id quo* as the cause of, or distinct from, the divine *id quod.*

In fact, he tried every conceivable device to safeguard the divine simplicity: *In theologicis . . . multis nominibus et diversis modis idem significamus.*[31] But he was always anxious to avoid confusion of abstract and concrete terms in any science. Their use was to be regulated according to the principle that abstract terms such as *divinitas, humanitas, veritas, etc.,* primarily express an *id quo.* To state *Pater est veritas,* as Boethius had done,[32] was as inaccurate in Gilbert's eyes as to say: *Pater est paternitas.* Consequently, adjusting Boethius to his own system of thought, he wrote: *Pater veritas, i.e. verus est.*[33] St. Bernard, who could have cited many patristic texts to support Boethius, called this comment "obscure and perverse",[34] but his suggestion that Gilbert should have said: *Pater est verus, i.e. veritas* would have equally failed to satisfy the Bishop of Poitiers who would have said: *Pater est verus veritate,* not, for instance, *verus bonitate* or by any other divine attribute. He would not have agreed with his admirer, Otto of Freising, who approved the proposition: *(Deus) est sapientia bonus,*

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[30] Mansi XXI, 711.

[31] *De Pr.;* 1306B.

[32] *De Pr.;* 1301B or ed. Stewart-Rand, p. 34.

[33] *De Pr.;* 1307C.

[34] *Sermo in Cant. LXXX,* 8; PL 183,1170B. The verdict is repeated by Gerhoh, *Lib. de novitatibus,* c. 21; ed. Thatcher p. 217. The *Chronicle of St. Blase,* c. 4; MGH, SS XX, 305, generalizes as follows: Que expositio Pape ceterisque episcopis perversa visa est, but it was written after 1209

bonitate sapiens.[35] The fact that a terminology was traditional did not deter Gilbert from moulding it into his pattern of thought[36] and the sentence *Divinitate est Deus,* condemned by St. Bernard,[37] fits well into this logical pattern. If, however, the use of the ablative *(divinitate)* is objectionable in Gilbert's writings, it is hardly less objectionable in the *Profession of Faith* drawn up by St. Bernard and Geoffrey of Auxerre,[38] where we read: Si vero dicitur . . . divinitate Deum esse et alia hujusmodi, credimus . . . nonnisi ea divinitate (esse) Deum, quae ipse est.

If it is right to say that God is God "by that divinity which is God himself", it would seem equally lawful to say: *Divinitate est Deus.* In both cases, the ablative expresses an *id quo* and its orthodoxy is no more questionable than that of Peter Lombard who writes: *Essentia* (ablative) *Deus est et deitate substantia est.*[39] When Pope Eugenius defined that *essentia,* predicated of God, is not to be used *only* in the ablative but also in the nominative case,[40] he sided with Gilbert and defined on principle that *forma, divinitas, substantia,* predicated of God, could likewise be used in the ablative case, though not exclusively. Gilbert's writings do not conflict with this decision.

Had Gilbert been more anxious to cite patristic texts confirming his comments on Boethius, he could have corroborated his position by excellent authority. Even St. Augustine speaks of substance *qua Deus est*[41] or of the divine *essentia* by which (*qua*) the Son is whatever He is.[42] He teaches that the Father's substance is the Father Himself, not *quo Pater est, sed quo est.*[43] In other words, according to St. Augustine, the divine substance is the *quo est* of the Father as substance, but not the *quo est* of the Father as Father. He goes so far as to refer to the divine *id quo* as *causa*[44] without ever incurring the suspicion of heresy. Gilbert's adversaries who compiled many Augustinian passages against him[45] did not make mention of these and similar texts.[46] We learn from Otto that Magister Johelinus of Sens rose indignantly against such "profane novelty" when Gilbert made the statement: *Audacter confiteor Patrem alio esse Patrem, alio esse Deum, nec tamen esse hoc et hoc*[47] to which no doubt corresponds the Augustinian *non quo Pater est, sed quo est.* It must be admitted that Gilbert's *alio . . . alio* could be considered a profane novelty in the sense that it could imply an *aliud et aliud* in God, though it actually means that the Father as God has another *quo* than the Father as Father. Johelinus who objected knew his Augustine better than Otto of Freising who cites an Augustinian text with the caustic remark that *magister* Johelinus had not read or perhaps not understood it. As a matter of fact, Otto's "quotation" is false and means the very opposite in the original.[48] Indeed, Augustine recognized no *aliud et aliud* in God[49] and Johelinus' criticism was undoubtedly based on the assumption that *aliud et aliud* designates a distinction of substance and, in this particular case, between the divine Persons and God's substance. Yet, to counteract the accusation of teaching a quaternity in God, Gilbert had wisely added: *nec tamen esse hoc et hoc* which meant that *alio* and *alio* must not be interpreted as a division of substance.

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[35] *Gesta Frid.* I, 53; MGH, SS XX, 381.

[36] Concerning the sentence *divinitas inesse Patri* which might evoke the idea of inherence, see *De Tr.;* 1274B. Gilbert found similar difficulties in the traditional christological terminology, discussed in *C. Eut.;* 1388C. Cf. Geoffrey, *Libellus,* n. 7; PL 185,598B.

[37] *Serm. in Cant. LXXX,* 6; PL 183,1169C. The anonymous author of a commentary on Boethius, *De Trinitate;* ed. J. M. Parent, *La doctrine de la création dans l'école de Chartres* (Paris, 1938), p. 202, warns against "the poison of some *imperiti* who teach *Deus est a deitate Deus.*" Ps-Bede (PL 95,403D), on the other hand, affirms that, according to the Council of Rheims, *Deus est a deitate* must be taken "intransitively".

[38] PL 185,617B. John of Salisbury, *Hist. Pontif.*, c. 11; ed. Poole, p. 25 Otto of Freising, *Gesta Frid.* I, 56; MGH, SS XX, 383.

[39] *Sent.* I, d. 33, c. 2; ed. Quaracchi I (1916), p. 211.

[40] Otto of Freising, *Gesta Frid.* I, 57; MGH, SS XX, 384. John of Salisbury, *Hist. Pontif.*, c. 11; ed. Poole, p. 25.

[41] *De Trinitate* V, 8, 9; PL 42,817.

[42] *De Trinitate* VII, 1, 2; PL 42,934: Qua essentia (Filius) est quidquid est.

[43] *De Trinitate* VII, 6, 11; PL 42,943: Ut substantia Patris ipse Pater est, non quo Pater est, sed quo est, ita et persona Patris non aliud quam ipse Pater est. The text is quoted by Lombard, *Sent.* I, d. 23, c. 1; *ed. cit.*, p. 147. See also Alcuin, *De Fide s. Trinitatis* I, 3; PL 101,16AB.

[44] *De Trinitate* VII, 1, 2; PL 42,935: Quid enim aliud dicimus, cum dicimus "Hoc est illi esse quod sapere" nisi "eo est quo sapiens est"? Quapropter quae causa illi est ut sapiens sit, ipsa illi causa est ut sit.

[45] See Geoffrey, *Libellus;* PL 185,599 ff.

[46] Before the Council of Rheims, Lombard, *In Ps.* LXVIII, 2; PL 191,627B wrote: Itaque eo quo vel quod Deus est substantia est.

[47] *Gesta Frid.* I, 52; MGH, SS XX, 379.

No doubt, the problems of terminology were enormous. *Ineffabilia fari cupimus,* —says St. Augustine with disarming candour.[50] But if, for instance, Father and Son in the Trinity are *alius* et *alius* or as Persons *alia* et *alia,* Gilbert felt justified in expressing their *id quo* by *alio.*

St. Augustine's use of *substantia* or *essentia qua, id quo* or even *causa* has never been citicized as detrimental to the absolute simplicity of God and the critics do not tell us that Gilbert was no less anxious to insist: *In theologicis . . . multis nominibus et diversis modis* IDEM *significamus.*[51] He should be believed when he observes: *Dei vero essentia omnino simplex est,* for there is hardly a more accurate way to state God's absolute simplicity.[52] In this sentence, *essentia* is obviously used in the nominative case. Gilbert speaks of God's *essentia qua* in the same fashion: *Neque enim ea, qua ipse est essentia . . . potest esse non simplex.*[53] If we take *essentia qua* and *quae* as two distinct *res* one of which is not God, the conclusion can rightly be made that, despite his insistence on the absolute simplicity of each distinct *essentia,* Gilbert taught a composite *id quod* in God. If this supposition is right, *God* himself is indeed no longer *omnino simplex.* But Gilbert states the very opposite: *Deus vero omnino simplex est.*[54] There is no cause prior or superior to God's *essentia quae.* To quote Gilbert's own words: *Deus qui non habet prae se alterius quam,* QUAE *ipse est, essentiae causam . . .*[55] He maintains, therefore, that the divine *id quo* and *quod* is fully expressed when a substance is said to be God, though a great deal is left to be said when a substance is affirmed to be man.[56] Yet Gilbert knew that a great deal was said and still left to be said about God, but the question was how to say it *salva Dei simplicitate.*[57] He does not just say: *salva essentiae simplicitate.* It was, of course, impossible to coin an entirely new theological vocabulary: *Non est tanta dictionum copia.*[58] For this reason, Gilbert agreed with Boethius that, if properly explained, we can speak in God in terms of the ten categories[59] as had been done in the past and that by approved writers.[60] From St. Augustine to the present day, it has not been questioned that man cannot speak about God *nisi per modum compositorum,* as St. Thomas expresses it.[61] Gilbert was no exception to this rule. If, as A. Hayen, a recent critic of Gilbert's doctrine, maintains,

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[48] Compare Otto of Freising, *op. cit.*, p. 379: Sic aliud est Deo esse, aliud subsistere . . . with Augustine, *De Trinitate* VII, 4, 9; PL 42,943: Si autem aliud est Deo esse. Abelard, *Theologia 'Summi Boni'* II, 5; ed. H. Ostlender, *Beiträge* 35 (1939), 63 also reads: Sic aliud est Deo esse. . . Cf. *Theol. christiana* III; PL 178,1243D. Without consulting St. Augustine, A. Berthaud, *Gilbert de la Porrée*, p. 275 agrees with Otto.

[49] *De Trinitate* VII, 6, 11; PL 42,943: Non enim aliud est Deo esse, aliud personam esse. *Ibid.*, VII, 1, 1; PL 42,933: Non aliud illi est esse, aliud Deum esse. *Ibid.*, V, 8, 9; PL 42,917: Non aliud est Deo esse et aliud magnum esse. Cf. Gilbert, *De Tr.;* 1285B: Eodem est magnus quo Deus.

[50] *De Trinitate* VII, 1, 2; PL 42,934.

[51] *De Pr.;* 1306B.

[52] *C. Eut.;* 1368A.

[53] *De Tr.;* 1268B.

[54] *De Hb.;* 1320C.

[55] *C. Eut.;* 1377C.

[56] *De Tr.;* 1284D: Ille vero, de quo dicitur "est Deus", est perfecte hoc ipsum quod dicitur, scilicet Deus, i.e., nihil prorsus QUO ipse sit de ipso adhuc dicendum relinquit.

[57] *De Pr.;* 1303A.

[58] *De Tr.;* 1283C.

[59] *De Tr.;* 1281A.

[60] *De Pr.;* 1303B. Cf. Augustine, *De Trinitate* V, 10, 11; PL 42,918. Alcuin, *De Fide s. Trinitatis* I, 15; PL 101,22C. Although William of Thierry, *Aenigma Fidei;* PL 180, 418AB describes them as aliena a natura fidei and entirely unworthy of things divine, he concedes: Ratio tamen fidei . . . assumit ea sibi et conformando singula suis regulis et coaptando in obsequium fidei ac servitutem captivatum quodammodo redigit eorum intellectum.

[61] *S. Theol.* I, qu. 3, a. 3, ad 6.

Gilbert's distinction of *id quo* and *quod* in God proves that he taught a real distinction between *Deus* and *divinitas*,[62] the divine attributes would logically deserve the same classification in Gilbert's theology. The divine *sapientia qua, potentia qua, veritas qua, justitia quà*, to mention only a few, would prove an incredible multiplicity of distinct forms in God.[63] But they are each *diversum quidem nomine*, IDEM *vero re*, not excluding the *divinitas*.[64] Even if we believe that Gilbert is "only a *dialecticien réaliste*" as Hayen[65] calls him, it is entirely false to assert with the same critic that Gilbert's *id quo* as distinct from the *id quod* is a *propriété transcendentale de l'être*.[66] After discussing the various types of composition, including the union of *id quo* and *quod*, Gilbert declares emphatically: *Sed haec omnia nonnisi de rebus creatis intelligi volumus*.[67] It does, therefore, not apply in the same sense to Creature and creature. It is only transcendental within the categories of *created* being in the sense that it is not restricted to any particular category.

According to Gilbert, we do not and cannot know what God is,[68] but he considers it the theologian's task to speculate on the various divine attributes and names, including those of the Holy Trinity, and to express his thoughts logically and in terms of categories, as the *dialectici* call the predicaments, or in terms of qualities, as the grammarians call them.[69] The divine attributes are not all synonymous and, despite his firm belief in the absolute simplicity of God, Gilbert holds that it is childish to see no difference whatsoever in attributes such as *Deus, unus, aeternus, persona, principium, auctor, Pater, Filius, Connexio* (Holy Ghost).[70]

In returning to the alleged "root of all evil" in Gilbert's theology, we can now legitimately conclude that his differentiation between God and divinity is basically one of grammar, formally "one of logic and not of metaphysics".[71] It now remains to be shown that Gilbert's assertion: *In theologicis . . . multis nominibus et diversis modis* IDEM *significamus* is also true of the trinitarian *id quod* or substance.

III. THE TRINITARIAN MYSTERY

It has been pointed out that, according to St. Augustine, the divine substance is the *quo est* of the Father as substance, but not the *quo est* of the Father as Father.[1] Aiming at the same distinction, Gilbert declared "boldly", though perhaps with less skill than St. Augustine: *Patrem alio esse Patrem, alio esse Deum*. Realizing that it could be misinterpreted as a distinction of substance, he added: *Nec tamen esse hoc et hoc*.[2] He also caused a great commotion when, in the discussion on the trinitarian Persons, he made the remark: *Omnis persona*

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[62] A. Hayen, 'Le Concile de Reims et l'erreur théologique de Gilbert de la Porrée', *Arch. d'hist. doctr. et litt.* 10-11 (1935-36), 56 ff. Without acknowledging it, M. Bergeron, 'La structure du concept latin de personne', *Et. d'hist. litt. et doctr.* (Paris, 1932), p. 142 follows Th. De Régnon, *op. cit.*, p. 97 ff., in deriving Gilbert's theological doctrine from the Boethian principle: Diversum est esse et id quod est, though both authors could have learned from *De Hb.;* 1320B that the principle does not apply to God. While Th. De Régnon, *op. cit.*, p. 108, ends with words of cautious restraint copied (without acknowledgement) from D. Petavius, *De Deo* I, 8, 7; ed. Paris I (1865), 128, Bergeron (p. 147) accuses Gilbert of tritheism.

[63] Cf. St. Bernard, *Serm. in Cant. LXXX*, 6; PL 183,1169C.

[64] *De Pr.;* 1310C.

[65] *Ibid.*, p. 74.

[66] *Ibid.*, p. 74.

[67] *C. Eut.;* 1381D.

[68] *De Hb.;* 1320C.

[69] *De Pr.;* 1303C.

[70] *De Pr.;* 1301D-1302D. Cf. *De Hb.;* 1320C and St. Thomas, *S. Theol.* I, qu. 12, a. 4.

[71] R. Seeberg, *Lehrb. der Dogmengesch.* III (Leipzig, 1930), p. 257. J. C. Sikes, *Peter Abailard* (Cambridge, 1932), p. 147. With many other writers, K. Barth, *Die kirchl. Dogmatik* II, 1 (Zurich, 1946) p. 372 f. still accuses Gilbert of teaching a real distinction between God and his *divinitas*.

[1] *De Trinitate* VII, 1, 2; PL 42,935.

[2] Otto of Freising, *Gesta Frid.* I, 52; MGH, SS XX, 379.

est per se una.[3] This definition was hardly unknown to his audience, but its application to the trinitarian Persons aroused indignation. That Father, Son and Holy Ghost were truly called "three Persons" was, of course, an accepted dogma of faith. Much less certain, however, was the definition of person in general, and of the trinitarian Persons, in particular.

According to Abelard, the trinitarian *nomen* of person is not found anywhere else[4] and he wisely abstained from a definition. In grammar, its use was well known[5] and, long before Abelard, Remigius of Auxerre had pointed out to the grammar students its derivation from the custom of using masks on the stage: *Persona dicitur eo quod per se sonat.*[6] From Boethius he had also gathered that, with regard to its "substance", a person is *individua unius rei representatio.*[7] To understand the disagreements concerning the definition of person which appear in the Carolingian period, it may be noted that theology had inherited a compromise made by St. Augustine who taught that the word "person" is an absolute divine attribute such as *Deus, magnus, bonus* and, accordingly, wrote: *Ad se quippe dicitur persona.*[8] At the same time, he compromised and followed the commonly accepted usage of previous writers "worthy of authority" who had not found a more suitable word to express the dogma of the Trinity.[9] To enable the faithful to avoid giving a wrong answer to the inquiry: *Quid tres?*, St. Augustine sanctioned the ecclesiastical usage adopting an absolute term to express a relative divine attribute.[10] In the ninth century, Godescalc of Orbais cited the Boethian definition in his *Opusculum de rebus grammaticis*[11] but avoided the direct use of it in his *De trina Deitate.*[12] Instead, he described person as *per se una*[13] which Hincmar of Rheims rejected as false[14] because it allegedly overstresses the idea of individual substance (*per se stare*) and number.[15] With a slight but important omission Hincmar quotes Augustine as follows: *Nam esse ad se dicitur, persona vero relative*[16] but his quotations suggest that he was aware of a twofold usage without openly admitting it.

While theologians warned against overstressing person as *per se una* in the Trinity, they could not stress it enough in defining the personal unity in the two natures of Christ. For his reason, Abelard defines the person of Christ as *quasi per se una,*[17] though he was familiar with the Boethian and other definitions.[18]

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[3] *Ibid.*, p. 380.

[4] *Theol. christ.* III; PL 178,1231B.

[5] *Op. cit.;* PL 178.1257D and 1067C. Cf. Priscian, *Inst. Gramm.* XVII, 71 ff.; ed. M. Hertz in H. Keil, *Gramm. Latini* III (Leipzig, 1859), p. 149 ff. Donatus, *Ars Grammatica; ed. cit.* IV (Leipzig, 1864), p. 384.

[6] *In Artem Donati Minorem commentum;* ed. W. Fox (Leipzig, 1902), p. 33. Cf. *Sent.* III, d. 10, c. 1; ed. Quaracchi II (1916), p. 594.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 33. Although the Boethian definition differs, Remigius was not ignorant of it, for his "stage definition" evidently dates back to Boethius, *Contra Eutychen,* c. 3; ed. Stewart-Rand, p. 84. Cf. D. M. Cappuyns, 'Le plus ancien commentaire des *"Opuscula Sacra"* et son origine', *Rech. de théol. anc. et méd.* 3 (1931), 268. M. H. Marshall, 'Boethius' Definition of *Persona* and Mediaeval Understanding of the Roman Theater', *Speculum* 25 (1950), 471-482.

[8] *De Trinitate* VII, 6, II; PL 42,943. Cf. *Sent.* I, d. 23, c. 1 and *Summa theol.* I, qu. 29, a. 4.

[9] *De Trinitate* V, 9, 10; PL 42,918: Cum alium modum aptiorem non invenirent, quod sine verbis intelligebant. . . Dictum est tamen "tres personae", non ut illud diceretur, sed ne taceretur. Cf. *Sent.* I, d. 23, c. 1; *ed. cit.*, p. 148.

[10] *De Trinitate* VII, 6, 11; PL 42,943.

[11] *Opusc.* I, 33; ed. D. C. Lambot (Louvain, 1945), p. 383.

[12] For many centuries, the theologians hesitated to apply the Boethian definition to the trinitarian persons. How ambiguous such an application could be may be gathered from Gerhoh of Reichersberg, *Lib. de novitatibus hujus temporis,* c. 12; ed. O. J. Thatcher (Chicago, 1903), p. 204: Tres divine sunt persone, quarum quisque substantia rationalis est. The rather unfortunate influence of the Boethian definition upon early mediaeval christology will be discussed in the following chapter of this article.

[13] Ed. Lambot, p. 82. Cf. *Glossaria Lat.* I (Paris, 1926), p. 439: Persona eo quod per se una est (Glossarium Ansileubi).

[14] *De Una et non trina deitate,* c. 15; PL 125,580B, 584CD, 585A, 586A.

[15] PL 125,581A, 586A, 587C.

[16] PL 125,586B. St. Augustine wrote: Nam SI esse ad se dicitur, persona vero relative. . .

[17] *In Symb. Athanasii* and *Expositio Symboli;* PL 178,631A and 624C. The definition

Apparently in dependence on an Augustinian text in the *Sic et Non,*[19] the Abelardian *Ysagoge* and the *Summa Sententiarum* place a heavy stress on person as absolute attribute and then describe it as the only divine *nomen* that, *if used in the plural,* signifies relations.[20]

Gilbert's definition of person as *per se una* was, therefore, novel and discredited in its application to the Trinity. However, his very opponent, the author of an anonymous *Commentary on Boethius' De Trinitate* proposes the definition of person as *quasi per se una* after an unsuccessful attempt to explain *"Augustinus: Persona dicitur a se"*.[21] Closer to St. Augustine is the author's affirmation that *alia et alia persona* is a *nomen negationis* in the sense that, for instance, the person of the Father is not the person of the Son.[22] The words *alio* used by Gilbert offended his audience precisely because he expressed in positive terms what was best expressed by a negation. He was obviously anxious to uphold that the *id quo* of the Father as Father must not be confused with the *id quo* of the Father as substance. Confusion would lead either to the *Deus triformis* of tritheism or to the error of Sabellianism. His audience knew well that he intended to reject the notion of a substance distinct from the Three Persons when he added: *Nec tamen esse hoc et hoc.*

Gilbert's own exposition of person as *per se una* begins *in naturalibus*[23] where it is based on the distinct and individual *id quo* of a rational substance. Since the trinitarian Persons have no such distinct substantial *id quo,* he concludes that the word "person" does not apply to Them "in its fullness" but only in part and "in proportion".[24] The part that does not apply is found in Their one substantial *id quo*:

> Quod enim de naturalibus dictum est personam ita esse per se unam, ut nullo illorum quibus est ipsa sit alia, non convenit theologicis personis. Immo eodem, quo est una, est alia.[25]

Geoffrey's assertion that Gilbert taught the divine form to be the "deifying nature and mother of the Trinity" really reveals a "monstrous picture",[26] though it was not painted by Gilbert. While the latter laboured hard to penetrate the mystery regarding the relationship between the divine substance and the trinitarian Persons, Geoffrey abstained from an exposition with the candid confession: "This discussion is beyond me." To say the least, Geoffrey's simplified version of Gilbert's doctrine does not reflect the depth of Gilbert's thought.[27] After citing a rather obscure text from Gilbert's work on Boethius' *De Praedicatione,*[28] Geoffrey asserts: "From this divine substance the personal *proprietates* are, as he (Gilbert) affirms, numerically so distinct that the divine substance is one *unum* and each proprietas another *unum*".[29] "Elsewhere, he (*i.e.* Gilbert) called them *res oppositas* and denied that one God is three Persons".[30] He (Gilbert)

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is found in the Glossary of Placidus. Cf. *Summa theol.* I, qu. 29, a. 4.

[18] Cf. *Theol. christ.* III; PL 178,1257D-1258D. William of Thierry, *Aenigma Fidei;* PL 180,413B notes a definition of person as *cujus pro sui forma certa fit agnitio* which occurs also in the anonymous *De Diversitate nature et persone* and is cited by J. de Ghellinck, 'L'histoire de persona', *Rev. néosc. de phil.* 36 (1934), 115.

[19] Augustine, *De Trinitate* VII, 6, 11; PL 42,943. *Sic et Non*, c. 8; PL 178,1364A.

[20] *Ysagoge* III; ed. A. Landgraf, p. 261. *Summa Sent.* I, 9; PL 176,55D. *Sent. Divinitatis;* ed. Geyer, 167*. *Comm. in Librum Boethii De Trinitate;* PL 95,403AB.

[21] PL 95,402D-403A.

[22] PL 95,404B.

[23] *De Tr.;* 1294D-1295B.

[24] *De Tr.;* 1295C and 1294A.

[25] *De Tr.;* 1295C. M. Bergeron, *art. cit.*, p. 147, speaks of la réalisme de Gilbert, qui l'a conduit au trithéisme, par référence à sa notion de la personne *"res per se una"*. Whatever may be said of Gilbert's realism in philosophy, the adoption of a somehow controversial definition in his trinitarian discussion does not justify an accusation of tritheism. Even Gilbert's anonymous critic, as we have seen, adopted it without incurring a suspicion of error.

[26] *Libellus*, n. 26; PL 185,604A.

[27] *Libellus*, n. 40; PL 185,609A.

[28] *De Pr.;* 1303B.

[29] *Libellus*, n. 41 f.; PL 185,609CD.

[30] *Libellus*, n. 43; PL 185,610A: Unum Deum

contradicts Boethius who teaches that in God there is no number, nothing except his *id quod est.*[31] The Catholic faith accepts neither *proprietates affixas* nor *infixas* nor any *res medias* between substance and accidents.[32] Gilbert, we are told by Geoffrey, teaches a quaternity rather than a Trinity and with his three *unitates* he arrives at a *trifaria Trinitas* of persons, *proprietates* and *unitates,* while we know only a Trinity of persons.[33]

If Geoffrey had not searched for "a gloss more obscure than the text", as he characterizes Gilbert's entire commentary,[34] he could have mentioned that his *proprietatum magister*[35] set out "like a sophist" to discuss the question how the divine attributes are predicated *de his qui sunt unus Deus.*[36] In order to decide if Father, Son and Holy Ghost are predicated *substantialiter* "or in some other way", Gilbert follows the example of Boethius and lays down "the firm foundation of the Catholic faith": He who is called Father is truly a substance; He who is called Son is truly a substance and He who is called Holy Ghost is truly a substance. According to the same faith, They are not three essences but one single substance. Therefore, one single essence or substance is predicated of Them both individually and collectively speaking.[37] *How* is this substance *predicated* of the trinitarian Persons: *substantialiter* or in some other way? Before discussing it, Gilbert insists that the divine essence is not composite, no *diversorum unio* of any kind, for there is no *Deus triformis,* as some heretics have taught.[38] The divine essence is

> una simpliciter qua illi tres sunt unum et simplex et omnino id quod sunt. Illa autem de tribus communiter et divisim et collectim—sicut dictum est—praedicatur.[39]

Of this divine substance or essence certain attributes are predicated *substantialiter* and are common to all three Persons, *viz. divinitas, veritas, bonitas* etc. Thus *deitas,* which is predicated *substantialiter,* is predicated *et divisim de singulis et collectim de tribus.*[40] Hence we can say that Father, Son and Holy Ghost *is* and *are* one *veritas, i.e. unus verus.*[41] Other attributes are taken from the categories of quality and quantity which are not in God what they are called. We call God great, as if He were great by quantity, or we call Him just, as if He were just by quality, yet His greatness and justice are identical with His substance: *eodem est magnus quo Deus* and *eodem quo est Deus est justus.*[42] We even speak of God in terms of extrinsic categories expressing a comparison between God and something else. Applying the category of time we say that God is always, or using the category of place we say that God is everywhere. These categories do not enter the essential constitution of a thing

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tres esse personas negabat. The same accusation is made in *Comm. in Lib. Boethii De Trinitate;* PL 95,393C with the modification *ex parte subjecti.* This apparently means that those *ignominiosi* who were led by Gilbert did not admit the sentence: Unus Deus est tres personae, yet conceded the sentence: Tres personae sunt unus Deus. Referring to *quidam veritatis adversarii,* Lombard confirms that such a (grammatical) distinction was taught, though he does not mention Gilbert. *Sent.* I, d. 4, c. 2; *ed. cit.,* p. 40.

[31] *Libellus,* n. 43; PL 185,610B.

[32] *Libellus,* n. 44 and n. 46; PL 185,610D and 611B.

[33] *Libellus,* n. 46 f.; PL 185,611B-612C.

[34] *Libellus,* n. 43; PL 185,609D.

[35] *Libellus,* n. 46; PL 185,611B.

[36] *De Pr.;* 1303D.

[37] *De Pr.;* 1304D-1305A.

[38] *De Pr.;* 1205AD. While, as we have seen, modern writers accuse Gilbert of tritheism, Gerhoh of Reichersberg implies that Gilbert taught the very opposite, *viz.,* semi-Sabellianism. Some contemporaries, he observes, preach God's singular essence and often use magister Gilbert's expression *singularitas.* Yet, to avoid full-fledged Sabellianism, they call the *proprietates* of the persons *forinsecus affixas* and do not concede that they are God. Gerhoh then quotes Gilbert, *De Tr.;* 1295D-1296A. Cf. *Lib. de nov. hujus temporis,* c. 13; ed. Thatcher, p. 205 f.

[39] *De Pr.;* 1306A.

[40] *De Pr.;* 1307C. Cf. *Sent.* I, d. 22, c. 1 ff.; *ed. cit.,* p. 144.

[41] *De Pr.;* 1307C.

[42] *De Tr.;* 1283C.

and applied to God are not predicated as the previous categories are predicated.[43] God is everywhere, but not *ut in loco;* He is always, though without succession of time.[44] The Trinity did not begin to be a *principium,* but It began to act (creation). Applied to God or the Trinity, *principalitas* and *actio* are thus predicated as *extrinsecus affixa predicamenta* in reference to creatures. *Principium* is therefore predicated of God *aeternaliter, actio* with reference to time but they are not *predicated substantialiter.*[45] Yet, in different ways, all these and similar attributes are truly predicated of the divine substance and of the Three Persons both individually and collectively speaking. However, certain divine attributes are not interchangeable among the Persons. Not even in the natural order can *generatio, nativitas* and *connexio* be predicated of one and the same person.[46] Accordingly, the personal names Father, Son and Holy Ghost cannot be transferred from one to another. Used individually, they are certainly not predicated *substantialiter,* for if the word Father were a *nomen substantiale* such as *deitas* and *veritas* it would be *predicable* of all three Persons. Therefore, the *res* which is predicated by the word Father is not the substance of Him of Whom it is predicated: *res quae hoc nomine praedicatur non est ejus de quo praedicatur substantia.*[47] Boethius had rightly concluded that each Person is predicated *ad aliquid* and, as a consequence, not even the word *Trinitas* is predicated of God *substantialiter.*[48] Just as *paternitas, filiatio* and *connexio,* predicated of Father, Son and Holy Ghost, are distinct (*diversa*), their individual *unitas* is distinct and is predicated as such, but not *substantialiter.*[49] The Three Persons are one God by the *unitas* of Their divinity or essence, in which case *unitas* is predicated as "the companion" of the divinity. Hence they are three and one.[50] True plurality of persons, however, is based on a distinct *id quo* and, for that reason, the trinitarian number is not a number in the ordinary sense: *Non enim vere sunt tres.*[51] The divine Persons are at once *sine numero unus* and *proprietatibus plures numero.*[52] They are one God: *Hi tres, quibusdam proprietatibus a se invicem diversi, sunt singulariter et simpliciter unus Deus.*[53]

In view of their common essence, Boethius writes that Father, Son and Holy Ghost *is* the same God but, grammatically speaking, so Gilbert tells us, he should have said that Father, Son and Holy Ghost are the same God in view of the fact that They are *relationum diversitate plures.*[54]

The three Persons differ only by relations which make Them "related"[55] for, as Boethius puts it, *relatio multiplicat Trinitatem.*[56] To be more accurate, They differ only by "dividing relations" for dividing relations alone are predicated in the singular and separately of each Person. The relations are dividing in as far as they are opposed and as *relations* they are *predicated* according to an extrinsic category. Since division and distinction cannot be attributed to the divine substance Gilbert concludes: *Theologicae personae . . . extrinsecus affixarum rerum oppositione a se invicem aliae et probantur et sunt.*[57]

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[43] *De Tr.;* 1285C-1289B.

[44] *Ibidem.* Gerhoh, *op. cit.,* c. 42; ed. Thatcher, p. 233 f., severely criticizes Gilbert's use or preference of *mora* to designate the divine eternity.

[45] *De Pr.;* 1307A. Discussing such attributes as *Creator, Dominus, principium,* William of Thierry, *Aenigma Fidei;* PL 185,424A professes: Difficili intellectu est, quomodo accidens non sit.

[46] *De Tr.;* 1295CD.

[47] *De Pr.;* 1309B. Cf. *Sent.* I, d. 22, c. 4; *ed. cit.,* p. 145: Quae autem relative dicuntur, substantialiter non dicuntur.

[48] *De Pr.;* 1302A and 1309C.

[49] *De Pr.;* 1309B.

[50] *De Pr.;* 1309D.

[51] *De Tr.;* 1275D.

[52] *De Tr.;* 1281AC.

[53] *De Tr.;* 1278B.

[54] *De Tr.;* 1298C, 1280B, and *De Pr.;* 1307C.

[55] *De Tr.;* 1296D, 1282A.

[56] *De Tr.;* 1255A, 1298B.

[57] *De Tr.;* 1295D-1296A. The idea that only opposite relations constitute persons was first expressed by St. Anselm, *Monologium,* c. 43; ed. F. S. Schmitt, *Flor. patr.,* fasc. 20 (Bonn, 1929), p. 44: Sic sunt oppositi (Pater et Filius), ut alter numquam suscipiat proprium alterius.

This conclusion was bound to cause suspicion and, deprived of its context, could lead to misconceptions. Gilbert's adversaries were not anxious to cite his immediately following remark that in theology the name and number of persons is *tam ineffabile verbis quam incomprehensibile ratione.*[58] We have seen how firmly Gilbert held that the three divine Persons are one God and that the same divine substance is predicated of each and every Person individually and collectively. The precise question was: *how* is this one divine substance predicated? If it is predicated *substantialiter* of each Person, the Trinity is divided into three substances. Boethius, whom Geoffrey cites as orthodox authority, had taught that the trinitarian Persons differ *sola relatione,* that They are not predicated *substantialiter,* and that "Trinity does not belong to substance".[59] By saying that They are predicated *ad aliquid,* Boethius had clearly indicated the category required to form a concept of the Trinity. His conclusion had never appeared offensive. On the contrary, Gilbert's adversary, Geoffrey, quotes Boethius: *Ex his intelligimus Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum* non de ipsa divinitate *substantialiter dici, sed alio quodam modo.*[60] Geoffrey considers it repulsive to Catholic ears that Gilbert should describe the Persons as *relationum subjecta* conflicting with Augustine's doctrine: *quidquid in ea* (i.e. the divine substance) *intelligi potest, substantia est.*[61] However, it was St. Augustine who had first pointed out that relation was the only category suitable to express or predicate the trinitarian Persons. As to the unity of Their substance, Gilbert is no less definite than St. Augustine. *Essentiae singularitate sunt unus,* Gilbert writes[62] and insists that this one divine substance is predicated whenever the Divine Persons are predicated individually or collectively because each Person is the divine substance. Even if Gilbert had described the Divine Persons as *relationum subjecta*—an expression which he does not use—the Boethian text quoted against him by Geoffrey proves nothing against him, for it refers only to the divine substance or God *in quo est nullus* essentiarum *numerus,* as Gilbert rightly interpolates Boethius with the additional remark that, being a *forma,* the divine *unum* cannot be a *subjectum.*[63] Long before Gilbert, tradition had accepted the Augustinian thesis that the Divine Persons are predicated *relative,* not *substantialiter.*[64] Accordingly, their *locus rationis,* i.e. Their place in the human mind, as Gilbert expresses it, is not the category of substance, but that of relation applied, of course, *aliqua rationis proportione.* In accordance with his classification of intrinsic and extrinsic categories, Gilbert describes the Divine Persons as *res extrinsecus affixae* to avoid the triplication of the divine substance. Not even Geoffrey assumed that Gilbert considered these *res* as accidents and only a superficial critic will deny that Gilbert identified the Persons with the one divine substance. At the same time, he upheld that the plural expressed by "three" and "persons" means a numerical plurality *rerum et vocum* as previously explained.[65] Whatever such a plurality *rerum* may be, a mere plurality *vocum* would be pure Sabellianism. A critic who still believes that he has sufficient reasons to accuse Gilbert of separating the trinitarian Persons from the divine substance should at least concede that "the heresy was one of expression, not of fact"[66] because he frequently professes Their identity in substance. Otherwise he would not have proclaimed that the trinitarian mystery is *tam ineffabile verbis quam incomprehensibile ratione.*[67]

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[58] E. Vacandard, *Vie de Saint Bernard* II (Paris, 1927), 341 asserts, however, that in view of Gilbert's real distinction between *divinitas* and the three persons participating the same essence, "the mystery of the Trinity is easily explained." This would perhaps be true, if Gilbert had taught such a real distinction and participation. A similar wrong supposition is made by A. Forest, 'Le réalisme de Gilbert de la Porrée', *Rev. néoscol. de phil.* 36 (1934), 102 f.

[59] *De Tr.;* 1254B. *De Pr.;* 1302AB. According to Gerhoh, *Lib. de novitatibus,* c. 42; ed. Thatcher, p. 234, Boethius is "a man of sound faith" and always in complete accord with St. Augustine.

[60] *Libellus,* n. 43; PL 185,610A.

[61] Augustine, *De Trinitate* V, 3, 4; PL 42,913: Quidquid de Deo dicitur, secundum substantiam dicitur.

[62] *De Tr.;* 1298B. Cf. *De Pr.;* 1306A: Illi tres sunt unum et simplex et omnino id quod sunt.

[63] Boethius, *De Trinitate,* c. 2; ed. Steward-Rand, p. 10: Quocirca hoc vere unum in quo nullus numerus, nullum in eo aliud praeterquam id quod est. Neque enim subjectum fieri potest. Gilbert, *De Tr.;* 1273D.

[64] Cf. Augustine, *De Trinitate* V, 4, 5 ff; PL 42,913 ff. Alcuin, *De Fide s. Trinitatis* I, 7 ff.; PL 101,18 ff.

[65] *C. Eut.;* 1377D. The right to use the word *res* had been defended by St. Anselm,

R. Seeberg[68] claims that Gilbert asserts of the Divine Persons: *diversa esse non modo a se invicem, verum etiam ab essentia.*[69] Yet the subject of this sentence is not the Divine Persons but the divine names. Once it is established that the three divine names differ from other divine attributes, it is to be shown if what corresponds to them is predicated *substantialiter* or not. Speaking of the trinitarian names, not Persons, Gilbert writes:

> Ostendit autem (Boethius) illa et de diversis praedicari et *esse diversa, non modo a se invicem, verum etiam ab essentia,* quae diversis nominibus una de eisdem dicitur, de quibus et illa (nomina) salva Dei simplicitate dicuntur.[70]

The reader will notice that, even while he is discussing the preliminary question regarding the names,[71] Gilbert does not abstain from referring to the one divine essence *quae diversis nominibus una de eisdem dicitur.* His whole exposition must be understood *salva Dei simplicitate.* In his approach to the Trinity, Gilbert could have adopted an attitude, later suggested by his follower, Raoul Ardens: *Noli investigare, si non vis errare,*[72] but Gilbert knew that no progress of thought has ever been achieved by avoiding problems. Although posterity has not agreed with Gilbert, since his final analysis would seem to explain away the

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Ep. De Incarn. Verbi, c. 2; ed. Schmitt, p. 10. St. Thomas, *Summa theol.* I, qu. 30, a. 1 also describes a divine person as rem subsistentem in natura divina and concludes: Unde sequitur quod sint plures res subsistentes in divina natura.

[66] R. L. Poole, *Illustrations of the History of Mediaeval Thought and Learning* (London, 1920), p. 158. The *Profession of Faith* issued at the Council of Rheims would seem to imply that Gilbert taught *res* or relations or *proprietates* "which are not God". This implication may be based on the assumption that, according to Gilbert, they act like distinct forms comparable to the distinct *forma qua* of God. On the Platonist background of Twelfth Century thought such errors could easily arise, but it still remains to be shown that they were actually taught. Warnings do not prove facts. Thus Abelard, *De Unitate et Trinitate divina* II, 4; ed. H. Ostlender, *Beiträge* 35 (1939), 62 warns that the divine *proprietates* must not be conceived as forms and, presumably, to avoid such a misconception, William of Champeaux (G. Lefevre, *Les variations de G. de Champeaux* [Lille, 1898], p. 28) expresses the otherwise strange view: Per illa vocabula "Pater, Filius, Spiritus sanctus" nullas intelligimus poni proprietates. Supposing that the divine relations might be misinterpreted as forms, Walter of Mortagne, *De Trinitate,* c.11; PL 109,586D tells us that the divine persons "do not differ by relations *or other forms.*" His explanation (587BC) reveals that he objects to relations and *res* "other than the divine substance", because they would destroy the eternity of the Trinity. Negligence or ignorance concerning the analogical use of the categories accounts for many accusations raised in Gilbert's time and in numerous cases only mental distinctions were probably intended by those accused of teaching real distinctions. While Gilbert was officially told not to divide between nature and person in God, one of his followers wrote some thirty years later: "I shall never cease to thank God . . . that I must hold with Cyril of Alexandria and John Damascene that person and nature are not the same, and with Basil the Great and Gregory the Theologian that personal *proprietates,* persons and essence are not the same." (*Lib. De Diversitate naturae et personae;* Ms Cambridge, Univ. Lib., *Lat.* I i. IV. 27, fol. 130^r). We do not learn what kind of distinction was meant, but the intention was obvious: opposition to Sabellianism which consists in the denial of all distinctions.

[67] Cf. William of Thierry, *Aenigma Fidei;* PL 180,422D: Non potest explicare verbis quod ineffabile est. Deficiunt verba, caligat intellectus.

[68] *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte* III (Leipzig, 1930), p. 255.

[69] *De Pr.;* 1303A. Seeberg rightly denies that Gilbert taught a quaternity.

[70] *De Pr.;* 1303A.

[71] The investigation into the "names" is only preliminary. To quote William of Thierry, *Aenigma Fidei;* PL 180,416C: Quasi prima elementa sunt nomina divina.

[72] *Hom. II,* 1; PL 155,1947A. Cf. St. Bernard, *De Consideratione* V, 7, 15; PL 182,797B: Scrutari haec temeritas est.

substantial trinitarian unity which he so clearly professed, we cannot but recommend the cautious judgment passed by St. Thomas:

> Circa hoc *dicitur* Gilbertus Porretanus errasse, sed errorem postmodum in Remensi Concilio revocasse. Dixit enim quod relationes in divinis sunt assistentes sive extrinsecus affixae.[73]

More than usual, Gilbert stressed the numerical plurality of the trinitarian Persons against the actual danger of veiled Sabellianism apparent in a widespread opposition to a numerical distinction. By a heavy emphasis on Their substantial unity, many of his contemporaries denied with Geoffrey that the Divine Persons differ *numero,* as taught by Gilbert who warned that it is not a number in the ordinary sense.[74] If, however, the distinction is not somehow numerical, the gate to Sabellianism is wide open. Gilbert's teaching soon appeared more acceptable when it became known that St. John Damascene supported it, though Peter Lombard did not copy John's text without a special warning.[75] One and perhaps the principal philosophical reason why Gilbert's thesis caused criticism is to be seen in the then widely accepted opinion that numerical distinction is due to accidents and therefore not applicable to the trinitarian distinctions. Gilbert did not share this philosophical view,[76] least of all if transferred to God, and Clarenbaldus of Arras should have omitted his entirely unfounded remark: *Iste* (Gilbert) *personas—ut ego ipsum intelligo—vult accidentibus variari.*[77]

Controversial also was the exact significance or function of the divine *proprietates* in the explanation of the trinitarian mystery and it is by no means easy to define the precise point of controversy. Dissension arose at the Council of Rheims when master Robert de Bosco openly defied St. Bernard's proposition: *Proprietates personarum sunt ipsae personae et quod Pater est paternitas.* Robert had personally heard Anselm of Laon and his brother Raoul reject such a statement[78] and we learn from John of Salisbury that Gilbert the Universal, Alberic of Rheims, and Gilbert of Westminster likewise disapproved of it.[79] Otto of Freising[80] relates that the whole question was suppressed by the Council.[81] He indicates that the disagreement hinged on the problem whether the individual can be predicated *in the proper sense* or not. It also seems that the scholars mentioned by John of Salisbury considered it poor logic to say *Pater est paternitas,* even in theology. The same scholars apparently argued that, logically speaking, the *proprietas* of a person is not the person itself. There was obviously nothing heretical in such debates for there is no reason to assume that St. Bernard's opponents denied the absolute simplicity of the divine nature.

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[73] *Summa theol.* I, qu. 28, a. 2.

[74] *De Tr.;* 1262B. See, for instance, the Commentaries on Boethius, *De Trinitate* by Thierry of Chartres (?) and Clarenbaldus; ed. W. Jansen (Breslau, 1926), pp. 5*, 45*, 46*, 77*. Thierry of Chartres, *De Sex Dierum Operibus; ed. cit.,* 109*. Cf. St. Bernard, *De Consideratione* V, 7, 17; PL 182,798C: Si unum, ubi numerus? William of Thierry, *Aenigma Fidei;* PL 180,410C: Numerus qui ibi est et numerus est et numerus non est.

[75] *Sent.* I, d. 19, c. 10; ed. Quaracchi I (1916), p. 135. Cf. *Summa theol.* I, qu. 30, a. 1 ad 4 and a. 4

[76] Cf. *De Tr.;* 1264A, 1295D. *C. Eut.;* 1399CD.

[77] Ed. Jansen, p. 78*.

[78] A text from Raoul of Laon, found *in quadam scriptura sua,* is quoted by Geoffrey, *Libellus,* n. 63; PL 185,616D. If authentic, it only shows that, according to Raoul, the divine names do not designate proprietates quae sint aliud quam ipsae personae. To this corresponds the statement in St. Bernard, *De Cons.* V, 7, 15; PL 182,797B: Proprietates non aliud quam personae. Gerhoh of Reichersberg, *Lib. de novitatibus;* ed. Thatcher, p. 199, probably had St. Bernard in mind, when he wrote: Personarum quippe proprietates—ut ante nos dictum est—non aliud quam personas . . . catholica fides confitetur. We have previously noted the ambiguity of such terminology.

[79] *Hist. Pontif.,* c. 8; ed. Poole, p. 19 f.

[80] *Gesta Frid.* I, 50 and 57; MGH, SS XX, 379 and 384.

[81] Cf. St. Bernard, *De Cons.* V, 8, 18; PL 182,799A. According to the *Summa Sent.* I, 10; PL 176,59A the opponents of St. Bernard's view claimed: Si per eas (proprietates) discernuntur personae, quomodo sunt ipsae personae?

They rather believed that, as much as possible, theological terminology was to be guided by logical principles. We may rightly suppose that they would have agreed with Gilbert's statement: *Sunt tres diversis proprietatibus suis.*[82] Both parties would have been in agreement with Gerhoh of Reichersberg saying: *Pereant etiam proprietates vel persone que divina substantia non sunt.*[83] Without denying their identity with the divine substance, Gilbert conceived the *proprietates* as *id quo*, as did Peter Lombard when he wrote: *Proprietas qua Pater est Pater et proprietas qua Filius est Filius . . .*[84] The disagreement was primarily a logical one and every page of Gilbert's writings provides evidence of the fact that he attempted to build a system of theology in harmony with both dogma and his principles of logic.

IV. THE INCARNATE WORD

According to Geoffrey, Gilbert "attributed the Incarnation to the Person of the Son to such a degree that he denied it entirely to the divinity."[1] Since Geoffrey cites only two Boethian texts without even saying how Gilbert—*pro libitu bene dicta depravans*—commented on them,[2] we may briefly outline Gilbert's position. Speaking of Christ, he states: *In ipso itaque* divina essentia, *qua Christus est Deus, et humana subsistentia, qua ipse est homo, recte intelliguntur conjunctae.*[3]

Christ, he declares, is one Person or *is qui* with a twofold *id quo*: the divine essence or divinity and the human subsistence or humanity.[4] We learn that the principle: *Persona personae numquam componitur*[5] applies to both God as *is qui* or person and man as *is qui* or person.[6] As a consequence, not two persons but two natures are united in and by the eternal Person of Christ,[7] for He who assumed human nature did not become but was a Person. In other words, the second trinitarian Person, not the divine nature, assumed human nature and united it to His divine nature: *Non enim assumpsit persona personam, neque natura naturam, neque natura personam, sed tantummodo persona naturam.*[8]

Christ assumed a human body and a human soul which Gilbert describes with the following characteristic precision:

> In order that He who was God by nature and the Son of God the Father by relation and a Person by individual *proprietas* may also be man, He assumed that which belongs to man, *i.e.*, a human body and a human soul.[9]

Since all this was written before 1148, it is difficult to see how Geoffrey's accusation can be justified. Gilbert, obviously, does not deny the Incarnation *entirely* to the divinity, though he does stress the view that the Boethian *divinitas quae suscepit*[10] is neither the Father nor the Holy Ghost, but the second

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[82] *C. Eut.;* 1377D. Cf. *De Tr.;* 1300A and 1295CD. See also Raoul Ardens, *Hom. I*, 1; PL 155, 1945D. Lombard, *Sent.* I, d. 24, c. 1; *ed. cit.*, p. 155 likewise uses the ablative: Distinctae sunt personae proprietatibus.

[83] *Lib. de novitatibus;* ed. Thatcher, p. 208. Lombard, *Sent.* I, d. 33, c. 2; *ed. cit.*, p. 211 mentions that some scholars, *impatientiae spiritu agitati*, attempted to show proprietatem qua Pater est Pater et proprietatem qua Filius est Filius non esse Deum. If this had actually been taught by Gilbert in the sense that the divine proprietates are not really identical with the divine substance, the question would not have been suppressed at Rheims as recorded by Otto of Freising.

[84] *Sent.* I, d. 26, c. 3; *ed. cit.*, p. 166.

[1] *Libellus*, n. 54; PL 185,614A.

[2] *Ibid.* Boethius, *Contra Eutychen*, c. 6 f.; ed. Stewart-Rand, pp. 108 and 118. Geoffrey's words: *Non enim natura sed persona* are not Boethian and, as they stand, make no sense. They seem to be a fragment from Gilbert's commentary: 'Divinitas suscepit, quia non natura sed persona suscepit naturam. *C. Eut.;* 1405D.

[3] *C. Eut.;* 1383A.

[4] *C. Eut.;* 1383C.

[5] *C. Eut.;* 1384B. Cf. *Sent.* III, d. 7, c. 2; ed. Quaracchi II (1916), p. 587.

[6] *C. Eut.;* 1385A.

[7] *C. Eut.;* 1388CD.

[8] *C. Eut.;* 1388D. Cf. *Sent. Divinitatis* IV; ed. Geyer, 53*. Lombard, *Sent.* III, d. 5, c. 1; ed. Quaracchi II (1916), p. 566.

[9] *C. Eut.;* 1390B.

[10] *C. Eut.;* 1405CD.

Person in the Trinity. Expressions such as *deitas* or *divinitas incarnata est* could easily invite or imply the ancient error of the *Patripassiani,* as John of Salisbury has well explained,[11] but Gilbert even accepts the famous formula: *Deus passus est*[12] which could likewise be misunderstood, unless it is properly interpreted of the second Divine Person.[13]

In the error charged against Gilbert, the omission of any reference to the Son of God makes his doctrine indeed appear as a denial of the Incarnation or perhaps of Christ's divinity. The accusation reads: *Quod divina natura non sit incarnata nec naturam humanam susceperit.*[14] When, however, the conciliar discussion of the question "if nature assumed nature" began, it soon appeared that Gilbert was not the only scholar to teach this "error". It came to a *tumultuatio,* when the accused tried to manoeuvre St. Bernard into contradicting a canon of the sixth Council of Toledo.[15] While the *Libellus* significantly omits this canon, other sources cite it to prove that "nature did not assume nature."[16] The question was finally shelved, "because Gilbert did not differ much from the others."[17] Otto's affirmation that no official decision was made is implicitly confirmed by Lombard who, after the Council, describes the issue as *scrupulosa etiam inter doctos quaestio* which he would not have done if, as Geoffrey asserts, the fourth *capitulum* had been condemned by the Pope.[18] We need not deny that some of Gilbert's "followers" may have overstressed the point, provided a remark made by Gerhoh of Reichersberg is true:

> Dicere soletis: "Proprietas ejus (i.e. Filii) forinsecus ei affixa est incarnata et Filii divinitas ab incarnatione penitus est aliena.[19]

Geoffrey never suspected or accused Gilbert of Nestorian tendencies, although he "discovered" after the Council of Rheims that Gilbert denied the adoration of *latria* to Christ's humanity in his comment on *Psalm 98* and in this sense "misinterpreted" *Phil.* ii: 9.[20] Gerhoh was apparently the first to raise objections against Gilbert and the *Gilbertini*[21] and soon launched attacks on Lombard[22] as a follower of Gilbert.[23] But these and similar dissensions in christological questions originated from fundamental discrepancies in the explanation of the Hypostatic Union and there is no doubt that Gerhoh's exaggerated idea of Christ as *homo deificatus,* which expression he later retracted as contrary to St. John Damascene,[24] did not offer an altogether satisfactory solution. With a rare gesture of generosity, Gerhoh refrains from accusing Lombard of error in this matter and professes that *ille magister Petrus* only records the doctrine of others infected by Nestorius.[25] This may be a reference to Gilbert's "Nestorianism". The notorious attack on the "four labyrinths of France" made by Walter of St. Victor likewise contains accusations of Nestorianism possibly aimed at Gilbert, though it is rather directed against the *Sententiae divinitatis* which Walter suspected to be the work of Abelard. It is, incidentally, very doubtful if Walter read any of Gilbert's works, but it may be mentioned here that he denounces the four *capitula* as *hereses Gisleberti Porretae.*[26] John of Cornwall was candid enough to admit that he had not read anything written by Gilbert on the Hypostatic Union, yet he relates—*ut multi perhibent*—that Gilbert advocated the second of the three current theories on the Incarnation recorded by Lombard. We shall see that this is substantially correct but, after saying that those who personally heard Gilbert disagreed among themselves, John proceeds to trace in other authors "the falsehood which he (i.e. Gilbert) is also believed to have taught."[27] No wonder that Gilbert's doctrines remained under suspicion, but some modern historians are much more positive regarding his christological errors. According to E. Portalié, both Gilbert and Lombard "contributed powerfully to acclimating semi-Nestorianism in the schools."[28] On the authority of J. Bach, F. Vernet echoes Geoffrey's exaggeration and, with rather peculiar logic, states: *Attribuant l'incarnation à la Personne du Fils, non à la divinité, Gilbert tombe dans un déminestorianisme . . .*[29] The foundation for such erroneous claims is the so-called *habitus* theory on the Incarnation, commonly confused with "christological nihilism", which has, to my knowledge, never been explained satisfactorily.

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[11] *Hist. Pontif.*, c. 14; ed. Poole, p. 39 ff.

[12] *C. Eut.;* 1405A.

[13] See, for instance, the objection cited by Gerhoh, *Liber De novitatibus;* ed. Thatcher, p. 201: Si divinitas est incarnata . . . ergo Pater est incarnatus.

[14] *Libellus*, n. 67; PL 185,617B.

[15] Otto of Freising, *Gesta Frid.* I, 57; MGH, SS XX, 384.

[16] *Sent. Divinitatis* IV; ed. Geyer, 53*. Lombard, *Sent.* III, d. 5, c. 1; *ed. cit.* p. 567.

[17] Otto of Freising, *op. cit.*, p. 384.

[18] *Sent.* III, d. 5, c. 1; *ed. cit.*, p. 567. The rather vague exposition given by Robert of Melun is found in F. Anders, *Die Christologie des Robert von Melun* (Paderborn, 1927), p. 54 f.

[19] *Liber De novitatibus;* ed. Thatcher, p. 201. On p. 208 he states: Pereat igitur haec nova doctrina negans divinitatem incarnatam.

[20] Geoffrey, *Ep. ad H.*, n. 9; PL 185,592C. H. Denifle, *Die abendländischen Schriftausleger* (Mainz, 1905), p. 385 has shown that Geoffrey's quotation is not derived from Gilbert but from Lombard's *Collectanea* on Ps. 98:5. See also, A. Landgraf, 'Die Stellungnahme der Scholastik des XII Jhrts zum Adoptianismus', *Divus Thomas* (Freiburg, 1935), 267 ff.

[21] See his Letter to Otto of Freising; PL 193,587A; 589A; 590B; 590D; 591A. *Opuse. De Gloria et honore*, c. 1,3; PL 194,1080B. *De Ordine donorum s. Spiritus;* MGH, Lib. III, 275.

[22] *Coll. in Ps. XCVIII,5;* PL 191,895AD. *Coll. in Phil.* 2:9; PL 192,433C. *Sent.* III, d. 9, c. 1 and d. 18, c. 3; *ed. cit.*, pp. 593 and 630.

[23] Gerhoh, *De Gloria et honore*, c. 7,2; PL 194,1096D.

[24] Compare his *Comm. in Ps. i,3* with *De Gloria et honore*, c. 2,3; PL 193,645C and PL 194,1082D. In his *Lib. de novitatibus;* ed. Thatcher, p. 198, he speaks of *caro deificata.*

To present a clear exposition of the three famous theories on the Hypostatic Union recorded by Lombard is indeed extremely difficult, particularly with regard to the first theory, because their exponents often failed to define their terms with sufficient clarity. The crucial issue is their concept of person and personal union. With the eyes of their mind trained on the Boethian definition of person as *naturae rationabilis individua substantia,* they made numerous and hardly successful efforts to explain the undisputed truth of faith that the second trinitarian Person assumed human nature. To grasp their theories it is fundamental to realize their intimate association of person and individual rational substance. In order to prove that Christ is *one person,* most scholars endeavoured to show that Christ is *one substance.*[30] As a result, the first theory held that, in the Incarnation, a man's substance became God; the second opinion denied this and reduced *both* the divinity and humanity to natures entering into the *composition* of Christ's single substance, which led to the logical conclusion that Christ's humanity as such is not a substance or person but a substantial principle or nature; the third theory denied the idea of substantial components, declared that Christ's humanity is related to the second trinitarian Person as a *habitus* is related to a substance, and agreed with the second theory in the sense that in Christ's humanity body and soul were never so united to one another as to form a substance which would have made it a person. In dependence on

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[25] *De Gloria et honore,* c. 19, 2; PL 194,1143D.

[26] *Contra IV labyrinthios Franciae* II; ed. Geyer, *Beiträge* VII (1909), 199*.

[27] *Eulogium ad Alexandrum Papam III,* c. 3; PL 199,1050D-1051A.

[28] *DTC* I, 1 (Paris, 1923), 416.

[29] *DTC* VI, 2 (Paris, 1925), 1353. J. Bach, *Die Dogmengeschichte des Mittelalters vom christol. Standpunkt* II (Wien, 1875), p. 145 ff. Bach's appraisal of Gilbert (pp. 133-150) is as superficial as many of his other judgments. On p. 149 he makes the remark: Gilbert ist deshalb durchweg mit Nestorius einverstanden, nur will er das, was jener Person nannte, Natur genannt wissen. What else could Gilbert do?

[30] Although Boethius speaks of *diversarum conjunctio substantiarum,* he means natures (at least after their union) and points out that Christ could not be "defined", if the substance of God and man were different. In *Contra Eutychen,* c. 4; ed. Steward-Rand, p. 94, he states: Si enim Dei et hominis diversa substantia est unumque in utrisque nomen nec diversarum conjunctio subsubstantiarum unam creditur fecisse personam, aequivocum est nomen Christi et nulla potest definitione concludi.

Augustinian terminology, the authors, especially of the second opinion, may speak of two or even three "substances" or they may teach "three essences" in Christ, as St. Bernard did,[31] yet in their final analysis, the duality or "trinity" of substances becomes a duality of natures.[32] It is needless to stress the fact that the three theories listed by Lombard were all duly supported by patristic texts, differently interpreted according to the differences of doctrine.

The first or so-called *homo assumptus* theory takes as starting point a fully constituted human substance or man composed of body and soul and teaches that, through the Person of the divine Word, the substance "came, *i.e.* began to be God." Thus the assumed man is the Word.[33] We are told that, although the divine and human *natures* remained intact, "it so came to pass that God is that substance and that substance is God." That substance is *not composed* of two natures and the two natures must not be considered as parts of it because only soul and flesh are parts.[34] Like many other contemporary theologians, the exponents of this theory describe a personal union as *unio in* or *ad personam*. The definition later given by Alanus of Lille: *Personalis unio est quae rem facit esse personam*,[35] may well serve as key to the understanding of the first theory which apparently originated in the mind of Hugh of St. Victor. After defining a person as *individuum rationalis substantiae*, Hugh of St. Victor argues that, strictly speaking, only the soul is a person in itself and, by being united to the soul, the body becomes one person with the soul.[36] Though not very satisfied with the current definitions of person, he finds a clear analogy in the Incarnation: In Christ, the divine Word is a Person and, by his union to the Word, the assumed man becomes one and the same Person.[37] Accordingly, "anyone who denies that the *assumed man* is a person, denies that man was assumed into the person."[38] The result of the union is not only an *unus* but also an *unum*[39] or *totum*, comparable only to the soul, in which Hugh does not allow the divine and human natures to be considered as parts.[40] "If you do not understand it, believe it", is Hugh's advice[41] and many of his contemporaries neither understood nor believed it. However, they widely agreed with him that Christ assumed body and soul separately, *i.e.* before their union one to another constituted a human person,[42] since it was unanimously held that Christ assumed a human nature, not a human person. Those who, like Hugh of St. Victor, declared the soul in itself to be a person, could scarcely solve the objection that, in assuming a soul, united to a body or not, Christ must have assumed a person. Yet we learn from Hugh that Christ assumed a soul as part of human *nature.*[43]

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[31] *De Consideratione* V,9; PL 182,800BC. Cf. *Eulogium*, c. 4; PL 199,1053C.

[32] J. De Ghellinck, 'L'entrée d'*essentia*, et autres mots apparentés dans le latine médiéval', *Arch. lat. medii aevi* 16 (1942), 109, passes too rapidly over the development in the twelfth century. For the present study it may suffice to note that our writers often use substance and nature without proper discrimination, sometimes even deliberately so. While they never deny the two natures, many of them do not clarify the question if the substrate of Christ's human accidents was distinct from his divine substance or not. By teaching that through the Hypostatic Union one substance became the other, the advocates of the first theory identified the substances, though not the natures. This explains the advice given by the author of the *Apologia de Verbo Incarnato*, qu. 7; PL 177,303B: Noli ergo sic argumentari: "Si Christus est quaedam substantia simplex vel increata, ergo non est quaedam composita vel creata", cum sit utrumque, licet non secundum idem.

[33] *Sent.* III, d. 6, c. 2; ed. Quaracchi II (1916), p. 574. R. F. Studeny, *John of Cornwall, an Opponent of Nihilianism* (diss., Vienna, 1939) p. 29, describes this theory as an opinion "according to which *man* predicates of Christ a being composed of body and soul only, not connoting the divinity . . . the human substance became the divine person." It is hard to see how such a substance does not even connote the divinity.

[34] *Sent.* III, d. 6, c. 2; *ed. cit.*, p. 547. The "part theory" originated in the Abelardian school, though Augustine's denial that God and man are parts of Christ was well known. The interpretation varied and St. Jerome was cited as evidence against Augustine. A discussion of the question would lead too far away from the object of this study. The first opinion excludes all parts from Christ's *substance* or person, not from his human nature.

[35] *Theol. reg.*, n. 102; PL 210,676B

[36] *De Sacramentis* II, 1, 11; PL 176,406A-411D.

[37] *Ibid.*; PL 176,411CD.

[38] *De Sacramentis* II, 1, 9; PL 176,394B.

[39] *De Sacramentis* II, 1, 9 and 11; PL 176,394A and 411D.

[40] *De Sacramentis* II, 1, 11; PL 176,402D and 406C. St. Anselm, *Ep. De Incarnatione Verbi*, c. 11; ed. F. S. Schmitt, *Flor. Patr.*, fasc. 28 (Bonn, 1931), p. 21 even compares it to God's nature: Sicut enim in Deo una natura est plures personae . . . ita in Christo una persona est plures naturae. . . In Christo Deus est persona et homo est persona, nec tamen duae sunt personae sed una persona.

[41] *De Sacramentis* II, 1, 11; PL 176,403A.

It will hardly surprise the reader that the advocates of this theory exaggerated the knowledge, power and other prerogatives of Christ's humanity. Gerhoh of Reichersberg, for instance, speaks of *homo deificatus* and *caro* or *humanitas deificata* and, naturally, fails to see why his opponents deny Christ's human nature the power of His divinity.[44] He maintains that "just as Christ is a divine Person, he is also a human person,"[45] yet both are one and the same person. Consequently, scholars of this school insist that Christ *as man* is an *aliquis* in the sense of person, an *aliquid* in the sense of substance, and that "the *man* Jesus is equal to God and coeternal with the Father."[46] St. Augustine and other Fathers are cited to corroborate the doctrine that Christ's "human form" or nature is the Person of the Son[47] and Pope Alexander III is told that, without any figure of speech, this is the true Catholic faith: *Persona divina facta est natura sive substantia humana et . . . natura sive substantia humana facta est persona divina.*[48]

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[42] *De Sacramentis* II, 1, 9; PL 176,394A. *De Verbo Incarnato* II; PL 177,319B. *Summa Sent.* I, 15; PL 176,70D. *Ysagoge in Theologiam* II; ed. A. Landgraf, *Ecrits théol. de l'ecole d'Abélard* (Spic. Sacr. Lov., fasc. 14, Louvain, 1934) p. 162. *Sent.* III, d. 5, c. 3; *ed. cit.*, p. 571. Alanus of Lille, *Theol. reg.*, n. 101; PL 210,676A.

[43] *De Sacramentis* II, 1, 11; PL 176,403B.

[44] *Lib. De novitatibus*, c. 16; ed. Thatcher, p. 210: Magistrali, ut dicitur, auctoritate astruunt hominis in Deum assumpti solam personam, non etiam naturam, divinitatis habere virtutem.

[45] *Ibid.*, c. 8; ed. Thatcher, p. 202: Christus enim sicut est persona divina sic est etiam persona humana.

[46] John of Cornwall, *Eulogium*, c. 19; PL 199,1083B. John considers Christ's humanity a *substantialis qualitas* rather than a substance (*op. cit.*, c. 9; PL 199,1066D) and deliberately uses nature and substance without discrimination, with the explicit assumption that Boethius identified them. When Lombard, *Sent.* III d. 11 c. 2; *ed. cit.* p. 600, raises the question *An homo ille semper fuerit* it may appear to us as if he was wasting his time. Yet, after citing the words of John VIII, 58: "Before Abraham came to be, I am," Hugh of St. Victor insists that this and similar texts refer to Christ as *homo* (*De Sacr.* II, 1, 9; PL 176,396A). Robert of Melun, *Questiones de divina pagina*, qu. 63; ed. R. M. Martin (Spic. Sacr. Lov., fasc. 13, Louvain, 1932), p. 33, proposes the following conclusion: Haec tria Verbum, caro, anima, sunt una persona. . . Haec tria sunt Deus. Ergo aliqua creata sunt Deus. Hugh of St. Victor (PL 176,397A-398B) tells us that as *homo-persona* Christ is eternal, as *homo-natura* he is not. The key to such ideologies is the oneness of substance which causes Gerhoh, *Lib De novitatibus*, c. 4; *ed.* Thatcher, p. 199, to claim: Substantialiter accepta divinitate, Filius Dei Deus dicitur et est. In this regard, no distinction must be made, as we are told in the *Disp. altera adversus Abaelardum* II; PL 180, 301B: TOTUS ergo Christus, quia dividi non potest, in illa Trinitate, quae Deus est, una persona est. Hence we learn from Lombard, *Sent.* III, d. 7, c. 1; *ed. cit.*, p. 583, that those scholars accepted statements such as: "A substance is God which is not the divine substance" or "A substance is God which has not always existed". He leaves it to his readers to argue the point, but later critics express open ridicule. See Alanus of Lille, *Theol. reg.*, n. 101; PL 210,675BD and Peter of Poitiers, *Sent.* IV, 8; PL 211,1172B.

[47] *Eulogium*, c. 19; PL 199,1082C: In libro *De Trinitate* [II, 5, 9] formam i.e. naturam humanam dicit [Augustinus] esse personam Filii: Forma, inquit, illa suscepti hominis Filii persona est, non etiam Patris.

[48] *Eulogium*, c. 19; PL 199,1081D. The Migne text is defective. To correct it, I have collated all known manuscripts: Paris, Arsen., *Lat.* 265; London, Brit. Mus., *Lat. Royal* 7 F XIII; Oxford, Balliol Coll., *Lat.* 65; Cambridge, Corpus Christi Coll., *Lat.* 62; Durham, Cath. Library A 11 21. The theory that one substance *became* the other is well illustrated by John (*Eulogium*, c. 9; PL 199,1063A) explaining that the apparition of the Holy Ghost at Christ's Baptism was no Incarnation because, to become one person with the dove, the Holy Ghost had to become a dove and viceversa. Thanks to his complete failure to grasp the three theories, R. F. Studeny (*op. cit.*, pp. 25, 27, 53, 57) repeatedly accuses John of confused thinking, of "quibbling" (p. 34), of citing texts which are "not to the point" (p. 33), of Arianism (p. 45) and so on. Rather than consult John's contemporaries, Studeny adopts the erroneous view that "the theologians of the Thirteenth Century treated those systems not as they existed at a later stage of development, but as they were explained by the magister and debated

This theory thus conceives the Person of Christ as *one single individual substance* for which not the constitution of man but rather the soul serves as proper comparison.[49] An attempt to place the concept of person on a different basis without sacrificing the general structure of the theory was made by Robert of Melun who, we read, "most certainly taught nothing heretical in theology."[50] Robert reasons that in Christ "two substances are one Person."[51] To prove his point, he declares that body and soul are one person, yet they cannot be one substance.[52] Hence the word man signifies, not one substance, but one person in which the substance of the soul is the person *quasi substantialiter et materialiter* and, by being united to, and somehow assumed by, the soul, the substance of the body becomes that person.[53] Thus man is called a person in view of the union of two separate and distinct substances. Similarly, we are told, Christ is not one but two substances and, at the same time, one Person: *Persona tamen illa divina substantia est, homo autem illa persona est, non per naturam—ut supra dictum est—sed per gratiam.*[54]

Robert's attempt failed mainly because most of his contemporaries were not prepared to accept his premises. They held, as Robert knew, that man is not a juxtaposition of two substances but a *totum* or *unum, i.e. one* substance resulting from the union of two substances; consequently, a person resulting from the union of body and soul neither of which is a person by itself.[55]

The concept of person as one substance or substantial unit is at the bottom of the general idea that in Christ both the divine Word and his humanity are to be understood as natures. It had led Abelard straight into the error for which he was condemned at the Council of Sens.[56] *Non duae substantiae Christi sunt,*[57] he writes and affirms that the two united natures cannot be *aliquid aeternum.*[58] In other words, the *aliquid* resulting from the union of two natures cannot be

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in the Twelfth Century" (p. 9). Studeny's over-long quotations from St. Thomas are not only out of place but obscure the proper analysis of John's work whose stated object was to show "the truth" of the first theory by comparing it to the others (*Eulogium;* PL 199, 1046A), while Studeny insists that John really *thought* to be defending the second opinion which, according to Studeny, is the orthodox doctrine. He expects us to accept his mistaken claims (pp. 118 and 115) that Peter of Poitiers also confused the first opinion with the second and that Alexander III was misinformed when he referred to the "depraved doctrine" of Peter Lombard. If Studeny had properly understood the issue, he would not have called John "a theologian of moderate pretensions" (p. 83).

[49] Even authors of the first opinion will occasionally speak of Christ as *compositum* with reference to his human nature. Thus an advocate of the first theory, the author of the *Apologia,* qu. 9; PL 177,306D assures us: Nos credimus et confitemur utrumque quod *ex carne et anima* sit quoddam compositum et quod illud sit Deus et tertia in Trinitate persona per gratiam, non per naturam. Achard of St. Victor declares: Non enim audiendi sunt qui dicunt nichil esse compositum ex anima et corpore. Quoted by J. Chatillon, 'Achard de Saint-Victor', *Mélanges F. Cavallera* (Toulouse, 1948), 332.

[50] *Eulogium,* c. 4; PL 199,1055A. John never read Robert's work but attended lectures in which Robert and Maurice of Sully refuted the doctrine of Peter Lombard. Studeny, *op. cit.,* p. 123, has this to say: "In Robert of Melun we have the case of a theologian who owes his reputation as a defender of the Catholic doctrine not to his own merits but to the testimony of John of Cornwall." In addition to this peculiar verdict, Studeny (p. 123 ff.) offers only a distorted analysis of Robert's doctrine.

[51] F. Anders, *Die Christologie des Robert von Melun* (Paderborn, 1927), p. 92.

[52] *Op. cit.,* pp. 64 and 41.

[53] *Op. cit.,* p. 64.

[54] *Op. cit.,* p. 66. Cf. *De Sacramentis* II, 1, 9; PL 176,398B.

[55] *Op. cit.,* p. 62 f. Compare the severe criticism of this concept of man made by Hugh of St. Victor, *De Sacramentis* II, 1, 11; PL 176,460C with Gilbert, *C. Eut.;* 1371D who just as firmly rejects the opinion that the soul as such is a person.

[56] Mansi XXI, 568C: Quod nec Deus et homo neque haec persona, quae Christus est, sit tertia persona in Trinitate. The peculiar, though never universal, usage of calling Christ the third Person in the Trinity dates back to Isidore of Seville.

[57] *In Symb. Athanasii;* PL 178,630CD. Cf. *Epitome,* c. 24; PL 178,1732C: Persona est substantia rationalis individua. Christus igitur una est persona. Abelard did not deny the two natures in Christ, although he calls them "two substances *or* natures" in his *Introductio ad Theologiam* III, 6; PL 178,1108A. Cf. *Eulogium,* c. 3; PL 199,1051C.

[58] *Disputatio altera adv. Abaelardum* II; PL 180,401A.

an eternal substance and as such not an eternal person.[59] The early Abelardian school explained that, applied to Christ and the second trinitarian Person, the word *persona* has an altogether different meaning.[60] He is, we learn, indeed a *fourth* person resulting from a union into which neither the divine Word nor man enter as persons. In this sense, the author of the *Ysagoge* concludes: *Igitur ex quo fuit Verbi et hominis unio, neutrum eorum fuit persona.*[61] The fact that the notion of Christ being a fourth person was contrary to tradition[62] caused Robert Pulleyn to claim that, compared to the Trinity, Christ is in fact a fourth person with a "trinity of substances", but not to be "numbered" with the three trinitarian Persons because of the widely different meaning of the word person: *Sed hanc* (*Christ's Person*) *cum illis* (*trinitarian Persons*) *numerandum non puto, quippe longe differenter hic atque ibi dicitur persona.*[63] Robert, whom, incidentally, Geoffrey of Auxerre[64] recommends against Gilbert, tells his readers that one *nature* of that "humanized person" is one Person in the Trinity.[65]

Fundamentally, the exponents of the second theory listed by Lombard followed the same principles with heavier stress on the divine element. Its advocates who contended that Christ is composed of two natures or "three substances", opposed the teaching of the first theory that His human nature is a person or the Son of God. They argued particularly that Christ did not become a person but was a person from all eternity. In the Incarnation, they claimed, He only became a man's person and thus a "composite Person." According to Lombard, they considered the "three substances" (*divinitas, caro, anima*) as *two natures,* for they interpreted the Augustinian *Aliud est Verbum Dei, aliud homo* or *alia substantia Deus, alia homo* to designate a distinction of natures, not of substances. Consequently, they reasoned that Christ is *aliud natura qua est homo, aliud natura qua est Deus* and, at the same time, *unum et idem,* not *aliud et aliud* as distinct substances, just as there is no *alius et alius* in Christ.[66]

Walter of St. Victor, who falsely asserts that the first of Lombard's theories was held neither by heretics nor by Catholics, considered the second opinion as "thoroughly Catholic" without realizing that the leading mind behind this theory was the "heretic," Gilbert.[67] In his commentaries on Boethius, Gilbert does not actually speak of three substances, as St. Augustine did occasionally,[68] nor does he use the expression *persona composita,*[69] yet it is obvious that the idea of interpreting Christ's "three substances" or two natures as *natura qua est homo* or *Deus* points to Gilbert. Still unable to separate the concept of person and individual rational substance, this theory was afflicted by difficulties similar to those of the first theory, but it took a firm stand against calling Christ's human nature a person and the Son of God.[70] Although it admits the qualified term *persona facta hominis,* it strongly disapproves of the term *persona facta,* for the Person of Christ is eternal, the second Person of the Trinity who, in the Incarnation, united human nature to His divine nature, both of which are understood as *id quo.* In the light of Gilbert's principles, this school of thought denied that Christ's human nature is a *humanitas quae* (*est Christus*) with the assumption that this would lead to a dual person. Hence it only admitted a *humanitas qua,* whereas theologians of the first group taught both a *humanitas qua* as nature or form and a *humanitas quae* as human person.[71]

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[59] According to his *Theol. christiana* IV; PL 178,1274A, it is a figure of speech to say that Christ is "an eternal divine substance, a non-eternal human substance". Cf. *Sic et Non,* c. 75; PL 178,1448B. In attempting to saddle Abelard with "christological nihilism", John of Cornwall, *Eulogium,* c. 3; PL 199,1052C was no less mistaken, though more reserved, than J. De Ghellinck who speaks of *le "nihilisme christologique" que Pierre Lombard avait hérité d'Abélard* (*L'Essor de la litt. latine au XII^e siècle* I [Bruxelles, 1949] p. 56). When Lombard became bishop of Paris, he declared publicly that his view was an *opinio quam a magistris acceperat. Eulogium,* c. 3; PL 199,1053A. The reading *a magistro* in Migne is contrary to all manuscripts.

[60] *Sententiae Parisienses* I; ed. A. Landgraf, *Ecrits théol. de l'école d'Abélard,* p. 30: Quando tu dicis "Illa persona que est Verbum est unita huic persone que est Christus", hic accipitur persona diverso modo.

[61] A. Landgraf, *ed. cit.*, p. 163. Cf. *Epitome,* c. 24; PL 178,1732B: Non tamen (Verbum) ibi est persona per se, quia sic persona jam esset in persona.

[62] Cf. *Sent.* III, d. 6, c. 2; ed. Quaracchi II (1916), p. 575.

[63] Robert Pulleyn, *Sent.* III, 20; PL 186,791AB.

[64] *Libellus,* n. 63; PL 185,616A.

[65] PL 186,791A: Una hujus personae natura una est in Trinitate persona.

[66] *Sent.* III, d. 6, c. 3 and d. 7, c. 2; *ed. cit.,* pp. 576 and 584. Cf. *Eulogium,* c. 11; PL 199,1069B: Cum enim dicitur aliud Deus, aliud homo, differentia *naturarum* ostenditur. See also *Apologia,* qu. 7; PL 177,304D. Studeny, *op. cit.,* p. 34, describes John's procedure as "quibbling" which "is of no importance to us." Yet, without seeing the reason for it, he rightly observes that John intends to show "that humanity, or human nature, is not a substance, but a mere propriety." All three theories avoided the idea of *two substances.* The *Summa de sacramentis* II, c. 32; *Ms* Troyes, *Lat.* 276, fol. 153^{rb} of Peter Cantor still records a similar distinction: Christus est unum diuinitate et aliud humanitate, non tamen est unum et aliud. In other words, Christ is a substantial unit consisting of two distinct natures.

[67] *Contra IV labyrinthos Franciae* III; PL 199,1146BC. Walter knew and used the *Apologia* whose author clearly taught the first theory and rejected the second: Dicunt quidam quod, quando *Verbum caro factum est,* factum est quoddam compositum ex creatore et creatura, scilicet divinitate et

The best criticism of this theory stems from the pen of Robert of Melun who maintains that, if Christ's humanity is a (substantial) form, it must inform either a divine or a human substance, "because it is impossible that the form of a person be not the form of a substance." Since it cannot be the form of the divine substance, it must inform a human substance. This would, so Robert argues, cause a human substance indeed to be man, yet it would not cause the divine Word to be man.[72] We know Robert's own solution and may mention here that, without knowing its author and without being fully aware of its implications, most theologians of the thirteenth century preferred Gilbert's theory with certain modifications. Its weakness, however, is undeniable: it did not deny that the person of Christ is a substance, but it did deny that his human nature (or *Christus secundum quod homo*) is a substance or *id quod,* often called *aliquid,* which would, as its exponents thought, have made it a human person.[73] Again, the critical background of this view was the Boethian definition

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carne et anima. Illud compositum est creatura, quia non semper fuit; et illius compositi pars divinitas. Ergo Creator est pars cujusdam creaturae. Sed quid absurdius, imo quid falsius (PL 177,304D). Apparently referring to the first opinion, Gilbert, *C. Eut.;* 1383B, has this to say: Quidam qui, cum nihil intelligant, omnia judicant, homines impudentissimi, desipientia sapientissimi, absque disserendi ratione disertissimi . . . cum audiunt hominis Deique factam in Christo conjunctionem putant quod *is qui* homo est et *is qui* Deus Christo dicantur conjuncti. If this were the case, he reasons, Christ could not be *naturaliter unum.*

[68] As a rule, St. Augustine speaks of two substances, but, for instance, in *De Trinitate* XIII, 17, 22; PL 42,1031 he writes: . . . ut ex duabus substantiis fieret una persona, ac per hoc jam ex tribus: Deo, anima et carne. Cf. *Sent.* III d. 6 c. 3; *ed. cit.,* p. 578.

[69] The expression was probably adopted later in view of St. John Damascene's *hypostasis composita.* Cf. *Sent.* III, d. 6, c. 3; *ed. cit.,* p. 577.

[70] *Sent.* III, d. 7, c. 2; *ed. cit.,* p. 584: Negant quoque naturam humanam esse personam vel Filium Dei. Studeny, *op. cit.,* p. 2 declares that the second opinion "is the orthodox doctrine." Despite the fact that St. Thomas and most of his contemporaries adopted the second opinion, such a statement is false. They did not analyse Lombard's exposition in the same sense as Lombard and his contemporaries understood them.

[71] Gerhoh of Reichersberg, *Liber de gloria,* c. 2, 1; PL 194,1081D.

[72] F. Anders, *op. cit.,* p. 59. Other critics concentrate on rejecting the idea of Christ as *compositum.* For instance, the *Apologia,* qu. 7; PL 177,305A, and the author quoted by A. Landgraf, 'Frühscholastische Abkürzungen der Sentenzen des Lombardus,' *Studia Mediaevalia* (Bruges, 1948), 183. We learn from St. Thomas, *Script. sup. Sent.* III, d. 6, qu. 2, a. 3, that the expression *persona composita* was put out of use by the *moderni* of his time

[73] John of Cornwall, *Eulogium,* c. 1; PL 199, 1048A, oberves very accurately: Notandum etiam quod haec tertia sententia commune habet cum secunda quod Christus non est aliqua substantia constans ex carne et anima et quod Christus secundum quod homo non est aliquid. Gilbert, *C. Eut.;* 1382D declares: In eo [Christ] namque nihil est quod sit homo quod ei, qui in illo Deus sit, intelligatur conjunctum. He holds (1383BC) that Christ's body and soul were united to one another, yet with regard to the Divine Person they are not an *id quod* or substance. Studeny's disagreement (p. 54) with B. Geyer—F. Ueberweg, *Grundriss der Gesch. der Philosophie* II (Berlin, 1928), p.

of person of which Gilbert says: *Non habet diffinitio pluraliter "persona est individuae substantiae," sed singulariter "individua substantia".*[74]

In order to justify the Boethian definition, it seemed a logical necessity to sacrifice Christ's humanity and deprive it of its own substantiality. In this respect, the second theory paved the way for the third group of theologians who candidly admitted that the *auctoritates* hardly contradict the first two views. They frowned especially on the notion of *persona facta* or *composita* in any sense and, like the second group, refused to speak of Christ as *aliquis homo* conveying the idea of person.[75] They denied that Christ's body and soul were ever actually so united to one another as to form a man's substance, because such a union, they thought, would result in a human person. To eliminate Christ's humanity as substantial component, taught by the second theory, they contended that, if we speak in terms of categories, Christ's human nature is related to the second Divine Person, not like substance united to substance, but like a *habitus* united to a substance. This *habitus* is, by its very concept, extrinsic to the divine substance and as nature is neither one substance or *aliquid,* nor a person or *aliquis.* The theory does not deprive Christ's soul of its substantiality and does not deny that His body was a substance united to the soul; it only claims that, in Christ, these two substances did not enter into so close a union as to form *one* substance. The opposition maintained that the theory thus deprived Christ of being a true man.

Whether or not Lombard, who considered none of the three opinions as the final answer, advocated the third theory is controversial, but his contemporaries were apparently convinced that he defended it at least as a probable opinion. After raising the question: "If Christ as man is a person or *aliquid",* he presents two solutions which strikingly reveal the significance of *aliquid:* (1) If Christ as man is a rational substance, he is both an *aliquid* as substance and, in accordance with the Boethian definition, a person; (2) if Christ as man is a person, He must be the third Person in the Trinity and therefore (as man He must be) God. In order to avoid these and other inconveniences, so Lombard relates, some scholars said that Christ as man is not a person or *aliquid,* unless perhaps the qualification "as man" is chosen to express the *unitas personae.* Lombard then disproves the first solution with the reply that the soul is a rational substance without being a person. He ignores the second and concludes with the words: *Non eo quo homo est, eo Dei Filius est.*[76] Lombard's reply is directed against the first theory and implies that as man Christ is not an *aliquid* which, in different ways, was the contention of both the second and third theories.

The fact that the exponents of the third opinion were accused of teaching a heretical separation of God and man in Christ,[77] is based on the *habitus* **theory** of this school of thought which, in addition to the denial that Christ as man is

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278, regarding "the orthodox opinion as nihilianistic" could have been avoided, if he had followed John who, after all, knew what he was talking about.

[74] C. *Eut.;* 1379C.

[75] *Sent.* III, d. 6, c. 4; *ed cit.,* p. 578 f.

[76] *Sent.* III, d. 10, c. 1; *ed. cit.;* p. 593 f. After denying even a trace of nihilism in Lombard, Studeny, *op. cit.,* p. 115, expects us to believe that the mention of Lombard's name in the papal censure must be given "a different interpretation . . . because he was falsely accused before Alexander II." Later, on p. 116, we learn that Peter gave the third theory "the title of probable opinion . . . such a procedure cannot exactly be approved . . . it was a felix culpa." In defending himself, Lombard did insist that it was only an *opinio,* not an *assertio,* but so, to his mind, were also the other theories. In comparison with the first two opinions, the third theory needs no apology. The partial condemnation by Rome of the last solution was no approval of the other views.

[77] Cf. Robert of Cricklade, *Speculum Fidei* III,, 5: Separat hominem a Deo, ut non sit una persona cum Deo in Trinitate qui revera Filius Dei est. Quoted by R. W. Hunt, 'English Learning in the late twelfth century', *Transactions of the Royal Hist. Soc.,* 4th series, 19 (1936), 38. It cannot be overemphasized that many of those accusations come from scholars who taught what actually amounts to a heretical *union* of God and man.

an *aliquid*, denied the kind of union advocated by the first two opinions. They denied that a human substance became or began to be God, that Christ's human nature is a substantial *id quo* or form, that it is a substance or *aliquid* resulting from the union of body and soul, that it is a part in the constitution of Christ's personality. Such was, we are told, the teaching of St. Augustine who wrote: *Deus Filius Deo Patri natura est aequalis, habitu minor.*[78] Christ's person, they argued, is transcendent, neither *facta* nor *composita*, even after the Incarnation. When we say "God is man", either a *habitus* is predicated or a (divine) Person or rather a *persona humanata.*[79] In other words, in the sentence "God is man", the word God expresses a divine person; by being united to a *habitus, i.e.*, human nature, that very same person is a "humanized person."

In the explanation of their theory, the defendants of this opinion naturally began with an exposition of the categories in order to rule out the category of substance, adopted by the previous opinions.[80] The category of *habitus* appeared to be least detrimental to a concept of a personal union between God and man, especially since both Scripture and tradition seemed to support it. It is significant and understandable that Lombard was accused of teaching that Christ's human nature is an accident,[81] though the weight of such an accusation depends entirely on the meaning of the word accident.[82] While the word *habitus* aims at the classification of the Hypostatic Union in the ten categories, the question whether the assumed human nature is a normally constituted human substance aims at the human personality of Christ. An excellent summary of the doctrine is found in a letter of a Parisian student of theology to his *magister P.*, to whom he had previously written concerning the *dampnate nuper hereseos professores* who still tried to prove with many authorities and reasons:

> Nec esse nec fuisse (Christum) aliquid constans ex partibus nec—secundum quod homo—esse aliquam substantiam compositam ex anima et carne, sed sic illa duo, scilicet carnem et animam, persone Verbi uel nature unita esse aiunt uelud indumentum.[83]

It should not surprise us that the theory had an extremely large following, as we learn from John of Cornwall who professes, not without deep regrets, that, in his younger days, he belonged to it himself.[84] Similar regrets may have been felt by Pope Alexander III who, prior to his pontificate, had also taught that as God Christ is the "third" Person in the Trinity, but not as man, particularly because as man he is neither a person nor—"to speak more truthfully and without lying"—an *aliquid*.[85] In defining Christ with St. Augustine as *Verbum habens hominem*, to which corresponds the definition of man as *anima habens corpus*,[86] Roland Bandinelli, later Alexander III, revealed that the Abelardian school was not unfamiliar with a formula in which the verb *habere* pointed directly to the category of *habitus*.[87]

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[78] *De Trinitate* I, 7, 14; PL 42,829. Cf. *Sent.* III, d. 7, c. 2; *ed. cit.*, p. 588.

[79] *Sent.* III, d. 7, c. 2; ed. cit., p. 587.

[80] When a defender of Lombard's doctrine introduced his defence by saying: Nosti . . . albedinem esse in corpore et non conferre corpori quod substantia sit, Robert of Cricklade cut him short and retorted: I know what you are aiming at. Leave the examples and speak two *natures*. Robert, of course, won the argument: Obmutuit ille confusus. R. W. Hunt, *art. cit.*, 38.

[81] Cf. R. W. Hunt, *art. cit.*, 38.

[82] Cf. St. Thomas, *Script. sup. Sent.* III, d. 6, qu. 3, 2, ad 1; *ed.* M. F. Moos III (Paris, 1933), p. 247: Natura humana in Christo habet aliquam similitudinem cum accidente et praecipue cum habitu quantum ad tria: primo, quia advenit personae divinae post esse completum sicut habitus et omnia alia accidentia; secundo, quia est in se substantia et advent alteri vestis homini; tertio, quia . . . non mutat Verbum.

[83] G. Morin, 'Lettre inédite d'un étudiant en théol. de l'Université de Paris,' *Rech. de théol anc. et méd.* 6 (1934), 413.

[84] *Eulogium;* PL 199, 1034B and 1084B. Studeny, *op. cit.*, p. 147, declares: "Personally, I find no sufficient reason for admitting that such a monstrous doctrine as nihilianism ever acquired a strong foothold among Catholic theologians." On p. 59, he affirms that John's reference to the infinite number of his adversaries is "objectively false." Like many others, Studeny confuses the *habitus* theory with nihilism, though they are two very distinct aspects of the third opinion. Nihilism, ill-chosen as it is, means that Christ's *human nature* was not a substance, *id quod* or *aliquid* which was taught by both the second and third theories. The *habitus* theory as such deals with the classification of the Hypostatic *Union* and was held by the advocates of the third opinion who, *in addition*, denied to Christ's human body and soul the sort of union which would have constituted a substance or person. The adoption of *habitus* in opposition to substance, as understood by their contemporaries, was a very healthy reaction. To condemn it as expressing "a merely accidental union", as Studeny (p. 22) does, or to characterize it as designating "the relation of an accident" (G. H. Joyce, in *Enc. of Rel. and Eth.* IX [New York, 1924], p. 370), is misleading, for its advocates never taught Christ's human

Judged by its opponents, the *habitus* theory appears as a rather dangerous and novel interpretation of the Pauline: *Et habitu inventus est ut homo* (*Phil.* ii, 7) which, in the words of Gerhoh, they "glibly interpret as an extrinsic garment."[88] There is no evidence in the commentaries on Boethius to show that Gilbert developed the theory.[89] In fact, he passes rather rapidly over the Boethian *homine vestitus*[90] which would have offered an opportunity to enlarge on it. We know that, in his days, the doctrine on the category of *habitus* was a controversial topic in "universal confusion".[91] However, the supposition made by the exponents of the *habitus* theory that, being an extrinsic category, *habitus* contributes nothing to the substance was not fully accepted by Gilbert, for he teaches that body and soul are related to one another as *extrinsici habitus*, though in themselves they are (substantial) subsistences (*id quo*) the union of which results in one substantial form, *humanitas*, as man's *id quo*. Yet the advocates of the *habitus* theory chose the category of *habitus* precisely in order to prove that Christ's human nature contributes nothing to the constitution of Christ's substance or person.[92] It was well known, though very differently explained, that the so-called *Symbolum Athanasianum* strongly suggested the relationship of *habitus* in the words: *Sicut anima rationalis et caro unus est homo, ita Deus et homo unus est Christus.*[93] It was equally well known that St.

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nature to inhere in the divine nature like an accident or to be so loosely attached as to deny that Christ is God. If we use the word "substantial union" in the same sense as it was then understood, we cannot but disagree with the opponents of the *habitus* theory. Concerning christological "nihilism", the third theory (as well as the second) adopted a course which is not nearly as "monstrous" on its Platonist background as it may appear in the Aristotelian atmosphere of later centuries. Insisting on *verus* or *perfectus homo*, Pope Alexander intervened but, having reached a deadlock, theology was slow in accepting the papal verdict, because it could not yet explain how, though admittedly a *verus homo*, Christ's humanity could be a human substance without being a human person. It is entirely false to see in "nihilism" the teaching that "Christus als Mensch is überhaupt nichts" (R. Seeberg, *Realenc.* XI [Leipzig, 1902], p. 639 partly modified in his *Dogmengesch.* III [Leipzig, 1930], p. 262) or that "Christ as man is nothing" (Ueberweg-Geyer, *op. cit.*, p. 278) or that "there was nothing in Christ which could be called *homo*" (G. H. Joyce, *loc. cit.*, p. 370). After a similar error, H. Reuter, *Gesch. der rel. Aufklärung* I, 5, 3 (Berlin, 1875), p. 14, goes as far as to assert that some theologians accepted it "perhaps without knowing what they were doing."

[85] A. M. Gietl, *Die Sentenzen Rolands* (Freiburg i.B., 1891), p. 177. Although Roland Bandinelli, later Alexander III, was by no means infallible when he composed his *Sentences*, Studeny (p. 104) denies without any foundation that he "taught that proposition in the nihilianistic sense which he afterwards censured." It is worth noting that another strong "nihilist", Gandulphus (*Sent.* III, 17 ff.), is praised as Magister Gandulphus, cuius est magna in ecclesia Dei auctoritas. Cf. J. de Ghellinck, *Le mouvement*, p. 349 and R. Seeberg, *Dogmengesch.* III, p. 262.

[86] Augustine, *In Joh. Tr. XIX*, 15; PL 35,1553. *Summa Sent.* I, 15; PL 176,71A.

[87] In the *Epitome*, c. 24; PL 178,173A, the definition is also reversed: Christus est . . . homo habens Verbum. See also *Sent. III*, d. 7, c. 2; *ed. cit.*, p. 587.

[88] *De Gloria et honore*, c. 18; PL 194,1141D.

[89] However, the anonymous *Comm. Porretanus in I Ep. ad Cor.*; ed. A. Landgraf, *Studi e Testi*, 177 (Vatican City, 1945), p. 28 speaks of habitus ligans utramque (naturam).

[90] *C. Eut.*; 1405C.

[91] Ps-Augustine, *Categoriae Decem*, c. 11; PL 32,1431.

[92] They would not have accepted the proposition of magister Omnebene, quoted by H. Denifle, *art. cit.*, p. 466: Christus non est aliud nisi Verbum habens hominem. Idem habet esse ex Verbo et homine. The *habitus* theory denies that Christ has an *esse ex homine*.

[93] Denzinger-Bannwart, *Enchiridion Symbolorum* (Freiburg i. B., 1937), n. 40. Often cited and interpreted in accordance with all theories, the text is usually followed by the observation that, in Christ, God and man are more intimately united than body

Augustine speaks of *habitus Christi*[94] or of *haec veritas carne induta.*[95] St. Leo's *Verbum carne vestitum*[96] was no less familiar to them than "Bede's" *Verbum humanatum*[97] or the expression *Deus humanatus,* attributed to both Cassiodorus and Origen.[98] Still better known and more forceful was St. Augustine's interpretation of *Phil.* ii, 7 in which he stresses the garment idea to safeguard the absolute immutability of God in the Incarnation.[99] Among other interpretations of the passage, the Augustinian exposition is given considerable space in Lombard's comment on the text and we are finally told: *Habitus ergo est susceptio hominis quasi vestis quae non mutat.*[100] Commentators, particularly those advocating the first opinion, protested:

> Hoc autem quod quidam addunt de suo quod, sicut homo quando induitur veste non fit aliquid sic nec Deus quando formam servi accepit factus est aliquid, hoc, inquam, non habent ex verbis Augustini nec alterius sancti, cum sit falsum.[1]

Despite patristic quotations and careful expositions of the categories, the waves of opposition grew stronger and shortly after Lombard's death a conciliar debate of the problem at Tours (1163) was held in the presence of a very competent judge, Pope Alexander III. Two distinct propositions were attacked and defended without immediate results: (1) Christ is not *aliquis homo* and (2) Christ as man is not an *aliquid.*[2] Expressed in grammatical terminology, the first proposition means that Christ is not a human person. This proposition was attacked by the adherents of the first theory. The second proposition, refuted by the same group, is really the premise of the first and means that as man Christ is not a substance, for he would otherwise be a human person. At the Council itself, nothing was decided,[3] but, in 1170, the second proposition was censured by Alexander III as "the depraved doctrine of Peter, once bishop of Paris".[4] Some seven years later, the censure had to be renewed.[5] When the

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and soul, because in Christ God can be called man and viceversa, while the soul cannot be called body or viceversa. Cf. A. Landgraf, 'Die spekulativen Erörterungen der hypostatischen Vereinigung im 12. Jahrhundert', *Z. f. kath. Theol.* 65 (1941), 183-216.

[94] *De Trinitate* I, 8, 15; PL 42,829.

[95] *In Joh. Tr. XLI*, 1; PL 35,1692.

[96] *Sèrmo XXVI*, 1; PL 54,213A.

[97] Zacharias Chrysol., *In Unum ex Quatuor* I; PL 186,92D. Cf. *Sent.* III, d. 7, c. 2.

[98] Lombard, *In Rom. I,* 1; PL 191,1306B. *Sent.* III, d. 7, c. 2; *ed. cit.*, p. 587 : In the Eighth Century, theologians objected to such terminology. PL 101,1326A and 1337C.

[99] *Liber LXXXIII Quaestionum,* qu. 73; PL 40,84 f. *Sent.* III, d. 6, c. 5 f; *ed. cit.*, p. 580 f.

[100] PL 192,235D.

[1] *Quaestiones in Ep. ad Phil.*, qu. 5; PL 175,577B. The work belongs to the school of Robert Melun.

[2] *Eulogium;* PL 199,1043A.

[3] *Eulogium;* PL 199,1043A. R. W. Hunt, *art. cit.*, p. 33 asserts wrongly that "Peter's view of the natures of Christ . . . was indeed condemned at the Council of Tours in 1163." Both Ueberweg-Geyer,*op. cit.*, p. 278 and J. G. Sikes, *Peter Abailard* (Cambridge, 1932), p. 174, err in their claims that Alexander III anathematized "nihilism" at the Lateran ouncil in 1179. False is also the statement made by Walter of St. Victor, *Contra IV lab. Franciae* II; ed. Geyer, p. 182* that, at Tours, Alexander condemned the heresy qua Christum nihil esse secundum hominem, imo nec Deum nec hominem, impiissime argumentantur.

[4] *Ep. "Cum in nostra";* PL 200,685BC. Dated May 28, 1170 and addressed to William of Champagne, bishop of Sens. See also his *Ep. "Eis qui";* PL 200,684D written on June 2, in the same year and addressed to the Prelates of Bourges, Rheims, Tours and Rouen. According to William of Auxerre, *Summa Aurea* III, tr. 1, qu. 8; ed. Paris (1500), fol. 113^{4}, an Archbishop of Sens and his followers advocated the first theory. Identifying him with William of Champagne, Studeny, *op. cit.*, p. 115, concludes that the first decretal was addressed to "the principal advocate of the first opinion." It is much more probable that William favoured "nihilism", because he was remarkably lax in enforcing the papal orders which were adressed to him as papal legate, not as advocate of a particular opinion. It is worth noting here that, before 1176, Peter of Poitiers dedicated to William of Champagne, then Archbishop of Sens, his *Sentences* in which, despite the papal censures, the first two opinions are criticized, while the third view is at least treated kindly. Cf. *Sent.* IV, 10; PL 211,1176C. The suggestion made by E. Rathbone, 'John of Cornwall', *Rech. de théol anc. et méd.* 17 (1950), 53, that William of Auxerre refers to Archbishop Peter of Corbeil (1200-1222) seems contrary to the very evidence used by Rathbone, for her source attributes the

discussion of the question was suggested at the Lateran Council (1179) some Cardinals remonstrated and a certain bishop Adam Wallensis is on record as having said: *Domne Papa, ego . . . defendam Sententias magistri.*[6]

In this struggle between the advocates of the first theory (listed by Lombard) and the adherents of both the second and third opinions, the papal decision was a defeat for both parties. Alexander omitted any reference to the *habitus* problem which concerns, not the constitution of Christ's humanity, but the classification of the union between God and man in Christ. Moreover, he did not approve the first proposition which, under the cloak of *aliquis homo,* aimed at an official sanction of the *persona humana.* By rejecting the proposition that Christ as man is not an *aliquid,* Alexander dealt a decisive blow to the followers of the second and third theories. He reasoned that Christ is a "perfect man" by which he meant to say that, though not a person, Christ's human nature is a rational substance.

The remarkably stubborn opposition to his decision was founded on a conviction far more general than the so-called *habitus* theory that as a rational human substance Christ's human nature could not be but a human person. As a consequence, the concept of person had to be revised.[7] But it is quite obvious that, if Boethius had been more accurate, theology would never have drifted from one extreme to another in an attempt to "define" the Incarnate Word.[8]

In denying that Christ's human nature is a true rational created substance, the second and third theories tended to undermine the reality of His humanity either by making it a substantial *id quo* (not *id quod*) or by separating Christ's body and soul to prevent them from constituting one substance resulting in a human personality. The fact that the so-called *habitus* theory is commonly described as "christological nihilism" is only an echo of false accusations and it is now sufficiently clear that it has nothing at all to do with Nestorianism or semi-Nestorianism. It has nothing in common with the heresy of Eutyches, for it was much more rigorously opposed to a confusion of both natures than the first two theories. After long years of study, St. Thomas came to the right conclusion that the first opinion was an actual lapse into the heresies of either Nestorius or Eutyches, though it was long protected by an orthodox terminology. The fact that St. Thomas considered the second opinion as orthodox only proves that he failed to interpret it accurately. More justifiable, however, is the accusation made by Walter of St. Victor and others that the third opinion made of Christ's humanity a *homo phantasticus.*[9] Walter claims that the "heretical" doctrine expounded in the *Sententiae divinitatis* is based on the premise: *Humanitas nihil est.*[10] If this contention were right, the author of the work would deserve his accusation of "nihilism", but neither Gilbert who, in all probability, condemned the work at Rheims nor Lombard who states the very contrary[11] should be burdened with such "nihilism", for no twelfth century theologian

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second theory to Peter. Cf. M. Grabman's note, *ibid.,* 7 (1935), 76.

[5] *Ep. "Cum Christus"*, dated February 18, 1177, and addressed to the same William, then Archbishop of Rheims (1176-1202).

[6] Mansi XXII, 458. H. Denifle, *art. cit.*, 406. J. de Ghellinck, *Le Mouvement*, p. 260, identifies him with Adam du Petit-Pont.

[7] A definite step in a new direction is made by Simon of Tournai, *Disp. XVII*, qu. 3; ed. J. Warichez (Spic. Sacr. Lov., fasc. 12, Louvain, 1932), p. 61. St. Thomas states clearly that Christ's human nature "is in itself a substance" (*Script, sup. Sent.* III, d. 6, qu. 3, a. 2, ad 1; ed. Moos, p. 247) and quoddam individuum in genere substantiae. *Summa Theol.* III, qu. 2, a. 2, ad 3.

[8] The theologians became soon aware of the fact that the Boethian definition of person was causing the confusion and Peter of Poitiers, *Sent.* I, 32; PL 211, 923B, tells us that, in his time, most theologians denied that the Boethian definition was "authentic".

[9] PL 199, 1151B and 1059B.

[10] *Contra IV lab. Franciae II;* ed. Geyer, p. 180*. Geyer's contention (p. 25) that this view harmonizes with Gilbert's system in which *divinitas* and *humanitas* are only "empty abstractions", is based on an erroneous analysis of Gilbert's thought.

[11] *Sent.* III, d. 2, c. 1; *ed. cit.*, p. 554. Cf. *Eulogium*, c. 11; PL 199, 1070C.

taught that Christ as man is nothing.[12] A much less than mediocre compiler of ideas heard or copied from Gilbert without fully grasping them, the author of the *Sententiae divinitatis* refutes the very controversial "part theory" in the sense that in the person of Christ the component elements are not two persons but two natures. He gives this thought the very unfortunate expression: *Nihil Christi Deus est et nihil Christi homo*[13] which, if taken as denial of Christ's humanity, would amount equally to a denial of his divinity, though this was by no means the writer's intention. Neither Gilbert nor Abelard nor any other public lecturer could fully protect themselves from the age-old danger of class-room notes[14] and we need not suppose that the "infinite number of scholars"[15] who accepted and defended the theory that Christ as man is not an *aliquid* questioned the reality of Christ's humanity and divinity, no matter how loudly they were denounced as heretics by Gerhoh, Walters and others who considered their own mistaken views as the final answer. How much superior to their vilifications is Lombard's humble conclusion:

> In a matter so grave and difficult, I do not wish the reader to think that our discussion ought to be sufficient. He should also read other expositions which are perhaps more adroit and considerate.[16]

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[12] To the Twelfth Century theologian, trained in grammar, the word *nihil* as compared to *aliquid* did not necessarily evoke the idea of "nothing". A good comparison is found in Gilbert, *C. Eut.;* 1362BC. In our particular controversy, *nihil* is opposed to *aliquid;* the former denies, the latter affirms the *substantiality* (not the existence) of its subject. In the third theory, Christ's soul is an *aliquid* or substance and Christ's body is an *aliquid* or substance. Both were and always remained united to the Divine Word, even in Christ's death, yet they were never so closely united *to one another* as to constitute one single substance or *aliquid* because as a rational *aliquid* it would result in an *aliquis.* Using the word nihil, the *Apologia,* qu. 10; PL 177,307B, express this idea quite accurately: Nihil habet esse ex illis duobus [body and soul], ut quidam dicunt. Robert of Melun who likewise adopts *nihil* observes that, according to this theory, they did not constitute an *unum.* Cf. Anders, *op. cit.,* p. 60. The critics retorted that they must have been united, for otherwise they could not have been *separated* in Christ's death. Cf. A. Landgraf, 'Das Problem *Utrum Christus fuerit homo in triduo mortis* in the Frühscholastik,' *Mél. Aug. Pelzer* (Louvain, 1947), 109 ff. In the second theory, no attempt is made or required to weaken the union between Christ's body and soul but, with regard to *Christ's* substance, the man resulting from the union of body and soul is conceived as *id quo,* substantial form or nature, not *id quod* or substance. Hence Christ as man is not an *aliquid* or *aliquis.* Gilbert, C. Eut.; 1382D, puts it as follows: In eo namque nihil est *quod* sit homo.

[13] *Sent. Divinitatis* IV; ed. Geyer p. 68*. Cf. Simon of Tournai, *Disp. XLIX,* qu. 5; ed. Warichez, p. 141.

[14] The *Sententiae Florianenses* appear to be such a class-room product in the Abelardian school.

[15] *Eulogium;* PL 199,1043B. The author of the *Summa theologiae,* described by M. Grabmann, *art. cit.,* p. 75 states: Prima opinio sustinetur ab *omnibus modernis* et est vera.

[16] *Sent.* III, d. 7, c. 3; *ed. cit.,* p. 589. In his quite unnecessary endeavour to whitewash Lombard, Studeny, *op. cit.,* p. 115, writes: "As far as my own insufficient study of the question permits me to judge, Peter Lombard defended the second opinion." In recent years, great efforts have been made by Déodat de Basly, L. Seiller and others to revive the "traditional" *homo-assumptus* theory. The endless compilations of patristic texts offered by de Basly and continued by L. Seiller prove only that the expression was used. Without entering into the dispute concerning the complete *volte-face* of which de Basly accuses St. Thomas, we must take exception with de Basly's conviction that Pope Alexander III approved Gerhoh's *homo-assumptus* theory at the Council of Sens (1164). Although the *Annales Reicherspergenses* (MGH, SS XVII, 471) make such a claim, Alexander's known official declarations contain nothing to support it. Alexander does not use the expression *homo assumptus* and, insisting on *verus* or *perfectus homo,* only condemned and retracted a theory which, some twenty years arlier, he had held himself. In correcting an error attached to, not entirely identical with the third opinion, Alexander neither censured the *habitus* theory as heretical nor approved the *homo-assumptus* theory as orthodox. If, in claiming that St. Thomas succumbed to St. Cyril's "Appolinarism", de Basly aimed at the revival of the views expressed by Gerhoh and others, he deserves much of the current criticism. More than any other theologian of his century, Gerhoh was under the influence of the same St. Cyril (Cf. *Med. Stud.* XII (1950), 17 f.) whose *una natura* somehow reappears in the *una substantia* of the first theory which in fact, not in words, taught a transubstantiation or conversion of a human substance into the divine substance. If we are interested into a revival of ideas rather that terminology, we do well to consider Lombard's three theories, most of all the

V. CONCLUSION

In reviewing Gilbert's case we can hardly overstress the fact that a proper analysis of *id quo* and *quod* holds a pivotal position in the understanding of his system and his influence. Otto of Freising relates an incident which may puzzle many a modern reader, though it serves well to illustrate the basic point in Gilbert's theology. At the Council, all of a sudden and for no reason apparent in Otto's report, *magister* Johelinus of Soisson remonstrated to Gilbert: *Quid est quod dicis esse Deum nihil est?* To this unexpected enquiry, Otto adds that there was an opinion held by some logic professors that "he who says *Socrates est* says nothing." Gilbert, so Otto tells us, "inadvertently" transferred this opinion to theology.[17] It caused quite a stir for two reasons: first of all, because opinions on the interpretation of a sentence such as *Socrates est* were widely divided and, secondly, because it was even more controversial whether or how the current opinions applied to *Deus est.*[18] The present tense (*Socrates est,* instead of *Socrates erat*) and the available comments offer sufficient proof that the controversy did not concern the use of the verb *est* as expressing existence. Gilbert apparently held that the statement *Socrates est* is not complete and therefore in need of further specifications such as *homo, corpus, albus* etc. In accordance with his principles, as previously outlined, the full sentence would be *Socrates est homo humanitate* or *corpus corporalitate* or *albus albedine* indicating the respective *id quo.* Gilbert's writings show clearly that his application of this rule to theology was not due to inadvertence in a public debate, but a deliberate logical design. The sentence *Deus est* "is nothing" in the sense that it does not yet state *what* God is. To be complete, it requires predicates such as *bonus, aeternus* etc. To express their *id quo,* the full sentence would read *Deus est bonus bonitate* or *aeternus aeternitate.* Accordingly, while *Deus est Deus* is tautological, only the sentence *Deus est* (*Deus*) *divinitate* fulfills Gilbert's rigid requirements of logical speech. Similarly, as we have seen, Gilbert will say *Pater est* (*Pater*) *paternitate* or *Filius est* (*Filius*) *filiatione.* Just as there is no real distinction between *bonus* and *bonitas* or *Pater* and *paternitas,* there is no real distinction between *Deus* and *divinitas.*

This may suffice to justify the following conclusions: (1) Gilbert's use of *id quo* and *quod* in its numerous variations is first of all an application of a grammatical and logical rule of speech and as such not restricted to any particular science. As a philosophical principle, however, it is restricted to *created* beings according to his clear axiom: *In naturalibus enim aliud est quod est, aliud quo est.*[19] (2) The differentiation between God and divinity is not a metaphysical or real distinction but a logical one in accordance with a general rule of human language and human mode of thought: *In theologicis . . . multis nominibus et diversis modis idem significamus.*[20] (3) Gilbert's *explanation* of the mystery of the Holy Trinity creates the impression that his doctrine on relation as extrinsic category obstructed the clarity of his approach to the trinitarian mystery, but the Catholicity of his faith is beyond doubt: *Illi tres sunt unum et simplex et omnino id quod sunt.*[21] (4) Regarding the explanation of the Hypostatic Union, Gilbert shared with his contemporaries an erroneous concept of person, though neither he nor Lombard can justly be accused of semi-Nestorianism.

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first of them, as *passus extra viam.* For literature concerning the increasingly violent controversy, the reader may consult H. Diepen's article in *Rev. thom.* 49 (1949), 428 ff., or L. Seiller's *"Réflexions"* in *Etudes Franciscaines* 4 (1951), 25 ff., and he will notice that both authors share with reviewers such as J. Rivière (*Rev. des sc. rel.* 11 [1931], 71 ff.) and A. Gaudel (*ibid.* 17 [1937], 64 ff.) in a regrettable lack of penetration into the opinions listed by Lombard.

[17] *Gesta Frid.* I, 52; MGH, SS XX, 379 f.

[18] R. W. Hunt, 'Studies on Priscian', 224 ff.

[19] *De Tr.;* 1278D.

[20] *De Pr.;* 1306B.

[21] *De Pr.;* 1306A.

The Unfinished *Convivio* and Dante's Rereading of the *Aeneid*

ULRICH LEO

I.
THE UNFINISHED *CONVIVIO*

THAT Dante's *Convivio* is unfinished is known to everyone. The author himself tells us that he intended to write fifteen books, not four. He indicated the subject matter for some of them (VII, XIV, XV)[1] and helped us date the work approximately by referring to his exile (I, iii, 3), by mentioning the *Vita nuova* as being already written (I, i, 16) and the *De Vulgari eloquentia* as planned for the near future (I, v, 10). The *Commedia* is not mentioned. But why the *Convivio* is left unfinished the author does not tell us and nobody seems to know exactly the answer to that question. The work is not just broken off in the midst of a sentence as is the *De Vulgari eloquentia;* the fourth book is evidently brought to its real end with the last line of the *canzone* explained and the *divina mente* finishing the whole in a rhythmical clausula formally as satisfying as it is moving. But then there is nothing more and no reader or critic of the precious book has yet, as far as I know,[2] given a concrete answer to that intriguing 'why'. Some, however, have gone a little farther in their attempt to do so than Giovanni Boccaccio:

> Compose ancora un Comento in prosa in fiorentino vulgare sopra tre delle sue canzoni distese, come che egli appaia lui aver avuto intendimento, quando il cominciò, di comentarle tutte, benchè o per mutamento di proposito o per mancamento di tempo che avvenisse, più comentate non se ne trovano da lui; e questo intitolò *Convivio,* assai bella e laudevole operetta.[3]

Let us see what some modern critics have to say on the subject:

> M. Barbi: . . . il pensiero e l'entusiasmo per un'opera di tanta grandezza (*the Commedia*) non è da credere che portassero di necessità l'interruzione del *Convivio?*[4]
>
> Th. Spoerri: Dass Dante am *Gastmahl* nicht weiter arbeiten konnte, ist klar.[5]

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[1] See Barbi's résumé contained in the Introduction to the edition of Busnelli and Vandelli, *Convivio* I (Firenze, 1937), pp. XV, XLI f. Quotations from Dante's works are cited from the *Testo critico* (Firenze, 1921) unless otherwise indicated.

[2] No one should dare say a word about Dante without subscribing to what a master said some ten years ago: Quant à l'immense littérature sur Dante, je n'y puis penser sans une sorte de vertige (Etienne Gilson, *Dante et la philosophie* (Paris, 1939), p. X). How many pertinent publications may have been overlooked by the present writer! He takes this opportunity of expressing his heartfelt gratitude to Professors J. E. Shaw of Toronto and H. Hatzfeld of the Catholic University of America for their most important suggestions concerning many passages in this article, and to Rev. Eugene Beck, S.J., of Loyola University, New Orleans.

[3] *Vita di Dante*, ed. Macri-Leone (Firenze, 1889), chapter 16. Yet Boccaccio must have known the *Convivio* much better than this short note in the *Vita di Dante* seems to imply. In the *Corbaccio*, towards the end, the *spirito*, the poet's guide through the *Laberinto d'amore*, gives a detailed account of *gentilezza* conceived ethically: Ma non sai tu qual sia la vera gentilezza e quale la falsa? . . . La gentilezza non si può lasciare per eredità, se non come la virtù, le scienze, la santità, e così fatte cose . . . (*Opere minori in prosa* (Milano, 1879), pp. 312 f.). There can be little doubt but that this is an extract of Dante's philosophy of *nobilità* (*gentilezza*) from the *Convivio* IV, x ff. and that Boccaccio refers to him as of the *filosofiche schuole* (*op. cit.*, p. 312). It is true that Dante deals with *nobilità* in the same sense but much more briefly in the *Monarchia* II, iii, 4 ff. Busnelli and Vandelli in their edition of the *Convivio* do not mention the parallel from Boccaccio.

[4] *Op. cit.* I, p. XIX. Cf. also pp. XLII, note 1; XLVII, n. 1; LVI f.

[5] *Einführung in die göttliche Komödie* (Zürich, 1946), p. 35 without any substantiation for the statement.

> Karl Vossler: Dante scheint die innere Unfertigkeit dieses Werkes gefühlt zu haben, und deshalb vielleicht liess er es liegen.[6]
>
> F. Selmi: Come adunque il *Convito* fu opera morale concepita ad intendimento civile, e fondata particolarmente sull'*Etica*, così la *Commedia*; nell'uno volle ciò che nell'altra; di modo che intralasciando quello e accingendosi a questa, mutò di forma, non di proposito.[7]
>
> C. H. Grandgent: It is likely that both these works [*Convivio and Vulg. Eloqu.*] were interrupted by his excitement over the election and the ill fated expedition of Henry VII.[8]
>
> A. Pézard: . . . tout semble s'être passé comme si Dante était mort sans avoir publié ce nouveau *Banquet*; . . . comme s'il avait gardé en réserve son *Convivio* inachevé, espérant le reprendre plus tard, le mener à terme et le publier sous une forme plus parfaite. . .[9]

Within this limited selection of opinions there are several approaches to an explanation why our author's book was left unfinished. An essential change in Dante's spirit is hinted at by Barbi and Vossler; in addition we find the political, the esthetic and even the bibliographical explanation. This last is perhaps not the worst; yet, according to my feeling, the "forme plus parfaite" of the *Convivio* did appear during Dante's lifetime under the title *Incipit Comedia Dantis Alagherii, florentini natione non moribus.* However, the one way to a solution of the problem will be to try to find the fundamental change in Dante's spiritual position which obliged him to drop a work intended, when he began it, to be a *Summa philosophiae* in *volgare* and the main fruit of his life. Let us begin by reviewing the conclusions of three modern scholars who have been most concerned with the question.

Luigi Pietrobono's thesis is as follows.[10] The Dante of the *Vita nuova* is a "mystic" and the Beatrice of the *Vita nuova* an angelic creature sent to him from Heaven. The last chapters (39-42) were added twenty years later to smooth out the contradictory effect between the worship for the Donna Gentile (35-38, and continued allegorically in the *Convivio*), and the resumed worship for Beatrice, the basis of the *Commedia,* which, according to Pietrobono, was begun about 1312. Here, in the latter, he finds once more the dominating character of "mysticism", evidently understanding this word more in a general sense of ecstatic religious feeling. In the *Convivio,* however, the guide followed by Dante is human reason. Not that he has become a faithless rationalist; his reason leads to Christian faith—a point stressed by Pietrobono in his article of 1934—but it is a faith void of superrational illumination, an *intellego ut credam* which dominates him during his philosophical period.

As different as possible is Michele Barbi's way of understanding Dante's

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[6] *Die göttliche Komödie* (2 Aufl., Heidelberg, 1925), p. 167.

[7] *Il Convito. Sua cronologia* . . . (Torino, 1865), p. 109. In this older book one finds stressed the tendency to understand Dante's works as a unity of thought and even of form. For Selmi the *Commedia* is an ethical *trattato*, just as it is in a certain way for Barbi. It is true that Dante himself understood his Poem in this way, a point to which we will return at the conclusion of this chapter.

[8] *Dante* (New York, 1916), p. 17.

[9] *Le Convivio de Dante. Sa lettre, son esprit* (Annales de l'Univ. de Lyon, Ser. III, fasc. 9, Paris, 1940), p. 121.

[10] Pietrobono developed his mature opinion in his edition of the *Vita nuova con il commento di T. Casini* (3za ed. Firenze, 1933), especially in the *Introduzione*. Then appeared, in answer to Barbi's criticism, a booklike article 'Il rifacimento della *Vita nuova* e le due fasi del pensiero dantesco', *Giornale dantesco* XXXV (1934), 2-84. Cf. also his earlier article: 'Il prologo della Divina Commedia', *ibid.*, XXVI (1923), 323 ff. and XXVI (1924), 141 ff. Ch. S. Singleton explains the fact that "the '*Convivio*' is a fragment" by connecting it with the two concepts of allegory: the poetical and the theological. ('Dante's Allegory', *Speculum* XXV (1950), 82). Like Barbi, E. Garin tries to establish an almost imperceptible transition from the *Convivio* to the *Commedia* (*La Filosofia,* I (1947), 146). Concerning the *rifacimento* problem, see *infra* note 22.

"trilogy". If Pietrobono tends to an excess of exaltation in his interpretation of the *Vita nuova* and the *Commedia*, Barbi, the great philologist, tends toward an excess of sobriety. In spite of his declaration that Dante must be read before all as a poet, one feels, from time to time, as if, for Barbi, the *Commedia* might as well have been written in prose:

> Col fine principale che Dante si proponeva, d'illustrare agli uomini quel divino disegno, penso ch'egli abbia voluto congiungere allora l'altro suo primitivo di dire di Beatrice "quello che mai fu detto d'alcuna", poichè questo intento si prestava, come invenzione, ad allargare ed arricchire il contenuto sentimentale della *Commedia*, ed a rendere poeticamente più attraente l'immaginato viaggio pei regni d'oltretomba. Ogni opera, cosí, viene ad essere intesa come prodotto naturale del tempo in cui sorse nello spirito del poeta, e riceve una più sicura e più piena interpretazione.[11]

Beatrice would, in this way, become not much more than a poetic adornment of a book which itself would be not much more than a versified essay on political ethics! The *Vita nuova* is, for Barbi as opposed to Pietrobono, a highly poetic love story set on a background of reality, written in the poet's youth and never rewritten. The *Convivio*, with its rationalism, is not so very far away from the ethical idealism of the *Commedia*. Barbi denies that there exists between the two works the *abisso* alleged by Pietrobono. Rather, Barbi arrived here at his most original point in his understanding of the difficult philosophical book: he feels that in the *Convivio* Dante has intentionally restricted his views to earthly human happiness. Dante knows that there is a higher happiness than that of earth, one not attainable by natural human means (*Conv.* IV, xxii, 17-18); but in the philosophical *trattato*, celestial happiness is not his theme. The use of natural reason which pervades the *Convivio* serves a natural purpose only and not a supernatural one. There is nothing presumptuous in Dante's philosophical thinking and there is no spiritual gap between the *Convivio* and the *Commedia*.

This much is true: Dante himself, in his own interpretation, says nothing about any "sense" of his Poem—which he calls *tractatus!*—other than the ethical sense (besides the "literal" one). Thus he gives the strongest historical support to every "sober" interpretation of his work, such as Barbi's, just reviewed. Let us hear Dante:

> Finis totius et partis esse posset et multiplex, scilicet propinquus et remotus; sed, omissa subtili investigatione, dicendum est breviter quod *finis totius et partis est removere viventes in hac vita de statu miserie et perducere ad statum felicitatis*. Genus vero phylosophie sub quo hic . . . proceditur, est *morale negotium, sive ethica;* quia non ad speculandum, sed ad opus inventum est totum et pars. (*Epistolae*, XIII (ad Canem Grandem), 39, 40).

But there are three objections to this very strong argument of the "legitimists" with their slogan *ciò che è fuori della coscienza del poeta, a noi non può importare* (Barbi). First, there is, beside the *coscienza*, the much more essential *subconscious;* and more generally speaking, although philological interpretation should never disregard the self-interpretation of a poet, neither is it obliged to accept it as dogma. Cervantes' last words in the *Quijote* are that he has intended nothing except *poner en aborrecimiento de los hombres . . . los libros de caballerías* (II, 74), but no modern critic, least of all the compatriots of the immortal novelist, accept that restriction. Secondly, Dante himself adds later on: *multa*

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[11] Besides the already quoted Introduction to Busnelli-Vandelli's edition of the *Convivio*, there is Barbi's article 'Razionalismo e misticismo in Dante', 1933, which appeared in his *Problemi di critica dantesca* II (Firenze, 1941), pp. 1-86. The passage quoted above is found on p. 83 (appendix of 1937).

namque per intellectum videmus quibus signa vocalia desunt (*op. cit.*, 84), stating, in this way, that inspired supernatural vision is the real essence of his Poem. The seeming contradiction is easily solved. What he stressed in the preceding statement (39, 40) was the *utile*, the practical use of his work for the reader, not the visionary way by which the poet arrived at such an *utile*. Thirdly, it seems evident that the *Epistola to Can Grande* was written *before the Paradiso itself had been written*. The *Epistola* treats exclusively of the *prologus*, that is vv. 1-36 of *Par.* I (see *Epistola XIII*, 43, where the *prologus* is separated from the *pars executiva*). The *pars executiva*, that is the whole *Paradiso* from I, 37 to the end, is treated only in a few words at the end of the *Epistola*, (89) and—still more important—*in the future tense*: *In parte vero executiva . . . ubique procedetur ascendendo de celo in celum, et recitabitur de animis beatis*. Evidently he had written the *prologus* only when he composed the Letter; the *pars executiva* was planned but *not yet written*. And this point makes even more understandable the fact that, in his self-interpretation, he insists more on the ethical aim of the Poem than on its poetic and visionary procedure.

The conscious restriction of Dante's use of reason to earthly happiness in the *Convivio* is a feature of Barbi's views, accepted and developed by Etienne Gilson.[12] One of the many important things that one may learn from him is that, for Dante, in the *Convivio*, philosophy is not the *ancilla theologiae* in the Thomistic sense. Rather philosophy, the "miracle of God", can help theology independently. But that does not mean anything like Averroism in Dante. It simply means that, conscious of the incapacity of philosophy to reach of itself regions of supernatural understanding, he considers metaphysics as *practically* less important than ethics. Metaphysics, without divine help, cannot become sure of the immortality of the soul—a restriction made by Dante himself, not by St. Thomas. Dante as a metaphysician is more Aristotelian than Thomistic. Yet he always adds the Christian reservation, so that metaphysics becomes for him somewhat like imperfect theology.[13] And so he takes the decisive step, a step not taken by St. Thomas or by Aristotle: in the *Convivio* he gives the highest position in the order of sciences not to metaphysics but to ethics, making ethics and not metaphysics correspond to the Crystaline Heaven. It is true that the contemplative life leads, for Dante as for St. Thomas, higher than the active life, for ethics does not enable man to take the highest step. But since happiness on earth is the subject in the *Convivio* and since it can be reached by free will, ethics has the first place here. Gilson considers as the most original achievement of Dante the philosopher the fact that he sees an independence of ethics from metaphysics and theology, just *because* he recognizes the inferiority of ethical values compared with metaphysical and theological ones. Where human happiness on earth is the aim, there ethics, just because of its imperfection, is autonomous. *Hierarchy of values does not imply interdependence of values.* This according to Gilson, is Dante's great theoretical discovery.[14] Gilson does not recognize, consequently, anything like Pietrobono's *crise de philosophisme* for the *Convivio*, but only limits between different fields. In a synopsis of Dante's three greatest works, he gives the following scheme:

Convivio: philosophie éthique; bonheur temporel de l'individu.
Monarchia: justice; bonheur temporel de l'humanité.
Commedia: salut éternel de l'humanité par l'église.

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[12] E. Gilson, *Dante et la philosophie* (Paris, 1939). The recently published English translation *Dante the Philosopher* (London, 1949) does not contain any additions. We are concerned here with that section of Gilson's book entitled 'Dante et la philophie dans le *Banquet*', op. cit., pp. 85-160.

[13] *Op. cit.*, p. 127 and p. 138 (Dante's "third beatitude" is exclusively Christian).

[14] *Op. cit.*, pp. 154 ff. Consequently, Gilson stresses the fact that the leadership is given by Dante to different authorities in the different regions of thought: Ptolomaeus, St. Thomas, Aristotle, the Scriptures.

II.

CREDER PUOSSI E DI VEDER SI BRAMI

A.

On the question we are concerned with, the three authors considered say, more or less, as follows:

Pietrobono: The *Convivio* reflects a temporary renunciation of the inspiration which produced the *Vita nuova* and a return to it with the *Commedia.* As a symbol of this return, the "divine" Beatrice, who reigned over the *Vita nuova,* comes back to the *Commedia.*

Barbi: There is no break between the *Convivio* and the *Commedia,* except that the form used is now poetic. Beatrice symbolizes this change of formal expression.

Gilson: Faith and metaphysics, purposely excluded from the *Convivio* because they had no practical part there, are at the center of the *Commedia.* The Donna Gentile is, in the *Convivio,* a mere philosophical allegory; Beatrice, the young woman of the *Vita nuova,* is raised, in the *Commedia,* to the dignity of a revealer of religion.

This writer finds one fundamental deficiency common to these three positions. In none of them is there given a conclusive reason *why the philosophical work had to be interrupted when the poetical work was undertaken.* Pietrobono is aware of the essential difference between the two works, but seems too general in his attempt to explain it; the two other critics, considering them as essentially similar to one another, do not even touch our problem.

If, as Barbi and Gilson put it, the whole difference between the *Convivio* and *Commedia* consisted in a greater amount of Christian faith present in the latter than in the former and if, on the other hand, man's happiness, heavenly in the latter, earthly in the former, were really the main subject of the two works, then the interruption of the philosophical book remains a riddle. All the more so because the *Convivio* is not only a prose work, but required, for every book, a *canzone,* the highest kind of poetry according to Dante's own theory (*De Vulgari eloquentia* II, iii, 3), so that if he needed poetic expression, this urge might be appeased without interrupting the great work he had under way. On the other hand, he wrote at least one prose work years later, the *Monarchia;* it would be a mistake to say that, with the breaking off of the *Convivio,* he had become exclusively a poet. We need a profound and concrete reason to understand the inner necessity of the abrupt transition from the *Convivio,* together with the *De Vulgari eloquentia,* to the *Commedia.*

There seems to be not only one but two such reasons, one of a philosophical and religious nature, the other a literary and esthetic one. The first shows, perhaps more clearly than Pietrobono has done, that the character of Dante's change of thought inevitably obliged him to take the amazing step from the field of ethical investigation to the field of religious inspiration. The second refers to a literary fact which seems to have been overlooked. It may serve to make more palpable the reasons why that decisive step had to be taken just then.

The first reason is based on the fact that heavenly light and supernatural vision, even seeing in general, have no place in the *Convivio,* while the *Commedia* is centered about them. The second is that Dante, while writing the last chapters of the fourth book of the *Convivio* and of the fragment of the *De Vulgari eloquentia,* is evidently under the influence of having reread and understood more personally than before the *Aeneid* along with other Latin poetry.

It is not without anxiety that the present writer resumes a controversy which seemed to have been closed by three of the most notable authorities on this difficult subject. He is aware that whatever may be added to it, rests on the foundation laid by them and their predecessors. The following attempt to establish the essential difference between the *Convivio* and the *Commedia* will be based on a "contrast" established between Faith and Vision. As an introduction, it seems advisable to show by a few quotations that this same distinction prevails in the scholastic literature preceding Dante:

Faith and not vision in statu viatoris:

> Cum fides, apostolo teste, sit non apparentium, ut *fidei* objectum sit aliquid *visum*, fieri *non* potest.
> (Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theol.*, II, 2, qu.I,a.4, Conclusio)
>
> In hoc enim speramus *beatificari* quod *videbimus* aperta visione veritatem cui per *fidem* adhaeremus. (*ibid.*, qu.4,a.1)

Vision and not faith *in statu beatorum*:

> Cum *fides* sit qua quis credit quod non videt, beatus autem it videat quo beatificatur, *impossibile simpliciter est illam simul cum beatitudine* in eodem permanere subjecto. (*Op. cit.*, II, 1, qu.67,a.3, Conclusio)
>
> . . . *in statu gloriae* non solum actu *tollitur objectum fidei quod est non visum,* sed secundum possibilitatem . . . ; et ideo frustra talis habitus (*fides*) remaneret. (*ibid.*, a.5)
>
> Non potest in beatis spes esse *sicut nec fides,* cum eorum beatitudo non jam futura sed praesens sit. (*Op.cit.*,III,qu.18,a.2,Conclusio)

Hugo of St. Victor and St. Augustine:

> . . . quia homo *oculum contemplationis non habet,* Deum et quae in Deo sunt, videre non valet. (Hugo, quoted by Thomas, *op.cit.*,II,2,qu.5,a.1)
>
> Si intellegere *nondum* valetis, *credendo* securi in portu maneatis. (St. Augustine, *In Johannem,* 36,7)
>
> Si *non potes* intellegere, crede, ut intellegas. (*id. Sermones,* 118,2)

Angels *ante confirmationem*, man before the fall:

> Respondeo dicendum . . . quod in angelis ante confirmationem et in homine ante peccatum *non fuit fides, propter manifestam contemplationem* quae tunc erat de rebus divinis . . . (Thomas Aquinas, *op.cit.*, II,2,qu.5,a.1)

These are some of the fundamental assertions, all in favor of *faith as a substitute for vision only.* Enriching and in part modifying them, one finds in St. Thomas indications concerning the interrelation of faith and science: concerning faith, insofar it is *cognitio* which remains even with the *beati;* concerning the influence of divine illumination on human faith, reserved by St. Thomas—Dante's main teacher—in general for the *status beatorum* only. *Beati* means in general the souls in Paradise; but a kind of imperfect *beatitudo* is recognized as possible already on earth. In the case of St. Paul, St. Thomas alludes to the exceptional fact of a transitory vision of God's essence already *in statu viatoris.*[15]

The thesis set forth in the following pages asserts that in the *Convivio* Dante presents himself within the limits of the Christian faith as a normal *viator;* in the *Commedia* he is illuminated by the *lumen gratiae* and, at the end, sees God as the *beati* see him. Therefore, putting aside, for clearness' sake, the transitions between Faith and Vision as exemplified in the preceding paragraph, I shall use, for the problem treated in this paper, those two terms in the fundamental sense of *replacing each other,* as we have seen St. Thomas do it, and as we shall see Dante do it.

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[15] Faith and science: *Summa theologica* II, 2, qu. 2, a. 1; faith as *cognitio; ibid.*, II, 1, qu. 67, a. 5; illumination by divine grace: *De Veritate*, qu. 10, a. 11, ad 9, 11; *Summa theologica* I, qu. 12, a. 5; *beatitudo* and *status viatoris: Summa theologica* II, 1, qu. 5, a. 3; the *raptus* of St. Paul: *De Veritate*, qu. 13, a. 2.

B.

What do we find about seeing, light, vision in the *Convivio?*

(1) . . . in alcuno modo queste cose (*the Lady's eyes and smile*) nostro intelletto *abbagliano,* in quanto certe cose affermano essere che lo'ntelletto nostro *guardare non può,* cioè Dio e la etternitate e la prima materia; che *certissimamente si veggiono e con tutta fede si credono essere,* e però quello che sono intender noi non potemo (e nullo) se non *cose negando* (come sognando: Parodi) si può appressare a la sua conoscenza . . . Veramente può qui alcuno dubitare . . . che la scienza possa fare l'uomo beato, *non potendo* a lui perfettamente certe cose *mostrare* . . . A ciò si può chiaramente rispondere che lo desiderio naturale in ciascuna cosa è misurato secondo la possibilitate de la cosa desiderante: . . . Onde con ciò sia cosa che conoscere di Dio e di certe altre cose quello esse sono *non sia possibile* a la nostra natura, quello da noi naturalmente *non è desiderato* di sapere . . . (*Conv.* III,xv,6-8.10)

(2) E avvegna che quelle cose (*facts about the heavens*) . . . *assai poco sapere si possano, quel cotanto* che l'umana ragione *ne vede* ha più dilettazione che lo . . . certo de le cose de le quali si giudica (secondo lo senso) . . . (*Op.cit.,* II,iii,2)

(3) . . . ne la nostra *contemplazione* Dio sempre precede, *nè mai lui giungere potemo qui* . . . (*Op.cit.,* IV,xxii,17)

(4) Nè si meravigli alcuno se queste e altre ragioni che di ciò avere potemo, *non* sono del tutto *dimostrate;* che però medesimamente dovemo ammirare loro eccellenza—la quale *soverchia li occhi* de la mente umana . . . Poi che *non avendo* di loro alcuno senso . . . pure *risplende nel nostro intelletto alcuno lume* de la vivacissima loro essenza, in quanto vedemo le sopra dette ragioni . . . ;*si comme afferma chi ha li occhi chiusi,* l'aere essere *luminoso,* per *un poco di splendore o vero raggio,* c(om)e passa per *le pupille del vipistrello*: che non altrimenti sono chiusi *li nostri occhi intellettuali,* mentre che l'anima è legata . . . per li organi del nostro corpo. (*Op.cit.,* II,iv,16,f.)

(5) Poi quando dico: Elle *soverchian lo nostro intelletto,* excuso mi di ciò . . . e dico che poco ne dico per due ragioni. L'una si è che queste che paiono nel suo aspetto (*of the Donna Gentile*) *soverchiano lo'ntelletto nostro, cioè umano;* e dico come questo soverchiare è fatto, che è fatto *per lo modo che soverchia lo sole lo fragile viso, non pur lo sano e forte;* l'altra si è che *fissamente in esso guardare non può,* perche quivi s'inebria l'anima . . . (*Op.cit.,* III,viii,14)

These passages are sufficient to show the metaphysical limits within which the author of the *Convivio* scrupulously confines himself. The limits are traced at the point where *seeing* of supernatural things would begin. In all the five quotations this is the underlying feeling: mortal eyes can see very little or nothing of them, and so a reasonable human being does not even try to see them; consequently he *resigns* himself to believing them, to long for them, or to deduce them. We may observe that here the poet, far from making an exception for himself, submits to what he feels to be the inevitable conditions of *nostri occhi, nostra natura, nostro intelletto.* He is willing to suffer with his readers, to eat the same "bread" as his guests are eating, not to see more than they can see.

There are many words from the seeing-field used in the five passages; but all of them in a restricted or even negative sense. Let us reviw some of them, adding within parentheses the number of the corresponding passage. *Certissimamente si veggino . . . essere* (1) may seem to be an exception, but it does not mean a direct seeing of divine things; it refers, as is remarked by the editors, to *li occhi de la Sapienza sono le sue demostrazioni, con le quali si vede la veritade certissimamente* (III,xv,2). Therefore *vedere* is simply a metaphor here for "syllogistic deduction". Moreover, we have *queste cose abbagliano* (1) and *lo 'entelletto nostro guardare non può* (1). An *abbagliare,* a blinding effect of supernatural aspects, occurs frequently in the *Commedia* too, as will be shown later on. But the difference is that, in the Poem, such 'blindness' is followed by a strengthened eye sight, of which here there is no question. *Come sognando* (1), a conjectural reading in the *Testo critico,* is replaced in the edition of Busnelli and Vandelli by *cose negando,* the reading of the best manuscripts. Thus all that is left to science is *denying,* a purely dialectical and negative procedure, just the opposite of anything like "vision".[16] And even *sognando* would have expressed the one natural and not supernatural way left to man of "seeing" beyond the limits of reason. It is true that dreams play an important part also in the series of visionary experiences in the Poem; but the main and constant experience there is not dream but actual vision. Other expressions for seeing used negatively or nearly so are *non potendo mostrare* (1); *quel cotanto che l'umana ragione ne vede* (2); *contemplazione,* destined never to *giugnere* God (3); and others, marked by italics in the quotations.

So our author comes to two poetic comparisons, as compelling as any in the Poem,[17] but opposed to its trend, since it is not seeing but on the contrary almost blindness that is made "visible" by them: a) The aspect of the Lady is intolerable to the intellect, as the sun is, not only to weak but even to strong and healthy eyes (5). In the *Convivio,* then, the natural sun overpowers the human eye, whereas, in the *Commedia,* Dante's eyes become able to look not only into the natural sun but into its spiritual source.[18] b) Natural intellect (reason) "sees" just as much of the *eccellenza* of supernatural things—*la quale soverchia li occhi de la mente umana*—as the bat sees of the natural day light through its closed eyes (4). The bat, blind by day, then, is for the Dante of the *Convivio* the symbol for man in his approach to supernatural light; and, we repeat, he considers himself as one of the "bats". He claims no exception for his own eyes as long as he is writing his ethical *trattato.* The "bat" indeed is an incomparable symbol for a faith as far away from vision as possible—an "obscure", not an "illuminated" faith.

Vision is the supernatural element not to be found in the *Convivio.* The eyes as being able to convey supernatural impressions do not enter here. Faith, on the other hand, is at all times present in the mind of our philosopher, a fact made even clearer by the demonstrations of Barbi and Gilson. And we can go a step farther still. By the very absence of anything like "vision" as a positive means to penetrate into God's mysteries, "faith" obtains, in the *Convivio,* an independent force and an importance superior to that which it has in the *Commedia.* In the *Convivio,* faith is placed above reason and it is not subordinated to anything, because the one thing superior to it, vision, does not exist here as a positive fact, but only as a supernatural experience not to be attained by mortal man. Faith is, consequently, the means to the highest spiritual goal which mankind in its struggle for earthly happiness is able to attain. . . . . *con tutta fede si credono essere* (2): this is the highest religious step possible to the author of the *Convivio.*

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[16] Busnelli and Vandelli give the corresponding passages from St. Thomas. In opposition to the two Italian editors, Gilson (*op. cit.,* p. 136) stresses Dante's independence on St. Thomas and this because in the *Convivio* Dante gives less visual power to the natural intellect than does St. Thomas. This means that, in Dante's ethical philosophy, there is left even less room for "seeing" than in St. Thomas. B. Nardi, *Nel Mondo di Dante* (Roma, 1944), pp. 82 ff., is opposed to *cose negando* and prefers *come sognando,* the conjecture mentioned above.

[17] The image of the 'bat' is not Dante's however. It goes back to Aristotle (*Metaphysics* A el, I, 993b9) and has been used by many of the scholastics. St. Thomas: . . . sicut sol qui est maxime visibilis, videri non potest a vespertilione propter excessum luminis (*Sum. Theol.* I, qu. 12, a. 1). Cf. Busnelli-Vandelli on *Convivio* II, iv, 17. Petrarca: ut solem noctua, sic ille (Aristoteles) felicitatem, hoc est, lucem eius et radios, sed non ipsam vidisse videatur (*De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia,* c. iv; ed. Capelli, 1906, p. 40). For later reflections of the image see the present writer's *Torquato Tasso. Studien zur Vorgeschichte des Secentismo* (Bern, 1951), p. 204 and note 251. Dante also uses the *talpa* as a symbol for blindness (*Purgatorio* XVII, 3) as others the owl etc.

[18] See *infra,* note 22.

C.

All this has been changed in the *Commedia.* Here faith is of secondary importance, subordinated to, and even—there is no other expression left—put into "contrast" with the poet's glorious faculty of seeing with eyes illuminated by the *lumen gratiae.* Let us cite some passages:

(a) *creder* puossi e di *veder* si brami. (*Par.* X,45)
(b) Io (*Giustiniano*) li credetti; e ciò che'n sua fede era,
vegg'io or chiaro . . . (*ibid.* VI,19 f.)
(c) Lì si *vedrà* ciò che tenem per *fede,*
non dimostrato, ma fia per sè noto,
a guisa del ver primo che l'uom crede. (*ibid.* II,43 f.)
(d) Ed io appresso: Le profonde cose
che mi largiscon qui *la lor parvenza,*
a li occhi di là giù son sì ascose,
che l'esser loro v'è *in sola credenza* . . .
E da questa credenza si convene
sillogizzar, sanz'aver altra vista . . . (*ibid.* XXIV,70 f.)
(e) O santo padre, spirito che *vedi*
ciò che *credesti* . . . (*ibid.* v.124 f.)
(f) La forma universal di questo nodo
credo ch'io vidi . . . (*ibid.* XXXIII,91 f.)[19]

In these quotations seeing is established as the fulfilment of faith which, therefore, no longer appears as satisfactory in itself. The general feeling is now that man on earth *in statu viatoris* must have faith, not for faith's sake, but only that he may hope to see after death *in patria* (a) (c). Passage (d) especially is like a glance backward on the narrow limits within which the author of the *Convivio* had constrained himself to work. Then he had *sola credenza* and the only way open to him was *sillogizzar*—the key word of scholastic philosophical procedure; now *le profonde cose* give him their *parvenza,* dialectical reasoning is necessary no longer. To encourage man to believe while hoping for something better, the poet shows him the status of the blessed *beati* who see and need not, therefore, believe any more. (b) (e). In passage (f), the poet, facing the Vision of visions, couples *credere* with *vedere,* because, in this highest moment, he does not trust his memory but is true to his basic intention of affirming only as reality what he is absolutely sure he has seen. For reality and seeing, in the *Commedia,* are inseparable,a point stressed by this writer on many earlier occasions.[20]

But the really decisive difference is this: the author of the *Convivio* had, as we have seen, submitted himself to the limits of mortal man, limits established also in the *Commedia,* in accordance with the Thomistic doctrine. But in the *Convivio,* he did not even try to "see" anything beyond natural limits. In the *Commedia,* on the other hand, it has been granted the poet to overcome, in an ecstatic rush, those human restrictions. He himself is now seeing; his own mortal eyes are opened mercifully to the reality of God's realm. Therefore there can be no doubt but that once Dante had experienced such a miracle of grace, he could no longer write the views of the "bat". He took the great step away from the Donna Gentile, back and forward to Beatrice.

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[19] While describing the *unión mistica,* St. John of the Cross speaks of 'aquella misma luz divina y calor divino que se lo (*scil.* el contento al alma) da; lo cual en la otra vida es por medio de la lumbre de la gloria y en ésta por medio de la fe ilustradisima'. (*Llama de amor viva* IV, vv. 5, 6; *Obras* (Mexico City, 1942), p. 936). C. S. Singleton characterizes Dante's specific relation to reality in the *Commedia* by changing the Thomistic 'praecedit fides, sequitur intellectus' into 'praecedit fides, sequitur visio'. ('Dante and Myth', *Journal of the History of Ideas* X (1949), 502).

[20] See *infra,* note 21.

D.

This writer has tried elsewhere to show that, epigrammatically speaking, *the central action of the Commedia is the story of the development of the poet's eyes in their confrontation with the reality of transcendence.*[21] It is here, in the tension between seeing and reality, that I find the so often sought for "unity" of the Poem, and not only of the *Paradiso*. For, from the first step out of the *selva oscura*, the Poem is centered on experiences of the eyes and their efforts to assure themselves of the reality around them. In the *Inferno* we still have the natural eyesight corresponding to the earthlike if marvelous character of that godless region. But since it is marvelous, the poet feels that what he tells us can not be accepted by the reader as real without being proved; and the constantly renewed proof given by the poet is that he has *seen with his own eyes* the things he is relating. Furthermore, the main element of admonition of Vergil, his moral preceptor, to his pupil is *seeing together with marching* . . . guarda e passa. (*Inf.* III,51).

Nothing in any way comparable to this emphasis upon the eyes and their encounter with reality is to be found in the *Convivio*.

But we do find it in an earlier book by our author. His *Vita nuova* is a work based on the sense of the eyes as is the *Commedia*. The *spiriti del viso* stand at the beginning of the *Vita nuova*, and they struggle with Love for their place (II,5;XIV,5 f.). The first adventure told is a *maravigliosa visione* (III,3). Later on are colors, beautiful visages, garments, monsters too and specters seen in a fever dream, Death and Love in personal, visible appearence; in short, reality as received through the eyes. These are the main contents of the youthful love story, even if half hidden under the discrete veil of generalizing anonymity, and veiled once more by an esthetically introverted, aristocratically obscure style. A *mirabile visione* is at its end (XLII,1), when natural seeing begins to be replaced by supernatural ecstatic contemplation. And not to forget the basic fact; Love is received through the eyes by a troubadour like Dante:

De li occhi suoi, come ch'ella li mova,
escono spirti d'amor inflammati,
che feron *li occhi* a quel che allor la *guati*
e passan sì che'l cor ciascun ritrova:
voi le *vedete* Amor *pinto nel viso,*
la've *non pote alcun mirarla fiso.* (*ibid.*, XIX,12).[22]

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[21] Cf. *Italica*, XXIV (1947), 290 ff. and the references on 274, note 1.

[22] Two important books dealing with the *dolce stil nuovo* have recently been published: J. E. Shaw, *Guido Cavalcanti's Theory of Love* (Toronto, 1949), especially p. 128 ff. and C. S. Singleton, *An Essay on the Vita nuova* (Cambridge, Mass., 1949), *passim*. The question of the so-called *rifacimento* at the end of the *Vita nuova* (see *supra*, note 10) may be considered under this point of view of 'seeing'. While there is no mention in the *Vita nuova* from chapter I-XL of any restriction of the visual powers of man, we find towards the end: con ciò sia cosa che lo nostro intelletto s'abbia a quelle benedette anime *sì come l'occhio debole a lo sole* (chapter XLI, 6). That is, only here do we find the pessimism concerning human visual power that is prominent in the *Convivio*. Immediately following these words comes a quotation from Aristotle illustrating the same idea. It is erroneous (cf. G. Salvadori, *La Vita giovanile di Dante*, (1906), p. 111 ff.), but it is the only time Aristotle is named in the book while reference to him occurs at every moment in the *Convivio* and the other later writings. The *occhio debole* and this quotation add a foreign note to the style of the *Vita nuova*. One wonders if, in spite of all evidence to the contrary, at least chapter XLI was not added later.

Thus, it is *with reference to this living through the eyes* that the *Convivio* really forms a gap between the *Vita nuova* on the one hand, and the *Commedia* on the other. In the *Convivio,* the author's guides are not seeing and vision, but reason and faith. While the poet of the *Vita nuova* and again that of the *Commedia* is not to be imagined without his eyes open, the *Convivio* might have been written by a blind man, although one longing to be able to see.

This may be the place to stress a fact which has symbolic force. The radiant eyes and the inspired smile of Beatrice are already to be found in the *Convivio* where they belong, not to Beatrice, but to her philosophical rival, the Donna Gentile. The striking difference between the two smiles and the two pairs of eyes is that in the *Convivio* they are only mentioned to be explained allegorically, while in the Poem the allegory of Beatrice's eyes and smile, if there is one, must be discovered by the reader. In the *Convivio* we read:

> Dice adunque lo testo che ne la faccia di costei appariscono cose che mostrano de'piaceri di Paradiso; e distingue lo loco dove ciò appare, cioè *ne li occhi e ne lo riso.* E qui si conviene sapere che li occhi de la Sapienza sono *le sue demonstrazioni* . . . ; e lo suo riso *le sue persuasioni* . . . (III,xv,1 f.)

This the author says in his explanation of the "allegorical" sense of his *canzone.* But even in the "literal" explanation, he does not say much more than that one cannot look at those eyes (III,viii,14); just the opposite of what happens with Beatrice's eyes and smile to the poet of the *Vita nuova* and of the *Paradiso.* In the *Commedia* we read:

> Apri gli occhi e riguarda qual son io:
> tu hai *vedute* cose, che *possente*
> *se' fatto a sostener* lo riso mio. (Par. XXIII,46 f.)

In the *Paradiso,* the smile of Beatrice is so real, though supernatural, that her last, most sublime but also most tender smile, from her seat in the Rose, cannot but make the reader remember the first smile of the young girl in the street of Florence.[23] Her eyes, although filled with divine light, are really shining. And on the poet's side, there are visions of real if supernatural things, seen with real if supernaturally strengthened eyes. If there is anything "allegorical", such as the *demostrazioni* and the *persuasioni* of the *Convivio,* left here, at least the poet does not mention it.

In the *Convivio,* as in the *Monarchia* and the *De Vulgari eloquentia,* propositions are proved by syllogizing. In the *Commedia,* and already in the *Vita nuova,* reality is made convincing by seeing. The artistic ethics of the Poem can be summarized in a twofold statement such as the following, inapplicable to the *Convivio*: What has been seen by the poet is real and true, and so he tells it; what he has not seen, he does not claim as real and true, and so he does not tell it. Here are three examples:

> Sempre a *quel ver* c'ha faccia di menzogna
> de' l'uom chiuder le labbra fin ch'el pote . . .
> ma qui tacer nol posso; e per le note
> di questa comedìa, lettor, *ti giuro*
> *ch'i'vidi* . . .
> venir notando una figura in suso . . . (*Inf.* XVI,124 f.)
> *Io non vidi e però dicer non posso,*
> *come mosser* li astor celestiali;
> *ma vidi ben* e l'un e l'altro *mosso.* (*Purg.* VIII,103 f.)

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[23] See *The University of Toronto Quarterly,* XII (1943), 207.

La forma universal di questo nodo
credo ch'io vidi . . . (*Par.* XXXIII,91 f.)

E.

Seeing confronted with reality and even a proof of reality: this motive, essentially absent from the *Convivio,* is the leading one in the *Commedia.* Thus, the antithesis between the visionary Poem and the *trattato* where light and vision have no place becomes especially striking, when, in the Poem, light appears with the reappearance of the earthly sun at the foot of the Holy Mountain. For here begins the second and most exciting part of what we have called "the story of Dante's eyes". From now on these mortal eyes are trying to tolerate the ever increasing power of the reality of the divine region, a reality presenting itself in the form of light, natural and supernatural: the earthly sun at first;[24] an angel's wings and face; the light-woven bodies of the blessed; the shining heavens; the divine *punto* (*Par.* XXVIII,16); the sea of light in the Empyrean; and at the end when hearing, speaking, memory, will and wish have disappeared, the three-colored Trinity with a *fulgore* (XXXIII,141) as the last visionary experience.[25]

Increasing strength has been infused into Dante's mortal eyes more than once by Beatrice's eyes and smile, bearers of the lumen gloriae. But now a crisis has been reached when the ever failing ability of these human eyes to do their superhuman task is felt as an earthly remainder, the burden of which can be suffered no longer. The solution is as sublime as it is organic and legitimate in this atmosphere of light and vision. I refer to the "merciful blinding" in the canto of St. John: at first glance a punishment like that in the story of St. Paul at Damascus; in reality a mercy, followed by an eyesight which, for the first time, is similar to that of the blessed.[26]

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[24] At first, looking into the natural sun is still impossible (*Par.* I, 58) just as it had been in *Conv.* III, viii, 14. But later on, looking down from the Fixed Stars, he will say: l'aspetto . . . quivi sostenni (*Par.* XXII. 42 f.).

[25] Hearing and speaking: *Par.* XXXI, 41 f.; memory: XXXIII, 106 f.; phantasy, will, wish: *ibid.*, 142 f. The moment here described is quite similar to pure contemplation of the divine light, without the use of intellect, speech or concept as described by Plotinus, *Enneades* V, 3, 17. But Dante's intellect was still actively awake a few lines before when he *veder volea* the mystery of the Incarnation (*ibid.* 137), and nowhere does he say that, even at the last moment, his enquiring intellect was appeased. To call Dante a mystic, if one considers such a passage, seems misleading in spite of appearances. Perhaps L. Tonelli made happy use of the expression *estasi estetica* rather than *estasi mistica* in his *Dante e la poesia dell'ineffabile* (Firenze, 1934), p. 31. To feel how near Dante is to a really *religious* extasis, compared to the writers of lyrics some decades later, one need but read Petrarca, *Sonnet 34* (*In vita di Madonna Laura*). Here too speaking, weeping, sighing are quenched and *sola la vista mia* del cor non tace; but this happens not under the influence of God's presence but under that of the beloved.

[26] Ahi quanto ne la mente mi commossi, / quando mi volsi per veder Beatrice, / per non poter veder . . . (*Par.* XXV, 136 ff.). The exterior reason for the blinding has been the poet's attempt to see the supposed body of St. John (*ibid.*, 118 ff., especially . . . perchè *t'abbagli* / per veder cosa che qui non ha loco? 122 f.). But even though we consider only the 'literal' sense of the episode, it would seem absurd to have him punished so shortly after having gloriously passed the examinations and that *nel mondo felice* (*ibid.*, 139). It is much more reasonable to understand the blinding as the doing away with mortal eyes to be replaced with blessed ones just immediately before entering the Empyrean. Thus St. John himself at once predicts new eyesight for the poet (XXVI, 4 f.). Beatrice will bestow it upon him and she does so. Then the poet describes the great boon that has been given him, the *lumen gratiae,* in the touchingly simple words: *onde mei che dinanzi* vidi poi (*ibid.*, 79). This interpretation of the blindness becomes more probable by the fact that in the cantos immediately preceding canto XXV, the poet's complaints concerning the weakness of his natural eyesight have been more frequent than usual. Physical blindness, considered almost as a condition for supernatural vision, does not disappear with the Middle Ages although it may now be used with relation to worldly affairs. Petrarca allows the blind Homer to say: qui mihi corporeos (oculos) Deus abstulit, ille nequibat / restituisse *alios, quibus haec arcana viderem?* (Africa IX, 201 f.). A poet, inspired by the religious revival of the counter-Reformation, Barahona de Soto, recalls even the visionary presence of angels to make credible that

The blinding as a transition to stronger sight occurs not only where we have just studied it, though only there it is described in detail. Two other times in the Poem does the poet undergo similar though very rapid experiences; that is, this topic of supernaturally increased seeing belongs so intimately to the idea of the *Commedia* that its outstanding symbol presents itself almost instinctively. The first event of this kind is to be found in the *Purgatorio*. Dante has looked at the guardian angel while ascending from the sixth to the seventh terrace. On many such occasions, there was felt only the too strong impression of supernatural light on the mortal eyes without further consequences:

> . . . per che l'occhio da presso nol sostenne
> ma chinail giuso . . . (*Purg.* II,39 f.)
> . . . dentro a un lume che li era,
> tal che mi vinse e guardar nol potei. (*ibid.* XXVII,59 f.)

But this time the poet says not only: L'aspetto suo m'avea la vista tolta, but he adds:

> per ch'io mi volsi dietro ai miei dottori,
> com'uom che va *secondo ch'elli ascolta.* (*ibid.* XXIV,142 f.)

"Like a man who walks according to what he hears," that is *like a blind man.* We have here *ascoltare* as a substitute for *vedere,* just as, in the scene with St. John, we have "ragionare": ben è che ragionando la (*vista*) *compense.* (*Par.* XXVI,6)

The other episode describing a concrete if rapidly vanishing blindness is to be found in the Empyrean:

> Come subito lampo che discetti
> li spiriti visivi sì che priva
> da l'atto l'occhio di più forti obietti,
> cosi mi circunfulse luce viva;
> e lasciommi *fasciato* di tal *velo*
> del suo fulgor, che *nulla m'appariva.* (*Par.* XXX,46 f.)

Already the comparison with the dispersion of the *spiriti visivi,* that is a transitory state of physical blindness,[27] suggests to the reader something like a supernatural blinding. This impression is strengthened by the metaphor of a veil and a bandage, *fasciato,* as if placed on blind eyes. But more important are the verses following these, telling about the eyesight not only recovered but strengthened:

> e *di novella vista* mi raccesi
> tale che *nulla luce è tanto mera,*
> che li occhi miei *non si fosser difesi.* (*ibid.* v.58 f.)

Exactly as in the scene with St. John, the "blindness" appears not only as temporarily preceding the stronger eyesight, but almost as causing it. The merciful gift of the *lumen gratiae* has had its beginning but not its fulfilment in that first scene.[28]

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his blind Orco can fall in love with Angelica (*Las Lágrimas de Angélica* III, 43 ff.).

[27] Cf. *Vita nuova* XIV, 5 f.

[28] Even after the apparently definitive acquisition of 'blessed' eyes, as affirmed in *Par.* XXVI, 56-8, these became stronger still by being bathed in the Sea of Light (*ibid.*, XXX, 85 ff.), and once more so in the presence of the Trinity (*ibid.*, XXXIII, 52-7). As a personal merit, just as if seeing and nothing else were man's task set him by God, Bernardo submits to the Blessed Virgin that Dante has *vedute* / le vite spirituali . . . (*ibid.*, 23 f.) and on the basis of that 'merit', she is asked to strengthen his eyesight once more—the central theme of the Poem! No other religious or moral gifts are asked of her to prepare the traveler for his appearance before God except: che possa con li occhi levarsi. . . . And thus it comes to pass: . . . la mente mia . . : / *mirava* fissa,

Thus our poet's imagination is led by this deep and bright symbol of the mortal eyes in their heroic struggle with the experienced reality of divine light—a symbol varied hundreds of times throughout the Poem; of their falling into blindness and their being saved and strengthened mercifully by the same power which made them succumb. Nothing of all this could have been introduced within the limits of the ethical *trattato.* It is evident that, once the poet's spirit found itself filled with this greatest of all his religious symbols—the experience of his eyes confronted with the reality of supernatural light, a symbol which, besides being religious more than philosophical, is *poetic and not prosaic*—he had to renounce his philosophical and ethical prose writing, *per correr migliori acque* of religious poetry.

F

There are passages in the Poem which reveal their secret only if understood through this fundamental idea of reality apparent to the eyes, and particularly in the form of divine light received by vision. In the XXVIIIth and XXIXth cantos of the *Paradiso,* Beatrice expounds to Dante the doctrine of the angels, their nature, creation, fall, wisdom, number. This lecture, accompanying or rather interrupting and rationalizing as it does the sublime vision of the nine angelic choirs turning about the *divino punto* (XXVIII,1-39), might be condemned by the unprejudiced reader as one of the most scholastic and least poetic parts of the whole Poem. However, the lecture loses abstractness and gains interior necessity and even poetic life if we understand it as conceived out of the experience of vision replacing every other human *habitus.* The first lines of canto XXIX (7-9) show us Beatrice herself gazing for an imperceptibly short and full moment at the radiant point which symbolizes God, silent, and evidently *praying* for illumination for what she has still to say about her arduous problem. This opening moment of visionary prayer may warn the reader that the following explanations will contain more vision and less reasoning than he might expect at the first impression.[29] In fact, the speech is centered about the happiness of the angels seeing into the mind of God. Already in canto XXVIII, *love,* though it is the condition for the *lumen gratiae* and the essence of angelic life, had been placed on a secondary level opposite to vision itself, the restful haven of the unquiet intellect. And this in conformity with St. Thomas and St. Augustine:

> quinci si può veder *come si fonda*
> *l'esser beato ne l'atto che vede,*
> *non in quel ch'ama* che poscia seconda. (*Par.* XXVIII,109 f.)

Now Beatrice goes on to say even more concerning *memory,* which is needed no longer by those who enjoy uninterrupted contemplation:

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immobile e attenta, / e sempre *di mirar* faceasi accesa (*ibid.,* 97 f.). Once again there is an additional reinforcement: . . . per *la vista che s'avvalorava* / in me guardando . . . (*ibid.,* 112 f.).

[29] It is not inexpedient to stress the evidence that Beatrice's look at the *punto* is a prayer for illumination. The writer has consulted Scartazzini, Grandgent, Torraca, Philalethes, Vossler, Zingarelli; the latter, at least states: Beatrice, in quella contemplazione, ha veduto il suo desiderio (*Vita di Dante,* p. 1302), but all are concerned with the comparatively secondary astronomical indications which introduce the passage and not with Beatrice's gaze and with what it means. This prayer-like gaze at God's light before entering upon a difficult instruction reminds us of her earlier contemplation of the earthly sun, the mirror of divine light. Moreover, this gaze should be understood, analogically, as a moment of recollection in prayer before Beatrice rises to heaven with her disciple (*Par.* I, 43 ff. Cf. also *Italica,* XXIX (1947), 294 f., where the writer had not as yet realized these implications). Compare Vergil's 'practical' gaze upon the sun with Beatrice's 'mystical' regard (*Purg.* XIII, 13 ff.). Mystical prayer does not fit into Vergil's rational, ethical and humanistic character; what he seeks in the sun is information concerning the way leading up to the Mountain.

> *. . . non hanno veder interciso*
> *da novo obietto,* e però *non bisogna*
> *rememorar* per concetto diviso. (*ibid.* XXIX,79 f.)

Here one feels a most personal touch, a touch almost of envy, in this negative but exact description of the act of remembering by a poet who so often and so bitterly complains of the insufficiency of memory as an instrument of intellectual activity.[30] We need memory, because it is the only mortal way of recalling reality that we have seen but see no longer; but for the negative point of view of Dante, the recalled reality will never be what the seen reality was. This seemingly scholastically abstract canto is impregnated with personal emotion, if only one keeps in mind the idea of *vision* as underlying it. Beatrice concludes her lecture about contemplation with a *vedi* . . . (142). Already (67 f.), she had insisted on the power of her speech to make her disciple look at the angels without need of further questions about them.[31]

As a kind of formal peak in the development of the theme of seeing within the *Commedia,* we may consider the moment when the word *vidi* has reached the dignity of rhyming only with itself. That dignity had been reserved until that moment, with one exception hard to explain, to *Cristo* only.[32] The power of sight acquired by our religious traveller is now, after his "merciful blinding", no longer that of mortal eyes. It is now equal to the supernatural, inviolable strength with which the blessed look at God, as is expressed in the verses quoted above (*Par.* XXX,56 f.). Very shortly after this decisive point in the "story of Dante's eyes confronted with transcendence", there comes the *vidi* twice (95 ff.) echoing itself like an esthetic stamp on a long visionary effort. There is now, as it were, no linguistic counterpart to correspond to the sound of a word which we may call the central word in the *sacrato poema,* and which, in the philosophical *trattato,* had only a negative part if any: *vedere.*

III.

THE REREADING OF THE *AENEID* AND THE STEP FROM PROSE TO POETRY.

A.

We have tried to show what new insight evidently shattered Dante's philosophical limitations of the *Convivio* epoch, obliging him to change his way of

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[30] We quote two examples from many: *Par.* XXX, 25 ff.; *ibid.,* XXXIII, 106 f. Concerning *caritas* (*amore*) as remaining with the *beati* as opposed to *fides* and *spes* which disappear, cf. St. Thomas. *Summa Theol.* II, i, qu. 67, a. 5, 6.

[31] With the intention of freeing future visual impressions from accompanying explanations, Vergil explains the system of the *Basso Inferno* before entering into it: ma *perchè poi ti basti pur la vista,* / intendi come e perchè son constretti (*Inf.* XI, 20 f.). The same technique, a notable achievement in the composition of this type of travel poem, is to be found where Vergil makes use of a pause to explain the general system of the Mountain of Purgatory before they see it (*Purg.* XVII, 82 ff.). Seeing, freed as much as possible from every other concern, is really the thread that runs through the Poem.

[32] This threefold *vidi* has been understood satisfactorily by earlier readers of Dante. Some of these have been pointed out by Scartazzini on *Par.* XXX, 97. Places have been cited where words rhyme only with themselves in *Italica,* XXIV, 303, note 20.

The word *Cristo* had 'to be raised in dignity' because of Dante's own purification and sublimization before it could be allowed to rhyme only with itself. We have a striking proof of that fact. In one of the sonnets to Forese Donati (*Rime* LXXVII, 9 ff.), the word *Cristo* occurs as a rhyme word between *tristo* and *acquisto,* just as if Christ were being crucified between two sinners by a still careless young mocker. *Cristo* appears as a rhyme word with two other words of the same ending because Dante himself was at that time simply one of a group of young men similar to himself. And then Dante, together with *Cristo,* ascended to a point where no other man could be associated any longer with him and where the word *Cristo* could no longer be associated with another. Pulci, in spite of being a spirit apparently as different as possible from Dante, echoes, evokes and quotes

Christian ethics and their prosaic expression for the way of Christian vision and poetic form, a way not entirely different from that of his youthful love poetry. We cannot say under what impulsion the revelation of vision as the element of his real spiritual destiny may have come to him. There must have been a moment of "illumination" while he was composing the last part of *Convivio* IV, a moment when he said to himself: "What I have asserted in this *trattato,* is not true. At any rate, I now know that mortal man is not limited to a belief in the reality of God. He may see it if, through God's mercy, his eyes are strengthened for the vision." After this had been revealed to him, the *Convivio* was already virtually condemned to remain unfinished and the *Commedia* had already virtually begun to replace it.[33]

Nevertheless, our author wrote the fourth book, by far the deepest and the most original of all, full of superrational insight into divine predestination as manifested in the mysteries of human "individuation". Moreover, when he had nearly finished book IV he evidently still intended to go on with the *trattato,* for he says:

> . . . avendo ricevuto da Dido tanto di piacere, quanto *di sotto nel settimo trattato* si dicerà . . . (IV,xxvi,8)
> Ma però che di giustizia *nel penultimo trattato di questo volume* si tratterà . . . (*ibid.,* XXVII,11)

Thus, although we may be sure that Dante's interior evolution was carrying him irresistibly beyond the horizon within which the ethical book had to be continued, we have not yet found any exact point of relative chronology from which to date the moment of the transition. We are still asking: what reason—it must not be a visionary adventure—may have induced him practically to take the irrevocable step? For no small amount of moral force was necessary to sacrifice that fruit of years of hard work. We may feel in such passages as the following—only two among many—how seriously he took his *trattato,* how he loved this prose book while groaning under the almost too heavy burden of writing it:[34]

> Però nullo si maravigli se per molte divisioni si procede, con ciò sia cosa che *grande ed alta opera* sia per le mani al presente e *da li autori poco cercata,* e che *lungo* convegna essere lo trattato e *sottile,* nel quale *per me ora s'entra* . . . (IV,iii,3)
> *Oh com'è grande la mia impresa,* a volere omai così trifoglioso campo sarchiare . . . ! Certo non del tutto questo mondare intendo . . . (*ibid.,* VII,4)

It would not be astonishing if a man of less strong character had renounced a task which seemed almost too difficult and, still more important, one that had

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him at every turn. It is no wonder then that he allows *Cristo* to rhyme only with itself. Cf. *Morgante Maggiore* XXV, 98 (the first six lines of a stanza); 126 (the last two lines).

[33] In order to show more exactly the non-visual character of the *Convivio* together with the *De Vulgari Eloquentia* and *De Monarchia,* and the basically visual character of the *Commedia* together with the *Vita nuova,* comparative statistics of words and word groups denoting sight and seeing (natural and supernatural) would be needed. In this chapter we shall leave aside the still mooted question whether there existed a draft of the Poem, at least of the Inferno, written as early as *ca.* 1295. This writer believes that A. Bassermann has found a way to a solution in 'Urcommedia', *Deutsches Dante-Jahrbuch,* XII (1930), 211 ff. G. Borgese has tried to uncover evidence that there is a complete change of style from *Inferno* VIII on ('The Wrath of Dante', *Speculum,* XIII (1938), 183 ff.). For the matter treated in this paper, the question is not essential.

[34] The other main passages wherein he expresses the difficulty of the task, especially in book IV, are: v, 2; xvi, 2; xxi, 6. In the preceding three books, such are not to be found. The fourth was by far the most important and the most difficult for him and it was during the composition of it that Dante made up his mind to change over to the Poem.

already become foreign to the secret depths of his mind. But to exchange that load for the Poem, a load a thousand times heavier still, that may seem astonishing. For it is not enough to say that the Poem had to be one of vision and religious inspiration and would be in this way a more pleasant task than to march on in the dust of scientific prose. Everybody knows how the new responsibility weighed upon the poet's shoulders:

> Di nova pena *mi conven* far versi
> e dar matera al ventesimo canto
> de la prima canzon, ch'è de'sommersi. (*Inf.* XX,1 f.)
> . . . cotal qual io la lascio a maggior bando
> che quel de la mia tuba, che deduce
> l'*ardua* sua materia terminando. (*Par.* XXX,34 f.)

We shall seek, therefore, what additional cause may have precipitated the decision of our poet to throw away the *trattato* about reason and faith, renouncing many things which he had prepared already, and to begin the *tractatus* about seeing and vision. We find that cause in the evidence that Dante, while writing the last chapters of the *Convivio* (and probably of *De Vulgari eloquentia*), was rereading his Latin classics and had a decisive spiritual meeting with the one who was to be his *duce*, Vergil.

B.

Already in the *Vita nuova*, Dante quotes Vergil and other Latin poets and he does so according to the following form:

> che li poete abbiano così parlato come detto è, appare per Virgilio; lo quale dice che Juno, cioè una dea nemica de li Troiani, parloe ad Eolo, segnore de li venti, quivi nel primo de lo Eneida: *Eole, nanque tibi,* e che questo segnore le rispuose, quivi: *Tuus, o regina* . . . Per Lucano parla la cosa animata a la cosa inanimata, quivi: *Multum, Roma,* . . . Per Orazio . . . Per Ovidio . . .(XXV,9)

That is to say, he simply mentions their names, sometimes, for example Vergil and Ovid, accompanied by the title of their books, and then gives a short textual quotation, without showing any personal relation towards them. It is indeed exceptional if he says *lo modo del buono Omero* (*ibid.*), distinguishing in this reserved way the one Greek poet who was for him the greatest, just as he was for the centuries after him.[35]

In the same way, we find the Latin poets mentioned in the *Convivio* until shortly before the end. Our examples will be limited to the three poets most important to Dante:

> *Virgilio* dice nel quarto de lo Eneida che la Fama . . . (*Conv.* I,iii,10)
> Vergilio nel primo de lo Eneida, ove dice Venere ad Amore:
> "Figlio, vertù mia . . . " (*ibid.* II,v,14)
> Virgilio, d'Enea parlando, . . . pietoso lo chiama. (*ibid.* II,x,5)
> . . . sì come fa Virgilio nel secondo de lo Eneidos, che chiama Enea: "O luce",
> ch'era atto, "e speranza de'Troiani", che è passione . . . (*ibid.* III,xi,16)
> . . . Virgilio nel primo de lo Eneida, quando dice, in persona di Dio parlando:
> "A costoro . . . " (*ibid.* IV,iv,11)

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[35] See the delightful article of G. Toffanin, 'Omero e il Rinascimento', *Comparative Literature*, I (1949), 57, 62. In the Poem, Vergil is called *buono* several times; and St. Thomas Aquinas with the same mixture of respect and familiarity *buon frate* (*Conv.* IV, xxx, 3). For Dante's erudition and reading, quotations from classical authors in the *Vita nuova* and the *Convivio*, the allegory of the *Convivio*, see P. Chistoni, *La seconda fase del pensiero dantesco* (Livorno, 1903), chapter V and especially chapter IV.

> . . . lo figurato che di questo diverso processo de l'etadi tiene Virgilio ne lo Eneida . . . (*ibid.* IV,xxiv,9)[36]
> . . . anco per la testimonianza di *Lucano* nel nono suo libro . . . (*ibid.* III,v,12)
> Onde si legge ne le storie d'Ercule, e ne l'Ovidio Maggiore, e in Lucano, e in altri poeti . . . (*ibid.* III,iii,7)
> E ciò testimonia Lucano, quando dice, a quelle parlando: "Sanza contenzione . . . " (*ibid.* IV,xi,3)
> E ciò vuol dire Lucano nel quinto libro, quando commenda la povertà di sicuranza, dicendo: "O sicura facoltà . . . ". E quello dice Lucano, quando ritrae come Cesare di notte a la casetta del pescatore Amiclas venne, per passare lo mare Adriano. (*ibid.* IV,xiii,12)[37]
> . . . e sì come dice *Stazio* nel quinto del Tebaidos, quando Isifile dice ad Archimoro: "O consolazione . . ." (*ibid.* III,xi,16)
> . . . sì come dice Stazio poeta del tebano Edipo, quando dice che "con etterna notte solvette lo suo dannato pudore". (*ibid.* III,viii,10)

These are all the quotations of the three poets occurring before *Conv.* IV,xxv. Their general form,[38] is, as one sees, almost the same as that of those in *Vita nuova* XXV: names and places in the corresponding text briefly mentioned; the text itself given in Italian this time and not in Latin; no added personal remarks or impressions. So it goes to the end of IV,xxiv. Then we read:

> E così infrenato mostra *Virgilio, lo maggiore nostro poeta,* che fosse Enea, ne la parte de lo Eneida ove questa etade si figura: . . . E *quanto raffrenare fu quello,* quando, avendo ricevuto da Dido tanto piacere . . . e usando con essa tanto di dilettazione, elli si partio, per seguire onesta . . . via e fruttuosa, come nel quarto de l'Eneida scritto è! *Quanto spronare fu quello,* quando esso Enea sostenette solo con Sibilla a intrare ne lo Inferno a cercare de l'anima di suo padre Anchise, contra tanti pericoli, come nel sesto di detta istoria si dimostra! . . . (*ibid.* IV,xxvi,8 f.)
>
> E questa cortesia mostra che avesse Enea *questo altissimo poeta,* . . . quando dice che Enea rege, per onorare lo corpo di Miseno morto, che era stato trombatore d'Ettore . . . ,s'accinse e prese la scure ad aiutare tagliare le legne, per lo fuoco che devea ardere lo corpo morto . . . (*ibid.* IV,xxvi,13)
>
> . . . sì come dice lo predetto poeta, nel predetto quinto libro, che fece Enea, quando fece li giochi in Cicilia ne l'anniversario del padre; che ciò che promise per le vittorie, lealmente diede poi a ciascuno vittorioso . . . (*ibid.* IV,xxvi,14)
>
> E che queste due cose convegnano a questa etade, ne figura *quello grande poeta Lucano,* . . . quando dice che Marzia tornò a Catone e richiese lui e pregollo che la dovesse riprendere . . . (*ibid.* IV,xxviii,13)
>
> E però dice *Stazio, lo dolce poeta,* . . . che quando Adrasto . . . vide Polinice coverto d'un cuoio di leone, e vide Tideo coverto . . . , e ricordossi del risponso che Apollo data avea . . . (*ibid.* IV,xxv,6)

Evidently, this series of quotations from the three poets from *Conv.* IV,xxv on is essentially different in its stylistic character from the other series. On the one hand, here we *no longer have textual quotations* from the poems. They are replaced by something not to be found in the first series until IV,xxiv, namely *detailed summaries;* and not only detailed to an astonishing degree, but vibrating with personal emotion, especially the one from Vergil (*Conv.* IV,xxvi,8 f.) with its anaphorical exclamations: *quanto raffrenare fu quello . . . ! quanto spronare fu quello . . . !*

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[36] Here there is first mentioned an allegory of the four ages of man as found in Vergil. Dante returns to it in IV, xxvi, 8. The four ages of man are the subject of the last part of the *Convivio*, from xxiv, 1 on. One may wonder then whether this connecting of his subject with the allegorically explained Vergil was not our poet's immediate reason for rereading Vergil just at that time.

[37] This quotation from Lucan is the only one among the whole series of quotations until IV, xxv, which might possibly but need not necessarily be based on a direct reading of the original text.

[38] That is, with the exception mentioned in note 37, *supra*.

The textual excerpts in the first series of quotations were, on the contrary, without personal coloring. They need not even have been found by reading the original texts but might have been selected from one or the other of those collections of maxims and aphorisms by which the remnants of classical poetry were made palatable to the medieval students of Latin.[39] The summaries of the second series, on the other hand, are undoubtedly the fruit of careful and enthusiastic reading of the original texts. And so we conclude that, *before the composition of ch.XXV of book IV of the* Convivio, *Dante had reread his Latin classics, and that with a completely new and personal reaction.*[40]

How strong and how personal that reaction must have been we learn from the second feature which distinguishes the second series of quotations. Whereas until the end of IV,xxiv Dante had quoted his Latin poets by their names only, shortly and objectively, *Ovidio Maggiore, Orazio, Stazio, Virgilio,* he now adds epithets that show veneration as much as familiarity. Statius is now *lo dolce poeta;* Lucan is called *quello grande poeta,* exactly in the way that our author speaks of a respected contemporary: *quel nobile Guido Guinizelli* (*Conv.* IV,xx,7). To others he adds an explanatory qualification[41] just as if he has only recently become really acquainted with the author of whom he is speaking. And Vergil is *now for the first time "lo maggiore nostro poeta, questo altissimo poeta".* Neither in the *Vita nuova* nor hitherto in the *Convivio* has Vergil's name been honored in this way by our poet, but soon such epithets will reecho:

> o degli altri poeti onore e lume!
> onorate l'altissimo poeta! (*Inf.* I,82; IV,80)

Considering this sudden and passionate appearance of personal veneration, one feels inclined to suppose that, in some of the cases at least, the "rereading" may have been a first real reading, resulting in a quite new personal attraction on Dante's part towards those who, until now, had perhaps been not much more than names to him.[42]

This supposition is almost raised to certainty in the case of certain books of the *Aeneid.* For the third distinctive feature between the two series of quotations which we are studying is the following. Until *Conv.* IV,xxv, Dante had quoted only the first, the second, and the fourth book of the *Aeneid.* But in IV,xxvi, when the first epithet of praise is added to Vergil's name, there are quoted, *for the first time in Dante's works,* and now five times in succession, the fifth and the *sixth* book. We omitted these references in part in our previous quotations in order to group them together here:

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[39] For the *Flores, Florilegia, Excerpta, Sententiae* used as 'readers', see Manitius, *Geschichte der lateinischen Literatur des Mittelalters* I, (1931), 255 ff.

[40] The conclusion may seem too 'pat'. But this much is true: the stylistic gap in Dante's method of quoting on which this whole argumentation is based falls between chapters XXIV and XXV. A reason why Dante may have done such reading just at that time was suggested in note 36, *supra.* Juvenal is mentioned but once and only by name in the earlier part of the *Convivio* (IV, xiii. 8), whereas in IV, xxix, 4f. we have an extensive summary of one of his passages with exact quotations 'ne l'ottava satira', and he is called 'esso poeta satiro'. Evidently Juvenal belongs also to the group 'reread' by Dante on that occasion. Ovid is quoted also in the last part (IV, xxvii, 17 f.) with a minuteness that has not been met with previously. In the case of Ovid, however, there are in the earlier part two mentions that excede the mere quoting of a portion of a text (II, i, 3; IV, xv, 8).

[41] See note 40, *supra.*

[42] If further proof were required that the *De Monarchia* is a later work than the *Convivio,* it would follow by the fact that Vergil is given there too such epithets as appear in *Convivio* IV, xxvi, 8 and 13: divinus noster poeta, noster vates (*De Monarchia* II, iii, 6 and 12). No such expressions have been found in the *De Vulgari eloquentia.*

> . . . . la quale parte comprende lo quarto, *lo quinto e lo sesto* libro de lo Eneida. (*Conv.* IV, xxvi,8)
> . . . come *nel sesto* de la detta istoria si dimostra. (*ibid.* xxvi,9)
> . . . *nel quinto* libro sopra detto. (ibid. xxvi,11)
> . . . *nel sesto* sopra detto. (*ibid.* xxvi,13)
> . . . *nel* predetto *quinto* libro. (*ibid.* xxvi,14)

I hardly need to recall that the sixth book of the *Aeneid* is the one which describes *the descent into Hell of Aeneas.* We even find a reference to that fact in one of the passages previously quoted, which sounds like a first stirring of creative fantasy aroused by that story:

> Quanto spronare fu quello, quando esso Enea *sostenette solo con Sibilla a entrare ne lo Inferno* a cercare de l'anima di suo padre Anchise, *contra tanti pericoli,* come nel sesto de la detta istoria si dimostra! (*ibid.* xxvi,9)

Another valuable confirmation of the fact that Dante, at that time, was reading the Latin classics extensively is the following passage in *De Vulgari eloquentia,* written, as is known, in the same years as the *Convivio;* even, according to Barbi's convincing hypothesis,[43] as a complement to the disquisitions about the *volgare* in *Convivio* I:

> Et fortassis utilissimum foret . . . regulatos vidisse poetas, *Virgilium* videlicet, Ovidium Metamorfoseos, *Statium* atque *Lucanum,* nec non alios qui usi sunt altissimas prosas, ut Titum Livium, Plinium, Frontinum, Paulum Orosium, et multos alios, *quos amica sollicitudo*[44] *nos visitare invitat.* (*De Vulg. El.,* II,vi,7)

Especially notable for our subject is that the three poets who concerned us in the *Convivio* are here enumerated in the first place, together with Ovid, another important source of inspiration for the *Commedia.*

Our conclusion is that Dante, while writing the last chapters of the fourth book of the *Convivio,* and at the same time the end of the fragmentary *De Vulgari eloquentia,* read again, or in part for the first time, classical Latin poetry and prose. Among the poetry read by him was—perhaps suggested by the allegorical explanations of Vergil used in *Conv.IV*—the sixth book of the *Aeneid,* which tells the story of Aeneas' descent into Hell. The impression made on our poet was evidently very strong, a fact shown by the laudatory epithets now bestowed on some of the poets for the first time, and by the detailed and personally felt retelling of the passages quoted by him, instead of the short, and, in general, colorless textual quotations he had used before. It is shown, too, as far as Vergil is concerned, by repeated quotations from the fifth and sixth books of the *Aeneid,* until then not mentioned in his works.

This reading of the *Aeneid,* particularly of book VI, may have given him the final impulse to put into action what, virtually, had already become nearly inevitable: to discontinue the *Convivio,* an ethical treatise, and also the *De Vulgari eloquentia,* and to go himself, as a poet, to Hell and Heaven. There he might hope to *see,* with his eyes opened and strengthened by divine grace, those things which, during the time of the *Convivio,* he had only *thought or believed.*

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[43] Cf. *Convivio,* ed. Busnelli and Vandelli, Introduction, p. XIX, note 1.

[44] The reading *sollicitudo* instead of *solitudo* of the *Testo critico* has been reestablished from the manuscripts by A. Marigo in his edition of the *De Vulgari eloquentia* (Firenze, 1938). Marigo adds: 'amica solicitudo' è lezione chiara (benchè meno poetica che 'amica solitudo' degli editori) . . . (op. cit., p. 224).

He did this under the guidance of *lo maggiore nostro poeta,* who had led *Aeneas* into Hell and would, therefore, be a good *duce* on such an expedition. Also the *dolce Stazio,* his secondary guide on the Mountain of Purgatory, had now entered his mind, perhaps for the first time in his life.

One last point should not be forgotten, for it symbolizes the unity in Dante's mind, in spite of the great crisis and change he had experienced. By the very choice of his *duce,* representing for him, more than other things, *natural reason* and *voluntary ethics,* Dante took with him, into the new poetic and visionary world, the basic spiritual forces which had guided him during his now finished philosophical period.

C.

We have tried to fix the essential difference between the mental conditions, thinking and seeing, under which the *Convivio* and the *Commedia* were composed. Moreover, we have found a not unreasonable answer to the question why the transition from the one to the other work was made at just that time, an answer which allows us, moreover, a glimpse into the development of Dante's classical studies. Now, in order to strengthen the conclusion arrived at, it may be possible to find in the prose book, and especially in its last parts, signs of a stylistic change, leading formally to the realm of poetry which was soon to become the author's home again.

Indeed, there are *verses* within the prose of the *Convivio;* and not only single rhythmical lines, which would not be surprising, but, at least in two places of book IV, long stretches of them: *endecasillabi, settenarii* and less determined units; even rhymes. It is as if the poet's language had already taken the first step towards the tercet, while he was still hesitating whether to go on with the prose in spite of all. In the first three books of the *Convivio* I have found no rhythmical elements within the prose comparable in length and in poetic style to the two we shall now study.

In the following two quotations, I give the parts without a determined rhythm within parenthesis, while the indisputable verses are shown as such, each line preceded by a figure signifying its nature (*endecasillabo* (11); etc.).

(E sí come peregrino che va)
(11) per una via per la qual(e) mai non fue,
(11) che ogni casa che da lungi vede,
(11) crede che sia l'albergo, e non trovando
(11) cio essere, dirizza la credenza
(11) a l'altra, e così di casa in casa
(8) tanto che a l'albergo viene;
(11) cosi l'anima nostra, incontanente
(11) che nel nuovo e mai non fatto camino . . . (*Conv.* IV, xii, 15).

Accepting certain hiatus—they are not rare in the *Commedia* either—and adding the rhymes, this might be a simile from the Poem, where there are some with the same subject. And not only is the form rhythmical, but the tone of the passage is poetically softened. One senses the tears trembling in the voice of the exile, while he rather sings than speaks of the wanderer seeking rest.[45]

Another passage, quite near the end of book IV, is still more striking because it presents not only verses and even rhymes, but also, as its subject, *Cato,* or more exactly Marzia, his wife. Thus it constitutes, in form and content, an outstanding forerunner of the Poem:—

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[45] Without regular verse rythm but with the same deeply felt resonance is the comparison: e si come a colui . . . (IV, xxxviii, 5). Soon afterwards there is an anaphorical system that emphasizes the longing for home that is unappeased: . . . uscir le pare . . . e ritornare . . . , uscir le pare . . . e tornare (IV, xxviii, 7). These lines might well be changed to regular verses.

(. . . "io", dice Marzia)
(11) "feci e compiei il tuoi comandamenti"
(cioè a dire che la nobile anima . . .)
(Dice:)
(7) "E tolsi due mariti"
(cioè . . .) (E dice Marzia:)
(11) "Dammi li patti de li antichi letti,
(11) dammi lo nome sol(o) del maritaggio".
(che è a dire . . .) (E dice Marzia:)
(11) "Due ragioni mi muovono a dir(e) questo:
(11) l'una si è che dopo mi si dica,
(11) ch'io sia morta moglie di Catone;
(9) l'altra che dopo mi si dica,
(7) che tu non mi scacci*asti,*
(11) ma di buon animo mi marit*asti"*. (*Conv.* IV, xxviii,16-18)

The last two rhymed lines correspond exactly to the end of a *ballata* such as

. . . cerchiò la mente mia
merzè di vostra grande cortesia. (*Rime,* LVII,17 f.)

It is improbable that they came quite unconsciously from the pen of their author. The same might be said about the anaphora "*dammi . . . dammi . . .* " (repeated twice more in the immediately following lines, which have no regular rhythmical character).[46] On the other hand, the inserted allegorical explanations (beginning with "*cioè . . .*" "*che è a dire . . .*") are *not* rhythmical. This fact makes it even more probable that the rhythmical character of Marzia's speech was not unintended by the poet, for the whole passage acquires, in this way, the aspect of a piece of poetry with a commentary in prose—analogous to the whole *Convivio* itself, of which it forms a little part.[47]

Since we are seeking stylistic foreshadowings of the Poem in the *Convivio,* there may be mentioned here a passage which sounds like the first draft of an immortal line in the *Commedia*:

> . . . quelli intelletti che per malizia d'animo o di corpo infermi non sono, *liberi, espediti e sani* a la luce de la veritade . . . (*Conv.* IV, xv,17)

This will become later on: *libero, dritto e sano* è tuo arbitrio . . . (*Purg.* XXVII, 140).[48]

It will be clearer from the preceding examples that, not only metaphysically and esthetically, but even formally and stylistically, our author, while still occupied with his prose work, had already entered the realm of the Poem.

Our inquiry about the stylistic, that is *essential,* difference between the *Convivio* and the *Commedia* leads us also into the disputed field of the "allegorical sense".

We return to the "two smiles" mentioned before (chapter II, D): the allegorical smile of the Donna Gentile in the prose work and the real, but not only physical smile of Beatrice in the Poem. Here may lie one of the deepest if most hidden motives why our poet abandoned the first work for the second. For in the *Convivio* all had to be explained according to the "two senses", unless, as in the third *canzone*, the poet himself denied a "literal sense" (or, in modern terms, poetic quality) to his own poem. In the first two *canzoni*, his very theme obliged him to find and formulate a literal and an allegorical meaning in every word. In the *Commedia*, on the other hand, the "second sense" of what he sang might be hidden or visible, pointed out by himself as for example *Inf.* IX,61 f., or neglected, or not existent; or there might also be naked allegory without a "literal" cloak at all.[40] For the poet there was no longer any such self constructed prison to hinder the flight of his expression. Earthly love might now be mixed with heavenly love, as he himself describes it to St. John (*Par.* XXVI,55 f.), earthly light with heavenly light and sensual reality with intellectual reality. He had broken the self forged fetters which had obliged him, while writing the *trattato*, to do violence to his own poetic intentions by separating those ideas. Beatrice had only retired for a time: *quella viva Beatrice beata, de la quale più parlare* in questo libro *non intendo* (*Conv.* II,viii,7). *In questo libro!* But now *questo libro* was given up; the Donna Gentile had disappeared. Beatrice had come back, and with her not only religious, but *also poetic* vision; that is, mental experiences in which appearance and "allegory" are so completely unified, that in most cases one does better to renounce separating them.

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[46] See also note 45, *supra.*

[47] Of course, it must not be forgotten that the whole speech of Marzia is an imitation of the corresponding verses of Lucan, a fact which may have contributed to its strikingly metrical form. Busnelli and Vandelli, *ed. cit.,* (on IV, xxviii, 13) give Lucan's verses. The editors say nothing of the 'verses' in Dante's prose.

[48] I have since found the same reference in Torraca's commentary on the *Commedia* (7th ed., Milano, 1930). Since they illustrate the problem at hand, I have not discarded the lines.

The following assertion may still sound bold, while it is nothing less than the fruit of the life's work of a man like Michele Barbi: *The Commedia, though containing many allegories, is not an allegorical poem.* That means that the *Commedia* is, esthetically considered, the first modern rather than the last medieval poem. The latter designation better fits an essentially allegorical creation like the *Roman de la Rose.*

As was mentioned earlier (chapter III,A), in the last chapters of the *Convivio* and also in the last but one of the *De Vulgari eloquentia,* there are indications that the author still intended to continue. The final decision not to do so must have been sudden, as if inspired. But there are, on the other hand, indications that he hurried to the end in both cases. In the *Convivio,* he treats of *adolescenza,* the youthful age, in almost double the space (IV,xxiv,11—xxv,13) given to *gioventute,* the more mature age (xxvi,1-15), although, considering the greater importance accorded by him to the latter, the contrary should have happened. We may suppose, then, that he was impatient to finish the book, even at the risk of not saying all, or sinning against the laws of formal symmetry so dear to him. And in the *Vulgari eloquentia,* immediately before the abrupt end, he still says: . . . *proprium enim eorum* (rithimorum) *tractatum* in posterum prorogamus, cum de mediocri poemate intendemus (II,xiii,1), that is, he still intends to execute his original program. But he seems to have felt very soon afterwards that he would not realize this intention, for he inserts some of his material on the rhyme prematurely, as if under a pretext: *Preterea nobis bene convenire videtur, ut que* cavenda sunt circa rithimos, huic appendamus capitulo, *cum* in isto libro nil ulterius *de rithimorum doctrina tangere intendamus* (*ibid.,* xiii,11). The abrupt ending in the midst of a sentence makes the problem of the unfinished *De Vulgari eloquentia* even more puzzling than the problem of the comparatively organically interrupted *Convivio.* Nevertheless, for the reasons just considered and for others mentioned previously, there can be hardly any doubt that both books remained fragments for the same general reason, namely the urge to take the step to poetry and vision, away from reason and prose.

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[40] Nessuno nega che *dove è manifesta* in Dante l'intenzione di foggiare simboli o allegorie, si richerchi il suo vero intendimento . . .; ma nessuno può ammettere la convenienza di *moltiplicare artificiosamente* quei casi (M. Barbi, 'Per un nuovo commento della Divina Commedia', *Studi danteschi,* XIX (1935), 35). This method of understanding Dante's poem above all as a poem is not as yet generally accepted. See also E. Gilson, *op. cit.,* p. 51 ff. It may be supported by the consideration that the *Commedia,* unlike the *Convivio,* is based essentially on the unity of the reality made visible there. In regards to Dante's own declaration that the *Commedia* must be understood also according to the two senses (*Epistolae* XIII, 20-25), see chapter I, *supra,* towards the conclusion.

When Dante serves his spiritual "meal" to the intellectually if not socially humble readers for whom it is destined, he stays with them as a good host, teaches them how to eat and helps them, though combining with the metaphor of a host the other of a navigator:

> Poi che . . . *è lo mio pane* . . . con sufficienza preparato, lo tempo chiama e domanda la mia nave uscir di porto . . . Ma però che più profittabile sia questo mio cibo, prima che vegna la prima vivanda, *voglio mostrare come mangiare si dee.* (*Conv.* II,i,1)

In the *Commedia,* likewise intended for humble readers, the simile of the *cena* returns. But this time the poet cannot stay, attentive and jovial, while his guests are eating; a higher task requires his presence, he must leave them to themselves:

> Or ti riman, lettor, sovra'*l tuo banco,*
> dietro pensando a ciò che *si preliba,*
> s'esser vuoi lieto assai prima che stanco.
> *Messo t'ho innanzi; omai per te ti ciba;*
> che *a sè torce tutta la mia cura*
> *quella materia* onde io son fatto scriba. (*Par.* X,22 ff.)

For in the *Convivio* his task was rational and moral discussion of earthly affairs, and that is a social task. In the *Commedia,* he had to look into transcendent reality; and to do that, one had better stay away from the *vulgus.*

Le Dossier Anti-Matrimonial de l'*Adversus Jovinianum* et Son Influence sur Quelques Ecrits Latins du XIIe Siècle

PHILIPPE DELHAYE

DANS la société de l'antiquité et du moyen âge, la femme n'occupe qu'une situation inférieure. Si elle n'est pas qu'un instrument de plaisir, elle se trouve cantonnée dans les tâches obscures de l'éducation des enfants et de l'administration de la *familia.*[1] Certes le christianisme a affirmé la dignité foncière de la femme et proposé à la vénération des fidèles la radieuse figure de la Vierge Marie.[2] Mais les influences païennes continuent à s'exercer et inspirent même une mysogynie dont le but ascétique vaut infiniment mieux que certains moyens de propagande. Puisque les clercs et les moines pratiquent la chasteté parfaite, ou tout au moins y tendent, il est assez normal qu'ils craignent les tentations de l'éternel féminin.[3] Un inconscient transfert de l'attitude concrète sur le jugement abstrait risque de transformer la femme en un monstre épouvantable. Par vertu, on devient antiféministe, quitte d'ailleurs à excepter de la réprobation universelle une mère, des parentes, des personnes mieux connues dont on a pu apprécier la vertu et le discernement.[4]

L'expression de cet anti-féminisme constitue évidemment toute une province du royaume des lettres et je serais bien présomptueux de m'en proposer une exploration complète. Mon dessein est moins audacieux et je ne veux étudier ici qu'un point très limité. Saint Jérôme, s'inspirant de Porphyre, a écrit une critique serrée de la femme et du mariage dans son *Adversus Jovinianum,* et cet écrit a été très remarqué des âges postérieurs. Il m'a paru intéressant, du point de vue de l'histoire des idées et des lettres, de relever des traces de cette influence sur quelques textes latins du XIIe siècle que j'avais étudiés.

On le voit, ce ne sont que des fruits, des feuilles, . . . à peine comparables à ceux que les explorateurs rapportèrent de la terre promise. Certains me reprocheront sans doute de ne pas avoir poussé assez loin mes recherches. Ils s'en consoleront sans doute aisément en pensant qu'ainsi je ne les prive pas des joies de la découverte personnelle. Pour moi il m'aura suffi de rappeler quelques vieux textes au théologien et de marquer pour l'historien quelques étapes dans le cheminement d'une idée.

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[1] Quelques indications bibliographiques: G. Truc, *Histoire illustrée de la femme* (2 vols., Paris, 1941); A. Couvreur, *La femme aux différentes époques de l'histoire* (Paris, 1910). *ANTIQUITE:* H. Lallier, *De la condition de la femme dans la famille athénienne* (Paris, 1875); Michelet, *La femme romaine* (Paris, 1877); H. Pascal, *Education et culture de la femme romaine à la fin de la République* (Abbéville, 1916); Ch. Favez, 'Les opinions de Sénèque sur la femme', *Revue des études latines* XVI (1937), 335-45; J. Dumortier, 'Le mariage chrétien dans les milieux d'Antioche et de Byzance d'après saint Jean Chrysostome', *Lettres d'humanité* VI (1947), 102-66; E. Bréhier, 'La femme dans la famille à Byzance', *Mélanges H. Grégoire* I (Brussels, 1950), 105-8; *MOYEN AGE:* T. Neff, *La satire des femmes dans la poésie lyrique du moyen âge* (Paris, 1900); A. Hentsch, *De la littérature didactique du moyen âge s'addressant plus spécialement aux femmes* (Cahors, 1903); H. Langlois, *La vie en France au moyen âge d'après quelques moralistes du temps* (Paris, 1908); M. Borodine, *La femme et l'amour au XIIe siècle d'après les romans de Chrétien de Troyes* (Paris, 1909); *Le roman idyllique au moyen âge* (Paris, 1913); E. Faral, *Recherches sur les sources latines des contes et des romans courtois du moyen âge* (Paris, 1913); R. Briffault, *The Mothers* (3 vols. New York, 1928), chapters 27-9; H. Dupin, *La courtoisie au moyen âge* (Paris, 1931); D. de Rougemont, *L'Amour et l'Occident* (Paris, 1935); P. Belperron, *Joie d'amour, contribution à l'étude des troubadours et de l'amour courtois* (Paris, 1948); J. J. Parry, *The Art of Courtly Love by Andreas Capellanus* (New York, 1941). On verra aussi les bibliographies de ces deux derniers ouvrages.

[2] Encore que dans l'Eglise ancienne, la piété mariale soit beaucoup plus discrète que de nos jours.

[3] Pour les anciens auteurs chrétiens de même que pour les médiévaux, les femmes constituent le *lubricus sexus.* On pourra citer des textes innombrables à ce suject. Cf. PL 220, 916, l'index 171 § 8.

[4] Cette façon de faire et de voir, aussi spontanée qu'illogique, peut être observée chez Sénèque et saint Jérôme.

I. *LE DOSSIER*

Dans les dernières années du IV^e^ siècle, Jovinien avait pris position contre le mouvement ascétique dont saint Ambroise de Milan s'était fait le héraut dans l'église latine. Reprenant une thèse stoïcienne[1], Jovinien affirmait: de même que toutes les fautes sont d'égale gravité, toutes les vertus et tous les mérites sont équivalents. Une fois acquise, la sainteté baptismale, tout comme la sagesse du philosophe ne peut plus se perdre. En conséquence il n'est pas plus parfait de pratiquer la virginité et la tempérance que de se marier et de vivre largement. Une vierge ou un ascète chrétien ne mène pas une vie plus morale qu'une personne du monde[2]. Les cercles pieux et les autorités ne manquèrent pas de s'émouvoir; Jovinien fut condamné par un concile romain en 390 et par un synode milanais en 391. Le sénateur Pammachius ayant demandé à Jérôme, retiré en Palestine, de confondre l'ennemi de l'idéal ascétique, celui-ci écrivit l'*Adversus Jovinianum libri duo* dont les outrances et la truculence devaient d'ailleurs désoler ses meilleurs amis.[3]

Plus que toute autre question, c'est la valeur de la virginité qui a retenu l'attention de saint Jérôme et c'est à ce sujet qu'il consacre son premier livre en entier. Jovinien a évoqué les Ecritures, Jérôme lui répondra d'abord sur ce terrain qui lui est si familier. Saint Paul, interrogé par les Corinthiens, a posé dès l'abord le principe "que c'est un bien pour l'homme de ne pas toucher de femme" (I *Cor.* vii, 1). Inversons la proposition, dit Jérôme, cherchons le mal contraire à ce bien; nous voyons "qu'il est mauvais pour l'homme de s'unir à une femme". Toutefois, il faut le reconnaître, l'apôtre tolère le mal du mariage pour en éviter un plus grand, le débordement des passions dans la fornication.[4] Il ajoute, en effet: " . . . pour éviter l'impudicité, que chacun ait sa femme". Mais si l'union conjugale est tolérée, il ne faut pas se faire illusion sur sa valeur morale: l'usage du mariage empêche de prier et de recevoir la Sainte Eucharistie. L'Apôtre ne dit-il pas que les époux se priveront l'un de l'autre d'un commun accord pour vaquer à la prière (I *Cor.* vii, 5)? Or, raisonne Jérôme, il dit aussi qu'il faut toujours prier (I *Thessal.* v, 17). Il serait donc normal que le chrétien n'use jamais du mariage[5] et c'est ce que voudrait saint Paul lorsqu'il souhaite que tous restent, comme lui, libres de ces attaches (I *Cor.* vii, 7). Bienheureux celui qui sera comme Paul, bienheureux celui qui sera comme le Christ.[6]

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[1] Les auteurs récents ne semblent pas avoir remarqué cette filiation; c'est en vain qu'on en chercherait une mention dans P. Cavallera, *Saint Jérôme, sa vie et son oeuvre* (Louvain, 1922), par exemple. Les anciens eux, ne s'y sont pas trompés comme le montrent ces remarques: Qui enim in coitu et saturitate Epicureus est, subito in retributione meritorum Stoicus efficitur. Hierosolymam Citio, Judaeam Cypro, Christum Zenone commutat. Si non licet a virtutibus paululum declinare et omnia peccata sunt paria, eiusdem criminis reus qui panem esuriens surripuerit et qui hominem occiderit: tu quoque maximorum scelerum reus teneris: Saint Jérôme, *Adversus Jovinianùm* II, 21; PL 23, 315. De parilitate peccatorum soli Stoïci ausi sunt disputare, contra omnem sensum generis humani; quam eorum vanitatem in Ioviniano illo, qui in hac sententia stoïcus erat, in aucupandis autem et defensandis voluptatibus Epicureus. . . Saint Augustin, *Epist. 167*, 4; PL 33, 735. Hic omnia peccata, sicut Stoici philosophi. . . *De haeresibus*, 82, PL 42, 45.

[2] Saint Jérôme a résumé en quatre propositions les idées de son adversaire: Dicit virgines, viduas et maritatas quae semel in Christo lotae sunt, si non discrepent caeteris operibus, eiusdem esse meriti. Nititur approbare eos qui plena fide in baptismate renati sunt, a diabolo non posse subverti. Tertium proponit inter abstinentiam ciborum et cum gratiarum actione perceptionem eorum nullam esse distantiam. Quartum quod, et extremum, esse omnium qui suum baptisma servaverint, unam in regno coelorum remunerationem. *Adversus Jovinianum* I, 3; PL, 23, 214. Saint Ambroise, *Epist. 42;* PL, 16, 1123 ff. et saint Augustin, *De haeresibus*, 82; PL, 42, 45 ff. attribuent encore à Jovinien la négation de la virginité de Marie *in partu.*

[3] Sur l'agitation et les critiques provoquées par l'ouvrage, on verra les lettres 48, 49 et 50 de saint Jérôme lui-même.

[4] Opponam in prima fronte apostolum Paulum et quasi fortissimum ducem suis telis id est suis armabo sententiis . . .; . . . *Bonum est,* inquit, *homini mulierem non tangere.* Si bonum est mulierem non tangere, malum est ergo tangere: nihil enim bono contrarium est nisi malum. Si autem malum est et ignoscitur, ideo conceditur ne malo quid deterius fiat. Quale autem illud bonum est quod conditione deterioris conceditur? Numquam enim subiecisset *unusquisque uxorem suam habeat* nisi praemisisset *propter fornicationem autem.* S. Jérôme, *Adversus Jovinianum* I, 6, 7; PL 23, 218-219.

Mais alors, dira-t-on, pourquoi le Seigneur n'a-t-il pas imposé à tous la virginité? Car saint Paul le reconnaît, "pour ce qui est de la virginité, il n'a point reçu de précepte du Seigneur, il donne un conseil personnel" (I *Cor.* vii, 25). De fait, il faut bien perpétuer l'espèce, les hommes sont faibles et la virginité a une valeur morale plus grande si elle est volontaire. Pour ces raisons le mariage est admis, mais qu'on ne s'y trompe pas, cette institution n'aura qu'un temps, elle passera avec ce monde (I *Cor.* vii, 26) et ceux qui en usent auront des tribulations dans la chair (I *Cor.* vii, 28). "Ce n'est pas le moment, remarque Jérôme, de décrire les ennuis du mariage et de reprendre ce lieu commun de rhétorique". Et pour l'instant il renvoie à son ouvrage contre Helvidius, à sa lettre *de Virginitate* dédiée à Eustochium ainsi qu'à Tertullien et à saint Grégoire de Nazianze.[7]

En effet le saint docteur désire en terminer tout d'abord avec les questions exégétiques soulevées dans ce débat. Jovinien a allégué l'Ancien Testament et l'autorité des apôtres qu'il prétend opposer à saint Paul. Jérôme proteste: tous ces écrits aussi affirment que la continence est supérieure au mariage. Ecrivant à Eustochium, saint Jérôme avait reconnu que, dans l'Ancien Testament, la fécondité était plus appréciée et vantée que dans la Nouvelle Alliance.[8] Mais ici les positions se sont raidies sous l'influence de la polémique et saint Jérôme veut montrer que même sous l'Ancienne Alliance la virginité a été préférée au mariage; c'est dans ce sens qu'il interprête différents textes concernant la pureté rituelle et qu'il récuse les passages mis en avant par son adversaire.[9] Celui-ci invoque encore l'exemple des apôtres qui, à l'exception de Jean, étaient mariés. A quoi Jérôme répond qu'en tout état de cause, les apôtres ne connurent plus leurs femmes après avoir reçu leur mission. D'ailleurs le fait n'est certain que pour

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[5] Oro te, quale illud bonum est quod orare prohibet, quod corpus Christi accipere non permittit? Quamdiu impleo mariti officium, non impleo continentis. Jubet idem apostolus in alio loco ut semper oremus. Si semper orandum est, numquam ergo coniugio serviendum, quoniam quotiescumque uxori debitum reddo, orare non possum. *Ibid.*, 7; PL 23, 220.

[6] *Volo autem omnes homines esse sicut meipsum.* Beatus qui Pauli similis erit. Felix qui audit apostolum praecipientem, non ignoscentem. Hoc, inquit, volo, hoc desidero, ut imitatores mei sitis sicut ego Christi. *Ibid.*, 8; PL 23, 221.

[7] Si virginitatem Dominus imperasset, videbatur nuptias condemnare et hominum auferre seminarium, unde et ipsa virginitas nascitur. . . Ille creator et figulus sciens fragilitatem vasculi quod operatus est virginitatem in audientis potestate dimissit. . . Et ideo plus amat virgines Christus quia sponte tribuunt quod sibi non fuerat imperatum. . . Non est huius loci nuptiarum angustias describere et quasi in communibus locis rhetorico exsultare sermone. Plenius super hac re contra Helvidium et in eo libro quem ad Eustochium scripsi arbitror absolutum. Certe et Tertulliamus, cum adhuc esset adolescens, lusit in hac materia. Et praeceptor meus Gregorius Nazianzenus virginitatem et nuptias disserens graecis versibus explicavit. *Ibid.* 12, 13; PL 23, 227, 228, 230. L'écrit de Tertullien ici mentionné est aujourd'hui perdu. Cf. Schanz-Hosius, *Geschichte der römischen Literatur*, III *Die römischen Literatur von Hadrian bis auf Constantin* (Munich, 1922), p. 326. Pour les autres écrits cités et les études de Jérôme auprès de saint Grégoire de Nazianze, on verra F. Cavallera, *Saint Jérôme, sa vie et son oeuvre* (Louvain, 1922), pp. 59, 93, 104. La description des *molestiae nuptiarum* à laquelle Jérôme fait ici allusion est d'ailleurs assez brève, par ex. *Ad Eustochium*, éd. J. Labourt, *Lettres de saint Jérôme* I (Paris, 1949), pp. 112, 124, 133. En ce dernier passage saint Jérôme tourne court une nouvelle fois en renvoyant à divers auteurs; Tertullien, saint Cyprien, saint Ambroise et le pape Damase.

[8] *S. Jérôme, Ep. 22 De Virginitate ad Eustochium*, 21; éd. *Labourt*, p. 131.

[9] Sed quoniam ad vetus nos trahit Testamentum, et incipiens ab Adam ad Zachariam et Elisabeth pervenit . . . nos quoque debemus per eadem currere vestigia quaestionum et docere castitatem semper operi nuptiarum fuisse praelatam. *Adversus Jovinianum* I, 16; PL 23, 234-235.

Pierre dont la belle-mère apparaît dans l'Evangile; encore pouvait-il avoir répudié sa femme et conservé chez lui sa seule belle-mère, à la manière de tant d'ouvriers de l'Evangile qui, pour les besoins de leur service, admirent des femmes de bien dans leur entourage. En tout cas les privilèges de l'apôtre Jean montrent l'estime dans laquelle le Seigneur tenait la virginité perpétuelle. Il a été l'apôtre bien-aimé. Le premier il a reconnu le Seigneur après la résurrection, il a reçu le don d'immortalité promis à la virginité et sa mort fut plus un passage qu'un trépas.[10]

La guerilla se continue encore quelque temps et saint Jérôme se donne au travail "vain"[11] des objections et réponses portant sur les sens de certains passages des *Proverbes,* de l'*Ecclésiaste,* du *Cantique* et des *Prophètes.* Ensuite il aborde un aspect tout nouveau de la question. Jovinien a prétendu que l'estime de la virginité était, dans l'histoire morale, une nouveauté contraire au droit naturel comme aux conceptions des anciens.[12] C'était aussi le point de vue de saint Ambroise pour qui la virginité était une vertu spécifiquement chrétienne, une valeur nouvelle laissant loin derrière elle la chasteté "provisoire et lucrative" des vestales et surtout l'impudicité des religions antiques dont le culte dionysiaque donne la vraie note.[13] Les nécessités mêmes de la controverse devaient amener saint Jérôme à prendre la position contraire; il prétendra que les païens eux-mêmes ont méprisé le mariage et attaché un grand prix à la virginité. Il n'adoptait d'ailleurs pas ce point de vue sans un fondement apparent car, s'il donne souvent aux textes le coup de pouce édifiant et s'il est peu sensible à l'évolution des idées, Jérôme connaissait des textes philosophiques favorables à sa thèse. Tout d'abord il savait que les néoplatoniciens discréditaient systématiquement tout ce qui était charnel, tout ce qui était matière. Il était aussi au courant des discussions classiques tenues dans toutes les écoles antiques sur la question: faut-il se marier? Nombreux étaient les philosophes stoïciens et épicuriens, auxquels faisaient écho des hommes de lettres et des rhéteurs, qui estimaient la vie conjugale indigne du sage. Il est vrai qu'étrangers à nos idées morales, ils ne prônaient pas pour autant la chasteté absolue: ils estimaient qu'un sage ne devait pas s'encombrer des soucis d'une famille et qu'il lui suffisait bien de satisfaire ses sens dans des aventures passagères.

De fait, saint Jérôme en appelle ici à l'autorité d'Aristote, de Plutarque et de Sénèque; leurs ouvrages sur le mariage, écrit-il, ont été la source de ces chapitres.[14] Il va sans dire que cette affirmation n'a été reçue par les philologues qu'avec un certain scepticisme; ceux-ci le savent assez, c'est un procédé habituel chez saint Jérôme de se référer avec complaisance à quelques grands noms et de s'abstenir soigneusement de mentionner les auteurs moins connus dont il s'inspire directement. Mais qui échappera à la critique interne? E. Bickel a montré qu'ici saint Jérôme ne s'était pas référé à Aristote et que s'il avait glâné dans le *De Matrimonio* de Sénèque et les *Conjugalia praecepta* de Plutarque, il avait surtout copié Porphyre: c'est à lui qu'il a emprunté nombre de ses citations philosophiques et des arguments de sa thèse.[15] Jérôme n'en agira pas autrement dans les chapitres du livre second relatifs au jeûne, et une fois de plus plagiera Porphyre sans le citer.

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[10] Qui assumpti [Apostoli] postea in apostolatum relinquunt officium conjugale . . . Quanquam, excepto apostolo Petro, non sit manifeste relatum de aliis apostolis quod uxores habuerint . . . intelligere debemus sine uxoribus eos fuisse. . . Et tamen Joannes unus ex discipulis, qui minimus traditur fuisse inter apostolos et quem fides Christi virginem repererat, virgo permansit et ideo plus amatur a Domino. . . *Ibid.,* 26; PL 23, 245, 246.

[11] Verum casso labore sudamus. Obiicit quippe nobis adversarius. . . *Ibid.,* 27; 23, 248.

[12] Sed quoniam intellexi in Commentariis adversarii, provocari nos etiam ad mundi sapientiam quod numquam hoc genus in saeculo sit probatum et novum dogma contra naturam religio nostra prodiderit. . . *Ibid.,* 41; PL 23, 270.

[13] Negatur virginitatis decus in ethnicis ullis umquam exstitisse, puta in Vestalibus sacris deae Phrygiae ac Liberi patris, atque etiam in philosophis, ubi et de Pythagorea virgine, in qua tamesti laudatur animi magnitudo, continentia tamen desideratur, cum utraque in nostris virginibus emineat. S. Ambroise, *De Virginibus* I, 4; PL 16, 192.

[14] Scripserunt Aristoteles et Plutarchus et noster Seneca de matrimonio libros, ex quibus et superiora nonnulla sunt et ista quae subiicimus. S. Jérôme, *Adversus Jovinianum* I, 49; PL 23, 280.

Relisons brièvement cette démonstration de saint Jérôme qui semble avoir tant frappé nos médiévaux. Dans sa première partie elle est historique. Elle tend à prouver que chez les Grecs, les Latins et les Barbares, les vierges ont été honorées[16] et que les meilleures des femmes mariées devenues veuves ont refusé les secondes noces qu'on leur offrait.[17] Onze traits repris aux fables ou aux institutions doivent montrer que les anciens estimaient la virginité. En effet ils ont loué des vierges comme Atalante fille du roi de Scyros, Harpalice de Thrace, Camille reine des Volsques, Chalchioque, Iphigénie, les Sibylles, Cassandre et Chryseis. Ils vénéraient les prêtresses de Diane et de Vesta: les consuls leur cédaient le pas; la chasteté de ces femmes était rigoureusement contrôlée comme on le vit pour Minutia et Claudia. Les païens avaient mis dans leur panthéon deux déesses vierges, Minerve et Diane, et avaient attribué à la virginité un des signes du Zodiaque. Les conséquences graves entraînées par les viols, comme des suicides, des vengeances meurtrières, des guerres doivent aussi indiquer, à leur manière, que la virginité n'était pas considérée comme une chose négligeable. Jérôme cite ici dix traits historiques ou légendaires concernant les filles de Phidon, celle de Démotion, les vierges de Messénie violentées par les Spartiates, Stymphalide, les vierges de Sparte cette fois malmenées par les compagnons d' Aristomène, les filles de Scedasius, des jeunes filles de Locride, de Milet, de Thèbes, la captive de Nicanor. Enfin saint Jérôme pense que les cas de parthénogénèse font eux aussi apparaître l'opinion des païens; avec un mépris des plus élémentaires distinctions, que nous jugerions blasphématoire chez un moderne, il cite à côté du Christ, Bouddha, Minerve, Liberius, Platon, Romulus et Remus.[18] Disons tout de suite, à l'honneur des médiévaux, que ce sera la partie de l'argumentation de saint Jérôme à laquelle ils prêteront le moins d'attention. Quant aux veuves qui refusèrent des secondes noces, saint Jérôme allègue ici les faits les plus variés. Nous voyons défiler d'abord Didon et la femme d'Hasdrubal, la veuve de Niceratus, Artémise et Teuta reine des Illyriens. Ensuite Jérôme cite les veuves hindoues qui périssent sur le bûcher consummant le corps de leur seigneur et rappelle la fidélité de la servante d'Alcibiade: si les matrones romaines, ajoute-t-il, pouvaient s'inspirer de ces leçons![19] Petite vengeance de perfides papotages! Viennent ensuite la femme de Straton, Panthia, Rhodogune, Alceste, Pénélope et Laodamie. A ces treize exemples étrangers s'en ajoutent huit repris à l'histoire romaine; ils montrent le prix qu'attachèrent à leur honneur et à la fidélité Lucrèce, Bilia, la fille de Caton, la femme de Brutus, Annia, Porcia, Marcella et Valeria.[20]

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[15] E. Bickel, *Diatribe in Senecae philosophi fragmenta* I (Leipzig, 1915), pp. 18, 116, chap. 5, pp. 129-220, *De Porphyrio peri agneias scriptore*, pp. 325 et 327. Cf. P. Courcelle, *Les lettres grecques en Occident de Macrobe à Cassiodore* (Paris, 1948), pp. 60-61. Dans son ouvrage sur *L'ascèse monastique de saint Basile* (Maredsous, 1949), Dom David Amand souligne la grande influence de Porphyre sur saint Basile. Qui étudiera en un travail synthétique l'influence de Porphyre sur les maîtres de l'ascétique chrétienne?

[16] Percurram breviter Graecas et Latinas Barbarasque historias et docebo virginitatem semper tenuisse pudicitiae principatum. *Adversus Jovinianum* I, 41; PL 23, 270. L'exposé s'étend sur les chapitres 41 et 42.

[17] Haec de virginibus saeculi currens per multiplices historias et properans sermo perstrinxerit. Veniam ad maritatas quae mortuis vel occisis viris supervivere noluerunt ne cogerentur secundos nosse concubitus et quae mire unicos amaverunt maritos; ut sciamus digamiam apud ethnicos etiam reprobari. *Ibid.*, 43; PL 23, 273. Cet argument est développé dans les chapitres 43-46.

[18] Referunt fabulae Atalantem Calydoniam virginem. . . Triginta Atheniensium tyranni cum Phedonem in convivio necassent, filias eius virgines ad se venire jusserunt et scortorum more nudari. . . c. 42, Apud Gymnosophistas Indiae quasi per manus huius opinionis auctoritas traditur. . . *Ibid.*, 42; PL 23, 270, 271, 273.

[19] Imitentur matronae, et matronae saltem christianae concubinarum fidem et praestent liberae quod captiva servavit. *Ibid.*, 44; PL 23, 274.

Après cet "argument historique",[21] saint Jérôme en propose un second, que l'on pourrait peut-être appeler philosophique puisqu'il consiste essentiellement à citer des opinions de philosophes ou de littérateurs classiques défavorables au mariage. Défilant l'un après l'autre, une vingtaine d'auteurs viennent déclarer que le mariage est incompatible avec la sagesse et la philosophie. Voici tout d'abord une longue citation de Théophraste: la vie intellectuelle ne peut se concilier avec la souci d'une famille et l'amour d'une femme, y lisons-nous. Tout d'abord les convenances veulent que l'homme épouse une femme sans la connaître et s'engage ainsi à l'aveuglette. Quelle qu'elle soit d'ailleurs, cette femme empoisonnera la vie de son mari. Si celui-ci lui confie le soin de la maison, il devient son domestique; s'il se le réserve, on lui reprochera sans fin sa méfiance. Est-elle pauvre, elle coûte cher. Est-elle riche, elle s'impose avec prétention. Bref le sage marié perd toute tranquillité d'esprit, toute solitude.[22] Cicéron déclare qu' il faut choisir entre une épouse et la philosophie.[23] Tout aussi sévères sont les avis de ces maris malheureux que furent Socrate, victime de deux mégères, Sylla, Pompée, Caton, Philippe et Gorgias. Les tragédies d'Euripide ne cessent de médire des femmes, et des sages de Leptis comme de Rome se sont plaints de l'esprit de chicane et de domination de l'autre sexe.[24] Hérodote déclare que la femme dépose toute pudeur avec ses habits, et les poètes comiques ont mis en vedette l'aspect burlesque de la domination féminine.[25] Epicure et Chrysippe déconseillent le mariage. Platon et Sénèque ont blâmé la violence de la passion et le néopythagoricien Xystus a déclaré: celui-là est adultère qui aime trop sa femme.[26]

II. CHEZ ABELARD ET QUELQUES AUTRES THEOLOGIENS

Nous ne pouvons rechercher ici d'une manière exhaustive quelle a été l'influence de l'*Adversus Jovinianum* durant le haut moyen âge. Notons seulement qu'auprès des écrivains de la réforme grégorienne et de leurs successeurs immédiats saint Jérôme jouit d'une autorité considérable. L'*Apologeticus* du moine Bernald déclare:

> le décret de Gélase montre que Jérôme est un auteur que les évêques eux-mêmes doivent écouter puisqu'il reçoit ses oeuvres comme canoniques et authentiques. Ses écrits sont mis sur le même pied que ceux de saints Cyprien, Ambroise, Augustin et en général de ceux des pères qui ne se sont jamais séparés de la foi ou de la doctrine enseignées par l'Eglise romaine[1].

D'autre part, des clers milanais adoptant la vie commune suivent les ordonnances de saint Jérôme dans sa lettre à Népotien en même temps que la règle de saint

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[20] Ad Romanas feminas transeam et primam ponam Lucretiam. . . *Ibid.*, 46; PL 23, 275.

[21] Sentio in catalogo feminarum multo me plura dixisse quam exemplorum patitur consuetudo, et a lectore erudito juste posse reprehendi. Sed quid faciam, cum mihi mulieres nostri temporis apostoli ingerant auctoritatem; et necdum elato funere prioris viri, memoriter digamiae praecepta decantent? Ut quae christianae pudicitiae despiciunt fidem, discant saltem ab ethnicis castitatem. *Ibid.*, 47; PL 23, 276.

[22] La citation de Théophraste est fort longue, elle couvre les colonnes 276-278 de la patrologie.

[23] Cicero . . . dicens non posse se uxori et philosophiae pariter operam dare. *Ibid.*, 48; PL 23, 278.

[24] *Ibid.*, 48; PL 23, 278-280.

[25] Scribit Herodotus quod mulier cum veste deponat et verecudia(m). Et noster Comicus. . . *Ibid.;* PL 23, 279-280.

[26] Origo quidem amoris honesta erat sed magnitudo deformis. Nihil autem interest quam ex honesta causa quis insaniat. Unde et Xystus in sententiis: Adulter est, inquit, in suam uxorem amator ardentior. *Ibid.*, 49; PL 23, 281.

[1] Hucusque Jeronimus, qui quantae auctoritatis fuerit etiam apud episcopos, apostolicae sedis decreta beati Gelasii papae satis insinuant, quae inter autenticas et canonicas sanctiones opuscula ipsius recipienda decernunt sicut etiam sancti Cypriani, Ambrosii, Augustini opuscula sive tractatus et reliquorum sanctorum patrum qui nec in fide nec in predictatione a sancta Romana Ecclesia deviarunt sed in eius communicatione usque ad finem vitae perdurarunt. Bernald, *Apologeticus* I, 35; MGH, Libelli de lite II, 79, l. 26.

Augustin.[2] D'une façon générale les oeuvres de saint Jérôme sont souvent mentionnées à cette époque: on peut en relever plus de cent citations dans les *Libelli de lite.*[3] Il va de soi que l'*Adversus Jovinianum* a sa part dans cette faveur: saint Pierre Damien en appelle à son autorité dans le *Liber gratissimus* et Manegold dans son livre *Ad Gebehardum*[4] tandis que Bernald l'utilise abondamment dans l'*Apologeticus* auquel nous nous sommes déjà référés.[5] De leur côté, des collections canoniques célèbres du début du XII^e^ siècle, comme la *Panormia* et le *Decretum* d'Yves de Chartres ou le *Decretum* de Gratien rapportent des textes de l'*Adversus Jovinianum* à propos de la continence, de la virginité, des secondes noces et de la tempérance.[6] En général cependant ces écrits ne prêtent pas au dossier anti-matrimonial de saint Jérôme l'attention que lui donneront nombre de théologiens et de littérateurs tout au cours du XII^e^ siècle.

Une fois de plus, Abélard semble avoir joué ici le rôle d'initiateur. Au premier livre de sa *Theologia christiana,* qui fut écrite vers 1124,[7] maître Pierre a entrepris de prouver que les philosophes païens ont connu quelque chose du mystère de la Très Sainte Trinité. Mais craignant qu'on ne lui reproche cette assertion et cet appel aux païens, il cherche aussitôt de se justifier. Entre autres raisons, il déclare que les anciens méritent d'être écoutés parce que leur doctrine et leur vie constituent des leçons utiles aux chrétiens.[8] Et c'est ici précisément que nous retrouvons l'*Adversus Jovinianum* puisqu'Abélard, entre autres dires, fait état de pureté de vie et de la continence des philosophes. Son exposé reproduit fidèlement les grandes lignes de saint Jérôme. Ici comme là, nous voyons citer tout d'abord l'autorité de saint Paul, spécialement de la première épitre aux Corinthiens.[9] Ensuite Abélard, comme saint Jérôme, passe à l'Ancien Testament, encore qu'ici sa fidélité au modèle soit moins grande. Il n'avait guère intérêt à suivre les détails et les détours de la polémique anti-jovinienne; il se contente de noter quelques points principaux: les expériences douloureuses d'Adam, Samson, David et Salomon dans leurs rapports avec les femmes; viennent ensuite les textes essentiels des Proverbes et de l'Eccléciaste.[10] Abélard donne alors la parole aux philosophes: il reproduit la longue citation de Théophraste ainsi que les remarques amères de Cicéron, Socrate, Hérodote, Epicure et Xystus.[11] Sa contribution personnelle est assez réduite: maître Pierre emprunte à Valère Maxime quelques sentences édifiantes sur la modestie ou des jugements sévères portés contre l'incontinence.[12] Après cette preuve philosophique, vient l'argument "historique"; ainsi se trouve en partie modifié l'ordre suivi par l'*Adversus Jovinianum*. C'est qu'aux yeux d'Abélard, cette preuve fait moins appel à des faits qu'elle ne représente l'opinion des "séculiers" ou des "laïcs" auxquels il ne concevait évidemment donner le pas sur les sages.[13] Nous retrouvons les exemples anciens de respect et d'estime manifestés aux vierges, nous voyons citer à nouveau les Sibylles, les Vestales, le signe de la Vierge au zodiaque, la fille de Démotion, les vierges de Milet, la captive de Nicanor et celle de Thèbes, soit environ un quart des faits alignés par l'*Adversus Jovinianum*. Reste l'exemple des femmes mariées:[14] Abélard ne reprend qu'un trait à son modèle, celui de Lucrèce, et remplace les autres par quelques anecdotes puisées cette fois encore chez Valère Maxime.[15] Dans tout ce développement qui couvre huit colonnes de Migne, Abélard a plusieurs fois cité *l'Adversus Jovinianum* mais uniquement pour des faits précis ou des commentaires. Il ne semble pas avoir voulu présenter l'ensemble de son argumentation sous l'autorité de saint Jérôme. Peut-être n'avait-il pas perdu tout désir de paraître original. La substitution de quelques anecdotes empruntées à Valère Maxime à celles qui étaient contenues dans le texte de saint Jérôme semblerait confirmer cette hypothèse. En tout cas, on ne peut s'y méprendre, nous avons ici un résumé du premier livre de l'*Adversus Jovinianum*: le plan est substantiellement le même; ici comme là l'on passe du Nouveau Testament à l'Ancien puis aux philosophes. Chacune des sections présente en raccourci l'exposé de saint Jérôme. Ajoutons-le aussi, seule la présence sous les yeux d'Abélard de l'*Adversus Jovinianum* peut expliquer dans la *Theologia christiana* la mention de l'argument d'Ecriture Sainte car il ne se raccroche que malaisément à une argumentation dont le but est d'exalter la chasteté des païens.

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[2] Nostris vero temporibus in Italia apud Mediolanum ex praecepto Alexandri papae coeperunt clerici secundum praecepta beati Hieronymi ad Nepotianum de vita clericorum et secundum regulam sancti Augustini nihil possidenter in commune vivere. Bonizon de Sutri, *Decretum* V, 120; MGH, Libelli de lite I, 595, note 6.

[3] Pierre Damien, *Liber gratissimus*, MGH, Libelli de lite I, 28, l. 10.

[4] Manegold, *Ad Gebehardum liber*, MGH, Libelli de lite I, 350, l. 22; 352, l. 25; 365, l. 1.

[5] Bernald, *Apologeticus* I, 7, 13, 16, 34, 35, 39; MGH, Libelli de lite II, 73, ll. 2, 29; 74, l. 7; 76, ll. 24, 27; 78-79.

[6] Yves de Chartres, *Decretum* VII, 124; PL 161, 572; *Panormia* III, 96; PL 161, 1152; Gratien, *Decretum,* D 2, c. 40; D.5, c. 29, 30; D. 27, c. 5; D. 29, c. 9; D. 31, c. 7; D. 35, c. 2; c. 21, qu. I, c. 10; C 32, qu. 4, c. 6; C. 33, qu. 5, c. 7, 8, 9; D. 50, c. 20.

[7] J. Cottiaux, 'La conception de la théologie chez Abélard', *Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique* XXVIII (1932), 262; H. Ostlender, 'Die Theologia Scholarium des Peter Abaelard', *Aus der Geisteswelt des Mittelalters* I (1935), 263-281.

[8] Operis parte superiori testimonia quaedam tam prophetarum quam philosophorum collegimus, quibus Sanctae Trinitatis fidem astrueremus. Ubi quidem dum philosophorum infidelium assertiones sicut et Sanctorum Patrum quasi in auctoritatem induximus, multorum detractionibus corrodendos patere praesensimus. . . Abélard, *Theologia christiana* II; PL 178, 1165.

[9] Et si post abstinentiam et magnanimitatem philosophorum eorum quoque continentiam consideremus, multa in confusionem nostram de eis et ab eis scripta reperiemus. . . Quam (continentiam) et Veritas apostolis inpungit . . . et Apostolus maxime commendat dicens. . . *Ibid.;* PL 178, 1195. L'exposé de l'argument paulinien prent environ une demi colonne.

[10] Quantis autem impedimentis et periculis matrimonia abundent, multorum antea testimoniis et lapsuum experimentis didicimus cum in paradiso mulier statim virum captivaverit et Nazareum Domini Samsonem. . . *Ibid.;* PL 178, 1195. Développement jusqu'à col. 1197.

[11] De quo [Theophrasto] ista Hieronymus in eodem primo contra Iovinianum libro. . . *Ibid.;* PL 178, 1198. Socrate et Sextus sont cités dans un ordre qui diffère de celui de saint Jérôme, Socrate, col. 1197, dans la transition entre les parties théologique et philosophique de l'argumentation, Xystus (avec référence et un mot de commentaire de l'*Adversus Iovinianum*) col. 1180 lorsqu'Abélard tentait d'expliquer "moralement" la communauté des femmes prônée par Platon.

Une dizaine d'années plus tard,[16] Abélard écrit l'*Historia calamitatum*. Il est abbé démissionnaire de Saint-Gildas; il a dû quitter son abbaye parce que ses moines lui rendaient la vie impossible et avaient même cherché à l'empoisonner. Ce nouveau malheur lui fait évoquer ceux du passé et notamment son aventure avec Héloïse, quinze ou seize ans plus tôt.[17] Avec une naïveté et une suffisance étonnantes, il raconte à son correspondant comment il a séduit la "nièce" du chanoine Fulbert, s'est enfui avec elle en Bretagne et a enfin cherché à réparer sa faute en épousant la jeune fille. Ici encore—si invraisemblable que cela puisse paraître—nous retrouvons l'*Adversus Jovinianum*. Car au dire d'Abélard, c'est en se référant à cet écrit, qu'Héloïse refuse le mariage et prétend se contenter de la position subalterne de concubine. Non seulement ce mariage sera inutile en raison de la haine tenace de Fulbert, mais il sera déshonorant, dommageable à l'Eglise comme à la philosophie.[18] Comment admettre qu'une femme confisque pour elle seule un homme comme Abélard qui se doit à tous? Le mariage, dit Héloïse, est une condition infamante et pleine de difficultés. Saint Paul déconseille aux chrétiens de s'y engager. "Es-tu libre, ne cherche pas à te marier. Que si tu es marié, tu n'as pas fait de faute et la vierge qui se marie n'en commet pas non plus. Mais ces gens-là éprouveront dans leur chair des tribulations que je voudrais vous épargner. Je vous voudrais exempts de soucis". Nous avons déjà lu tout cela et nous nous trouvons devant un résumé du premier point de l'*Adversus Jovinianum* et de la *Theologia christiana.*[19] Du second on nous fait grâce; les auteurs sacrés de l'Ancien Testament ne paraissent pas ici mais voici le troisième argument basé sur les dires et les faits des philosophes.[20] Les Pères, et notamment saint Jérôme, l'ont allégué, nous pouvons bien y être attentifs.[21] Comme il ne faut pas vouloir en apprendre à Minerve,[22] Héloïse se contente de présenter le thème sous une forme succincte avec un bref commentaire. Elle résume la pensée de Théophraste, cite Cicéron et Sénèque, enfin elle rappelle les malheurs de Socrate malmené par Xantippe.[23] Serait-ce un élément nouveau que cette comparaison entre les moines, les "Nazaréens" ou Esséniens et les philosophes sur laquelle Héloïse se base pour affirmer que chez tous les peuples, Juifs, païens ou chrétiens, on trouve une élite intellectuelle et morale séparée du commun par une observance plus stricte de la continence et de l'abstinence?[24] Non, c'est, sous forme plus concise, un thème que nous lisons dans un autre passage de la *Theologia christiana* et qui lui aussi se base sur l'*Adversus Jovinianum* au second livre cette fois.[25] Il n'est pas jusqu'à la citation de saint Augustin sur les philosophes, insérée dans cet exposé, qu'on ne retrouve dans le même ouvrage d'Abélard.[26]

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[12] Quanta autem cura honestas gentilium non solum actionum verum etiam suspicionum turpitudines evitaret, dicet Valerius Maximus. . . *Ibid.;* PL 178, 1200. Suivent cinq anecdotes reprises aux livres IV, 5; VI, 3.

[13] Quod si etiam post philosophos aut litteratas feminas, ad saeculares vel laicos venire delectat, nec de talibus exempla deerunt quae nos ad pudicitiam invitant, tam de innuptis quam de nuptis. Unde Hieronymus, in primo quoque contra Jovinianum libro, talium quoque laudem prosecutus, ait. . . . *Ibid.;* PL 178, 1201. Voir aussi col. 1197 l'éloge de la virginité des Sybilles.

[14] Si autem post virginalem ad conjugalem transmigrare juvet. . . *Ibid.;* PL 178, 1202. On se rappellera la transition toute pareille chez saint Jérôme. Voir *supra* note 17.

[15] Praestat in exemplo illa Lucretia. . . Unde est illud Valerii Maximi. . . *Ibid.;* PL 178, 1202.

[16] L'*Historia calamitatum* fait mention de la Bulle d'Innocent II datée de 1131 qui sanctionne l'établissement d'Héloïse et de ses religieuses au Paraclet. Depuis lors Abélard est venu plusieurs fois au monastère au point de provoquer des soupçons, il a eu des démêlés avec les moines de saint Gildas et a dû s'enfuir. Par contre rien ne permet de supposer qu'au moment où il écrit cette lettre, Abélard ait déjà repris son enseignement à Sainte-Geneviève (1136). On peut donc penser que l'*Historia calamitatum* a été écrite vers 1134.

[17] On fixe d'ordinaire à 1117 ou 1118 la liaison d'Héloïse et d'Abélard qui précède immédiatement le voyage en Bretagne. Lorsqu'Abélard paraît au Concile de Soissons en 1121 il est déjà moine de Saint-Denys depuis un certain temps.

Avouons-le, il est curieux de retrouver l'argumentation d'Héloïse dans un ouvrage d'Abélard antérieur au récit de l'*Historia calamitatum.* Certes, on se doute bien que maître Pierre ne nous livre pas ici la sténographie d'un entretien et que les amants n'ont pas compulsé les oeuvres de saint Jérôme et de saint Augustin au cours de leur conversation. Il y a donc ici une présentation littéraire conforme au genre de la lettre tel qu'on le concevait alors. Mais Abélard n'a-t-il pas été plus loin, n'a-t-il pas largement dépassé le sens des paroles d'Héloïse? Il sera sans doute toujours impossible de répondre apodictiquement à ces questions mais on ne peut s'empêcher de douter de l'entière véracité du récit. On a vraiment

[18] Quantas ab ea (Heliossa) mundus poenas exigere deberet si tantam ei lucernam auferret, quantae maledictiones, quanta damna Ecclesiae, quantae philosophorum lacrymae hoc matrimonium essent secuturae. . . Quam indecens, quam lamentabile esset ut quem omnibus natura hoc creaverat, uni me feminae dicarem. . . Detestabatur vehementer hoc matrimonium quod mihi per omnia probrosum esset atque onerosum. Abélard, *Historia calamitatum,* 7; PL 178, 130.

[19] Praetendebat infamiam mei pariter et difficultates matrimonii, ad quas quidem vitandas nos exhortans Apostolus ait. . . *Ibid.;* PL 178, 130.

[20] Quod si nec Apostoli consilium, nec sanctorum exhortationes de tanto matrimonii jugo susciperem, saltem inquit, philosophos consulerem et quae super hoc ab eis vel de eis scripta sunt attenderem. *Ibid.;* PL 178, 130. *De eis et ab eis scripta,* c'est l'expression même de la *Theologia christiana,* voir *supra* note 4.

[21] Quod plerumque etiam sancti ad increpationem nostram diligenter faciunt. Quale illud est beati Hieronymi in primo contra Jovinianum ubi scilicet commemorat Theophrastum. . . *Ibid.;* PL 178, 130.

[22] Ne Minervam ipsam videar docere. *Ibid.;* PL 178, 132.

[23] *Ibid.;* PL 178, Théophraste 130, Cicéron et Sénèque 131, Socrate 132.

[24] In omni namque populo tam gentili scilicet quam judaico sive christiano, aliqui semper exstiterunt fide seu morum honestate caeteris praeminentes et se a populo aliqua continentiae vel abstinentiae singularitate segregantes. *Ibid.;* 178, 131. Philosophes, Esséniens et clercs s'opposeraient donc comme un monde assez uniforme à celui des profanes, séculiers ou laïcs.

[25] Abélard, *Theologia christiana* II; PL 178, 1184-1185.

[26] Abélard *Historia calamitatum* 7; PL 178, 132; *Theologia christiana* II; PL 178, 1178. Cet extrait du *De Civitate Dei* VIII explique l'humilité sous-jacente au nom de philosophe revendiqué par Pythagore.

trop l'impression que les paroles rapportées ici ne sont pas d'Héloïse mais de l'auteur de la *Theologia christiana*.[27]

Quoi qu'il en soit d'ailleurs, ce qu'il nous est intéressant de noter c'est ce nouveau recours à l'*Adversus Jovinianum* et, à travers lui, à l'éthique païenne. Abélard et Héloïse, s'interrogeant sur la conduite à suivre, cherchent conseil auprès des moralistes païens. Ils ne veulent pas être indignes des leçons et des exemples des sages antiques. Comme l'écrit très justement M. Gilson:

> Sera-t-il dit qu'Abélard ne mérite pas d'être compté parmi ces *nobiles philosophos?* Pour Héloïse comme pour Abélard, c'est là toute la question. Ce qu'Héloïse voulait pour l'homme qu'elle aimait, c'était donc un état de vie qui fut digne de sa grandeur philosophique.[28]

Sans doute on pourrait objecter: Héloïse fait aussi appel à saint Paul. Elle songe aux dommages que l'Eglise subira si Abélard l'épouse. Elle s'étonne qu'un clerc et qu'un chanoine envisage pareil parti.[29] L'idéal chrétien n'est donc pas absent du débat. Certes, cela est exact mais il n'en reste pas moins qu'Héloïse songe beaucoup plus au déshonneur qu'à la perte d'une situation. Elle sait qu'Abélard, marié, restera clerc—cela M. Gilson l'a fort bien montré[30]—mais elle craint pour son amant la situation diminuée et méprisable de *clericus conjugatus, uxoratus*.[31] Or pourquoi un clerc marié est-il ridicule? C'est pour les raisons qu'elle vient de nous dire et qu'elle emprunte beaucoup plus aux philosophes qu'aux canons de la réforme grégorienne. Et cela montre que malgré ces incidences, le débat qui s'institue ainsi entre Abélard et Héloïse, ou sa conscience, est dominé par un esprit plus païen que chrétien.

Est-ce intuition historique, est-ce logique éternelle de l'amour-passion? Tous deux retrouvent dans ces textes l'esprit dans lequel Théophraste, Cicéron, Epicure et les autres ont conçu le mariage. En effet, nous l'avons dit, lorsque ces auteurs critiquent cette institution, ce n'est pas pour prôner la virginité comme le fait saint Jérôme mais pour vanter les avantages de l'amour libre. Posséder une femme légitime implique un train de vie, des obligations, un "établissement" tandis qu'un amour passager, une concubine (je n'ose employer les termes antiques) permet de satisfaire la volupté sans contracter la moindre servitude. Si Héloïse avait été fidèle à l'esprit de l'*Adversus Jovinianum*, elle aurait prié son amant de renoncer à leur liaison; mais si, par dessus saint Jérôme elle rejoignait les "philosophes", elle pouvait dire comme elle le fait ici: je ne serai pas ta femme mais ta maîtresse.[32]

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[27] On le voit, je rencontre ici les doutes du R. P. Muckle dans les *Mediaeval Studies*, (XII) 1950, 173. J'ai malheureusement connu trop tard son édition de l'*Historia calamitatum* pour pouvoir l'utiliser.

[28] E. Gilson, *Héloïse et Abélard* (Paris, 1938), pp. 66-67.

[29] Quantum ab ea mundus poenas exigere deberet si tantam ei lucernam auferret, quantae maledictiones, quanta damna Ecclesiae, quantae philosophorum lacrymae hoc matrimonium essent secuturae. Abélard, *Historia calamitatum*, 7; PL 178, 130.

[30] E. Gilson, *Héloïse et Abélard*, p. 46 ff., p. 50: La position d'Abélard lui-même est donc claire, et toute ce qu'il dit du mariage atteste que, de son propre point de vue, le mariage d'un clerc était un acte valide et licite mais que l'état de mariage ressemblait fort à une déchéance.

Par contre, il est possible qu'Abélard eût perdu sa prébende canoniale ainsi que le suggérait Yves de Chartres, quelques années auparavant, pour la cas similaire d'un chanoine parisien. *Epistola 218;* PL 162, 221. Mais Abélard était-il chanoine de Paris, on n'en sait rien. Cf. Ch. Charrier, *Heloïse dans l'histoire et dans la légende* (Paris, 1933), p. 112. Il est très possible, en effet, qu'il ait reçu l'écolatrie de Notre-Dame sans être pourvu d'un canonicat.

[31] Sur l'état des clercs mariés, on verra l'ouvrage classique de R. Genestal, *Le Privilegium fori* (Paris, 1921). Malgré l'autorité de ce travail, on ne peut dire que cette question ait été parfaitement élucidée. Une enquête plus large encore devrait être entreprise.

[32] Addebat . . . quam sibi charius existeret; mihique honestius amicam dici quam uxorem. Abélard, *Historia calamitatum*, 7: PL 178, 132. Non matrimonii federa, non dotes aliquas expectavi, non denique meas voluptates aut voluntates, sed tuas (sicut ipse nosti) adimplere studui. Et si uxoris nomen sanctius ac validius videtur, dulcius semper exstitit amicae vocabulum; aut, si non indigneris, concubinae vel scorti.

Dans cette perspective, on comprend la logique de cette argumentation qui a étonné tant de commentateurs. Il ne s'agit pas pour les deux amants de se référer à un idéal chrétien ou à des règles canoniques qui leur enjoignent la continence. Il n'est question que d'échapper aux obligations d'un état social. Les auteurs chrétiens comme les païens allégués ici seront d'accord pour déconseiller le mariage mais l'esprit dans lequel ils donnent ce conseil est totalement différent. Saint Paul préconise la virginité et Théophraste l'amour libre. En se ralliant à ce dernier parti, Héloïse et Abélard montrent très clairement la filiation spirituelle à laquelle ils se rattachent. Elle est païenne et non pas chrétienne.

Mais ne permettons pas plus longtemps à Héloïse de nous distraire de la philosophie et voyons plutôt dans quelle mesure le dossier anti-matrimonial a été remarqué par les disciples d'Abélard. Si les *Sententiae florianenses* et les *Sententiae Rolandi* (Alexandre III) ne semblent guère avoir prêté attention à cette question, il n'en va pas de même pour les *Sententiae Hermanni* ou *Epitome theologiae christianae*,[33] les *Sententiae parisienses*, l'*Ysagoge in theologiam* et le *Commentarius cantabrigiensis*. Chez eux le dossier anti-matrimonial est devenu comme un lieu commun, dont le texte s'amenuise sans cesse et dont la leçon ne s'encombre guère de nuances. Rencontrant le chapitre sept de la deuxième épitre aux Corinthiens qui traite de la virginité et du mariage, le *Commentarius cantabrigiensis* allègue brièvement l'autorité de Théophraste. L'auteur a si peu revu ses textes qu'il confond saint Jérôme avec saint Augustin. Chez lui les longs exposés de l'*Adversus Jovinianum* sont réduits à la dimension d'un proverbe qu'il compare vertement à un adage populaire sur la loterie matrimoniale: se marier c'est acheter un chat dans un sac.[34] Les trois autres textes sont un peu plus prolixes et mettent le dossier anti-matrimonial en relation avec la réforme des moeurs cléricales: Herman est nettement tête de file et l'*Ysagoge*, comme les *Sententiae parisienses*, s'inspirent de son ouvrage, avec des nuances cependant. Invoquant Théophraste et saint Jérôme, soit uniquement ce dernier comme c'est le cas pour l'*Ysagoge*, ils diront tous les aléas des épousailles. Dans tous les autres cas, chacun peut faire l'expérience de ce qu'il choisit; on essaie un cheval avant de l'acheter; mais il n'en va pas de même ici et il ne peut être question de connaître intimement une femme avant de s'être définitivement lié à elle. Un sage refuse de s'engager ainsi. La femme est chaste ou elle ne l'est pas. Dans le premier cas elle est orgueilleuse; dans le second, elle fait vivre en de constants soupçons. Herman et les *Sententiae parisienses* rappelleront de plus l'avis de saint Paul: le mariage est un esclavage dont on ne peut se libérer et dans lequel un homme avisé ne tombe pas.[35]

Heloïse, *Epistola 2;* PL 178, 184.

[33] H. Ostlender, 'Die Sentenzenbücher der Schule Abaelards', *Theologische Quartalschrift*, CXVII (1936), 208-252; F. Cavallera, 'D'Anselme de Laon à Pierre Lombard', *Bulletin de littérature ecclésiastique* (1940). 105.

[34] Et vir, quod ducit, cognosere non licet, sed mulierem peplatam et undique velatam ne noverit, ducit, ita videlicet ut vulgare proverbium in ducente compleatur qui tamquam catum emit in sacco. Et ideo recte Teofrastus, ut beatus dicit Augustinus, a sapiente uxorem non esse ducendam asserebat quia omnem, qui ducit, in ducendo tamquam indiscretum fieri oportet. A. Landgraf, *Commentarius Cantabrigiensis in epistolas Pauli* II (Publications in Mediaeval Studies 2, Notre Dame, Ind., 1939), p. 244.

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Herman, *Sententiae*, 31; PL 178, 1746.	*Sententiae Parisienses;* éd. Landgraf, p. 46.	*Ysagoge in theologiam;* éd. Landgraf, p. 198.
Inde Hieronymus et Theophrastus dicunt: Nulli sapienti ducenda est uxor. In aliis autem experiri possumus qualia sint antequam habeamus, ut equum antequam emamus etc., sed mulierem experiri non permittimur nisi postquam in uxorem accepimus.	Ieronimus ac Teofrastus dicunt: Nulli sapienti ducenda est uxor. Aliis enim experiri possumus qualia sunt, antequam ea habeamus, ut equum antequam illum emamus, etc., sed mulierem experiri non permittimur, nisi postquam in uxorem habebimus.	Ieronymus: Nulli, inquit, sapienti ducenda est uxor. In aliis enim eligendis experiri possumus qualia ea sint antequam habeamus. Mulierem vero experiri non permittitur.

Mais cet esclavage, on le sait, ne répugnait pas à tous les membres du clergé à cette époque et nos auteurs s'occupent du mariage des clercs comme d'une question fort agitée.[36] En des termes identiques, les Sentences d'Herman, de Paris et l'*Ysagoge* affirment qu'un clerc tonsuré ou dans les ordres mineurs peut se marier à condition de renoncer à ses bénéfices mais que les ordres majeurs (y compris le sous-diaconat) excluent le mariage. Les deux premiers ouvrages se font de plus l'écho d'une théorie nouvelle par laquelle les canonistes essaient alors de faire des ordres majeurs un empêchment dirimant au mariage en raison d'un voeu qui y serait implicitement joint.[37] Ils estiment que dans l'Eglise latine, à la différence de l'Eglise grecque, le sacerdoce implique un voeu de chasteté et que par conséquent, sauf disposition particulière comme ce fut le cas en Angleterre aux premiers temps de l'évangélisation, un prêtre de l'Eglise occidentale ne peut songer à se marier. Toutefois nos auteurs envisagent le cas des prêtres latins qui ont été ordonnés avant que l'on précise l'obligation de la continence cléricale et ils leur accordent la liberté de se marier s'ils cessent d'exercer les ordres reçus.

On le constate, les abélardiens semblent avoir eu une prédilection pour ce thème. Signalons-le toutefois, ce curieux dossier a aussi été utilisé en dehors de cette école. Dans ses sentences, Pierre Lombard a inséré la curieuse opinion de Xystus le Pythagoricien: est adultère le mari qui aime trop sa femme. Cette citation est suivie du commentaire de l'*Adversus Jovinianum*: le sage aime sa

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Item mulier aut casta est, aut incasta. Si casta, superba; si incasta numquam erit libera a suspicione.	Item, mulier aut est casta aut incesta. Si casta, superba; si incesta, numquam erit libera a suspicione.	Idem: Aut, inquit, casta mulier aut incesta. Si casta, superba; si incesta, numquam erit suspicione libera.
Conjugium etiam servitus dicitur. Unde Apostolus: Servus vocatus es, etc. (I Cor, VII, 21) id est, in conjugio utere servitute, id est habita etiam occasione dimittendi non dimittas.	Coniugium etiam servitus dicitur. Unde Apostolus: Servus vocatus est, id est, in coniugio utere servitute.	
Si autem liber, id est sine conjugio, ne accipias uxorem, si vis esse liber.	Si autem liber, id est non in coniugio, ne accipias uxorem si vis liber esse.	

[36] Herman, *Sententiae*, 31; PL 178, 1746.	*Senteniae Parisienses;* éd. Landgraf, p. 44-45.	*Ysagoge;* éd. Landgraf, p. 197.
Utrum clerici matrimonium contrahere possint quaeri solet. Sacerdotes qui non fecerunt (votum) possunt. Si vero aliquis in ecclesia, quae votum suscepit, fuerit qui non votum fecerit, potest ducere, sed in ecclesia illa officium non exercebit, quod est parochiam non tenebit.	Utrum clerici matrimonium contrahant quaeritur. Sacerdotes qui non votum fecerunt possunt. Si vero aliquis in ecclesia, quae votum suscipit, fuerit qui votum non fecerit, potest ducere, sed in ecclesia illa officium non exercebit.	
Graecorum vero sacerdotes quia votum non susceperunt bene uxores ducere possunt. . .	Grecorum sacerdotes, quia votum non susceperunt, bene uxores ducere possunt. . .	
Ordines impediunt; possunt tamen ducere usque ad acolitum sed beneficia dimittere debent. Qui vero supra acolythum ordinati ducere non possunt. Gregorius tamen anglicis permisit. . .	Ordines inpediunt; possunt tamen ducere usque ad acolitum sed beneficia dimittere debent. Qui vero supra acolytum ordinati sunt, ducere non possunt. Gregorius tamen Anglicis permisit. . .	Ordines quoque inpediunt usque ad acolytum. Tamen licitum est clerico conjugium sed ecclesiae beneficia dimittat. Ultra vero non est fas, licet Gregorius Anglis nuper conversis hoc permiserit. . .

[37] A. Esmein, *Le mariage en droit canonique* I (2ᵉ éd., Paris, 1929), p. 329.

femme par raison et non par affection car la violence de la volupté ne règne pas sur lui; il ne se laisse pas emporter par la passion à l'acte conjugal. Rien n'est plus honteux que d'aimer son épouse comme on le ferait pour une femme adultère. Ceux qui prétendent se marier pour propager le genre humain devraient avoir au moins le mérite des animaux; qu'ils élèvent leurs enfants et se montrent plus pères qu'amants.[38] Evidemment ces quelques lignes ne sont rien à côté des soixante-dix pages de saint Jérôme et des résumés en six ou trois pages d'Abélard. Mais à elles seules elles révèlent tout un esprit. Insérées dans l'ouvrage qui sans cesse sera commenté dans les écoles, elles vont à titre d'organe témoin assurer la survivance de la vieille polémique contre Jovinien. Elles passeront aussi dans la Somme théologique de saint Thomas et celui-ci, comme le Lombard et tant d'autres au moyen âge, enseignera que les relations charnelles entre les époux sont peccamineuses si elles dépassent la mesure strictement requise pour la propagation de l'espèce.[39] Il va sans dire que relayée par les deux auteurs théologiques, qui furent les plus commentés durant la période médiévale cette opinion de saint Jérôme devait pénétrer partout, dans les écoles comme dans les cloîtres.

III. *CHEZ SALISBURY ET QUELQUES AUTRES HOMMES DE LETTRES*

Il n'y a pas que des théologiens au XII^{e} siècle pour prêter attention à la diatribe de saint Jérôme. Des hommes de lettre ont suivi leur exemple, et il est piquant de relever les variations que leur talent, leur information ou leurs idées personnelles ont apportées au thème ancien.

Jean de Salisbury lui fait une place dans le *Polycraticus* qu'il publie en 1159. Encore qu'il fasse sonner bien haut les noms de Zénon, Epictète, Aristote, Critolaus et des Epicuriens,[1] le plus souvent cet auteur se contente de puiser dans le florilège de saint Jérôme, qu'il cite d'ailleurs honnêtement.[2] Il y ajoute seulement quelques traits nouveaux repris à Valère Maxime ou à Pétrone. Par contre dans l'interprétation philosophique des textes du dossier, Salisbury se montre plus personnel qu'aucun autre auteur. Il tend à atténuer la condamnation portée contre le mariage en insinuant que celui-ci peut être une chose excellente, et systématiquement il cherche à transformer la critique de l'institution en celle des abus.

Dès l'abord, Salisbury reprend à Valère Maxime un nouveau "logion" socratique. Un jeune homme ayant demandé à Socrate s'il vaut mieux se marier ou ne pas se marier, celui-ci répondit: dans les deux cas vous vous repentirez de ce que vous avez fait. Si vous ne vous mariez pas, vous souffrirez de la solitude et vous verrez finir votre lignage; si vous vous mariez, vous perdrez votre tranquillité et votre argent.[3] Ceci rend un son nouveau. Pour la première fois on ne présente pas tout en noir d'un côté, tout en rose de l'autre. Le trait est peu appuyé comme il en va d'ordinaire chez Salisbury qui abhorre les affirmations massives et les convictions trop nettes. Mais pour qui sait ce que parler veut dire, la chose est claire, le futur évêque de Chartres craint que l'on exagère complaisamment les ennuis du mariage et qu'on le discrédite sans mesure. Rassurons-nous, ce n'est pas chez lui manque de vertu mais absence de fanatisme et d'*apriori*.

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[38] Pierre Lombard, *Sententiae* IV, dist. 31, c. 5; éd. P.P. Quarachi, II, p. 939.

[39] Saint Thomas, *Summa theologiae*, 2^{a} 2^{ae}, q. 154, art 8, obj. 2 et resp.

[1] Zeno, Epictetus, Aristoteles, Critolaus, et Epicureorum quam plurimi traduntur posteris hanc publicasse sententiam. Jean de Salisbury, *Policraticus sive de nugis curialium et philosophorum* VIII, II; PL 199, 750; éd. Webb, p. 296, l. 9.

[2] De molestia et oneribus coniugiorum secundum Hieronymum et alios philosophos; et de pernicie libidinis, de mulieris Ephesinae et similium fide. *Ibid.;* PL 199, 748; éd. Webb, p. 294, l. 1.

[3] Unde referente Valerio, Socrates . . . ab adolescentulo quodam consultus utrum uxorem duceret an se omni matrimonio abstineret, respondit eum, utrum eorum fecisset, acturum poenitentiam. Hic te, inquit, solitudo, hic orbitas, hic generis interitus, hic heres alienus excipiet. Illic perpetua sollicitudo, contextus querelarum, dotis exprobratio, affinium graue supercilium, garrula socrus lingua, subsessor alieni matrimonii, incertus liberorum euentus. *Ibid.;* PL 199, 749; éd. Webb, p. 295, l. 21. Ce point de vue est assez proche de celui d'Innocent III qui dans son *De Contemptu mundi* I, 18, met en vedette les maux du célibataire comme de l'homme marié. *De Miseria continentis et coniugati;* PL 217, 709-10.

Tout aussi significatif est les commentaire de Salisbury sur le texte de Théophraste qu'il nous rapporte fidèlement d'après saint Jérôme. En effet, personnellement il n'adresse aucun reproche aux jeunes gens qui se marient; il s'en prend uniquement aux veufs que l'expérience aurait dû détourner des secondes noces, aux clercs et aux religieux qui oublient les leçons de la philosophie et de la religion, et cherchent à se marier ou tout au moins s'occuper du mariage et du ménage des autres. Ils ne peuvent, eux, invoquer la naïveté ou l'inexpérience car ils ont été instruits par les leçons des anciens.[4] Ils sont assez éclairés pour échapper à l'impudeur féminine stigmatisée par Hérodote comme le fit un ami de l'auteur dont l'histoire nous est ici contée.[5]

Pour Salisbury on le voit, sagesse païenne et christianisme, philosophie et cléricature sont intimement mêlées. On ne passe pas de l'une à l'autre par un *a fortiori* comme chez saint Jérôme; l'opposition plus ou moins consciente de l'*Historia calamitatum* abélardienne est ignorée. Salisbury avoue ne pas voir de distinction entre l'état du clerc et du philosophe; ces deux termes sont synonymes et ne font pas nombre.[6] Il est vrai que notre auteur interprête les sentences des philosophes, avec saint Jérôme, comme un éloge de la virginité et non comme une apologie de l'amour libre. C'est sans réticence qu'il propose aux chrétiens—ou plutôt aux plus parfaits d'entre eux—une leçon de l'éthique païenne.

Aussi Salisbury reprend-il à son compte les paroles que nous connaissons bien. Cicéron,[7] Philippe, Gorgias, Socrate victime de la mauvaise humeur de sa femme et, plus loin, Euripide et Epicure surgissent de l'*Adversus Jovinianum* pour dire au lecteur leur opinion. Le long épisode de la Matrone d'Ephèse emprunté au Satiricon de Pétrone—celui-là même que La Fontaine a immortalisé dans une de ses fables—apporte un exemple nouveau de la légèreté féminine, de la facilité avec laquelle les veuves apparemment les plus irréductibles se consolent et les femmes en général changent l'objet de leur amour et de leur haine.[8] Toutefois Salisbury estime que les Anciens ont exagéré car, quoi qu'ils disent, certaines femmes ont donné des exemples d'une grande pudeur.[9] L'éducation et l'effort peuvent d'ailleurs, à son sens, atténuer la légèreté féminine. De tous les auteurs que nous recensons, il sera le seul à faire écho à la conclusion du dossier de saint Jérôme dans laquelle celui-ci exhortait les femmes à réagir contre l'imprudence et l'impudeur.[10] Il ne lui suffit pas de consigner des traits de moeurs avec le cynisme découragé des païens; d'accord avec l'ascétisme chrétien il croit à un redressement possible dans cet esprit d'optimisme qui est la condition même de la tâche du moraliste. D'ailleurs si Salisbury doit bien dire que le mariage a des ennuis, il aime à remarquer que la société conjugale est bonne et voulue par Dieu et réserve sa séverité pour ceux qui recherchent le plaisir et la volupté en dehors de la loi.[11] Il concluera son exposé en disant:

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[4] Haec et huiusmodi Theophrastus. . : Scite fertur dixisse P. Clodius quia improbe Neptunum accusat qui iterum naufragium fecit. At non illud inelegantius diceretur quia improbe Venerem causatur adversam qui secundam ducit uxorem. . . Unde monstris simile est quod hii qui non modo philosophiae sed et religionis sibi vindicant nomen arceri nequeunt ab amplexibus mulierum. Saepe etenim qui antequam nomen profiteretur alterutrum . . . contentissime vixit, eum in aliquem gradum promotus est nactusque quietem, primae et summae deliberationis acumen exercet in eligenda uxore uel ducenda, aut quod nequius est, uicinorum matrimonia sollicitare et corrumpere non ueretur. *Ibid.;* PL 199, 751; éd. Webb, p. 298, l. 32.

[5] Erumpit interdum inuerecunda intemperies mulierum; quia, sicut scribit Herodotus, mulier cum ueste deponit et uerecondiam. . . Eleganter quidem Gaufridus de Heroumuilla, familiaris meus, unius talium (inuerecundarum mulierum) in causa huiusmodi confudit audatiam. *Ibid.;* PL 199, 752a; éd. Webb, p. 299, l. 18.

[6] Si tamen haec, religio scilicet et philosophia, numerum faciunt, cum sine religione nemo recte ualeat philosophari. *Ibid.;* PL 199, 751; éd. Webb, p. 299, l. 11. Bene cum philosophantibus, id est cum clericis agitur. PL 199, 752; éd. Webb, p. 300, l. 23.

[7] Cicero. . . *Ibid.;* PL 199, 752; éd. Webb, p. 300, l. 26.

[8] Matrona quaedam referente Petronio Effesi. . . *Ibid.;* PL 199, 753; éd. Webb, p. 301, l. 26.

[9] Sunt aliquae pudicissimae, licet satiricis dicat quoniam "rara auis in terris negroque simillima cigno" mulier exactae castitatis, et tragicus nullam esse feminam tam pudicam quae non peregrina libidine usque ad furorem incendatur. *Ibid.;* PL 199, 753; éd. Webb. p. 301, l. 21. On comparera cette affirmation à celle de Gauthier Map plus loin.

> Rien de meilleur qu'une femme pudique, rien de plus agréable pour ceux qui ne peuvent ni ne veulent garder la continence. Mais que ceux-ci usent de modération et qu'ils ne cherchent pas à s'enorgueillir de leur genre de vie. Sinon ils mériteront les reproches les plus graves.[12]

Ainsi donc, tout en marquant la supériorité de la continence, Jean de Salisbury porte sur le mariage un jugement plus nuancé que d'autres auteurs. Il cite les mêmes traits ou sentences que les autres—il semble plus attentif aux avis des "philosophes" qu'aux anecdotes—il enrichit même quelque peu le dossier transmis par la tradition mais son interprétation des textes est différente. En eux il voit moins une critique du mariage, dont timidement il dit quelque bien, qu'une censure des excès de la chair, du manque de modération, les secondes noces, d'inconduite, du mariage des clercs ou leur souci de s'occuper du mariage des autres. D'autre part on l'aura remarqué, les textes de l'Ecriture ne sont pas allégués en ce passage et la partie scripturaire de l'argumentation est négligée.[13] C'est une note caractéristique du *Polycratus.*

Son enseignement n'en est pas modifié pour autant puisqu'à la suite de saint Jérôme, il croit qu'ici l'enseignement des philosophes est tout à fait semblable à celui de la Révélation. On peut être chrétien de pensée en citant les païens et païen d'esprit en invoquant des textes chrétiens: ce qui compte essentiellement, c'est une mentalité générale, une sagesse dans le sens de laquelle on plie les arguments d'autorité. L'attitude de Salisbury s'expliquera plutôt comme une coquetterie de lettré: il lui plaît de retrouver dans la tradition philosophique un enseignement moral, de trouver chez les anciens, qu'il aime de toute son âme, des exemples et des préceptes dont il puisse s'inspirer dans sa conduite et dans ses écrits.

Salisbury s'est montré homme de coeur, Gauthier Map[14] se veut homme d'esprit. En ces matières la différence n'est pas nécessairement synonyme de progrès. Dans la quatrième partie du *De Nugis curialium,* écrite peu après 1180,[15] Map consacre un chapitre aux ennuis du mariage.[16] Il se vante d'avoir mystifié ses lecteurs quelques années auparavant en publiant séparément cet écrit sous un pseudonyme antique, Valerius. Beaucoup s'y sont laissé prendre et ont cru reconnaître ici quelques pages de Valerius Maximus,[17] celui-là même qu'Abélard et Salisbury avaient ajouté à la liste des auteurs présentée par saint Jérôme. D'autres ont jugé l'inspiration de cet opuscule si proche de celle de l'*Adversus Jovinianum* qu'ils l'ont joint au *Corpus hieronymianum* au moins à titre d'imitation, d'écrit composé "à la manière de" saint Jérôme.[18] En fait il s'agit très probablement d'un exercice de rhétorique[19] accommodé au genre épistolaire pour les besoins particuliers d'un destinataire ou simplement pour obtenir une diffusion plus grande dans le public.

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[10] Siquidem doctissimi uiri nox est pudicitiam imprimis esse retinendam [*Adversus Iouinianum* I, 49; PL 23, 281-2]; *Ibid.;* PL 199, 755; éd. Webb, p. 305, l. 15.

[11] Si ergo tanta est molestia nuptiarum, quae proculdubio sunt et a Domino institutae, ut eas sapiens reformidet, quis nisi demens ipsam approbet uoluptatem quae illicita est et tota uersatur in sordibus quam homines culpant et Deus proculdubio condempnabit? *Ibid.;* PL 199, 755; éd. Webb, p. 305, l. 5.

[12] Nichil enim melius, nichil utilius muliere pudica, nichil eorum quae possunt excogitari iocundius his qui continere non possunt aut nolunt; sed desipientis est ab his laudem sperare quae ueniam rectius merentur quam gloriam, si tamen moderationis bono fuerint temperata. Alioquin non uenia sed pena, sed ignominia utriusque libidinis maculam prosequetur; nisi forte decorus habendus sit qui in hircum transformetur aut suem. *Ibid.;* PL 199, 756; éd. Webb, p. 306, l. 15.

[13] Notons cette allusion chrétienne: le mariage est du grain qui a rapporté 30% alors que la virginité en procurait 60 ou 100. *Ibid.;* PL 199, 749; éd. Webb, p. 296, l. 6. Saint Jérôme avait développé cette idée dans l'*Adversus Jovinianum* I, 3; PL 23, 213.

[14] Cf. A. Boutemy, *Gautier Map conteur anglais* (Bruxelles, 1945), et la bibliographie de cet ouvrage.

[15] M. Manitius, *Geschichte der lateinischen Literatur des Mittelalters* II, 3 (Munich, 1931), p. 266.

[16] G. Map, *De Nugis Curialium,* Dist, 4, cap. 3; éd. T. Wright (Londres, 1850), p. 143.

Au point de vue littéraire ces pages ne sont pas sans mérite. La langue de Map est très supérieure à celle des autres écrits que nous avons examinés jusqu' ici et l'auteur a toutes les coquetteries d'un fin lettré. La présentation est originale car la *Dissuasio* est faite d'une série de paragraphes rappelant un fait ou une sentence et se terminant par une courte apostrophe: mon ami évite ce malheur, écoute cette leçon, défie-toi de la femme, le plus grand des dangers. Pour le fond, Gauthier a fait un effort de renouvellement, et s'il se sert de l'*Adversus Jovinianum* et très probablement de la *Theologia christiana,* il n'en a pas moins apporté des éléments nouveaux au vieux thème. Mais c'est surtout dans son interprétation des dits et faits des anciens que Map s'est montré personnel: son anti-féminisme est plus radical que celui de saint Jérôme lui-même. Selon celui-ci, des faits historiques montraient l'estime des anciens pour la virginité. La femme était dangereuse mais par un effort de volonté elle pouvait acquérir les mérites de la modestie et de la chasteté. Map se met à un point de vue exclusivement masculin et déclare que toute femme est déjà dangereuse par sa seule présence, en dehors de toute intention mauvaise. Bethsabée n'a fait aucune proposition à David, elle n'a pas intrigué; sa seule vue a perverti le roi en le conduisant à l'adultère et au crime.[20] S'il en va ainsi, quels torts ne pourra causer la femme perverse, celle qui veut nuire et séduire? Or c'est le cas le plus fréquent car une femme vertueuse est plus rare que le phénix.[21] On a bien cité des exemples de pudeur féminine, mais Map n'y croit pas: il n'y a pas de Lucrèce, de Pénélope ou de Sabine, déclarera-t-il: *Omnes time.*[22] L'*Adversus Jovinianum* citait des exemples de parthénogénèse; Map est seul à faire écho à ce passage si curieux mais il transforme radicalement le sens de l'exemple qu'il allègue: Perictione a conçu Platon d'un dieu en dehors de tout commerce charnel, écrivait Jérôme, et cela montre que les meilleures des femmes païennes ont cherché à échapper à la concupiscence, que les plus grands hommes sont nés sans intervention de la passion.[23] Voyez donc la petite vicieuse, ironise Gauthier Map.

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[17] P. Lehmann, *Pseudo-Antike Literatur des Mittelalters* (Leipzig, 1927), p. 23; A. Boutemy, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

[18] On trouve cet écrit parmi les *spuria* de saint Jérôme dans PL 30, 254. Cf. la préface de T. Wright, p. xxxi.

[19] M. Manitius, *ibid.;* M. R. James, *Walter Map, De Nugis curialium* (Oxford, 1914), p. XXIX.

[20] Veritas que falli non potest ait de beato Dauid: "Inueni uirum secundum cor meum". Hic tamen egregie precipitatus est amore mulieris ab adulterio in homicidium, ne umquam sola ueniant scandala. . . Amice, Bersabee siluit, in nullo malignata est: nichilominus tamen facta est stimulus subuersionis uiro perfecto et mortis aculeus marito innocenti. Map, *Dissuasio;* éd. Wright, p. 145, l. 16.

[21] Optima femina, que rarior est fenice. *Ibid.;* éd. Wright, p. 146, l. 13.

[22] Vexilla pudicitie tulerunt cum Sabinis Lucrecia et Penelope, et paucissimo comitatu trophea retulerunt. Amice, nulla est Lucrecia, nulla Penelope, nulla Sabina; omnes time *Ibid.;* éd. Wright, p. 146, l. 19.

[23] Speusippus quoque sororis Platonis filius et Clearchus in laude Platonis, et Anaxilides in secundo libro philosophiae, Perictionem matrem Platonis phantasmate Apollonis oppressam ferunt, et sapientiae principem non aliter arbitrantur nisi de partu virginis editum. Saint Jérôme, *Adversus Jovinianum* I, 42; PL 23, 285. [Perictione], virgo vergens in senium et fama castitatis privilegiata, tandem Apollonis oppressa fantasmate concepit peperitque Platonem. Amice, ecce quam illibatam seruauerunt vigilie deflorantit illusio per sompnium, ut semper omne rosarium aliquo turbine sua purpura spoliaretur. Map, *Dissuasio;* éd. Wright, p. 155, l. 6.

Perictione gardait jalousement sa chasteté mais elle n'en faisait pas moins des rêves impurs pendant lesquels elle se croyait violée par Apollon.

Dans le choix de ses arguments, Map use du plus large éclectisme. Il recourt tout d'abord à des sources théologiques et fait mention d'Adam, David, Samson et Salomon[24] comme Abélard dans la *Theologia christiana.* Comment dès lors a-t-on pu identifier le prétendu auteur Valérius à Valère Maxime qui n'a rien de chrétien? Il ne nous le dit pas, mais nous connaissons assez le manque d'esprit critique de cette époque pour ne pas nous en étonner. D'ailleurs Map recourt tout aussi volontiers aux idées païennes et s'en justifie en disant que l'abeille butine partout et ne fait pas de discrimination entre les fleurs dans lesquelles elle cherche son suc.[25] C'est ainsi qu'assez curieusement les quatre exemples de l'Ancien Testament sont flanqués par parallélisme de quatre autres repris à la mythologie. Jupiter, dit Map, était un roi sage que ses vertus firent diviniser. Il se prit d'amour pour Europe et se métamorphosa alors en un taureau mugissant. Ami, celui que la valeur avait porté aux nues a été ravalé à la condition des bêtes par l'amour. La femme pourra te faire mugir toi aussi car tu n'es pas plus puissant que Jupiter. De même Phébus, Mars et Pallas ont connu les pires avatars pour être tombés amoureux d'une femme.[26]

Cette argumentation théologique et mythologique est suivie d'une preuve historique faite d'anecdotes dont Map aime à tirer la morale. L'auteur montre bien ici qu'il est avant tout un conteur maniant le récit avec dextérité mais peu à l'aise dans la recherche ou la réflexion rationnelle. C'est ainsi qu'il négligera à peu près complètement les sentences philosophiques du dossier, et que Théophraste lui-même ne sera cité que dans une rapide allusion.[27] Sans le vouloir probablement et par le seul jeu des préférences personnelles, Map a pris le contrepied de Salisbury qui se cantonnait presque exclusivement dans l'argument d'autorité. Nous lisons donc, dans la *Dissuasio,* une série de douze traits de moeurs dont quelques uns nous sont déjà connus par l'*Adversus Jovinianum,* mais dont la plupart se trouvent insérés pour la première fois dans un florilège anti-féministe. César, le roi Phoronée, l'empereur Valence, Canius de Gades, Arrius, Démosthène, les maris de Livia et de Lucilia, Hercule enfin sont les nouveaux cas dont fait état ce réquisitoire contre les femmes. Arrius, par exemple, a été amené à consoler Pacuvius dont les trois femmes s'étaient pendues au même arbre: Je m'étonne que tu pleures, alors que le sort te favorise. Songe aux économies que tu as faites. Donne-moi donc une greffe de cet arbre afin que j'aie aussi de cette espèce heureuse en mon jardin. Ami, continue Map, je crains bien que si tu te maries, tu n'en sois réduit toi aussi à chercher, en vain d'ailleurs, à faire pousser un pareil arbre dans ton pré.[28] Livia, dira-t-il plus loin, tua son mari par haine, et Lucilia empoisonna le sien par amour en se trompant dans la composition d'un philtre. Ami, malgré la diversité des intentions, le résultat a été identique. Les chemins suivis par les femmes peuvent diverger, le mal est toujours le but vers lequel elles tendent. Vois par ces exemples comme la femme ne recule devant rien. Quand elle veut nuire—et c'est toujours le cas—elle ne se trompe pas; si par hasard elle veut faire du bien, elle réussit encore à nuire. Tu ne sortiras du triste sort où tu te mets que si tu as une chance extraordinaire.[29] On voit le ton et comment l'attaque est sans nuance aucune, dépourvue de tout sens de la mesure, de toute justice, de logique même. Mais on imagine assez qu'à la veillée, des seigneurs devaient goûter ces traits du bel esprit. Les médiévaux savent d'ailleurs ce que parler veut dire, ils aiment les expressions fortes, les outrances de langage et les affirmations massives.

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[24] Map, *Dissuasio;* éd. Wright, pp. 145-146. Le Nouveau Testament n'apparaît que par une citation rapide (si oportet, non expedit quidem. *II Cor.* xii, I) dans une réflexion de Map sur l'anecdote de Metellus. Cf. p. 152, l. 18.

[25] Amice, miraris an indignaris magis quod in parabolis tibi significem gentiles imitandos, Christiano ydolatras, agno lupos, bono malos? Volo sis argumentose api similis, que mel elicit ex urtica, ut suggas mel de terra et oleum de saxo durissimo. *Ibid.;* éd. Wright, p. 155, l. 13.

[26] Iupiter, rex terrenus, qui eciam dictus est celorum rex pre singulari stremitate corporis et incomparabili mentis elegancia, post Europam mugire coactus est. Amice, ecce quem bonitas super celos extulit, femina brutis comparauit. Poterit et te femina cogere ad mugitum, si non es Ioue maior, cuius magnitudini nemo alius par fuit. *Ibid.;* éd. Wright, p. 147, l. 6.

[27] Sed ut maiorum testimonio michi fides habeatur, lege Aureolum Teofrasti et Medeam Iasonis, et vix pauca inuenies mulieri inpossibilia. *Ibid.;* éd. Wright, p. 157, l. 17.

[28] Map, *Dissuasio,* Pacuuius flens ait Arrio suo: "Amice, arborem habeo in orto meo infelicem, de qua se prima uxor mea suspendit, et postmodum secunda, et iam nunc tercia". Cui Arrius: "Miror te in tantis successibus lacrimas inuenisse", et iterum "Dii boni, quot dispendia tibi arbor illa suspendit", et tercio "Amice, dede michi de arbore illa surculos quos seram". Amice, et ego tibi dico, metuo ne et te oporteat arboris illius surculos mendicare cum inueniri non poterunt. *Ibid.;* éd. Wright, p. 151.

Cette *Dissuasio* a d'ailleurs connu grand succès durant tout le moyen âge ainsi qu'en témoignent les cinq commentaires de cette époque que nous avons conservés.[30] Dès sa publication, si l'on en croit Map tout au moins, l'oeuvre fut avidement recherchée et copiée, appréciée et reçue avec ce respect que les médiévaux nourrissaient pour les oeuvres antiques. En reprenant ce texte dans son *De Nugis curialium*, Gauthier Map se gausse des naïfs auxquels le pseudonyme a donné le change et qui grâce à ce subterfuge ont goûté une oeuvre qu'ils n'auraient pas manqué de mépriser s'ils avaient su que l'auteur était un de leurs contemporains.[31]

Il trouve moins agréable par exemple d'avoir été dépossédé par certains qui se sont approprié son bien. Gilbert Foliot se serait rendu coupable de ce mauvais procédé qui d'ailleurs ne lui a pas porté bonheur. Car le préjugé favorable à l'antique a joué à rebours et, présenté comme récent, l'ouvrage a paru ridicule. Homère ne fut-il pas la risée de son siècle?[32] Quel est donc ce Gilbert Foliot qui aurait essayé d'annexer à son patrimoine littéraire cette oeuvre abérrante? C'est un moine de Cluny devenu évêque d'Hereford puis de Londres (28 avril, 1163), ennemi juré de saint Thomas Becket et vivement brocardé par les partisans du primat.[33] On possède de lui une vaste correspondance à laquelle on doit peut-être ajouter des homélies et des commentaires scripturaires.[34] La liste de ses oeuvres est d'autant moins aisée à établir que plusieurs auteurs portent le nom de Foliot à cette époque, comme par exemple Robert Foliot, évêque de Hereford lui aussi quelques années plus tard, et qui a souvent été pris pour Gilbert.[35] Ne serions-nous pas ici devant une nouvelle confusion?

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[29] Map, *Dissuasio*, Liuia uirum suum interfecit quem nimis odit; Lucilia suum quem nimis amauit. Illa sponte miscuit aconiton, hec decepta furorem propinauit pro amoris poculo. Amice, contrariis contendunt notis iste; neutra tamen defraudata est fine fraudis femine, proprio id est mala. Variis et diuersis incedunt semitis femine; quibuscunque anfractibus errent, quantiscunque deuient inuiis, unicus est exitus, unica omnium uicarum suarum meta, unicum caput et conuentus omnium diuersitatum suarum, malicia. Exemplum harum experimentum cape, quod audax est ad omnia quecunque amat uel odit femina, et artificiosa nocere cum uult, quod est semper; et frequenter cum iuuare parat obest; unde fit ut noceat et nolens. In fornace positus es; si aurum es, exibis aurum. *Ibid.;* éd. Wright, p. 154.

[30] Manuscrits qui nous ont conservé des commentaires de la *Dissuasio*: 14, Kk. 4.I. *Clare College Cambridge* et 115, E, 15 *St. John's College Cambridge* contiennent deux commentaires; un commentaire de Jean Ridewas se trouve dans Ff 6.12 *University Library Cambridge;* un quatrième, plus copieux, est conservé dans Lambeth 330; un cinquième, attribué à Nicolas Trivet, est à Oxford, Lincoln College 81 et University College 61. Manitius (*Geschichte* . . . II, 3, p. 268) signale un commentaire dans Monac. 22.374. Cf. R. J. Dean, 'Unnoticed Commentaries on the *Dissuasio Valerii* of Walter Map', *Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies* II (1950), 128-50.

[31] Scimus hanc placuisse multis, auide rapetur, transcrebitur intente, plena iocunditate legitur. . . Nomina nostra nominibus mortuorum in titulo mutaui, sciebam enim hoc placere. Sin autem, abiecissent illam, ut me. Map, *Dissuasio;* éd. Wright, p. 158.

[32] Si mouerer, et mirarer magis quod Gillebertus Foliot nunc Lundunensis episcopus, uir morum et sapiencie thesaurus, diues et clarus, stilo limpidissimo lucidus, quia scripsit delirus dictus est, cum nichil apcius suo opere possit inueniri, nisi quod legi mirabilem illum cocum dicentem:

> Ennius est lectus [saluo] tibi Roma Marone. . .

Deinde uero plangens Homerum ait:

> Et sua riserunt tempora Meonidem. . .

Scribas ergo, Gilleberte, securus, ut diuine legis inter occulta luceas, dulcesque nodos mellea soluas eloquencia; suaui serenitate salebras apperi salubres asperum planans iter et reflexos dirige calles. . . Ut per has tenebras te perducat in admirabile lumen suum qui cum Deo Patre et Filio et Spiritu Sancto uiuit et regnat Deus per omnia secula seculorum. Amen. *Ibid.;* éd. Wright, p. 158, l. 27.

[33] Cf. le *Dictionary of National Biography* XIX, p. 258. Dans son ouvrage sur *L'Eglise et la royauté en Angleterre sous Henri II*

En effet, lorsqu'on cherche à vérifier l'affirmation de Gauthier Map, on doit constater qu'aucun traité semblable à la *Dissuasio* ne lui a été attribué. Par contre, on voit qu'*Hugo de Folieto* (1100?-1174) a écrit un *De Nuptiis* en deux livres dont le premier critique le mariage en se basant sur le dossier de l'*Adversus Jovinianum* et sur la *Dissuasio,* tout au moins pour certaines tournures littéraires. Hugues était né à Fouilloy, faubourg de Corbie, et fut prieur d'un modeste et éphémère couvent de chanoines réguliers à Saint-Laurent-au-Bois dans le diocèse d'Amiens. Son oeuvre connut la célébrité, mais le plus souvent sous le le nom d'Hugues de Saint-Victor avec lequel on le confondit longtemps.[36] Dans ce cas l'assimilation s'est faite par le prénom. N'aurait-elle pu se produire ailleurs par une similitude du *cognomen,* Foliot *de Folieto?*

Une hypothèse se présente à l'esprit. Map a entendu dire qu'un Foliot avait écrit un opuscule destiné à faire renoncer un ami à son projet de mariage. Il a cru qu'il s'agissait de son ouvrage à lui alors que c'était une oeuvre différente dans sa facture mais nourrie aux mêmes sources, d'intention et d'inspiration identiques. Ce Foliot, l'auteur de ce qu'il a pris pour un plagiat, il l'a identifié avec un de ses concitoyens célèbres. Comment aurait-il pensé au supérieur d'un petit prieuré continental dont il ignorait probablement l'existence et qui songeait fort peu à se faire connaître? Dans le prologue de *De Claustro animae,* Hugues avait écrit en effet à l'ami auquel il destinait l'ouvrage: Je t'en prie, si tu communiques ce travail, ne révèle pas mon nom, de peur que mon incompétence et l'humilité de ma condition ne fasse mépriser l'ouvrage.[37] Sans doute il n'est pas impossible que deux auteurs de nom semblable aient écrit à la même époque un opuscule contre le mariage mais, comme nous ne connaissons qu'un de ces ouvrages, nous sommes tentés de croire à une erreur basée sur l'homonymie.

Quoi qu'il en soit, il est probable que Hugues *de Folieto* avait connu le *Dissuasio* au moment où il écrivait. Car il lui arrive d'apostropher son ami en des termes fort semblables à ceux de Map. Après avoir rapporté les paroles de Caton et de Philippe sur leurs malheurs conjugaux, il écrira par exemple: Eh quoi donc mon ami, es-tu plus sage que Caton? Es-tu plus fort que Philippe?[38] C'est là le genre d'apostrophe de la *Dissuasio.* Mais pour le fond de l'argumentation, il faut bien le reconnaître, nous sommes beaucoup plus près de saint Jérôme que de Gauthier Map.

Nous retrouvons ici la substance de l'argument philosophique de l'*Adversus Jovinianum* et les différentes sentences sont rapportées dans l'ordre même qu'a suivi saint Jérôme.[39] Après la longue citation de Théophraste, Hugues rapporte

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Plantagenet (Paris, 1943), Mlle. Foreville se fait l'écho des attaques d'autrefois contre Foliot. On verra notamment, p. 247, comment ou lui attribua faussement la lettre *Multiplicem nobis* dans le but de le discréditer.

[34] On verra sa correspondance dans PL 190, 739; 193, 1384; 202, 1145. Cf. *Histoire littéraire de la France* XIII, p. 372.

[35] Cf. le *Dictionary of National Biography* XIX, p. 360; *Histoire littéraire de la France* XIII, p. 373.

[36] C'est Mabillon qui le premier a montré qu'il fallait distinguer Hugues de Foliot et Hugues de Saint-Victor; cf. *Annales Ordinis Sancti Benedicti* VI, p. 457 (reproduit dans PL 196, 1153). On verra aussi: B. Hauréau, *Les Oeuvres de Hugues de Saint-Victor* (Paris, 1889), p. 169; M. Manitius, *Geschichte der lateinischen Literatur des Mittelalters* II, 3, p. 226.

[37] Nulli ergo nostrum frater, patefacias nomen, ne ex insipientia auctoris et personae vilitate, operis nostri labor vilescat. . .; Hugues de Folieto, *De Claustro animae* I, prologus; PL 176, 1019.

[38] Quid igitur delecte mi? num doctior es Catone? num Philippo rege potentior? *De Nuptiis* I, 1; PL 176, 1205.

[39] Foliet conclura ainsi son argumentation: Restat nunc, frater charissime, ut qui philosophorum posuimus exempla, ad divinarum Scripturarum testimonia transeamus. *Ibid.;* PL 176, 1206.

les avis de Cicéron et de Socrate. Si Sylla et Pompée ne sont pas mentionnés, voici à nouveau Caton, Philippe, Euripide et Hérodote. Hugues fait état des écrits d'Aristote et de Sénèque sur la question et leur attribue même généreusement les quelques mots de saint Jérôme qui suivent le rappel de ces grands noms.[40] Viennent ensuite, comme dans l'*Adversus Jovinianum,* des textes de Platon et de Sénèque. L'auteur cite enfin son modèle à propos de la phrase de Xystus.[41] La fin de l'écrit est plus originale car l'auteur y cite un texte de Xénophon et une remarque de Columelle sur le travail et le luxe féminins: les femmes ont réussi à se libérer de leurs tâches; elles vivent dans l'oisiveté et veulent dès lors s'immiscer dans la conduite de la famille. Elles abandonnent la vie simple des campagnes, s'en viennent en ville, vont aux spectacles, écoutent les conteurs publics, dansent et pensent que le bien suprême c'est de voir et d'être vu. Cher ami, ironise notre auteur, quelle femme préfères-tu, celle qui flâne, celle qui commande, celle qui travaille? La première se méconduira, la deuxième s'enorgueillira, la troisième se disputera. Voila ce qui t'attend.[42]

Notre étude serait trop incomplète[43] si nous ne mentionnions pas la lettre 79 de Pierre de Blois adressée à un diacre qui vient d'abandonner la cléricature pour se marier,[44] et si nous n'avions l'occasion d'admirer l'art consommé avec lequel ce plagiaire professionnel pille saint Jérôme, Jean de Salisbury, et Map pour vilipender le mariage. Ici encore nous sommes devant un pur exercice de rhétorique, un thème à déclamation; le drame humain de cette défaillance n'a pas un instant retenu l'attention de Pierre de Blois; il est seulement pour lui l'occasion de disserter sur un thème facile.

Notre auteur songe si peu à ramener son correspondant à des meilleurs sentiments qu'il rappelle tout d'abord imprudemment la réflexion de Socrate transmise par Jean de Salisbury: qu'on se marie ou qu'on ne se marie pas, on regrettera toujours le parti choisi.[45] Le pauvre diacre "vaincu par les femmes"[46] pourrait répondre qu'après tout, sa défection lui épargne tout au moins certains maux. Mais je l'ai dit, Blois pense fort peu à lui et ne cherche nullement à lui prodiguer de bons conseils: Quoi que tu fasses, dira-t-il en terminant, que tu abandonnes ta femme ou que tu la gardes, tu n'en sortiras pas. Porte-toi bien et sois désormais plus prudent.[47]

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[40] Scripserunt sicut legisse recolo Aristoteles et Seneca de matrimonio libros in quibus amorem formae uterque accusat "Amor, inquiunt, formae rationis oblivio est. . ." *Ibid.;* PL 176, 1205.

[41] De hoc eodem exemplo dicit Hieronymus contra Jovinianum: Origo quidem amoris honesta erat sed magnitudo deformis. Nichil autem interest ex qua honesta causa quis insaniat. Unde et Sextus in Sententiis: Adulter est, inquit, in suam uxorem amator ardentior. *Ibid.;* PL 176, 1205.

[42] Refert oeconomicus Xenophontis liber pulcherrimus. . . Unde Columella cum de luxu mulierum loqueretur. . . Quae igitur, charissime, placet tibi, an quae sectatur otium, an quae dominio gaudet, an quae labore fatigatur? Otium enim luxuria, dominium superbia, laborem jurgia sequuntur: his igitur et huiusmodi curis laborat et affligitur, qui uxoris pestiferae consortia diligit. *Ibid.;* PL 176, 1206.

[43] Signalons aussi cette allusion au texte de Théophraste conservé par le seul saint Jérôme par Jean de Alta Ripa, *Dolopathos sive de rege et septem sapientibus*, ed. A. Hilka (Heidelberg, 1913), p. 88, l. 17 ff.: Qui cum nubere uolens, a me super hoc consilium quereret egoque omnimodis id facere dissuaderem, asserens sapienti ut uxorem ducat omnino non expedire quia per hanc maxime impeditur philosophia nec a quoquam servari potest in uita cetera quoque que in libro aureolo ponit Theophrastus mulieris impedimenta, respondit ille se artem excogitasse qua eius omnes insidias eluderet.

[44] Pierre de Blois, *Epistola LXXIX, ad R. amicum suum;* PL 207, 243 ff.

[45] Refert Valerius Maximus quod Socrates rogatus a quodam adolescentulo utrum uxorem duceret an a nuptiis abstineret, respondit eum quodcumque eorum faceret poenitere. "Hinc te", inquit, "solitudo, hinc orbitas, hinc generis interitus, hinc haeres alienus excipiet. Illinc perpetua sollicitudo, contextus querelarum, dotis exprobatio, affinium importunitas, garrula socrus longua succensoria alieni matrimonii, incertus liberorum eventus. *Ibid.;* PL 207, 243. A quelques nuances secondaires près, c'est le même texte que nous avons vu citer plus haut par Salisbury.

[46] Gaudeant itaque mulieres quia de persecutore suo triumphavere feliciter. *Ibid.;* PL 207, 243.

[47] Video te inevitabilibus angustiis circumseptum, quia sive in matrimonio per-

Pierre a beau dire que tenant le mariage en haute estime, il vise seulement le cas particulier de son ami, désormais indigne de la philosophie et de sa vocation,[48] les raisons qu'il invoque valent contre tout mariage et contre tout commerce avec les femmes. A ce point de vue, il est beaucoup plus proche de Map que de Salisbury.

Quant aux procédés littéraires de Blois, ils sont bien conformes à ce qu'on peut attendre de lui. Rien ici ne sera original, sauf la mention en une ligne d'une satire de Juvénal.[49] Quinze anecdotes ou aphorismes seront repris à Map et à saint Jerôme, à parts presque égales. Mais pour éviter que ses emprunts soient trop visibles, Blois va passer sans cesse d'une source à l'autre. Sans doute il ne pouvait espérer cacher que l'*Adversus Jovinianum* était pour lui une source, car l'ouvrage était vraiment trop connu. Mais il avait quelque chance de paraître original en insérant de-ci de-là des traits ou des réflexions inconnues du lecteur. C'est dans ce but qu'il s'est adressé à Map, avec un certain succès semble-t-il, car je ne crois pas qu'on se soit avisé jusqu'ici de cette dépendance. Après l'avis désabusé de Phoronée, repris à Gauthier Map, on trouve donc un premier extrait de Théophraste d'après saint Jérôme; Map réapparaît avec Metellus pour céder aussitôt la place à une autre partie de la citation de Théophraste. Un nouveau fragment du *De Nugis curialium* fait état des actions et paroles de Livia, Lucilia, Déjanire et Valentinien. Ensuite nous retrouvons pour la troisième fois Théophraste critiquant la prétention de perpétuer une famille, une race; Hérodote lui fait suite comme dans l'*Adversus Jovinianum.* Nouveau recours à Map qui fournit l'épisode de Canius, puis appel à saint Jérôme qui procure les "sentences" de Cicéron, Euripide et Epicure. Map a le dernier mot avec l'anecdote de Pacuvius.[50]

IV. *CONCLUSION*

Les textes que nous venons d'étudier sont à la fois variés et semblables.

Ils sont variés à plusieurs titres. Par leur esprit tout d'abord. Alors que saint Jérôme, en recueillant ce dossier, songeait à prouver la supériorité de la virginité, Abélard s'en sert pour établir la dignité de vie des païens ou pour prôner l'union libre. Jean de Salisbury tient à reconnaître une valeur au mariage bien accordé tandis que Gauthier Map critique systématiquement la femme. Ces textes divergent aussi par l'ampleur et la fidélité avec lesquelles ils reproduisent leur modèle commun. En général, les hommes de lettres, Salisbury et Blois par exemple, ne font pas état de la partie scripturaire de l'argumentation de saint Jérôme; Map la défigure par un parallélisme avec la mythologie; les théologiens, eux, y font évidemment écho. Tous reprennent l'argument basé sur les dires

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severes, sive ab uxore divertas, vitae aut famae periculum non evades. Valeas et negotiare consultius. *Ibid.;* PL 207, 247.

[48] Non arguo nuptias . . . sed te nuptias contraxisse . . . eoque maxime quia vehementissimus eras in studiis et nominatissimus philosophiae professor. . . Quidquid enim in eo factum est, contra Deum et apostolicas praesumptum est sanctiones. *Ibid.* Ici nous aurions peut-être un écho de l'*Historia calamitatum.* Dans les deux cas nous retrouvons cette situation paradoxale: pour juger, le mariage d'un clerc, on se base plus sur l'opinion des philosophes païens qu'on ne s'embarasse de la loi ecclésiastique.

[49] La seule phrase originale dans cet exposé semble être celle-ci: Si illam satyram Juvenalis, Credo pudicitiam etc., frequentius religisses, nulla te proditoria mulierum malignitas in hanc miseram dejecisset. PL 207, 245.

[50] Tableau résumé de ces citations de *Blois*, Epist. LXXIX; PL 207, 243-246. *SOURCE: MAP*: 1. Phoroneus rex. . . 3. Metellus (dans les termes de Map et non dans ceux de saint Jérôme qui y fait allusion ailleurs). 5. Livia. 6. Lucilia. 7. Dejinara. 8. Valentianus. 11. Canius poeta. 15. Pacuvius. *SOURCE: SAINT JEROME*: 2. Texte Hieronymus Aurelius Theophrastus. . . 4. suite de Théophraste. 9. Troisième fragment de Théophraste: Liberorum causa . . . uxorem ducere. 10. Hérodote. 12. Cum Cicero rogaretur. . . 13. . . . Totae Euripidis tragoediae. 14. Epicurus.

et faits des païens mais ici encore des préférences se marquent: Salisbury rapporte plutôt les opinions philosophiques alors que Map et Blois préfèrent les anecdotes et les traits de moeurs. Entre les quelques lignes du *Commentarius cantabrigiensis* et la dizaine de pages de la *Theologia christiana,* entre la fidélité littérale d'un Abélard et les variations de Map, il y a bien du chemin.

Et cependant tous ces textes sont semblables. Lorsqu'on les analyse, on doit bien marquer les différences, dire que Hugues de Foliet ajoute un texte de Xénophon, et Abélard quelques traits repris à Valère Maxime pour éviter de fartidieuses répétitions. Mais on ne peut s'y tromper: tous ces textes ne sont que l'écho du thème de saint Jérôme. Perpétuellement ce sont les mêmes sentences, les mêmes faits, les mêmes noms qu'on relit en les parcourant. C'est à l'*Adversus Jovinianum* que tous ces auteurs doivent notamment de connaître le long extrait de Théophraste, inconnu par ailleurs. La plupart ne font pas mystère de leur dépendance et citent leur source commune. Or, nous l'avons dit, saint Jérôme s'inspire ici directement des philosophes païens et, comme Tertullien et saint Ambroise, il prolonge une tradition philosophique antique, celle de Chrysippe, Dion Chrysostome, une tradition littéraire, celle d'Euripide et Juvenal discutant ce problème de morale: quelle est la valeur du mariage? Il se fait donc qu'ici encore, malgré la pauvreté de leur bibliothèque ancienne, les auteurs du XII^e siècle se sont mis à l'école des philosophes et les ont interrogés sur un point d'éthique. Pareille démarche se comprendrait aisément si, comme ce sera le cas au siècle suivant, les intellectuels s'étaient trouvés devant une vaste documentation que la seule curiosité invitait à les lire et à les étudier. Mais ici on n'avait que des bribes, une vingtaine de "sentences" et tout autant d'exemples, auxquels en grapillant de gauche et de droite on parvint à ajouter quelques textes parallèles. Ce florilège ne pouvait attirer l'attention, encore moins connaître pareil succès que par un besoin de recherche, une faim intellectuelle et une confiance très grande dans la pensée païenne qui ne laissent pas d'étonner.

Proverbs and Proverbial Sayings From Scottish Writings Before 1600

Part Two M-Y[1]

B. J. WHITING

I.

SINCE the publication of the first part of this collection, a notable addition to the scholarship of English, and incidentally Scottish, proverbs has been furnished in Morris Palmer Tilley's *A Dictionary of the Proverbs in England in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1950). Because of the inclusiveness of this collection and the richness of the quotations and citations, I have not only given references to it in the second part of the present collection but give here the pertinent citations for the first part. In the following columns will be found the alphabetizing words of the Scottish proverbs followed by Tilley's designations, which consist of the initial letters of his first prominent words and appropriate numerals.

A Per Se: A275
Achilles: Cf. S731
Adam (1): Cf. A31
Adam (2): A29
Advisement (1): Cf. A45
Afterclap: A57
Age: Cf. Y47
Alone: C570
Answer: Cf. W822
Ape (2): A273
Appetite (1): S870
Arrow (2): A322
Arse (1): Cf. M991
Aspen: L140
Ass (1): Cf. A348
Ass (2): A351
Ass (3): A366
Avanter: V19
Avarice: S479

Back: B12
Bairn (1): C297
Bairn (3): Cf. C304
Bairn (5): B44
Bairn (6): W600
Bairn (7): C324
Bait: Cf. B50
Balk: M1191
Ball (1): B61
Battle: Cf. C223
Bautie: B571
Bayard: B112
Bean (3): B118
Bear (1): B132
Bear (4): B134
Beauty (1): B174
Bee (2): B202
Bee (3): B210
Bee (10): H255
Beetle: Cf. B219-20
Begin (1): E115
Begin (2): B254
Begin (3): Cf. B256
Beginning (1): Cf. B259
Beginning (2): B260
Bell (3): B275
Bell (4): B276
Belly (2): B286
Belly (3): B299
Berry: B314
Berwick: Cf. B315
Bird (1): B363
Bird (2): B377
Bird (3): Cf. B359
Bird-lime: Cf. B380
Black: B440
Blanket: B447
Blind Man (1): B452
Blind Man (2): M80
Blind Man (3): B451
Blood (1): B455
Blood (2): B458
Blue (1): T542
Boar (2): B482
Boar (6): B484
Bo-keik: Cf. B540
Bone (1): F365
Born (1): B137
Bow, sb. (1): B561
Bow, sb. (3): Cf. R148
Bow, sb. (4): B563
Bow, vb.: B566
Boys: B8
Brew: B654
Brier (2): Cf. B673
Brock (2): B679
Bucket: Cf. B695
Bur (1): B723
Bur (2): Cf. B724
Burgess: Cf. G305
Bush (2): B742
Bush (4): B740
Bush (6): R214
But: B675
Butterfly: F394
Button (3): B782
Buy (1): B787
Bygones: B793

Cammock: C33
Carrick: H429
Carver: C110
Castle: C126
Cat (2): C134
Cat (3): Cf. C184

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[1] For Part I, A-L, see *Mediaeval Studies*, XI (1949), 123-205.

Cat (5): C144
Cat Harrow: C187
Cause (1): C202
Chaff (2): Cf. G401
Change: C229
Charybdis: S169
Checkmate: C262
Cherry (1): Cf. C277
Chieftain: Cf. C70
Chop: C363
Clerks: C409
Climb (1): C414
Climb (2): C413
Climb (3): C412
Cloak (2): C420
Clock (1): Cf. C423
Cloth (2): Cf. B319
Coal (1): C458
Coat (1): C472
Coat-tail: Cf. S513
Cock (2): C491
Come: C533
Company (1): M248
Company (3): Cf. C569
Comparisons: C576
Concord: U11
Corbie: M903
Corn (2): C651
Council: C678
Counsel (2): Cf. C684
Counsel (3): C694
Counsel (4): C681
Court: K71
Court Holy Water: H532
Covet: A127
Covetise (1): C746
Cow (3): Cf. C753
Creed: C819
Creel: H89
Crocodile: Cf. C831
Croesus: C832
Cross: C835
Crow (1): C844
Crow (2): C851
Crow (3): Cf. C853
Crow (4): Cf. C855
Crystal (1): C875
Cup (1): C910
Cup (2): C902-3
Custom: C932

Dainty: Cf. D10, P425-6
Damsel: C122
Day (3): Cf. D87
Day (4): D100
Day (5): Cf. D111
Death (1): Cf. N311
Death (4): R69
Debt: D168
Delay: D196
Despair: Cf. D216
Destroy: Cf. P635
Devil (1): D287
Devil (2): D240
Devil (3): Cf. D289
Devil (4): D225
Devil (5): D293
Devil (6): Cf. E77
Devil (7): Cf. D281
Die (2): M505
Dirt: D347
Dirtin: A326
Discretion: Cf. D354
Do (2): D395
Do (3): D398
Do (4): Cf. M195
Do (6): Cf. T149, 200
Dog (1): D509
Dog (2): D455
Dog (3): Cf. D445
Dog (5): Cf. D489, 500
Dolour: S660
Drought: D621

Eagle (2): E3
Ear (1): E23
Ear (2): E13
Eel (3): E60
Egg (1): E66
Egg (4): E95
Emmet (1): F393
End (1): E125, 128
End (5): Cf. E132
Ending (1): B259
Enemy (1): F712
Enemy (3): Cf. B665
Enough (1): E158
Enough (2): E162
Enough (3): Cf. E159
Enough (4): Cf. H214a
Everything (1): E193, T161
Everything (3): Cf. T177
Evil (1): Cf. I27
Evil (2): E207
Experience (1): Cf. E221
Experience (2): E220
Eye (1): E247
Eye (3): W506

Face (1): F20
Face (2): Cf. M831
Face (3): F8
Fairness: Cf. B163
Falcon (6): Cf. E1
Familiarity: F47
Far (-Fetched): D12
Fast: P401
Fault (1): M116
Favel: C724
Feather (1): F150
Feather (2): F164
Fig (2): F210
Fig (3): Cf. F211
Fingers: F243
Fire (1): F281
Fire (8): F247
Fire (9): F248
Fish (2): F300
Fish (5): Cf. A136
Flea (7): F353
Flee: Cf. D79
Flint (3): Cf. F374
Flower (3): F389
Flower (6): F386
Fly: F396
Foe (2): E142, Cf. M389
Foe (3): Cf. F412
Foe (5): F410
Fool (1): A129
Fool (2): F474
Fool (3): F486
Fool (4): F515
Fool (9): F460
Ford: F587
Forgive: F597
Fortune (1): F601
Fortune (7): F606, 617
Founded: Cf. F619
Fowl (8): F625
Fox (1): F627
Fox (4): F629
Fox (6): Cf. F652
Fox (8): Cf. F632
Fox-tail: F344
Freedom: F668
Friend (1): F693
Friend (2): S201
Friend (3): F758
Friend (4): Cf. F733
Frog: F767
Frost: F772

Fruit (1): F777
Fuel: Cf. F785

Gall (1) (1): G11
Gall (2) (1): G12
Gall (2) (2): H700
Gallows: Cf. W232
Ganyie (1): Cf. A322
Gear: Cf. T34
Gentleman: Cf. G71
Gift (1): Cf. G100
Gift (2): G103
Gift (5): Cf. G105
Give (2): S742
Glass (1): Cf. G134
God (1): G217
God (2): G263
God (5): Cf. A138
God (7): Cf. G224, 270, V25
Gold (1): A146
Gold (9): G280
Gold (10): G284
Good (1): G301
Good (2): T150
Good (3): Cf. G312
Good Will (1): G340
Good Will (2): Cf. G338
Goose (1): G350
Gowk: C894, G384
Gown: Cf. G387
Grace (1): G396
Grass (1): G412
Grass (2): Cf. G413
Grass (4): Cf. G423
Grizel: G456
Ground (3): Cf. C486

Had-I-wist: H8-10
Hail (2): H11
Hair (1): H29
Hair (7): H30
Hair (10): H19
Hall Benches: B355
Hand (1): H111
Hand (2): H65
Hand (3): M397
Hand (4): H94
Hand (6): H95
Hand (10): H115
Hang: B139
Hap (2): C719
Hap (3): H135, 610
Hare (1): Cf. H148
Haste (1): F518, Cf. H197-200
Have: H214a
Head (1): H279
Head (3): Cf. S764
Head (5): H275
Heart (2): S648, Cf. T404
Heart (4): H311
Heart (5): Cf. H305, 307
Heart (8): Cf. H316
Heel: H317
Heifers: H395
Hell (1): H397
Hen (4): H426
Hereafter: H439
Hew: C357
Hid: N330
High (1): Cf. S493
High (2): S823
High Gait: M281
Ho (1): H477
Hold (1): H515
Hold (2): H510
Holly: H526-7
Holy: Cf. A116, P552
Home (1): H533
Honey (1): H544
Honey (2): Cf. H556-7
Honor (1): H583
Honor (2): Cf. A283-4
Hook (1): H588
Hope (1): Cf. C212
Hope (2): Cf. H605
Horn (1): H621
Horn (2): H622-6
Horse (1): H700
Horse (2): H713
Host: H726, 728
Hot: Cf. W366
Hound (1): D461
Hunger: H818

Ice: I2
Idleness: I9, 13
Inch (1): Cf. I49
Inch (2): I48
Iron (1): I94
Iron (2): I99-100
Ivory: I109

Jack (1): J16
Jack (2): J21
January: M768
Jet: J49
Job: J60
John (3): J73
Joy (1): J90
Joy (2): P408

Kentish: K17
Key: K23
Kind (1): K49
Kind (2): K42
King (3): K87
King (4): K69

Labor, vb.: L10
Lamb (1): L311
Lamb (2): L34
Late: T263
Lead (2): L137
Lead (5): L134
Lead (7): L135
Lead (11): L135
Leaf (3): L139
Leaf (5): L140
Leaf (6): L140
Leap (1): L369
Learn: Cf. N114
Lend: F723
Lere: Cf. L153
Lie (1): L219
Lie (2): Cf. M204
Life (1): L247
Life (2): Cf. C623a
Light: L276
Like: L286
Lily (2): L296
Line (3): L303
Lion (1): L312
Lion (8): L308
Lips: L326
Little (1): M356
Little (2): L362
Loan: L402
Look: L429
Lord (1): M322
Love (1): L475
Love (2): L479
Love (3): L506
Love (5): L483
Love (9): L495
Love (10): Cf. L494
Love (11): L513
Love, vb. (1) (1): L558
Love, vb. (1) (3): Cf. H316
Lovers (1): Cf. L569

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III. PROVERBS AND PROVERBIAL SAYINGS

MAID.

mek as a *maid* was he (Harry 295,1937; Stewart I,172,5620). Chaucer, *CT* I(A)69,3202; NED Meek, 1d.

See NAY (1) below.

MAIDEN.

Quhair ar becum thir *madynis* myld as mvde
Of thir wyvis ar non now fundin gude (Bannatyne IV,34,6-7). Cf. Fergusson 76(602); Maidens should be meek while they be married; Kelly 19(110): All are good Lasses, but where comes the ill Wives from? Oxford 253: Good lasses, 397: Maidens; Tilley M44.

MAN.

(1) Ane *wicht man* wantit never, and he wer myis (Henryson 73,2108). Fergusson 4(10): A wight man wanted never a weapon; Henderson 8; Kelly 6(32); Oxford 708-9, cf. 717: Wise man; Tilley M418.

(2) I hard a man sing till ane harp
ane *hesty man* wantit nevir wo (Bannatyne II,207,17-8).
It has bein said, and may be sae,
"A *wilful man* wants neuir wae,"
Thocht he gets little gains (Montgomerie C 33, 914-6). Apperson 289; Fergusson 4(9); Henderson 2; Kelly 2(7); Oxford 282; Ramsay 164(25); Tilley M159.

(3) For *houngrie men* may not leve on lukis (Henryson 6,104).

(4) Ane *dum man* ȝit wan neuer land,
And, in the court, men gettis na thyng
Withoute inopportune askyng (Lindsay I,41,56-8). Apperson 170; Fergusson 8(64); Kelly 5(23); Kissel 18(72); Oxford 161; Ramsay

154(24); Tilley F418. See WORD (6) below.

(5) the erle said "thair is no talk to be had betuix ane *fow man* and ane fastand" (Pitscottie I,91,9-10). Apperson 325: Ill talking; Cheviot 214; Ferguson 101(1349); Oxford 230.

(6) For oft is sene ane *man* off *small stature*
Reskewit hes ane Lord off hie honour (Henryson 54,1499-1500).
It is oft sene ane *sober simpill man*
To ane greit man ane counsallour may be (Rolland, *Seages* 36,924-5). Cf. Fergusson 10(87): A foole may give a wise man a counsel; Oxford 214; Tilley F469; Whiting, *ED* 155.

(7) Ane *wickit man* mon ay ill werkis wirk (Stewart III,442,57285).

(8) For naturall is, that *all men* anis mon *die* (Rolland, *Seages* 235,7638). Oxford 7: All men are mortal; Taylor 27; Tilley M505; Whiting, *ED* 278. See DIE (2) above.

(9) Sen kyndlie is *all man* sum tyme to *faill* (Stewart I,5,165). Cf. Chatterton I,113; Nashe III,355,31: Men are but men and may erre.

(10) Ffor als lang leivis the *mirry man*
As the sory for ocht he can (Lindsay II,40,383-4 and IV,170).
For als lang leivis the *mirry man*
as dois the wrech for ocht he can (Bannatyne III,76,5-6). Apperson 414; Cheviot 46; Fergusson 10(89); Kelly 48(307); Kissel 12(49); Oxford 381; Ramsay 162(26); Tilley M71; Whiting, *ED* 113,213, 226.

(11) bettir is a *man but land* nor land but man (Mannatyne III,9,33-4; Maitland 160,34; not in Fortescue). J. Gower, *Mirour de l'Omme* (ed. G. C. Macaulay, *Complete Works of John Gower,* Oxford, 1899), I,257,23341-3: Sanz terre valt prodhomme asess, Mais sanz prodhomme sont quassez La terre et la richesce en vein. Cf. Tilley M361.

(12) For *cruell men,* ȝe may weill see,
They end, ofttimes, with crueltie (Lindsay I,185,1501-2). Kissel 6(22a). See CRUELTY above.

(13) To *nureis gude men* and worthy
Men sould thame preis ay idantly,
For it is proffeit and honour (*Alexander* I,82,2597-9).
It is gude thing, suthlie,
To *nurris gude men* and wourthy (*Alexander* I,100,3151-2). Oxford 700: Well for him.

(14) for eth is a *man* to *til*
to do it þat is his wil (*Legends* II, 103, 159-60). Cheviot 94: Eith to that thy ain heart wills; Kelly 99(56).

(15) With *weilfull men* to argoun Is folie (Maitland 22,23). Cf. Apperson 687: Wilful man.

(16) All *seik men* hes ane vse and consuetude,
To seik all thing tha trow ma do thame gude,
And euerie man of counsall to inquyir,
Of noveltie tha haif so greit desyre (Stewart II,513, 35791-4).

(17) The long forspoken proverb true I find,
"*No man* is man," and man is no thing nou (Montgomerie C 91,v,7-8). Apperson 472: One is no number; Cheviot 34: Ae hand is nae hand. Unus vir, nullus vir.—L. One and none is all one.—E.; Henderson 69; Oxford 477; Tilley M353.

(18) It is full suthe be gode of hevyn
That *mony metis* at vnset stevyn
And sa be fell it there (Makculloch 154, 1027-9).

mony man meitis at vnset stevin (Bannatyne II,208,52).
That we may *meit* oft syis at vnset stewin (Maitland 236,24).
For *man* may *meit* at unsetstevin,
Thoght montanis nevir meitis (Montgomerie C 134, 47-48). Apperson 397(70); Chaucer, *CT* I(A),1524; Cheviot 387; Fergusson 80(1040); C. Horstmann, *Sammlung altenglische Legenden* (Heilbronn, 1878)34,548-9; Kelly 344(41); NED Steven, sb.^{2},2, Unset, 1; Oxford 228: Friends; Ramsay 239(26); Tilley F738; Whiting, *Ballad* 24, *ED* 129, 161; *Wise Man's Proverbs, Englische Studien,* XXIII (1896-7), 442,8.

(19) They war bathe *litle men,* and thair hart was at thair mouthe (Melvill I,325). Cheviot 239: Little folk are soon angry. For their heart goes soon to their mouth, 298: Short folk are sune angry, Short folk's breath is sune at their mouth; Henderson 138; Kelly 285(5), (6); Oxford 584; Ramsay 223(54). Cf. Tilley P497.

(20) *Suche man,* such judge (Knox I,155; Pitscottie II,63,3). Cf. Kelly 289(37): Shew me the Man, and I'll shew you the Law; Ramsay 163(44): As ye do yoursel ye judge your neibours; Tilley M375.

(21) Vir sapit qui pauca loquitur, the *man* is wysse that *speikes* few things (Montgomerie S 189, n.l.). H. P. Jones, *Dictionary of Foreign Phrases and Classical Quotations* (Edinburgh, 1923) 124. Cf. Tilley M606; Whiting, *ED* 6: It is good to be still.

(22) Robene, thow hes hard soung & say,
In gestis and storeis auld,
The *man* that *will nocht* quhen he may
sall haif nocht quhen he wald (Henryson 153,89-92).
I sie, the *man* wha *will not* vhen he may,
The tym sall come, he sall not vhen he wald.
I sie in me
This proverbe to be true (Montgomerie C 161,42-5).
the *man* that *will nocht* quhan he may,
he sall nocht quhan he wald (Montgomerie S 62,853-4). Apperson 292; Fergusson 40(342), 101(1364); Henderson 121; Kelly 147(161); Oxford 710; Ramsay 190(86); Tilley N54; Whiting, *Ballad* 24, *ED* 290.

(23) The *stait* of *man* dois *change* and vary
Now sound, now seik, now blith, now sary,
Now dansand mery, now like to dee (Dunbar 20,9-11).
So in þair kynd gois *manly successioun*
Now seike now hale now glad now in grevans
Never in a state to stand be condicioun (Asloan II,202,422-4). Cf. Whiting, *ED* 88. See NOW, THERE, TO-DAY (1), WORLD (3), below.

(24) The hedismen hes 'cor mundum' in þair mouth,
Bot nevir w^t mynd to gif þe *man* his meir (Scott 5,141-2). Cf. Apperson 396: Man (78): The man shall have his mare again; NED Mare^1, lb; Oxford 401; Tilley A153.

MAN IN THE MOON.
And on hir breist ane Churle paintit full evin,
Beirand ane bunche of Thornis on his bak.
Quhilk for his thift micht clim na nar the hevin (Henryson 114,261-3). Chaucer, *TC* i,1023-4; NED Man in the moon; Oxford 401; Marshall W. Stearns, *Robert Henryson* (New York,1949) 96; Tilley M240; Whiting, *ED* 353(700).

MANNER.
(1) Set it wes hard for to forbeire,

As commone sayis, a wount *manere* (Wyntoun IV,60,4901-2,61,4876: As clerkis sayis). See CUSTOM above and USE (1) below.

(2) For *maner* makis man of valour
and bringis a man to gret honor (*Consail* 71,185-6). Apperson 398; Henderson 43; Oxford 404; Tilley M629-30.

MARRIAGE.

See BAND above.

MARROW.

Marrowis in trybulatioun
Bene Wracheis consolatioun (Lindsay I,210,406-7 and III,267). Kissel 13(53). Cf. Apperson 110: It is good to have companions in misery; Oxford 106: Company; Tilley C571.

MARTIN.

And said sone: "Scot, *Martyns* fysche we wald hawe (Harry 14,383 and p. 389).

MAST.

Thocht he wer strang as *mast* (Dunbar 124,27).

MASTER.

sic *maister* ay sic man (Stewart I,1,9).

Sik man, sik *maister,* as it said (*Sat. Poems* 335,33).

Sic *maister,* sic disciple (*Catholic* 85,3). Apperson 366-7; Bradley 85; Fergusson 88(738); Kelly 292(56), 336(278); NED Master, sb.^{1}, 3b; Oxford 412, 427, 671; Ramsay 223(2); Taylor 47; Tilley M723; Whiting *ED* 117.

See LORD (1) above.

MASTERY.

Bot it is said in commone sawis
That *mastry* mawis þe medow doune aye,
And sa fell heire, þe suth to say (Wyntoun III,314,1498-1500). Cheviot 244; Fergusson 76(615); Henderson 133; Kelly 251(64); NED Mastery, 3b; Oxford 413; Ramsay 210(20); Tilley M741.

MAY.

O wantone yowth, als fresche as lusty *may* (Henryson 205, 17).

With him his Lady fresch as is the *May* (*Clariodus* 22,674). NED May, sb.^{3}, 1b; Tilley M763; Whiting, *Chaucer* 167-8, 269-70.

See JANUARY above.

MEAD.

(1) Of all thir madynis myld as *meid* (Bannatyne II,262,19, IV,34,6(mvde).

(2) The fair Madin als sweit as *meid* (Rolland, *Seages* 76,2217). Chaucer, *CT* I(A),3261; Whiting, *ED* 320(221).

MEAN.

that no estate may countervale the gyld or golden *meane* (*Sat. Poems* 29,811).

Retain then the *mein* then,
The surest way it seims (Montgomerie C 49,1427-8). Apperson 255: Golden (7); NED Golden, 5c, Mean, sb.^{2}, 1; Oxford 250; Tilley M792-3; Whiting, *ED* 120, 138. See MEASURE (1), MIDDLE WAY below.

MEASURE.

(1) Haly men *mesoure* helde al way (Wyntoun II,241,1348,cf.1345-6).

He wes in his begynnyng
Off gret *mesoure* in all thing (Wyntoun III,274,935-6).

In alkyn materis *mesur* the (Bannatyne II,110,48). NED Measure, 13. Cf. Apperson 409-10; Fergusson 76(611); Kelly 158(24), 314(93); Oxford 415; Ramsay 232(3); Tilley M804-6; Whiting, *ED* 73, 81, 85, 88, 135, 295.

(2) Eit and drink w^{t} *mesour* And defy the leich (Bannatyne III, 9,28-9;

Maitland 160,29; Fortescue 264,[24]). Fergusson 30(252): Eat measurelie and defye the mediciners; Henderson 15; Tilley M802.

MEAT.

be blyth at þi *meit* Devoit in distress (Bannatyne III,9,53-4; Maitland 161,54: and sad at the prayaris; Fortescue 263, [46]: devout at thy masse). Cf. Tilley M815.

MEDICINE.

ffor that which is guid for one, is death for another; and that *medicine* that is proper and also profitable for ane disease, is most noysome and hurtfull to another (Bannatyne, *Memoriales* 256). Cf. Apperson 410-1; Fergusson 12(117); Kelly 269(8); Oxford 252: Good for the head, 416: Meat; Tilley H267,M483.

MELL.

See MORTAR-STONE below.

MERCHANT.

. . . Nocht the less
Quhyls as gude *merchants* tynes as wins,
Gif auld mens tales be trew (Montgomerie C 45,1294-5). Cheviot 45; Fergusson 8(56); Henderson 71; Kelly 4(19); Ramsay 162(22). Cf. Apperson 413: Merchant (6); Oxford 386; Tilley M880.

MERMAID.

The minstrellis sang with curiositie,
Sweit as the *marmaid* in the orient sea (*Clariodus* 340,1885-6). Chaucer, *CT* VII,3270 (B,4460).

METAL.

Men *mettall* tryis by sey, and not by slight (Montgomerie C 177,23). Cf. NED Say, sb.², 4, Slight, sb.

MICKLE.

For *mckill* walde haf mare (Makculloch 118,60). Apperson 433: Much; Fergusson 78(637); Henderson 30; Kelly 245(18); NED Mickle, B, 1; Oxford 438; Ramsay 211(35); Tilley M1287; Whiting, *ED* 71.

MIDDLE WAY.

quharfor tyll hald the *mydlyng vay*
Is best as I hard wysmen say (*Foly* 55,133-4). NED Middle way; Whiting, *ED* 80.

MIDWIFE.

Thay maid a *midwyfe* of him thair (*Sat. Poems* 377,727). Fergusson 80(1051): Mak not a midwyf of me.

MILK.

One a muyle als the *milke* (*Awntyrs* 119,25).

Her own hands white as the *milk* (*Eger* 201,323; Henryson 49,1349; Douglas I,110,10; Stewart II,47,21534, 452,33891, 531,36357; Lindsay I,149,128; Bannatyne III,308,19).

His mayles was *mylk*-whytte (*Awntyrs* 145,382; *Legends* I,181,50, II.,47,23, 476,1172; *Eger* 204,311; *Roswall* 19,489,490, 20,546; Douglas I,10,17, 91,6, II,48,11, 125,29, 143,15, 257,21, III,99,27, 155,9, 178,13, 199,16, 242,6, 289,8, IV,104,20; Maitland 362,66; Melvill I,270).

With blanschite saill *milk* quhite as ony snaw (Douglas I,52,20).; Apperson 680-1; Chaucer, *Romaunt A* 1196, *CT* I(A),358, 3236; Kissel 36(166); NED Milk, lb, White, 1c; Tilley M931; Whiting, *Ballad* 29-30, *ED* 320(225).

MILL.

Bot clok lyk a corne *myll* (Bannatyne II,305,81). Cf. Chaucer, *CT* IV(E), 1200, X(I),405; Palsgrave 485: I clacke.

MILLER.

Or ane *millar* that hes na falt,
That will steill nowdir meill nor malt,
Hald thame for haly men (Lindsay II,366,3168-70). Cf. Apperson 417; *British Apollo* I(1708) 29,Ff^{v}: tailor, lawyer, miller; Fergusson 15(20); NED Miller, 1b; Nashe III,393,7-8: millers, weavers, tailors; Oxford 424; Tilley M955; Whiting, *ED* 354(711); Williams 194: miller, tailor, weaver. See TAILOR (1) below.

MINE.

about *myne* and thyne ryss mekle stryfe (Bannatyne III,9-10,58-9; not in Maitland; Fortescue 264,[51]). NED Mine, 6b, quot. 1555; Oxford 422: *Meum* and *tuum;* Tilley M910.

MINT.

But it is to be feirit, that according to the skilfull airt, lyk fenseres, they *mint* and seik at ane uthir pairt (Melvill II,740). Cf. Cheviot 249: Mint before you strike; Fergusson 76(610); Kelly 251(60); Oxford 426; Tilley M986.

MIRE.

Thow wald not rest bot raik,
And lair þe in þe *myre* (Scott 56,45-6).
Murther left ay his Maister in the *myre* (*Sat. Poems* 173,96, 207,95; Bannatyne II,328,44; Bannatyne, *Memoriales* 17; Montgomerie C 32,905). NED Mire, sb.^{1}, 1b; Roxburghe VII, 661; Tilley M989.

MIRTH.

Mirth nixt approtchithe eftir sorrow soir (J. Stewart 98,7).

MISCHANCE.

For by exempilis oft I hard tofoir,
He suld bewar that seis his fellow spurne,
Michance of ane, suld be ane vtheris loir (Douglas I,29,27-30,2). See LEARN above.

MISCHIEF.

(1) as the infortunat chance of worldlie effairis befallis, that *mischeif* followis wpoun mischeif (Pitscottie I, 69,2-3). Cf. Apperson 419: Misfortunes never come singly; Henderson 17; Kelly 143(122); Oxford 426-7; *Partonope* 210,5542: For efter won euylle comythe mony mo; Taylor 49; Tilley M1012. See CUMBER above, VICE below.

(2) gret *mischef* folowis ill vynyng (*Ratis* 4,108). See GOOD (1) above.

(3) For *mischief* lestis nocht all wayis (Wyntoun VI,38,4089). See BALE (2), JOY (3) above.

MITE.

(1) I sall nocht ask þarof a *myte* (Wyntoun VI,212,6436.

(2) Sall not availl ane *myte* (Henryson 52,1448; Asloan I,137,1707). Chaucer, *Romaunt* (B) 5762.

(3) That cair ȝe not ane *myte* (Rolland, *Seages* 115,3534, 233,7586; *Ballatis* 128). Tilley M1026; Whiting *ED* 354(714).

(4) thay compt nocht cursing a *myte* (Henryson 191,53; Douglas II,116,19; Lindsay II,366,3164). Whiting *ED* 354(714).

(5) I knaw him not a *myte* the mair (*Philotus* 129,702).

(6) Tha culd nocht les him of his pane ane *myte* (Stewart II,513,35763).

(7) May nocht mend thi meid a *myte* (Wyntoun III,290,1148; *Golagros* 36,1069; Stewart I,70,2366, 312,9867, 434,13547, II,312,29487, 605,37731, 720,42456).

(8) His heych prudence preualit hym nocht ane *myte* (Lindsay I,72,556).

(9) Of quhilk but dread he rekit not ane *myt* (*Clariodus* 87,1163). Chaucer *Mars* 126, *Anelida* 269, *CT* VIII(G) 698.

(10) He set noucht by þar mayne a *myte* (Wyntoun IV,335,152). Chaucer *TC* iii, 832-3,900; Whiting *ED* 354(714).

(11) Ond the Father ane *myte* not war he was (Rolland, *Seages* 254,8309).

(12) A lord borne without merit,
He said, is nocht worth a *myte* (Wyntoun III,304,1345-6, V,196,498; *Alexander* I,56,1776-7; *Howlat* 49,72; Douglas I,48,22, 81,26, II,16,28; Stewart I,177,5790, 381,11937, III,70,44767; Lindsay I,85,977; Maitland 51,75, 238,28; Montgomerie C 146,23). Chaucer *CT* I(A) 1558, III(D) 1961, VIII(G) 511,633; Kissel 36(167b); NED Mite², 1b; Tilley M1026; Whiting, *ED* 354(714).

MONEY.

Bot men for *money* may fynd ane aduocat (Asloan II,193,184). Cf. Whiting, *ED* 77; Wo wyll haue law, must haue monye.

MOON.

(1) Bot sen ȝe think it easy thing
To mount aboif the *mune,*
Of ȝour awin fidle tak a spring,
And dance quhen ȝe haif done (Montgomerie C 33,917-20). NED Moon, 3b; Whiting *ED* 355(717).

(2) quhen thy manheid sall wendin as the *mone* (Henryson 180,46).
Bot as the *mone* / all chengis sone (Bannatyne II,182,2).
ffor lyk as the *mone* chaingis befoir the pryme
Sa farith this warld (Bannatyne II,213,3-4).
Bot change and ay as dois the *mone* and see (Maitland 23,63).
thocht courttis ay hes bein chengeand
as dois þe *mone* (Maitland 428,17-8).
Thai chenge alss oft as dois þe *mone* (Maitland 432,29). Apperson 91: Changeful as the moon; Chaucer *Romaunt* B 3778; NED Moon, lc; Oxford 88; Tilley M1111; Whiting, *Ballad* 30, *ED* 321(227). See SEA (2) below.

(3) He did als far excell thame euerie wycht,
As dois the *mone* the sternis in the nycht (Stewart I,343,10821-2, 523,16280-1, 543,16919-20). Whiting, *ED* 321(227).

(4) it shone as *Moone* doth in the night (*Eger* 272,970). *Landavall, American Journal of Philology* X(1889) 23,83-4; Chaucer CT VII,870-80 (B,2069-70); Whiting, *Ballad* 30.

MOONSHINE.

Bot mett thame *moonshyn* ay for meill (Montgomerie C 128,23). Cf. NED Moonshine, 2; Oxford 437; Mouthful of moonshine.

MOOR.

we mein nocht to tyne tyme in wassing of sic *Moores* (Melvill I,375).

A *moir* will change his cullour, if a wicket man change his maneris (Bannatyne, *Memoriales* 304). Apperson 53; NED Blackamoor, 1; Oxford 693; Tilley E186; Whiting, *ED* 41.

MORSEL.

and so the Cardinall of Lorane gatt hir in his keping, a *morsall,* assuyre yow, meit for his awin mouth (Knox, I,219-20).

The Lady Erskin, (a sweatt *morsall* for the devillis mouth (Knox II,380). Cf. NED Morsel, 1e; Tilley M823.

MORTAR-STONE.

Mell-hedit lyk ane *mortar-stane* (Dunbar 41,60). NED Mell, sb¹, 3, Mortar-stone, quot. 1500-20.

MOST.

Quha *maist* hes than sall maist repent (Dunbar 28,29).

Considdryng quho *moste* had suld moste repent (Lindsay I,8,133). Kissel 3(10).

MOTE.

(1) þat þai fulfillit sa þe are
as *motis* ar in sown-beme fare (*Legends* II,61,493-4).
Als thik as *mot* in sonis beme (Bannatyne II,280,106). Chaucer, *CT* III(D),868; NED Mote, sb.^{1}, 1a; Tilley M1192.

(2) Beis nocht our studious to spy a *mote* in my ee,
That in ȝour awin a ferry bote can nocht see (Douglas II,19,7-8). NED Mote, sb.^{1}, 1a. Cf. Apperson 430; Ferguson 31(391); Oxford 435; Tilley M1191; Whiting, *ED* 108. See BALK above.

MOTHER.

For commonly thai [women] folow kynd
and gretly to the *moderis* strind (*Ratis* 27,939-40).
Walerius sayis of women þus I weyne
Sic Is þe douchter' as þe *moder'* beyne (Asloan I,101,623-4). Apperson 367; Oxford 435; Tilley M1199; Whiting, *ED* 49. Cf. Walter Map, *De Nugis Curialium,* ed. Montague R. James (Anecdota Oxoniensis, Mediaeval and Modern Series, 14, Oxford, 1914) 145,12-4.

MOTHER NAKED.

Modyr nakyt his body bar (Wyntoun V,83,2747). NED Mother naked. Cf. Cheviot 419: Ye're as souple. See BORN above.

MOTHER TONGUE.

In *Mother toung* of Latyng (Henryson 4,31; Stewart I,4,110; Lindsay I,218,640; *Catholic* 132,33, 224,12, 230,25; Melvill I,256). NED Mother tongue; Whiting, *ED* 355(719).

MOULD.

The *mold* is lost, vharin wes maid
This *A per se* of all (Montgomerie C 184,63-4). NED Mould, sb.^{3}, 2c.

MOUNTAIN.

See MAN (18) above.

MOURN.

Na tynis nocht thar wyt to See
The thing that may nocht mendyt bee (*Foly* 57,199-200).
Thay sall *murne* quhen thay ma not mend (Bannatyne II,247,63).
and *mvrn* quhen thow no mendis may (Bannatyne IV,27,24). Whiting, *ED* 9. Cf. Cheviot 107: For a tint thing carena; Tilley T127. See DOLE above, REHEARSE below.

MOUSE.

(1) And also fow and drokin as ane *mous* (Stewart II,661,40547). Apperson 166-7; Chaucer, *CT* I(A),1261, III(D),246; NED Mouse, 2; Oxford 159; Tilley M1219; Whiting, *ED* 321(228).

(2) The lamb than cheipit lyk a *mows* (Dunbar 53,55). Cf. NED Cheep, 1.

(3) ȝe peip like a *mouse* amongest thornes (Montgomerie S 131,1). Cf. NED Peep, v.^{1}, 1.

(4) he mudlet thame doun lyk ony *myss* (Bannatyne II,266,129). Cf. Laud 204,6918: Was born to grounde as a mous.

(5) . . . and fled fra hous till hous,
As fra ane cat dois ane chaissit *mous* (Stewart III,353,54257-8).

See BIRD (4) above.

MOUTH.

(1) His *mouth* is hony, bot his hairt is gall (Montgomerie C 204,86). Apperson 306: A honey tongue, a heart of gall; Oxford 301; Tilley T391. See HONEY (2) above.

(2) And nevir lat ȝour *mowth* and mynd go richt (Scott 16,12). See HEART (7) above.

(3) That euer I did *Mouth* thankles so persew (Lindsay I,103,33).
Ffor helth of body now haif e
Nor oft till mell w^t thankless *mowth* (Scott 25,64-5).
Becaus I sseruit *mouth* thankless (Maitland 365,8, etc.). Partridge 537. Cf. Edward Ward, *Nuptial Dialogues and Debates* (2 vols., London, 1710) II,360: All Mouths, says Proverb, must be fed, And we know what will eat no Hay.

MUD.

Quhair ar becum thir madynis myld as *mvde* (Bannatyne IV,34,6; *Eger* 343,2655: mood).

MULE.

Thay wer als meik as ony *mvlis* (Bannatyne II,267, 183).

MULTITUDE.

For *multitud* maiss na victory (Barbour I,40,330).

For *multitude* in fecht oft failȝeis (*Alexander* I,20,628).

Ane *multitude* alway na victor mais,
All fechtis nocht that to the battell gais (Stewart I,218, 7065-6). Cf. Tilley M1309. See FORCE above, ORDINANCE below.

NAIL.

I strake the *nail* upon the head (*Eger* 221,663). Apperson 435; Berrey 169.6, 188.13, 257.7; Fergusson 50(434); Hardie 469; Hyamson 247; Oxford 296; Taylor 50; Tilley N16.

NAME.

(1) And remmember ȝour gud *name* is gold wurth (Bannatyne II,114,35). Apperson 261; *Proverbs* xxii,1; Tilley N22. Cf. Cheviot 339: The name o' an honest man's muckle worth.

(2) bettir is gud *name* Nor evill win geir (Bannatyne III,8,14-5; Maitland 159,14; cf. Fortescue 263,[10]: A man of evill name, is good to forbere). Tilley G51. Cf. Apperson 261: Good name is better than riches; Fergusson 23(242): Better be weill loved nor hav evill wone geir.

NATURE.

nature passis nurtor with zow (Know VI,180[Q.Kennedy]).

I will nether interchange *nature* nor nurtor with yow (Knox VI,180).

As *Natur* passis Nuriture,
Of Natur all things hes a strynd (Montgomerie C 155,1-2, etc.).

To prove this proverbe to be true,
Difficultie, I think, is nane, . . .
Hou *Natur* passis Nuriture (Montgomerie C 156, 17-24). Apperson 437; Fergusson 71(925), 80(645); Jente 542; Kelly 257(9); Oxford 443-4; Ramsay 215(35); Tilley N47.

NAY.

(1) We [women] will tak it, perchance,
Howbeit that we say *nay* (Lindsay II,54,582-3). Apperson 391: Maid(11); Henderson 109; Kissel 11(43); Oxford 397; Tilley M34; Whiting, *ED* 174, 258, 264.

(2) Thow ma mend twa *nayis* Wt anis said ȝe (Bannatyne III,9,42-3; Maitland 160,43: said ȝoy; Fortescue 264,[35]: thre nayese). NED Nay, adv.^{1}, B, 1, quot. 1562; Tilley N55.

(3) Yone berne nykis yow with *nay* (*Golagros* 5,115, 12,332). NED Nick, v.^{1}, 2.

NECESSITY.

Sen *necessitie* hes no law (Maitland Quarto 214,5). Apperson 438; Fergusson

80(649), 81(1076); Kelly 266(74); Oxford 445; Ramsay 215(41); Taylor 50; Tilley N76. See NEED (2) below.

NECK.

(1) The *nek* to stoup, quhen it the straik sall get,
Is sone aneuch (Henryson 62,1766-7). Cf. Fergusson 62(486): It is na time to stoup when the head is aff; Tilley T305.

(2) Men may it nocht weill mend agane,
For in þe *nek* followis þe pane (Wyntoun V,414,3325-6). Whiting, *ED* 355(724).

(3) Heir euirmair the charge lyis on thair *nek* (Douglas III,51,8. NED Neck, sb.[1], 3c.

(4) Be nocht in countenance ane skornar, nor by luke,
Bot dowt siclyk sall stryk the in the *neck* (Dunbar 75,35-6).
Reprevit him that tyme in greit effecc
Of the same thing straik him self in the *necc* (Stewart I,516,16068-9).
Or euer he wist it straik him in the *neck* (Stewart II,49,21598). Cf. NED Neck, sg.[1], 3c.

NEED.

(1) *Neid* nakit man gars ryne (Burel 32). Apperson 439; Cheviot 262; Fergusson 82(656); Kelly 257(4); Oxford 446; Ramsay 215(43); Tilley N77.

(2) for *neid* may haif na Law (Henryson 28,731). Fergusson 80(649); NED Need, 11; Tilley N76; Whiting, *ED* 233. See NECESSITY above.

(3) This Tale of auld I hard quhilk is richt trew,
And richt weill knawin, that *neid* oft makis vertew (Rolland, *Seages* 7,158-9). Fergusson 80(648); Kelly 268(92); Tilley N80. See VIRTUE (1) below.

NEEDLE.

Tak thair a *neidill* for ȝour cace (Lindsay II,388,1495). Partridge 130: Case, 3, 555: Needle, 2.

NEEP.

(1) Quhyte as ane *Neip* (Henryson 82,2395). NED Neep, 1, quot. *c.* 1470. Cf. Apperson 101: Clean (*or* white) as nip.

(2) It will not wyn yow worth ane widderit *neip* (Henryson 81,2362.

NEGLIGENCE.

(1) Bot *negligence,* alace? excuisis nocht (Montgomerie C 166,56).

(2) Siklyk, I haif hard oft-tymis suith men say,
That *negligence* ȝit nevir furtherit nane (Montgomerie C 127,13-4). Cf. Whiting, *ED* 215.

NEIGHBOR.

(1) For wyse men hes said beforne,
"Euill *nichtbour* makes euill morne" (*Alexander* II,120,391-2).
Ane euill *nichtbour* had I thare!
On this tyisday airly hes he
Ouer tratourly wrethit me (*Alexander* IV,368-9,8819-21). Apperson 440: He that hath a good neighbour hath a good morrow; NED Neighbour, 1a; Oxford, 254-5, quot. 1598-9; Tilley N106-7.

(2) The suth in proverb spokin Is
fflyt with thy *nichtburis* and þai will tell
All the mischief þat the befell (Maitland 130,116-8). Cf. Fergusson 96(804): There was never a fair word in flyting; Kelly 303(15); Oxford 187; *Proverbia Rusticorum* in S. Singer, *Sprichwörter des Mittelalters,* II(Bern, 1946) 87(244): Veisin set tout.

(3) Of gud *nichtbour* the wyse makes sheild (*Alexander* II,175,2672).

(4) Sen it is so, it semis weill to me,
Giff ony man lykis to do the best,
With his *nichtbour* be ay at pece and rest (Stewart II,348,30608-10). Cf. Jente 757; Kelly 258(15): No man can live longer in Peace than his Neighbour pleases; Oxford 15: Ask; Tilley N113.

(5) Lett us surelie be perswaidit, "Quhan our *nychtbouris* house be on fyre, that we duell not without daingear" (Knox I,408). Apperson 441; Cheviot 397; Fergusson 106(720); Kelly 352(99); Oxford 447; Ramsay 241(23); Tilley N116.

NEST.

To lait I find the *nest* I seik,
quhan as þe birdis ar flowne (Montgomerie S 14,174-5). Apperson 49(17): The birds are flown; Oxford 45; Tilley B364; Whiting, *Ballad* 35, *ED* 291. Cf. Fergusson 101(1350); NED Nest, 1b. quot. c. 1400.

NET.

And said, scho fischit lang befoir the *Net* (Henryson 62,1763).
Tha socht the fische rycht far befoir the *net* (Stewart II,451, 33847).
Wald na mair go to fische befoir the *net* (Stewart II,653, 40284).
He that fischis sa far befoir the *net*
As he did than, richt litill gude will get (Stewart III,223, 409825-6).
Ʒe fysche befoir þe *net* (Montgomerie S 46,634). Apperson 217: Fish(4); Cheviot 145; Fergusson 34(419), 44(379); Henderson 121; Kelly 148(174); NED Net, sb.^{1}, 1d; Oxford 207; Ramsay 187(25); Taylor 33; Tilley N127; Whiting, *Ballad* 35: They fished before their netts were spunn, *ED* 345(556).

NETTLE.

Full oft I put the *nettill* for the rose,
And oft the bindweid for the lillie quhyte (Clariodus 352, 2260-1).
ffast by the *nettill* growis the rois (Bannatyne IV,21,61). Chaucer, *TC*, i,948-9; NED Nettle, 1a, quot. 1387. Cf. Lydgate, *Fall* I,111,4009-11; Tilley N135.

NEW.

(1) Ielouss vnkind / or chengeing for ane *new* (Bannatyne III,310,43). Whiting, *Ballad* 38, *ED* 68, 235. Cf. Chaucer, *TC* ii,755-6.

(2) As kyndlie is, ȝe knaw thame selffis to be,
All man desyris for to heir and se
Thingis ar *new* and wondrous for to heir (Stewart III,455,57740-2). Lydgate, *Troy* III,572,300-1, 722,5410-2. Cf. Chaucer, *CT* V(F),610; Oxford 451: New things are fair; Tilley T161.

(3) Begyn of *new;* all thing is guid onassayt (Douglas IV,230,9). Fergusson 14(144); Oxford 8; Tilley T162. Cf. Apperson 193: Everything new is fine; Kelly 3(11): All new Things sturts; quoth the good Wife, when she gae'd ly to the Hireman; Oxford 180. See EVERYTHING (1) above.

NIGHT.

(1) Bot ane blak sop of myst, als blak as *nycht* (Douglas III,70,4). Hyamson 47; NED Night, 1b.

(2) And doun a tempest sent als dirk as *nycht* (Douglas II,224,2). Green 22; NED Night, 1b; Whiting, *ED* 321 (234).

(3) And doun a tempest sent als mirk as *nycht* (Douglas II,130,22).

(4) Ʒit efter the *nycht* cumis the glaid morrow (Lindsay I,34,999).
And eftir dark *nycht* cumis the day (Bannatyne IV,21,62). J.C., *Alcila* (1595) in Arber IV,268; Kissel 2(7); Tilley N164.

(5) quha wald tak rest vpoun the *nicht*
The supper sowld be schort & licht (Bannatyne II,176,29-30). Cf. Fer-

gusson 72(578): Light supper makes long life; Henderson 32; Tilley S1003; Ramsay 207(4); *Journal of Celtic Studies* I(1949), 119(7); G. W. Wood, "On the Classification of Proverbs and Sayings of the Isle of Man," *Folk-Lore,* V(1894) 241:: To be easy at night much supper don't eat, Or else thou'lt complain of wanting thy health.

NIGHTINGALE.

Ze ken of auld this trew Tale
Nyce is the *Nychtingale*
The Empreour gaue her credence hale
And neuer word trew (Rolland, *Seages* 31,751-4). *Modern Language Notes,* LXXXV(1948) 535(175).

NOSE.

(1) of the wourd ye mak ane *neis* of walx, thrawing it to quhat contrarietie or absurditie ye list (*Catholic* 64,21-2). quhilk thaj thrau efter thair sensual iugement lyk a *neis* of valx (*Catholic* 77-8). Apperson 451; Oxford 461; Tilley N226.

(2) And reft him from hir in spyte of his *nois* (*Sat. Poems* 87,183).
In spyte of Fortuns *nose* (Montgomerie C 192,49). NED Nose, 6b; Tilley S764.

NOTE.

to turn our toung . . . and change our *not* (Melvill II,460). NED Note, sb.², 5b; Tilley N248; Whiting, *ED* 337(446). See TUNE below.

NOTHING.

(1) Ther was *na thing* sa guid bot might be bathe ill suspected and abbusit (Melvill II,457). Burton I,277 (i,ii,ii,6); Tilley N317.

(2) Quha *na thing* hes, can na thing gett (Dunbar 28,19). Cf. Apperson 445: Where nothing is, nothing can be had; NED Nothing, 1c; Tilley N337.

(3) *na thing* culd be maid of noth (Gau 33,27-8). Oxford 462, 463; Tilley N285.

NOW.

Sum quhill he had gret sufficience within;
Now want, now has; now loss, now can wyn;
Now lycht, now sadd; now blisful, now in baill;
In haist, now hurt; now sorouffull, now haill;
Nowe weildand weyle; now calde weddyr, now hett;
Nowe moist, now drowth; now wauerand wynd, now weit (Harry 58-9, 335-40). Cf. *Kyng Alisaunder* I,286,6992-7; Whiting, *ED* 236. See MAN (23) above, THERE, TO-DAY (1), WORLD (3) below.

NURTURED.

Bot not so weill *nurtorit* as fed (*Sat. Poems* 357,152). Apperson 43: Better fed than taught; Fergusson 54(464): He is better fed nor nortured, 57(696); Oxford 39; Tilley F174.

NUT.

See BEAN (1) above.

OAK.

(1) My neb is netheri as a *nok,* I am bot an Owle (*Howlat* 49,57). NED Nither, B, quot. *c* 1450.

(2) Waxand als dull and sad as ony *aik* (Stewart I,326,10298). Cf. NED Sad, 7a, c.

(3) als stark as ony *aik* (Stewart II,474,34574, III,165,47883).

(4) With steill waponis, als stiff as ony *aik* (Stewart I,312,9890).

(5) And Sir Palexis strong as ony *aike* (*Clariodus* 225,1094,327,1480; Stewart I,384,12029). *Guy of Warwick,* ed. J. Zupitza (EETS ES, 25-6,1875-6) 86,3004).

(6) The Scottis quhilk wer wicht as ony *aik* (Stewart II,139,24274, III,433,56993).

OCCASION.

It was answered, That the poetts and paynteris erred nott altogether, that fayned and paynted *Occasioun* with a bald hynd-head: for the first, when it is offered, being lost, is hard to be recovered againe (Knox II,382).

Ʒe knau *Occasio* hes no hair behind (Montgomerie C 91,v,5). Apperson 462; NED Occasion, 1b; Oxford 658-9; Tilley T311; Whiting, *ED* 114, 166. See TIME (12) below.

OCEAN

he . . . that intendis to compile ane verk to content euerye man, he suld fyrst drynk furtht the *occean* see (Complaynt 12,20-22). Tilley 09.

OCTAVIAN.

Men oyssit for his worschep ay
In til Rome a prowerb say,
Qwha happiar þan *Ottovian,*
Or qwha euir bettyr þan Traian? (Wyntoun III,287,10914). On Trajan, see Gower, *Mirour de l'Omme* (G. C. Macauley, *Complete Works of John Gower,* Oxford, 1899,I,248),22168-71 and p. 448, and on Octavian, cf. Gower, *CA*,III,75,4731 and p. 502.

ODD.

how dar þu þane for *hod* or ewyn
fra þi lorde tak hyre to þe? (*Legends* I,201,382-3).

I sal hir neuer displeis for *od* nor euin (*Thre Prestis* 43,972 and p. 83). NED Odd, 2c.

OFFICE.

this axiom and proverbe, "A *office* for a man is aneuche" (Melvill II,481).

OIL.

thei ceassed nott to cast *oyle* in the burnyng flambe (Knox II,383).

But all that was to cast *oyle* in the flaming fyre (Knox II,388). Apperson 463: Oil(3); NED Oil, sb.¹, 3c; Oxford 469; Tilley 030; Whiting, *ED* 356(739).

OLD MEN.

(1) Bot as the prouerbe speikis, it plaine appeiris,
Auld men will die, and barnes will sone forȝet (*Sat. Poems* 329,135-6).
To do to muche ffor *auld men* is bott lost;
Of freindschip had to wemen comes lyik gane;
Bestow not þow on childrene to much cost,
For quhat ȝow dois for thais is all [in] waine.
The auld man, or he can requyt, he deis;
Vnconstand is þe womanis wauering mynd;
Full sone þe boy thy freindschip will despyis,
And him for luif þow sell ingratfull find (Montgomerie S 211,33-40). Apperson 465(18); Cheviot 209, 269; Fergusson 25(280), 60(475); Kelly 180(31); Ramsay 200(28); Tilley K47, M569.

(2) and quhill [*old men*] hass appeyt and wyll
as fallis wantone childyr tyll (*Ratis* 48,1684-5, 49,1728-31).
Auld men is twyse bairnis, I persaif (*Philotus* 149,1245). Apperson 464-5; Fergusson 6(27); Henderson 1; Kelly 269(10); Oxford 472; Ramsay 165(31); Tilley M570.

(3) Ane *awld man* is fow daft That weddis a ȝoung woman (Bannatyne III,9,46-7; Maitland 160,47; Fortescue 264,[39]). Cf. Apperson 464-5: Old man (6,17); Oxford 471; Tilley L74; Whiting, *ED* 6, 24, 30.

ONE.

The Erll sayde syk chans myght fall

That *ane* myght cum swlde quyte all (Makculloch 134,479-80). Fergusson 102(1388): The day wil com that wil pay for all; Tilley D97.

ONION.

My sowklar sweit as ony *unyoun* (Dunbar 55,53).

ORATOR.

I am not a gud *oratour* in my awn caus (Knox III,378). Cf. Fergusson 12(120): A man is a lyon in his own cause, 76(623): Men are blinde in their own cause; Tilley M242,540.

ORDINANCE.

Hereby men may enssample ta,
That better is *ordinance* in till fecht
Sumtyme, þan ony strenth or mycht;
And Caton sais, of oþer thing
Men may oft mak amending
Quhen men trespast hes; bot in fecht,
Quhen men vnreullit are or vnrycht,
Men may it nocht weill mend agane,
For in þe nek followis þe pane (Wyntoun V,412-4, 3318-26). Tilley W43.
See FORCE, MULTITUDE above.

OVERHOMELY.

For *our-hamly* to folk lawly
Causs disspising comonly (*Foly* 58,225-6). Cheviot 274: Ower muckle hameliness spoils gude courtesy; Fergusson 83(1101); Kelly 270(17); Tilley F47. See FAMILIARITY above.

OWL.

(1) Foule lyke an *Oule* (Lindsay I,18,478).
(2) And he evir odious an ane *owle* (Dunbar 65,7).
(3) And euirmoir ane tratour callit be,
And as an *oule* haldin with euerie wycht,
Quhilk is nocht sene bot ay vpoun the nicht (Stewart III,307,52666-8).
And durst not cum into hir sicht,
Bot lyke ane *Houlet* on the nicht (Lindsay I,147,55-6). Cf. Chaucer, *CT* III(D),1081; Whiting, *ED* 322(240).

OX.

(1) Ladie! ladie! the blake *oxe* hes neuer trampit yit vpoun your foute! (Bannatyne, *Memoriales* 286 [quoted by John Knox on his death bed]). Apperson 52(24); Cheviot 316; Fergusson 102(1375); Kelly 327(198); Oxford 48; Taylor 52 and "The Proverb 'The Black Ox has not Trod on his Foot' in Rennaissance Literature," *Renaissance Studies in Honor of Hardin Craig* (Stanford University, 1941) 74-86; Tilley O103.
(2) Kirkmen so halie ar and gude,
That on thair conscience, rowme and rude,
May turne aucht *oxin* and ane wane (Dunbar 30,41-3). Cf. Tilley C603a, W888, quot. 1617.

OYSTER.

Quhen that in Iune In seasone Is the *oister*
till all mennis meit and fische ar nocht in see (Bannatyne IV,43,8-9). Cf. Apperson 480: Oyster(3); Green 29; Oxford 483-4; Tilley O117.

PACK.

(1) A man can sell nathing out of his *pak*
Bot as he hes (Rolland, *Seages* 7,177-8).
(2) Till oppin my *pak* and sell no wair (Montgomerie S 207,75). Cheviot 251, 264; Henderson 86; Kelly 262(44); Oxford 478; Ramsay 213(31).
See PIN (4) below.

PAGE.
Thus lauborit thay within few ȝeris,
That they become no *pagis* peris,
Swa haistelye thay maid ane band (Lindsay I,45,215-7). Cheviot 151; Fergusson 46(400); Kelly 160(253); Kissel 35(160); Tilley P12.

PAIK.
How that thow, poysonit pelor, gat thy *paikis* (Dunbar 7,70).
Thay serve richt weill to get thair *paikis* (Lindsay II,142,916).
Get I thame thay sall beir thair *paikis* (Lindsay II,186,2525).
he turnd and gaif thame bayᵗ thair *paikis* (Bannatyne II,268,196).
They sall not misse þair *paikis* (*Sat. Poems* 178,112; Bannatyne *Memoriales* 89). NED Paik.

PAIN.
See JOY (3) above.

PAIP.
Quhill I haue pullit the lyke ane *Paip* (*Philotus* 129,711). Cf. NED Paip.

PALLACE.
The Prouerb is: of *Palice,* Kirk and brig,
Better in tyme to beit nor efter to big (*Sat. Poems* 233,187-8).

PAPINGO.
Scho was als prowd as ony *papingo* (Dunbar 186,142). NED Popinjay, 4b.

PARTING.
Pryse at the *parting,* how that thow dois (*Rauf* 85,86). Apperson 509: Praise; NED Praise, 3b; Oxford 515; Tilley P83; Whiting, *Ballad* 24, *ED* 17, 21, 191, 211. See DAY (4), END (4) above.
See FRIEND (4) above.

PATERNOSTER.
And wald nocht let me bide sa lang,
To say my *Pater noster* (Lindsay II,139,1262-3).
Ane word not spak ane *Pater noster* space (Rolland, *Seages* 189,6076). Apperson 485; NED Paternoster, 1b; Tilley P99; Whiting, *ED* 357(755).

PATIENCE.
(1) *Paciens* ourũis all,
And is ane vertew principall (Scott 54,25-6). Apperson 485(6); Chaucer *CT* V(F)773, VII,1515-20(B,2705-10); Oxford 490: Patient men; Tilley P109; Whiting, *ED* 273. See THOLE below.
(2) Bot tuke, perforce, in *pacience* (Lindsay I,47,264).
On *paciẽs* I mon perforss (Scott 53,19).
Perforss tak *paciens* (Scott 55,9).
patience perforce (Montgomerie C 139,43).
Come *patience,* perforce (Montgomerie C 158,xx,12). Apperson 486(13); Fergusson 86(697); NED Patience, 1f; Oxford 489; Tilley P111; Whiting, *ED* 144, 159, 190.
(3) Is no remeid bot tak in *pacience* (Lindsay II,116,2053).
And no remeid, sen so it iss,
Bot *paciens* (Scott 48,40-1).
Chryst send remeid, I say no moir,
Bot *pacienss* (Scott 53,5-6).
Sa it is a guid thing to tak in *patience* whatever God sends (Melvill I,323). Apperson 451; No remedy, 486; Patience (11); Oxford 489: Patience, 537: Remedy; Tilley P108, R71.
(4) *patience* in end salbe Victorious (Maitland Quarto 214,6).
with *patience* then thow attend
and houp to Vanqueis in the end (Maitland Quarto 215,17-8). Oxford 490: Patient men. Cf. Whiting, *ED* 190.

PAY.

He has *payit* at he aw (Harry 25,251). Cf. NED Pay, v.^{1}, 7a. See Debt above.

PEACE.

(1) Now into *peace,* ȝe sould provyde for weirs (Lindsay II,247,2557). Kissel 26(111); Oxford 492; Tilley T300.

(2) And quhen tha knew, as it is rycht weill kend,
Of all weiris *peax* is the latter end (Stewart III,11,42824-5). Cheviot 269; Fergusson 84(675), 87(1145); Kelly 275(60); NED Peace, 1a, quot. 1484; Oxford 692; Tilley W55. See War (1) below.

(3) for, quhene twa fechtis, *pece* sal be
quhen we þe tane vincust se (*Legends* I,14,259-60).

PEACOCK.

as proud as a *packoke.* (Knox I,147; *Sat. Poems* 236,321). Apperson 514; Green 29; Hyamson 283; NED Peacock, 1a; Oxford 521; Tilley P157; Whiting, *ED* 322(245); Wilstach 303.

PEAR.

(1) I charge hit not a *pere* (*Pistill* 182,247).

(2) Na I compt nocht na hurt a *peire* (Wyntoun III,60,773; Bannatyne III,27,41). *Sir Degrevant,* ed. L.F.Casson (EETS 221,1949), 102,1712.

(3) No policie nor prattik wirth ane *peir* (Stewart I,147,4876, 160,5288, 418,13073; Bannatyne II,115,60, 161,16). Apperson 457-8; Tilley P161.

PEARL.

(1) I was to bald to cast *Peirlis* to the Swyne (Rolland, *Seages* 4,108).

nor cast any mo of our pretious *pearles* before your filthy swyne (Fergusson, *Tracts* 42).

cast not ȝour perle to suyne (Maitland Quarto 117,111).

and sett our *peirles* befor sic swyne (Melvill I,375). Apperson 488; Bradley 87; Fergusson 87(1148); Hyamson 267; NED Pearl, sb.^{1}, 3b; Oxford 493; Taylor 52; Tilley P165; Whiting, *ED* 357(760).

(2) Ȝour teith lyik . . . *perle* of orient (Maitland Quarto 116,89-90; Montgomerie C 184,44).

Hir teithe as *perle* in curall set (Montgomerie C 275,60). NED Pearl, sb.^{1}, 6; Roxburghe VII,380,15.

PEASE.

(1) All joy In erd thow sall no^t compt ane *peiss* (Bannatyne II,193,48). Vernon II,683,3. Cf. Apperson 457(26); NED Pease, B. 2b.

(2) Itss lyk þat ȝe had eitin *pyiss* / ȝe are so sweit (Bannatyne III,27,30).

PECCAVI.

To cry *"Peccaui"* with the waithman noit (*Sat. Poems* 266,144). NED Peccavi; Oxford 121; Tilley P170; Whiting, *ED* 363(846).

PEER.

Play with thy *peir,* or I'll pull thee like a paipe (Montgomerie C 63,95). Cheviot 277(as Kelly); Fergusson 86(688); Kelly 281(40): Play with your Playfeers; Oxford 506; Tilley P180. See POVERTY below.

PEN.

Als proud as ȝe prunȝie, ȝour *pen* salbe plukkit (Montgomerie S 136,80). Cf. NED Pluck, 1.

PENNY.

Sen all mēis *penny* makis him free (*Sat. Poems* 401,92; Bannatyne II,336,92). Cheviot 250: Money makes a man free ilka where; Oxford 429-30; Ramsay 211(3). Cf. Tilley M1050.

PEOPLE.

See SEA (2) below.

PERIL.

(1) Forse a *perell* ore It cum

For sudane cass is ay vylsum (*Consail* 75,335-6). Whiting, *ED* 42, 269.

(2) "And I haif hard," quod hoip, "that hie
Suld nivir scheip to saill the sie,
That for all *perellis* castis" (Montgomerie S 38,503-5). Cf. Apperson 544: Sail, vb. (2), quot. 1732; Cheviot 145; Kelly 167(308): He that forecasts all Perrels, will win no Worship; Oxford 113: Counts all costs, Counts all the pins, 219: Forecasts all perils, 555: Sail without danger; Ramsay 187(20). See CHANCE (1) above.

(3) Bot ȝit to mynd the proverb call,
"quha vsss *perrellis* perysch sall;"
schort quhill þair lyffis lestis (Montgomerie S 38,500-2). See CLOTH (3) above.

PEST.

eschewand plesour as ane *pest* (Maitland 442,55). Cf. An *Alphabet of Tales,* ed. M.M.Banks (EETS, 126-7, 1904-5) 495,16: he fled hur as he wold hafe done pestelens.

PHOEBUS.

(1) More brycht than *Phebus* in his speir (Lindsay I,366,5641, 380,6138; Rolland, *Court* 70,711). Whiting, *ED* 322(250). See APOLLO above.

(2) Als far as *Phebus* with his bemis bricht
All vther sterne excedis into licht,
Siclike this king (Stewart II,266,28091-3, 425,32051-2, III,272,51479-82).
As *phebus* bricht in speir merediane . . .
passis þe licht that cleipit is dyane (Bannatyne III,305,103).
Ȝe ar lyik *phoebus* in his spheir
amid ye starnis small (Maitland Quarto 114,52-3). Lydgate, *Fall* III,986, 2350-1, *Troy* I,386-7,8471-2.

(3) Flammand as *Phebus* with ane leivand lycht (Stewart I,394,12320, III,237,50312).

(4) Gilt birneist torris, quhilk like to *Phebus* schone (Douglas I,55,7). Lydgate, *Fall* III,1020,3565; Pepys IV,264,1.

See SUN below.

PICKER.

For comonly sic *pykeris* luffis not lycht (Henryson 10,203). Cheviot 144: He that does ill hates the light; Fergusson 38(310); Kelly 171(344); Oxford 150; Tilley I26.

PIKE.

Als big as ony *pyk* (Bannatyne II,337,20).

PIN.

(1) And we it wist we wald nocht pryse ane *pyn* (Maitland 251,22). Cf. Apperson 496: Pin(5).

(2) Thy pryd . . . proffittis noᵗ a *pin* (Bannatyne II,182,8).

(3) We thank him nocht thairof now worth ane *pyn* (Stewart I,210,6823). Apperson 458(28); NED Pin, sb.[1], 3b; Oxford 500; Tilley P334; Whiting, *ED* 358(772). See PREEN below.

(4) Quhill Drynk & dyss haf powrit him to þe *pyn* (*Thre Prestis* 16,244 and p. 67).

Suppose the pack come to [the] *pins* (Montgomerie S 118,1297). Cheviot 406; Kelly 368(66); Oxford 484; Tilley P5.

(5) Bot that ȝe may prouyde befoir,
To haue ane *pyn* for euery boir,
And to be richt war with thame (*Sat. Poems* 215,82-4).
Then he said, I wist weill he wald find a *pin* for euery boir (Melville 178). Cheviot 115: Gie him a hole and he'll find a pin; Kelly 264(57):

No body will make a Bore, but you'll get a Pin for it; Ramsay 215(32).

PITCH.

(1) the Devillis, als blak as *pik* (Dunbar 79,106; Douglas II,265,21-2). Apperson 135; Hyamson 47; NED Pitch, sb.[1], 4; Tilley P357; Wilstach 21.

(2) quha handillis *pik* or tar He is no[t] haisty clene (Bannatyne III,9,49-50). He þat twichis *pik* or tar may nocht weill be clene (Maitland 160,50; Fortescue 264,[42]: canot longe be).
Wald thow be clene? touch nather *pick* nor tar (Montgomerie C 232,7).
Quho tuitchis *pick* vith it will fyll thair hand (J.Stewart 234,136). Apperson 498; Jente 254; NED Pitch, sb.[1], 4; Oxford 667; Tilley P358; Whiting, *ED* 123.

PITTARROW.

he gatt this dicton and proverbe, "The good Laird of *Pittarro* was ane earnest professor of Christ; but the mekle Devill receave the Comptrollar, for he and his Collectouris ar become gready fectouris" (Knox II,311).

PITY.

Nor out of gentill hart is fundin *petie* (Dunbar 100,41).
Ladies in heart beine *pitious* ever maire (*Clariodus* 328,1484). Chaucer *LGW* 503, *CT* I(A),1761, IV(E),1986, V(F),479; Whiting, *ED* 288.

PLACEBO.

Quha can *placebo*, & noucht half dirige (Henryson 189,19).
thay haif bene at the scule of *Placebo* (Knox III,177).
Plaing "*placebo*" into princes faces (*Sat. Poems* 349,78).
Placebois part, behind his bak (*Sat. Poems* 378,744).
maid by sum *placebo* to flatter our King (Colville 120). Chaucer, *CT* III(D), 2075, IV(E),1476; NED Placebo, 2, 3; Oxford 591-2; Tilley P378; Whiting, *ED* 364(847).

PLACK.

He wald nocht mend thame worth ane *plack* (Bannatyne II,124, 68).
Ȝe ar nae prophet worth a *plak* (Montgomerie C 40,1153). Cheviot 219; NED Plack[1], c; Oxford 503; Roxburghe VIII,265; Tilley P379.

PLAIN.

thocht I be als *plane* as plesant (Fergusson, *Tracts* 73). Cheviot 253: More plain than pleasant. Cf. Roxburghe II,363,22: Plain-dealing is pleasing.

PLANK.

Far better is frelie ffor to giff ane *plank*
Nor be compellit on force to giff ane mart (Henryson 78,2270-1).

PLAY.

(1) for-þi quhen þe *play* best is,
best is to lefe þan I-wyse (*Legends* I,54,885-6).
quhen best is *play* / pass hame away Or dreid war eftir cum (Bannatyne III,22,111). Cheviot 115: Gie ower; Fergusson 106(714); Kelly 114(17), 233(28); Oxford 359: Leave off; Ramsay 206(24); Tilley P399.

(2) Ffor practik is to *play*, syne hald ȝor peice,
And counsale keip ffor hurting of thair name (Scott 17,51-2). Apperson 501: Play with me and hurt me not; Tilley P400. Cf. NED Play, 10c; Tilley B323.

PLEASURE.

Sen erdlie *plesour* endis oft with sorrow, we se (Douglas II,222,12).
Bot wardlie *plesour* bene so variabyll,
Myxit with sorrow, dreid, and Inconstance,
That thare in tyll is no contyneuance (Lindsay I,60,145-7). Cf. Apperson 502: Pleasure(5,6); Kissel 2(5c); Oxford 179; Roxburghe II,41,220-1, 393,7-8, VI,122,80; Tilley P408; Whiting, *ED* 163, 262, 278. See JOY (2) above.

PLOW.

(1) The *plewche* befoir the oxin go, the best the man to gyde (*Sat. Poems* 201,9). Apperson 503; NED Plough, sb.^{1}, 1d(b); Ramsay 216(59), 245(28); Tilley P434.

(2) Be seure that mair belangis to the *plewch* (Lindsay II,172,2401 and IV,196).

Ʒit sum thing moir belangis to the *plewch* (Lindsay II,246,2605).

Zit as ȝe ken, mair graith pertenis the *pleuch* (Rolland, *Seages* 79,2304). Gower, *CA,* III,452,2426; Kissel 37(172). Cf. Apperson 503: There belongs more than whistling to going to plough; Henderson 93; Oxford 705; Tilley M1156.

POISON.

Of gif þov wald put me to dede
With venome or wiþ felloun *poisoun*
That were a wiffis condicioun (Wyntoun IV,330,74-6). Cf. Paul A. Holmes, *Murder Buttoned Up* (New York, 1948) 83: Poison . . . is essentially a woman's weapon; Ngaio Marsh, *Death At the Bar* (Boston, 1940) 282: They say poison's a woman's weapon don't they? *The Medea of Euripides,* trans. Gilbert Murray (New York, 1907) 23: I love the old way best, the simple way Of poison, where we too are strong as men; J. C. Nolan, *Profile in Gilt* (New York, 1941) 150.

POKE.

Bot menstrallis, serving man, and maid,
Gat Mitchell in ane auld *pocke* nucke (*Sat. Poems* 375,660-1). NED Poke, sb.^{1}, 7. Cf. Cheviot 93: E'en pickle in your ain poke neuk.

POMMEL.

Apone a coursere *pommill* gray (Wyntoun III,22,217). Chaucer *CT* I(A),616, VIII(G),559. See DAPPLE above.

POPPLE.

Thus weidit is the *poppill* fra the corne (Bannatyne II,202,46). NED Popple, sb.^{3}, 1b.

POSTPONING.

For I haif hard scherurgeanis say,
oftymes *posponing* of ane day
may nocht be mendit the morne (Montgomerie S 36,475-7). Cf. Apperson 517: Never put off; Bradley 95; Hardie 464; Oxford 526; Tilley T378.

POT.

Many whisper, that of old his parte was in the *pott* (Knox I,92). Apperson 507: Pot(7); Oxford 242: Go to pot; Tilley P504.

POVERTY.

With riches dar not *poverty* play (Bannatyne IV,21,54). Cf. PEER above.

PRAISE.

. . . full suith they tell
That sayes ane man that *praisis* not him sell
The moir he beine to praise with uther men (*Clariodus* 27,839-41). See LOVE, vb. (2) (2) above.

PREEN.

(1) Sum of thame said this auaillis not ane *prene* (Rolland, *Seages* 158,5041 and p. 332).

(2) And nane dois cair for Commoun-weill ane *prene* (*Sat. Poems* 230,101; Rolland, *Court* 98,546; Maitland Quarto 251,40). NED Preen, 1b.

(3) thai cownt him nocht a *preyne* (Harry 168,910; Pitscottie I,3,17; Rolland, *Court* 133,711). NED Preen, 1b.

(4) Of þair will will not want ane *prein* (Maitland Quarto 46,94).

(5) nor of my pith may pair of wirth a *prene* (Henryson 179,22; *Thre Prestis*

50,1191; Stewart III,472,58306; Lindsay I,218,635, II,44,432; Bannatyne II,246,25, IV,75,42; Maitland 52,99; Maitland Quarto 96,200). Kissel 36(167c); NED Preen, 1b; Oxford 500: Pin; Whiting, *ED* 359(787).

(6) Your prayer profits not a *prin* (Hume 65,45).

(7) To mix, set ȝe not by twa *prenis* (Lindsay II,370,3228). Whiting, *ED* 359(787).

(8) Twelff gait glydis deir of a *preine* (Maitland 439,56).

(9) That no man micht the poynting of ane *prene*
Repreve (Douglas I,89,27-8).

See PIN above.

PRESENT.

in hope that he suld preuaill being *present*, before Leycester that was absent (Melville 130). Cf. Apperson 1: Absence is a shrew; Chaucer, *CT* I(A),3391-3; Oxford 1: Absent are; Tilley A9.

PRICK.

Quod Courage, kicking at the *prick* (Montgomerie C 42,1206). Apperson 339; Cheviot 213; Hyamson 208; NED Prick, 13; Oxford 333; Taylor 35; Tilley F433; Whiting, *ED* 351(659).

PRIDE.

(1) Throw pure *pride* ar mony shent (*Alexander* II,184,2960). Cf. Apperson 506: Poor(21, 22), 511: Pride and poverty; Cheviot 263: Ne'er marry; Oxford 517; Whiting, *ED* 28.

(2) That *pryde* neuer ȝit left
His feir but a fall (*Howlat* 80,961-2).
Swilk is casse of batalle,
þat *pryde* oftsyis wil gere fail
þat is apperande richt likly
To do oft tymys succudry;
Messurabil is gud to be,
And heyr proffer of honest[e] (Wyntoun VI,229,6859-64).
Fy! puft up *pryde*, thow is full poysonabill;
Quha favoris the on force man haif ane fall (Henryson 24,593-4).
And comounlie befoir a gret mischance
There cumis ane blythnes vithe ane arrogance,
And yare vithe cumis ane velthfull vantones vithe all,
And comounlie sone efter cumis ane fall (Hay 21).
Sen *pryde* left neuir his maist[er] but ane fall (Stewart I,178,5802,5810).
ffor winder suth *pryd* hes ane fall (Bannatyne II,350,23). Apperson 512; Cheviot 280; Fergusson 86(693); Hislop 249; Kelly 276(2); NED Pride, sb.[1], 1e; Oxford 518; Ramsay 218(17); Taylor 54-5; Tilley P581; Whiting, *ED* 44, 158.

(3) For wissmen in ald proverbis sayis:
"*Pride* gais befor, and schame alwayis
Followis þaron als fast
It oure takis at þe last" (Wyntoun VI,14,3761-4).
For eftyr *prid* oft folowis schame (*The Thewis off Gud Women* in *Ratis* 82,52). Apperson 511; NED Pride, sb.[1], 1e; Oxford 518; Taylor 55; Tilley P576; Whiting, *ED* 44, 135, 161.

(4) "Thy *pryde*," quod the Princes, "approchis our hie
Lyke Lucifer in estaite;
And sen thow art so elate,
As the Ewangelist wrait,
Thow sall lawe be" (*Howlat* 79,932-6). Apperson 514: Proud as Lucifer; Hyamson 227; NED Lucifer, 2; Oxford 521; Tilley L572; Wilstach 302. Cf. Whiting, *Ballad* 38, *ED* 6, 23, 81.

(5) The wise man wrytes, quhair he Indytes
All beginning of Ill is *pryde* (Rolland, *Seages* 196,6319-20).
The speciall rutis of all mischeif we suspect . . . to be . . .
pryde and auarice (Winzet I,6,29-31).
The Godlie aucht nocht to hald vile *pryde* in pryce,
Seing it is the Mother of all vyce (Lauder 17,430-1). Tilley P578; Whiting, *ED* 54, 79, 80, 263.

See FIRE (2) above.

PRIEST.

(1) Sic *preist,* sic pariche (*Sat. Poems* 356,102). Cf. Apperson 367: Like preist like people; Fergusson 90(761): Sike preist, sike offering; Kelly 241(91); Oxford 518; Ramsay 223(2); Tilley P583, 586.

(2) That same whingar . . . and that same hand, should be *preastis* to the Cardinall (Knox I,172). NED Priest, 6; Tilley P587; Whiting, *ED* 359(790).

PRINCES.

Bot *Princeis* must be pardonit to speik quhat thay pleise (Knox I,388). Cf. NED Prince, 1c, quot. 1868.

PROFIT.

Na *profit* nor pleasure without pean-taken (Melvill II,458). Cheviot 259: Nae profit without pains; Kelly 259(21); Tilley P24.

PROLIXITY.

Clerkis sayis þat *prolixite,*
That langsumnes may callit be,
Generis leth mare þan delite (Wyntoun IV,126,1-3). Cf. Chaucer, *TC* ii,1564, *CT* V(F), 404-5. See THING (5) below.

PROMISE.

Ȝe *promise* furder than ȝe pay (Montgomerie C 40,1129). Cf. Tilley P602; Whiting, *ED* 142.

See HIGHLANDMAN above.

PROSPERITY.

Best is bewar in maist *prosperite,*
For in this warld thair is na thing lestand (Henryson 67,1939-40).
So all warldly *prosperitie*
Is myxit with gret miseritie (Lindsay I,347,5002-3).
Be not our prowde of thy *prosperitie*
ffor as it cumis so will it pass away (Bannatyne II,145,8-9). Kissel 1(4). Cf. Lydgate, *Fall* II,536-7,2310,2317,2324,2331; Tilley P610. See WORLD (3) below.

PROVE.

And lipin nocht in a new-cumyne gest,
Lat vthire hyme *pruf* ore þow hyme traist (*Consail* 76,357-8).
The sureast way þat I can find
Is first to *prufe* and syne to trust (Maitland 288,25-6). Apperson 651: Try before you trust; Oxford 675; Tilley T595; Whiting, *ED* 221.

PUNISHMENT.

Lyke *punischement,* for lyke offence,
Oft cumis to pas (*Ballatis* 216). Tilley F114: Like Fault like punishment. Cf. W.S.Gilbert, *The Mikado*: To let the punishment fit the crime.

PURSE.

Ane pegrall theif that stelis a kow
Is hangit; Bot he that steilis a bow,
With als mekle geir as he may turss,
That theif is hangit by the *purss* (Lindsay II,252,2674-7).

Bot lytill iustice was wssit bot be the *purs* (Pitscottie I,312,22-3).

the puir men war hangit and the richmen war hangit be the *purs* (Pitscottie II,190,17-8). Chaucer, *CT* I(A),654-8; John Frith in *The Works of William Tyndale and John Frith* (London,1831) III,307; Kissel 16(65); NED Purse, 2b.

QUANTITY.

As cato sayis in his teiching
In al thingis knaw þe *quantetie*.
as all tyme askis of every thing (Bannatyne II,110,53-5).

QUICK.

Let *quik* to quik, and deid ga to the deid (Henryson 21,522). Apperson 375(38), quot. 1578. Cf. Oxford 376: Live by the quick; Ramsay 239(37); Tilley Q12.

RACHE.

Throw out this Realme lyke *Ratches* as ȝe range (*Sat. Poems* 140,23). Gower *CA* III,66,4387-8; NED Rache, sb.[1].

RAIN.

(1) . . . teris . . .
Furth ȝetting our hys chekis thyk as *rane* (Douglas III,315,21-2). *Richard Coeur de Lion,* ed. K. Brunner (Vienna, 1913) 244,2970.

(2) Like ony *rane* the bitter teiris ran (Stewart I,412,12856, II,654,40312-4). Laud 221,7512.

(3) The schour of arowis rappit on as *rayn* (Dunbar 117,195).
Als fast as *rayne* schour rappis on the thak,
So thik with straikis (Douglas II,251,18-9). NED Rap, v.[1],5, quot. 1508.

RAINBOW.

Than heyly to sit on the *Rayne-bow* (*Thre Prestis* 26,407).

RAKE.

(1) lene *raik* (Montgomerie S 184,782). Apperson 356: As lean as a rake; Chaucer, *CT* I(A),287; NED Rake, sb.[1],1b; Oxford 357; Partridge 474; Tilley R22; Wilstach 229.

(2) Was dene rurale to reid, rank as a *raike* (*Howlat* 54,216). NED Rake, sb.[1], 1b.

RAM.

(1) He said, "þe *rame* oft gais abak,
þat he þe mare debait may mak" (Wyntoun VI,218,6521-2). See LEAP (1) above.

(2) Thocht ȝe rin rudelie, lyke ane restles *Ram* (Lindsay I,103,36).
Bot thay, lyke *Rammis* in to thair rage,
Unpissillit rynnis amang the ȝowis (Lindsay I,338,4706-7).
Sum rynis at barlabreikis lyk *ramis* (Scott 25,54).
ran vpoun vderis lyk *rammis* (Bannatyne II,267,164). Whiting, *ED* 324(270). Cf. NED Ram, sb.[1], 1a, quot. 1470-85.

(3) Sum, that war ryatous as *rammis* (Dunbar 59,16).

RAM'S HORN.

Als evin be lyne ry[t] as a *rammis horne* (Bannatyne II,201-2, 8, 16, etc.). Apperson 531: Right; NED Ram's-horn; Oxford 543; Tilley R28.

RAVE.

Schir, be the Rude, unroikit now ye *raif* (Henryson 80,2346).
Thow *rauis* vnrockit, the rauin said, be the rude (Lindsay I,84,969).
Cappit knaif, proud slaif, ȝe *raif* vnrokkit; . . .
. . . ȝeis be knokit (Montgomerie S 186,802-4). Cheviot 411: Se rave unrocked, I wish yer head was knocked; Henderson 153; Kelly 369(75); NED unrocked.

RAVEN.

(1) For the Freiris rowping lyik *reavins* upoun the Bischoppes (Knox I,256).

(2) the Hammyltonis, (who then repaired to the Courte as *ravenes* to the carioun (Knox I,106-7).

those hypocrytes who flocked unto hir, as *ravennis* to a carioun (Knox I,324). Apperson 81: Carcase; W. Bullein, *A Dialogue against the Feuer Pestilence* (EETS ES, 52, 1888) 19, 31; Oxford 78.

RAZOR.

With brandis braid, that scharpe as *rasure* schair (Stewart I,221,7155, 308,9736, 332,10474, II,79,22481, 283,28606, 326,29910). Apperson 561; Hyamson 313; NED Sharp, 1d; Oxford 579; Tilley R36; Whiting, *ED* 324(272).

REAP.

See sow, vb. below.

RECKLESS.

Owre *rackles* may repent (Montgomerie C 49,1420). Ramsay 217(10). Cf. Whiting, *ED* 284.

RECKONING.

Ane *raknyng* rycht cumis of ane ragment small (Dunbar 149,37).

RED-HAND.

And tuik this carling and hir prenteis bayth
Reid-hand (Stewart II,515,35857-8).

To steill his irnes, and wes tane *reid hand* (Stewart III,274,51552). Hyamson 291; NED Red hand; Taylor 56.

REED.

The woman lyik þe *reid* þat waggis with wind (Montgomerie S 211,42). NED Wag, 3b. Cf. *The Examinations and Writings of John Philpot* (Cambridge, 1842), 112.

REEK.

(1) For, quhen the *reik* beginnis to ryse,
The fyre will follow, as thay tell,
Be it not quencheit be the wyse (*Sat. Poems* 292,52-4). Cf. Apperson 582: There is no smoke; Bradley 75; Hardie 465; Henderson 6; Oxford 454, 458; NED Smoke, sb., 4b; Taylor 60; Tilley F282, S569.

(2) wanyst away as he *reke* ware (Legends II,117,646, 118,660,675, 158,229, 162,376-7, 164,442; Douglas II,268,8). NED Reek, sb.[1], 1b.

(3) The strang stour rais, as *reik*, vpon thaim fast (Harry 158,579).

(4) His moder tholit nocht þe *reke* on him to blaw (*Thre Prestis* 16,228).

REHEARSE.

Litill *reherss* is our mekill off cair:
And principaly quhair redempcioun is nayn,
It helpys nocht to tell thar petous mayn (Harry 367,1135-6). NED Rehearse, quot. c 1470. See DOLE, MOURN above, REMEDY below.

REM.

W^t *rem* in ra, all nakkit, but adherance (*Sat. Poems* 395,46). Gayton 68; Nashe III,73,36; Partridge 694.

REMEDY.

Thairfor forȝet it, sen thair is no *remeid*
For to make cair for it or ȝit regrate (*Clariodus* 54,106-7). Head 436; Palsgrave 777. See REHEARSE above.

RENOWN.

al riches passs gud *renoune* (*Consail* 77,406). Cf. Apperson 262: Good reputation; Tilley R74. See NAME (1) above.

REPENTANCE.

(1) quhilk brocht euer with it oure lait *repentance* (Melville 4).

I was compellit to say that I fearit ouer lait *repentance* (Melville 140).

The vhilk at last, thoght lait, maid him *repent* (Montgomerie C 131,71).

To lait Apollo did *repent* (Montgomerie C 153,29). Apperson 528: Repentance comes too late; NED Repent, 3a; Oxford 539; Tilley A211; Whiting, *Ballad* 38, *ED* 42, 156, 166, 225, 274.

(2) To wit: The man with wit sould wey
Quhat philosophs haif said.
Quhilk sentance *repentance*
Forbad him deir to buy (Montgomerie C 43,1241-4).

Buy on *repentance* of that pryce (Montgomerie C 141,15). NED Repentance, 1a, quot. 1601; Tilley R81-2. Cf. Apperson 75: Buy(8).

REVERENCE.

As men in proverbe sais,
mare *reuerens* Is gewine always
to vekyt men fore dred & dowte
þan to gudmen for luf al-owte (*Legends* I,192,71-4). Cf. Tilley R105.

REWARDS.

And greit *rewardis* als he gaif him till,
Quhilk mony brekis oft syis of thair will,
Richt so wes he brokin amang the laif,
For euirilk man is reddie to heir haif (Stewart I,641,19819-22). Cf. Apperson 697(28): He was wise that first gave reward; Oxford 178: Every man has his price, 719. See BUD above.

RIGHT.

(1) And *rycht* mayss oft the feble wycht (Barbour I,21,510; Wyntoun V,355,2798). NED Right, sb.[1], 3b, quot. *c* 1430. Cf. Whiting, *ED* 167.

(2) the comont prouerb sais that in euyrie tua contrar opinions ther is ane *rycht* and ane vrang (*Complaynt* 183,27-9).

RIME, SB

But *ryme* or ressone all Is bot heble hable (Henryson 191,61).

Ryme as it may, thair is na ressoun (Henryson 215,23).

Sen ȝouthheid is without ressoun or *ryme* (Stewart I,67,2272, 109,3671, 270,8620, 603,18720, 637,19689; *Complaynt* 139,30; *Sat. Poems* 130,68, 171,38, 331,199; Maitland II,66,78; Montgomerie C 129,21).

He luikit nocht to ressone nor to *ryme* (Stewart I,91,3069, 103,3477, 625,19341).

Mony man makis *ryme* and lukis to no ressoun (Bannatyne III,8,1; Maitland 159,1; Fortescue 263,[1], 265,[64]).

Heere it not stands by reason, but by *ryme* (Montgomerie C 57,16).

No *ryme* nor resone it respects (Montgomerie C 148,40). Apperson 529; Kelly 267(88); NED Rhyme, 3b, Rime, sb.[1], 1b; Oxford 540; Tilley R98; Whiting, *ED* 360(799).

RIME, VB

It may wele *ryme* Bot it accordis nought (Makculloch 111-3, 8, 16, etc.).

Suppois it *ryme* it accordis nocht all clene (Douglas I,109,20). Apperson 529; Oxford 540; Tilley R99.

RIPE.

He finds thy friendship as it *rypis* is rotten (Montgomerie C 104,xxx,12). Apperson 588 Soon ripe; Chaucer, *CT* I(A), 3871-5; Cheviot 286; Fergusson 90(752); Green 31; Kelly 288(25); NED Ripe, 1c; Oxford 604; Ramsay 224(13); Tilley R133; Whiting, *ED* 121, 165, 286, 290.

RIVER.

But when he gettis y^{t} geir agane,
Thair will na *river* ryse for raine (*Sat. Poems* 380,822-3). See WINTER below.

ROAST.

for, quhē yat strāgers reuls ȝour *roist* (*Sat. Poems* 217,148). Apperson 540:

Rule(5); NED Roast, 1b; Oxford 551; Taylor 56; Tilley R144; Whiting, *ED* 361(810).

ROBIN.

Now grace and honour on that face,
Quod *Robein* to the Haggies (*Philotus* 143,1087-8). NED Robin[1], 1, quot. 1603.

ROBIN HOOD.

That he would give no more credit to the New Testament than to a tale of *Robin Hood,* except it were confirmed by the Doctors of the Church (Knox II,472). Apperson 535; NED Robin Hood, 1, Tale, 5b; Oxford 643; Tilley T53; Whiting, *ED* 360(803).

ROCK (1).

(1) This wildernes . . .
Was dark as *rock,* the quhilk the sey vpcast (Douglas I,8,15-7).

(2) Sho bydis, and slydis
No more than does a *rok* (Montgomerie C 190,41-2). Cf. Apperson 671: Weak(2), quot. 1900; Green 23; NED Steady, 8; Tilley R151; Wilstach 387.

ROCK (2).

With schinnis scharp and small lyk *rockis* (Dunbar 60,23).

His lymmis wes lyk twa *rokkis* (Bannatyne II,263,35). Cf. NED Rock, sb.[2].

ROD.

This ȝeir sall rycht and ressone rewll þe *rod* (Scott 1,11; *Sat. Poems* 101,34).

ROE.

(1) As nimble as the sweetest *roe* (*Roswall* 22,240). [R. Brathwaite], *Ar't asleepe Husband?, A Boulster Lecture* (London, 1640) 137: Mountaine Roe.

(2) It ran als swift as ony . . . *raa* (Stewart II,67,22120). Tilley R158.

(3) Sym lap on horsbak lyk a *ra* (Scott 14,155). Cf. *Reliquiae* I,275: I am as lyghte as any roe; Whiting, *ED* 324(275).

ROME.

(1) I wait weill, Schir, ȝe haue hard say
Rome was not biggit the first day (*Sat. Poems* 308,439-40).
Rome wes not biggit all vpon ane day,
And ȝit it wes compleitit at the last (Montgomerie C 137,35-6). Apperson 537; Bradley 90; Ferguson 88(1160); Green 30; Hyamson 296; Jente 152; Kelly 283(6); NED Rome, 1b; Oxford 547-8; Ramsay 220(17); Taylor 57; Tilley R163.

(2) Becaus in *Rome,* as I hard wyiss men tell,
Baith richt and wrang wes all tyme for to sell (Stewart III,78,45034-5). Burton I,371 (i,ii,iii,15); H. Latimer, *Sermons,* ed. G. E. Corrie (Cambridge, 1844) I,185, 186; Oxford 8; Nicholas Ridley, *Works,* ed. H. Christmas (Cambridge, 1843) 54; Tilley T164.

(3) Better Justice was not from hence to *Rome* (*Sat. Poems* 139,13). *Guy of Warwick,* ed. J. Zupitza (EETS ES, 42, 49, 59, 1883-91) 364,6914; Tilley H429.

RONCESVALLES

Or all the renttis fra thyne vnto *Ronsiwall* (*Golagros* 44, 1313).

ROOK.

(1) His skowdrit skyn wes blak as ony *ruke* (Stewart II,534,36458).

(2) Ruging and raifand vp kirk rentis lyke *ruikis* (Scott 5,125). NED Rug, v.[1], 1b.

ROOM.

Men had leuer haif all tyme to eik his pelfe,
His nychtbouris *roume* far erar nor him self (Stewart I,13,427-8). Apperson

538; Henderson 60; Kelly 183(54); Oxford 548; Ramsay 192(11); Tilley R168. Cf. NED Room, sb.[1], 7b.

ROSE.

(1) In riche robus arayed, red as þe *rose* (*Pistill* 181,212; Henryson 112,211; Stewart I,109,3681, 292,9244, 381,11928, 396,12390, II,259,27876; Bannatyne II,262,21).

I was reddere in rode þan *rose* in þe rayne (*Awntyrs* 129,161; *Eger* 196,217, 256,795).

Vox ridder weill than *rose* on rys (*Alexander* II,209,3755; *Golagros* 29,852-4; Stewart I,312,9889).

Hir collour schew as *rosis* quhyt and reid (*Clariodus* 220,942).

The riuer als, befoir that wes rycht wan,
As rubecund *roiss* all of reid blude ran (Stewart I,249,8031-2).

Ȝour louesum lips . . .
As *Roses* red quhen that ane showre is past (*Philotus* 121,483-4). Apperson 526; Hardie 468; NED Red, 1, Rose, 42; Oxford 535; Tilley R177; Whiting, *Ballad* 30-1, *Chaucer* 171; Wilstach 315.

(2) Her nek schane like unto the *roise* in May (Douglas II,44,9; Bannatyne III,337,51-2).

(3) *rosie* lippis (Montgomerie C 184,43, S 218,11). NED Rosy; Roxburghe VII,109,26; Whiting, *Ballad* 31.

(4) your rude as *ross* (Henryson 140,354).

As rose and lillie cullour was thair face (*Clariodus* 105,1718). NED Rud, sb.[1], 2; *Sir Degrevant,* ed. L. F. Casson (EETS 221, 1949) 34,534.

(5) I shaip not, for no suddan shours, to shrink,
Sen peircing pyks ar kyndlie with the *rose* (Montgomerie C 192,45-6). Cf. Apperson 451: No rose without a thorn; NED Rose, 4b; Oxford 549; John Taylor, *Works* (Folio Edition [1630], Spencer Society, 1869) 6, Errata, [15]; Tilley R182; E. Ward, *The Modern World Disrob'd* (London, 1708) 9.

(6) Off coloure was sche lik vnto þe *rose* (*Quare* 196,39). Cf. *Guy of Warwick,* ed. J. Zupitza (EETS ES, 25-6, 1875-6) 133, 4656.

(7) Ȝour smyland seimlie mouth is sueit
lyik *rosis* redolent (Maitland Quarto 116,85-6). NED Rose, 4a; Tilley R178; Whiting, *ED* 324(276); Wilstach 405.

(8) Lyk as the *rois* in June with hir sueit smell
The marygulde or dasy doith excell (Douglas II,3,16-17).

See NETTLE above.

ROWAN.

My ruby cheikis wes reid as *rone* (Maitland 206,14; Montgomerie C 193,12). NED Rone, sb.[2], cf. Rowan[1].

RUBY.

Thaire curall fynnis, as the *ruby* rede (*Kingis Quair* 38,153).

Reid of his cullour, as is the *ruby* glance (Dunbar 113,24).

As *ruby reid* (Douglas I,97,10).

Off his fyue Woundis Precious,
Schynand lyke *Rubeis* Radious (Lindsay I,364,5580-1).

The cherreis hang abone my heid,
Lyk tuinkling *rubeis* round and reid (Montgomerie S 24,305-6). Pepys VI,242,5; Whiting, *Ballad* 31; Wilstach 316. Cf. Chaucer, *To Rosemounde* 4.

RULE, SB.

For in sic luif is nother *reull* nor squair (Rolland, *Court* 98,536). NED Rule, 17, Square, sb., 4b.

RULE, VB.

He *rewlis* weill, that weill him self can gyd (Dunbar 75-6, 8, 16, etc.).

RUSH.

No more for þe faire fole þene for a *risshe* rote (*Awntyrs* 158,553). Cf. Apperson 458(31); NED Rush, sb.[1], 2a; Tilley S917; Whiting, *ED* 361(812).

RUSH BUSH.

See BUSH (6) above.

SABLE.

the uther half *Sabill* black (Henryson 112,221).

now nycht als blak as *sabill* (Dunbar 151,19; Douglas IV,107,19). Gower, *CA* III,465,2904; NED Sable, sb.[2].

SACKCLOTH.

See DAY (1) above.

SADDLE.

(1) als seimlye a sight, (yf men had eis), as to putt a *sadill* upoun the back of ane unrewly kow (Knox I,242). Apperson 118: Cow (11), 591: Sow (12); Fergusson 66(537): sow; NED Saddle, 2f; Oxford 28: Becomes, 608: Sow; Ramsay 203(99): sow; Tilley C758, S672; Whiting, *Ballad* 36.

(2) is altogether set besydes his *sadil* (Knox VI,220). Apperson 542; Tilley S18.

SAFFRON.

Thy skolderit skin, hewd lyk ane *saffrone* bag (Dunbar 10,171). NED Saffron, 6c; Whiting, *Ballad* 25. Cf. Chaucer, *CT* VII,730 (B,1920).

SAIL.

(1) Scho turnit hir *Saillis* vnto ane vther wind (Rolland, *Seages* 28,662). Cf. Apperson 652: Turn (7).

(2) The grit Secratar wold nocht pas by the castell of Edinburgh without stryking of *saille* in sing of obedience (Bannatyne, *Memoriales* 32). NED Strike, 17.

SAINT.

(1) Of yung *sanctis* growis auld feyndis but faill (Dunbar 135,35).
So ȝe be nocht ane ouir ȝung *sanct*,
And syne ane awld divil (Lindsay II,48,510-1 and IV,173). Apperson 720; Fergusson 18(191); Kelly 52(334); Kissel 24(99); NED Saint, B, 4b; Oxford 739; Taylor 57; Tilley S33; Whiting, *ED* 91, 220.

(2) To *Sanct Anthone,* to saif thy sow (*Ballatis* 197). Cf. Apperson 11: Anthony pig; *British Apollo,* II(1709-10) no. 62, Qqq2; NED Anthony; Oxford 556; Tilley S35.

(3) Cunningar men man serve *Sanct Cloun* (Dunbar 81,31).
I hauld this ay best cummer be *Sanct Clone* (Lindsay II,147,1371 and IV,310). NED Clown, 3, quot. 1500-20.

(4) Thocht he wer trew as ever wes *sanct Johne* (Henryson 46,1270).

(5) Bot I, quhill that Emilia is my Name
To trow I sall like to *Sanct Thomas* be (*Philotus* 123,543-4). NED Thomas, 1.

SALT.

salt sesonis all (*Legends* I,4,110). Apperson 549; Oxford 560; A. Taylor, *English Riddles from Oral Tradition* (Berkeley, 1951), 39(96); Tilley S80.

SAMSON.

Wicht *Sampsone,* nor ȝit the fers Achill,
No Troalus had neuir better will
To fecht in feild (Stewart I,308,9740-2).
He gaif the strenth aboue *Sampsone,*
And sapience more than Salomone.
Ȝoung Absolone, in his tyme moste fair,

To thy bewte wes no compair (Lindsay I,227,957-60).

Thot thow be wicht as was *sampsone* þe force (Bannatyne II,193,71) Tilley S85; Whiting, *ED* 325(280); Wilstach 395. Cf. NED Samson, 1. See HECTOR, HERCULES above.

SAND.

And brak his bonis in pulder small as *sand* (Bannatyne III,330,109). Roxburghe IX,813.

SARUM.

And we sal serue *Secundum Vsum Sarum* (Lindsay I,77,700 and III,105). Apperson 549-50; Kissel 36(162); Oxford 569; Skelton I,176,101-3, III,161; Tilley S198.

SAW.

His *saw* is ay als sickker as his Seill (Henryson 78,2282; Bannatyne II,232,51). See WORD (5) below.

SAY.

(1) Ȝe suld not *say,* sir, till ȝe se;
Bot, quhen ȝe se it, say (Montgomerie C 41,1155-6).

(2) The Hypocreitis ar fenȝeit, fals, and vaine;
Will *saye* ane thing, and syne will do ane vther (Lauder 34,67-8). Cf. Oxford 563: Saying and doing; Robert of Gloucester II,662,9331: þat muche wole segge & bihote & lute þer to do; Tilley S119,121.

SAYWELL.

(1) *Say weill* frome do weill defferis in lettir
Say weill is gud bot do weill is bettir (Bannatyne II,212,3-4). Apperson 551: Say(14); Fergusson 92(1212); Kelly 291(47); NED Say-well; Oxford 563; Ramsay 221(9-10); Tilley S122.

(2) *Sayweill* but doweill / Is nocht worth a straw (Bannatyne II,129,95). Cf. Tilley D402.

SCATHE.

One *skaith* is les nor two ȝe may believe (*Clariodus* 235,1413).

SCHOOL.

put money to þe *scule* All will not be clerkis (Bannatyne III,10,62-3; Maitland 161,59; Fortescue 265,[55]).

SCORN.

As *scorne* cumis comonlie with skayth (Montgomerie S 16,196). Cheviot 133, 290; Fergusson 92(1213), 114(1578); Henderson 99; Kelly 288(27), cf. 272(34); NED Scorn, 1b; Oxford 566; Ramsay 221(15); Tilley S151.

SCOT.

(1) The cankarit *Scottis* that neuir ȝit wes trew (Stewart I,337,10617).
Thir fals *Scottis* quhilk ar bayth vyle and rude (Stewart I,618,19120).
Tha [*Scots*] ar the leid culd neuir ȝit be leill
For band or aith, for saw or ȝit for seill.
Quhen euir tha list tha find ane caus to brek (Stewart II,33,21115-7).
Saying: avoyde the fals dissaitfull *Scot* (*Sat. Poems* 248,8). Apperson 202: As false as a Scot; Cheviot 43; NED Scot, sb.[1], 2; Oxford 189; Tilley S154; Whiting, *Ballad* 38.

(2) Of rasche decreitis cums rew and may not mend it,
As *Scottismens* wisdome dois behinde the hand (*Sat. Poems* 332,211-2). Apperson 698: Wise(44), quot. 1820; Cheviot 25; Fergusson 14(137); Henderson 89, 132; Kelly 28(165); Ramsay 207(9); Tilley M368.

(3) For had I witten that I wait,
Allace! is *Scotts* wisdume (*Sat. Poems* 126,139-40). Cf. Oxford 716: Wise after the event, quot. 1900; Tilley S162.

SCRUNT.

Nocht worth ane *scrunt* of all that to restoir (Stewart III,115,46237). NED Scrunt.

SEA.

(1) This warld walteris, as dois the wallie *sey* (Douglas I,74,25). Cf. NED Walter, v.[1], 5; Whiting, *ED* 325(282).

(2) i vait nocht quhiddir ane calme *sey* in vyntir, or the course of the mune, or ane mysty mornyng in symmyr, or the comont pepil, quhilk of them suld preffer vthirs in variance (*Complaynt* 140,4-7). Cf. Chaucer, *CT* IV (E),995-1001.

SEAL (1).

The carll wes fat as ony *selghe* (Wyntoun II,272,48). NED Seal, sb.[1], 1, quot. *c* 1425.

SEAL (2).

round als ane *seill* (Henryson 82,2395).

SEALED.

Nor [is all] to be *seald* that ilkane sayis (Montgomerie C 134,43). Cheviot 32: A' that's said shouldna be sealed; Kelly 9(46).

SENTENCE.

Bot sad *sentence* sulde haue ane sad indyte (Lindsay I,204,210). Cf. Chaucer, *TC* i,12-4. See SESSION below.

SEPULCHRE.

there is ane prouerb that seis parce sepulto; that is to saye, spair hym that is in his *sepulture* (*Complaynt* 127,26-7). Cf. Apperson 594: Speak well of the dead; Oxford 611; Tilley D124.

SERPENT.

(1) Wndyr cowart hyr malice hid perfyt,
As a *serpent* watis hyr tym to byt (Harry 292,1835-6).

a philosophour comperith þaim vnto ane *sserpent* hyd vnder flouris for the flouris ar' fair to behald bot It Is deid to approche þame (Asloan I,275,3-6).

In vnderneth the floure,
the lurkin *serpent* lyis (Montgomerie S 40,532-3). Apperson 583: Snake (3); Chaucer, *CT* V(F),512; NED Serpent, 1d; Oxford 601; Taylor 60; Tilley S585; Whiting, *ED* 361(823).

(2) Lyke vyle *serpentis* he hait thame to the deid (Stewart III,38,43719).

SERVANTS.

And þai þat of kynd ar fre,
Trew *seruandis* in pouerte,
Press nocht to put þame to gret hycht,
Na to na hie rysing of mycht (Wyntoun III,148,1963-6). Cf. *Proverbs* xxx,21-2.

SERVICE.

(1) For lang *service* rewarde is none (Dunbar 44,7).

Lang *seruyce* ȝarnis, ay, rewaird (Lindsay I,41,50). Kissel 18(74). Cf. Tilley S254.

(2) be weill-wyllyt in thin office,
For heritage is na *seruice* (*Consail* 76,371-2). Apperson 558: Service is no inheritance; Oxford 575; Taylor 58; Tilley S253.

SESSION.

Ane doolie *sessoun* to ane cairful dyte
Suld correspond, and be equivalent (Henryson 105,1). See SENTENCE above.

SEVEN.

(1) Boþe þe sonne and þe see þou sette vppon *seuene* (*Pistill* 183,264).

I swere be suthfast God, that settis all on *sevin* (*Golagros* 35,1045 and pp.280-1). NED Seven, B, 1b; Whiting, *ED* 362(826).

(2) For thair is segis in yone saill wil set vpone *sevin*,
Or thay be wrangit (*Golagros* 18,508-9).
With seymely scheildis to schew, that set vpone *seuin* (*Golagros* 23,668).
Cf. Apperson 575: Sixes; Oxford 594. See SIX below.

SHADOW.

(1) As *schadow* in the sonnis beme
Or primrois in the winter schone [*shower*] (Maitland 206,17-8). Cf. Whiting, *ED* 325(285).

(2) Lyk as ane *schaddow* in ane glas
Hyne glydis all thy tyme that heir is (Dunbar 149,5-6).
is evin bot as a *schaddow* in a glas (Bannatyne II,244,72).

SHAME.

Schame is past the sched of thair hair, as weill we knaw (Rolland, *Seages* 44,1188).

And vertew banist, fra *shame* pas shed of hair (*Sat. Poems* 43,132). Cheviot 294; Fergusson 90(768); Henderson 66; Kelly 287(24); NED Shed, sb.[1], 2b; Oxford 578; Ramsay 222(33); Tilley S275.

SHEAR.

See SOW,VB. below.

SHEEP.

(1) A scabbit *scheip* wald fane infect the lave (*Sat. Poems* 347,21).
a skabbit *scheip* infeckis all the haill flok (Bannatyne III,9,35-6; Maitland 160,36; Fortescue 264,[30]). Apperson 563; Fergusson 6(25); Kelly 269(6); NED Sheep, 2a(d); Oxford 576; Ramsay 166(39); Tilley S308.

(2) Better this . . . nor stelling *sheipe*, or sitting ydle, quhilk is als ill (Melvill I,120). Cf. Kelly 73(128): Better be idle than ill occupied; Ramsay 166(38); Tilley I7.

(3) This warld hes maid þe proverb manifest
Quha is ane *scheip* þe woulf will soune him hent (Maitland 52,110-1). Apperson 562: Sheep(6); Oxford 399: Makes himself; Tilley S300.

(4) als meke as þai *schepe* bene had (*Legends* I,219,382).
& mekly led hyme as a *schepe* (*Legends* I,287,71).

(5) And þare þai stekit þaim as *scheip* (Wyntoun III,42,511, 64,814). Laud 133,4488.

(6) Als thik as *scheip* that lyis in ane fald (Stewart I,345,10860, II,611,38915-6).
The deid bodeis that la als deid vntald,
As euir did *scheip* that la intill ane fald (Stewart I,396,12391-2). *Guy of Warwick,* ed. J.Zupitza (EETS ES, 25-6, 1875-6) 95,3312, 156,5448; *Morte Arthure,* ed. Erik Björkman (Heidelberg, 1915) 86,2922.

(7) Schoudrit and sched like *scheip* intill ane fald (Stewart III,177,48288, 429,56868). Cf. *Le Morte Arthure,* re-ed., J.D.Bruce (EETS ES, 88, 1903) 77,2563: shredde.

(8) That richt as *scheip* befor him [fast] they fled (*Clariodus* 148,1126).
Fra him tha fled to mony wod and scrog,
As houndit *scheip* fra ony masteif dog (Stewart III,409,56167-8).

(9) þat as a *schepe* ymang wlfis brath
beheld quha fyrst suld do hir scath (*Legends* II,50,127-8).

(10) As *scheip* that for the wolf takis flicht,
He led the folk (*Alexander* I,32,996-7). *Huon* 748,12-3; Lydgate, *Troy* II,448,1888. See HARE (3) above.

(11) Tha war als blait and basit as ane *scheip* (Stewart II,632,39586). NED Blate, 3, quot. 1535.

(12) Quham gadtherit I wald haif to gidder,

As errand *sheip* bene with thare hirdis (Lindsay I,313,3851-2). *Huon* 347,9-10.

(13) Syne sauld him to the skambillis lyik ane *scheip* (*Sat. Poems* 249,40).

SHELL.

And schuttis syne at ane uncow *schell* (Dunbar 2,13).

Schutand ȝour bolt at mony sindrie *schellis* (Lindsay I,103,37,45).

ffor schutting at þe *schellis* (Bannatyne III,20,58).

That hes but small / stufe corporall / Syne schutis at þat *schell* (Bannatyne IV,19,26). NED Shell, sb.[1], 2b; Partridge 753: Shell(2).

SHELLFUL.

Quhilk is not worth ane *schelfull* of credence (Rolland, *Seages* 71,2057). NED Shellful, quot. 1560.

SHIP.

(1) Ryght as the *schip* that sailith stereles
Vpon the rok[kis] most to harmes hye (*Kingis Quair* 6,15). Whiting, *ED* 325(287).

(2) Thy stormy thoucht ay walking to and fro
As doth the *schip* amang þe wawis dryve (*Quare* 210,549-50).

SHIPMAN'S BREECHES.

forgeing thair sermonis for the plesuir of euery auditour, efter the fassoun of *schipmenis breiks,* mete for euery leg (Winzet I,52). Nashe I,172,16, 327,7-8; NED Shipman, 3b. Cf. Tilley C599.

SHOE.

(1) he suld weir yrn *schone* Suld byd a manis deid (Bannatyne III,8,5-6).

The man suld haue Irne *schone* suld byd ane vther mannis deid (Maitland 159,5).

A budde have yron *schoune,* that bydes elke mans dedde (Fortescue 263,[5]). Fergusson 44(371); Tilley S375; Oxford 132. Cf. Whiting, *ED* 211.

(2) Thow knawis best quhair bindis the thi *scho* (Dunbar 169,54). Apperson 565; Bradley 91; Chaucer, *CT* III(D), 492, IV(E), 1553; Cheviot 98; Fergusson 30(256), 66(551); Green 24; Hyamson 315; Jente 337; NED Shoe, 2f; Oxford 583; Taylor 58; Tilley M129; Whiting, *ED* 39.

(3) Lo quhair scho gois hes tred hir *scho* on heill (Bannatyne IV,74,33). Apperson 644: Tread; NED Shoe, 2l; Tilley S373; Whiting, *ED* 368(910).

(4) estemying him self not worthy to deicht hir *schone* (Melville 126). Oxford 734; Tilley S378.

SHOT.

David Cuming with mekle bost and schoir,
New *schot* new bod quhair that he left befoir,
Begouth agane the Scottis till oppres (Stewart III,330,53465-7). John Jamieson, *An Etymological Dictionary of the Scottish Language* Bod, Shot 3.

SHOWER.

With that arrowis, scharpe as ony *schouris*
Of frost or haill that fallis fra the lift,
Als forsie flew as ony evin drift (Stewart I,248,7992-4).
Thair followit syne ane vther in the taill,
That scharper wer nor ony *schour* or haill (Stewart I,380,11913-4).

SIEVE.

I am to ȝow als sib as *seif* is to ane riddil (*Thre Prestis* 28,476).

We weir als sib as *seve* and riddill,
In una silva que creverunt (Dunbar 73,55-6). Apperson 570; Cheviot 42; Kelly 31(186); NED Sib,a, 1b; Oxford 587; Tilley S434.

SILENCE.

for my *silence* I be haldin gyltie (Knox II,409).

silence is taken for consent (Hume 182,613). Apperson 571; Jente 297; Oxford 589; Taylor 59; Tilley S446.

SILK.

(1) Bot soft and soupill as the *silk* is his sary lume (Dunbar 87,96).

Soft as *silk* is hir lyre (Lindsay II,58,614; *Sat. Poems* 399,26; Bannatyne II,334,26). Apperson 585; Chaucer, *CF* V(F),613; Green 31; NED Silk, 1c; Tilley S449; Whiting, *Ballad* 31, *ED* 325(290); Wilstach 369, 371.

(2) Hir hair wes lyk þe oppynnit *silk* (Bannatyne III,308,17). Cf. *Seege* 199,1530g: Here lovely ffax shyned as selke.

SILVER.

(1) And ye ar *silver* seik, I wait richt weill (Henryson 71,2036). NED Silver, 21; Tilley D620. Cf. Apperson 570: Sick of the silver dropsy; Oxford 588; Tilley D620.

(2) With leg harnes like as the *siluer* schene (Stewart I,311,9857).

With semelie sapheir as the *siluer* schone (Stewart I,407,12705). Chaucer, *Romaunt A* 1556-7. Cf. Whiting, *ED* 325(291).

(3) As ony *siluer* ouir the schaw that schone als lycht (Stewart I,394,12328).

SIN.

(1) And thair ald *sin* with new schame certify (Dunbar 14,320).

Commounly auld *syn* Makis new schame (Bannatyne III,8,13-4).

Comunlie still *syn* makis loud schame (Maitland 159,13; not in Fortescue). Apperson 467; Fergusson 12(109); Gower, *CA* II,281,2033, III,377,5115-6; Jente 582; Kelly 269(11); Oxford 473; Ramsay 165(34); Tilley S471.

(2) for he þat cesis nocht to *syne*
til þat it lewis hyme,
sal nothyr haf thang no mede
til lef, quham he ma do na dede (*Legends* II,70,39-42).

Thow leiss nocht *sin* quhill sin hes left the (*Thre Prestis* 51,1229).

Leave *sin*, ere sin leave thee (Montgomerie C 241,1). Chaucer, *CT* VI(C),286, X(I),92.

(3) as the commune saying is, *Non dimittitur peccatum nisi restituatur ablatum.* The *sinne* sal not be forgevvin, les nor that be restorit whilk is tane auay (*Catholic* 234,21-3). *The Vision of William Concerning Piers the Plowman*, ed. W. W. Skeat (2 vols., Oxford, 1886) I,153,257a: *Nunquam dimittitur peccatum, nisi restituatur ablatum* and II,87 (from St. Augustine). Cf. Kelly 320(143).

(4) For-quhy ane man committit hes ane *syn*,
Without contritioun liand lang thairin,
He causis him to fall intill ane vther,
Quhilk is far war oftymes na the tother (Stewart III,491,58934-7). Whiting, *ED* 72.

(5) *Syn*, my Lord, is sweat in drinkyng, but in digesting more bitter then the gall (Knox II,378).

(6) Speir at the Monks of Bamirrinoch,
Gif lecherie be *sin* (Lindsay II,51,261-2, 183,1831-2). Thomas Churchyard, *The Firste parte of Churchyardes Chippes* (London, 1575) 84: this Freer so wantton was . . . That by his lyef men gest he thought, That letchry was no syn.

SIT.

Scho is not ill / þat *sittis* still

persewit in þe seit (Bannatyne III,21,90-1). Cf. Apperson 574: Better sit still than rise up and fall; Fergusson 22(190); Kelly 66(70); Oxford 41; Tilley S491. See STAND below.

SIX.

Bot settis all his thrift on *sax* and sevin (Stewart I,654,20184).

Set all on *sex* and seuin, and perchance cast eleuin (Rolland, *Seages* 76,2226 and p. 330).

And set on *sax* and seuin the chance (*Ballatis* 26). Apperson 575; Berrey 174.6; Chaucer, *TC* iv,622; Fergusson 52(452), 68(869); Hyamson 318; NED Six, 5; Oxford 594; Taylor 59; Tilley A208. See SEVEN (2) above.

SKIN.

(1) . . . me think it better
to sleip in haill nor in ane hurt *skyn* (Henryson 38,1029-30). Apperson 682-3; Fergusson 64(517); Kelly 220(344); NED Skin, 5c; Oxford 596; Ramsay 200(42); Tilley S530.

(2) wharfor I beseik you burding me na mair with it, unles yie wald have my *skine* (Melvill II,494).

SLAY.

(1) Sir, he that *slayes,* he will be slain (Eger 305,2004). Cheviot 148; Fergusson 40(340); Tilley S525.

(2) He will not ly quhair he is *slaine.*
That douttis befoir he dies (Montgomerie C 19,471-2). Kelly 135(70); Oxford 364-5; Tilley L243.

SLEEVE.

(1) Bot se that ȝe put not ȝour *sleif*
Farther nor hand may reik (Rolland, *Seages* 105,3195-6). Apperson 15: Don't stretch thy arm farther than thy sleeve will reach; Fergusson 84(686); Kelly 277(10); NED Sleeve, 2f; Oxford 625; Ramsay 219(25); Tilley A316.

(2) lauching in your *sleive* (Melvill II,431). Apperson 352; NED Laugh, 1b, Sleeve, 2d; Oxford 352; Ramsay 216(56); Tilley S535.

SLIME.

(1) mair slippry than the *slyme* (Bannatyne II,36,2).

(2) Bot slydis away as dois the . . . *slime* (Rolland, *Court* 25,324).

SNAIL.

(1) And in the deid als schairp as ony *snaillis* (Douglas I,28,12).

(2) Heir sueirness sleipit slaw as onie *snaill* (J. Stewart 226,107).

(3) And quhen als swyft as swallow beis the *snale* (Bannatyne IV,43,33). Cf. Apperson 582-3(1, 4, 5); NED Snail, sb.[1], 2; Oxford 600; Tilley S579.

SNAKE-STONE.

knowing our Scottis Court never to be so quiet, as it is, bot when thai hath sum *snaik stone. Quante le meschant dort, le diable le bersse* (Colville 200). Cf. NED Snake-stone, but not before 1651 and no figurative uses; Randle Cotgrave, *A Dictionarie of the French and English Tongues* (London, 1611, reproduced . . . with introduction by William S. Woods, Columbia, South Carolina, 1950) s.v. Diable: Quand le François dort le diable le berse. (*A Proverbe made by the Flemings out of patience with th' impatient, and restlesse humors of the French.*)

SNOOD.

Not wirth . . . ane auld *snvd* (Bannatyne II,301,38).

SNOW.

(1) he mad þare hartis quhyt as *snaw* (*Legends* I,191,37, 419,590, II,248,883, 371,108; *Kingis Quair* 18,67; Henryson 132,100; Douglas I,52,20,

II,152,23, 178,19, III,256,19; *Clariodus* 154,1299, 199,246, 221,953, 252,1967, 310,910, 331,1593; Stewart I,470,14637, III,44,43911; Gau 63,29; Lindsay I,207,304; Scott 94,31; Bannatyne III,305,18-9; Rolland, *Court* 85,146; Montgomerie S 219,1; J. Stewart 242,171).

The *snaw* quhite dow (Douglas II,166,4, 204,6, III,54,17, 131,30, 203,12, IV,12,6, 179,21; *Clariodus* 79,886, 96,1452, 136,727, 137,775, 179,2099, 290,289; Montgomerie C 171,35, 184,53, S 216,3).

The quhilk stedis . . .
Excedit far the *snaw* in cullour quhyte (Douglas IV,98,9-10). Apperson 681; Hardie 468; NED Snow, 1b; Taylor 67; Tilley S591; Whiting, *Ballad* 31, *Chaucer* 172,270, *ED* 326(297); Wilstach 471.

(2) . . . the fedderit flanis flaw,
. . . thik as ony *snaw* (Stewart I,15,500-1, II,57,21820, 96,22011, 411,32570, 605,38721). Hazlitt II,105,305-6; C. Horstmann, *Sammlung Altenglischer Legenden* (Heilbronn, 1878), 221,35-6; *Huon* 339,26-7, 389,14-5, 474,27-8, 664,19-21. See HAIL (2), (3) above.

(3) And, as the *snaw*, ar meltit clene awaye (Lindsay I,276,2596).
For, siclyke as the *snaw* doith melt in May
Throuch the reflex of Phebus bemys brycht,
Thir gret Impyris rychtso ar went away (Lindsay I,321-2,4140-2).
The tender *snow*, of granis soft & quhyt,
Is nocht so sone conswmit vith phebus heit,
As is my breist (Montgomerie S 220,1-3). NED Melt, v[1], la; Roxburghe I,19,43-4.

(4) The dartis thik and fleand taklis glydis,
As doith the schour of *snaw* (Douglas IV,56,20-1).

(5) And clenar than maid sall I be,
Than euer *snaw* hes bene (*Ballatis* 123). *Quatuor Sermones* (1483) (Roxburghe Club, 111, London, 1883) 44: I shal be made clene and whit as snowe.

(6) It weschis away as *snaw* dois w^t the rane (Bannatyne II,193,62).

(7) Bot slydis away as dois the *snaw* (Rolland, *Court* 25,324).

SOAP.

And quhou scho schynes lyk ony *saep* (Dunbar 66,9). NED Soap, 1, quot. 1500-20).

SOCK.

Quhilk wes nocht worth ane pair of auld gray *sox* (Dunbar 9,144).

SOFT.

Doun from the hycht discendis *soft* and fair (Douglas II,236,22).
thinkand that the king sould be taine *softlie* and fairlie (Pitscottie I,174,1-2). Apperson 585; Chaucer, *TC* v, 347; NED Soft, adv., 7; Oxford 185-6; Tilley S601; Whiting, *ED* 364(858).

SOLOMON.

Thot thow wer wyiss as euir wes *salomon* (Bannatyne II,193,69, IV,27,26). Lean II,894; NED Solomon, quot. 1678; Tilley S609; Whiting, *ED* 326(299); Wilstach 478. See SAMSON above.

SONG.

(1) Wee al and sundrie sings the samin *sang* (*Thre Prestis* 11,142).
ȝe will sing baith ane *sang* (*Sat. Poems* 141,61). Apperson 574: Sing(11); Oxford 592; Tilley S638.

(2) But the Masse singeth ane other *song* (Knox III,66). Oxford 592; Tilley S637.

SOOT.

as ony *sut* fere mare blake (*Legends* I,220,440, II,59,428). Apperson 51; Hyamson 47; NED Scot, sb.[1], la, quot. c 1420; Tilley S642; Wilstach 21.

SOOTH.

(1) The *suith* suld nocht be haldin clos,
Veritas non querit Angulos (Lindsay I,122,167-8 and III, 146). Apperson 650: Truth seeks no corners; Chaucer, *Romaunt* C 6712: For sothfastnesse wole non hidynges; Kissel 14(57). Cf. *Bannatyne Miscellany* III (1855), 41; Kelly 317(121); Tilley T587; Whiting, *ED* 13, 21.

(2) And in althynge ful *suythe* to say
Is noucht speidful, na neidful ay (Wyntoun VI,386,1849-50). Apperson 650: Truth should not always be revealed; Hazlitt III,168,36: All soothes be not for to saye; Oxford 9; Ramsay 158(46); Tilley T594. Cf. Whiting, *ED* 9, 84, 212.

SORE.

See HEART (2) above.

SOUL.

Skantlie durst say thair *saull* wes thair awin (Stewart II,109,23395, III,189,48693-4). NED Soul, 4b; Tilley S667.

SOUR.

(1) To ȝow is *sour* that thay think sweit (Rolland, *Seages* 152,4815). See APPETITE (2) above.

(2) Quha sal me mend and of my bail me beit,
To tak the *sower* and for to leif the sweit? (*Thre Prestis* 48,1121-2). Cf. Apperson 614: Take the sweet with the sour; Oxford 636; Tilley S1038. See SWEET (4) below.

SOUTER.

and sum of thame sua meitt for thair office, in this trubilsum tyme, as ane *sowtar* is to saill ane schip in ane stormy day (Knox I,431).

maid lykuyse souters schipmen (*Catholic* 124,31). Chaucer, *CT* I(A),3904; Fergusson 103(1410): The devil maid soutars shipmen that can nather steir nor row; Henderson 90; Kelly 85(10); Oxford 607; Tilley D257.

SOW, SB.

(1) Now euerie fat *Sow* feidis ane vther,
And few hes pitie on the Pure (Lauder 26,9-10). Cf. Apperson 591: To grease the fat sow; Oxford 263; Tilley H487, S682.

(2) The common prouerb is ouer trew, Lat the *sow* put in ane fute, &c. (Winzet I,96-7, margin, and II,145: "This proverb is still in use, 'Let the sow put in one foot and she'll sune put in the others' ").

(3) He salbe druckin lyk a *sow* (Lindsay II,142,908). Apperson 167; NED Sow, sb.[1], 3c; Tilley S1042; Whiting, *ED* 326(300).

(4) Bot sleipand la, ay snorand lyke ane *sow* (Stewart II,633,39601; *Sat. Poems* 389,1077). Whiting, *Ballad* 31. Cf. Apperson 577: To sleep like a pig; Tilley H497.

(5) Syne fell on sleip alss sound as any *sow* (Stewart II,661,40546).
All nycht with huiris syne sleip[it] lyke ane *sow* (Stewart II,457,34016).
And also slepie, as wes ony *sow* (Stewart II,631,39554).

(6) Sleipand in sleuth, as ony *sow* als sueir (Stewart II,426,33065, 582,38013). Cf. NED Sweer, 3.

(7) Scho luikis doun oft ay lyk ane *sow* (Maitland 245,25).

(8) ay valouand me in þat syne,
as *sow* a medynge dois vithine (*Legends* I,309,467-8). *The English Works of John Fisher,* ed. J. E. B. Mayor (EETS ES, 27, 1876) 17,36-18,3; Roxburghe VII,820,54.

SOW, VB.

Quhat seid men *sawis* sic corne þai mon neid scheire

As we may se be naturale experiens (Asloan II,196,265-6).
And, sen that thow mon scheir as thow hes *sawin* (Lindsay I,36,1052).
Quhen ȝe sall scheir as ȝe haue *sawin* (Lindsay I,372,5873).
Edinburgh since that day had reaped as thai *sew* (Knox II,288-9). Apperson 591; Bradley 92; *Galatians* vi,7; Kissel 6(21); NED Reap, v.^{1}, 2b, Shear, 7b; Oxford 608; Tilley S687; Whiting, *ED* 74, 194, 299.

SPADE

I haue learned plainelie and bauldlie, to call wickitnes by the awin terms—a feg, a feg, and a *spead,* a spead (Bannatyne, *Memoriales* 97). Apperson 592; Oxford 75; Taylor 60; Tilley S699; Whiting, *ED* 364(866).

SPANIEL.

Lycht wynchis luve will fawin
Evin lyk ane *spanȝeollis* lawchter (Scott 20,25-6). Nashe I,224,27-8: like a Spaniell to fawne; Oxford 195; Tilley S704. See DOG (3) above.

SPARHAWK.

Nor ȝit *Sparhalk* sa blyith to get hir pray (Rolland, *Seages* 273,8964).

SPARK.

(1) And furth scho sprent as *spark* of gleid or fyre (Douglas IV,64,10). Cf. NED Spark, sb.^{1}, 1c.
(2) Tha fled als fast as *spark* gois out of gleid (Stewart II,67,22122, 713,42223). NED Gleed, 1b, Spark, sb.^{1}, 1c.
(3) . . . alssone hes hym slane
As *spark* of gleid wald in the sey remane (Douglas III,251,9-10). Whiting, *ED* 326(302).
(4) As ony *spark* out of ane fyrie brand,
Tha fled (Stewart II,461,34137-8). Cf. Chaucer, *CT* VII,904-5 (B 2094-5); Whiting, *Ballad* 31: spring.
Tha fled (Stewart II,461,34137-8). Cf. Chaucer, *CT* VII, 904-5 (B 2094-5); Whiting, *Ballad* 31: spring.

SPEAK.

he þt *speikis* mekle sum pairte mon spill (Bannatyne II,207,36). Cheviot 255; Fergusson 76(621), 107(1440); Henderson 85; Kelly 249(50); Oxford 422; Ramsay 211(36); Tilley M916.

SPEECH.

(1) Onsped *speche* bettir vnspokin be (Bannatyne III,258,8). NED Unsped, quot. *a* 1568.
(2) The fairer *speich,* the falsir hairtis:
The suirest bandis, the sonest brokin:
The greater lordis, the falser partis (*Sat. Poems* 241,19-21). Cf. Palsgrave 361: Some speke full swetely that meane full yvell; Skelton II,204,759.
(3) In mekle *speic*[*h*]*e* is pairt of vanitie (Dunbar 75,4).
(4) A man mekle of *speiche* quhylomis mon lie (Bannatyne III,9,29-30).
Ane man of meikle *speiche* may sum tyme lie (Maitland 160,30).
Men of mokill *speche* som tyme lye (Fortescue 264,[25]). Apperson 400: Many words, In, quot. 1548; Oxford 406; H. Rhodes, *Boke of Nurture* in *Manners and Meals in Olden Time,* ed. F. J. Furnivall (EETS, 32,1868) 94,455-6: To speake or prate, or vse much talke, Ingenders many lyes; Tilley W828.
(5) Quod scho it is ane Prouerb of the ald,
Quhilk I oft times in mirrines hes hard tald.
Let ane ȝoung man quhidder he speid or nocht
Hane not his *speich,* but speik furth & spair nocht (Rolland, *Seages* 270,8880-3).
He is bot daft þat hes ado,

that spairis [for] ony *speiche* (Montgomerie S 26,350-1). Apperson 593; Cheviot 148, 158, 162; Fergusson 38(307); Henderson 13, 79; Kelly 5(24), 167(309); NED Spare, v.[1], 6c; Oxford 609; Ramsay 190(79); Tilley S734; Whiting, *ED* 139.

SPEND.

press no[t] to *spend* Bot gife thow think to win (Bannatyne III,8,12-3).

He þat glaydlie wald *spend* suld preiss for to win (Maitland 159,12; not in Fortescue).

SPENDING.

Scarss *spending* / skathis gentriss (Bannatyne IV,296,486). Cf. Tilley S745.

SPIRIT.

Plesance and joy rycht halesum and perfyte is,
So that the wys therof in prouerb writis,
Ane blyth *spreit* makis greyn and flurist age (Douglas II,220, 19-221,1).

SPOON.

Als tyrd as scho had weschin a *spone* (Bannatyne III,27,57).

SPUR.

I will not *spure* a running man (Colville 117). Cf. Apperson 312: Do not spur a free horse; Oxford 616; Tilley H638,688.

SPURN.

He *spurnyt* oftare þan he sped
That sic a blosome brocht to bed (Wyntoun IV,72,5093-4).
For quha to wroth God has na dreid,
He sall *spurne* oft quhen he suld speid,
And at þe last end wrechitly (Wyntoun IV,184,697-9).
And quho that will noght for this prayer turn,
Quhen thai wald faynest speid, that thai may *spurn* (*Kingis Quair* 46,186).
That garris thaim *spwrn* quhen thai suld speid (*Foly* 62,362).
Oft in romanis I reid:
Airly *sporne,* late speid (*Golagros* 30,878-9 and p. 278.
For lidder speid cumis of airlie *spurne* (Stewart II,150,24615).
. . . and bad the laif nocht dreid
Quha *spurnis* airlie cumis lidder speid (Stewart III,226,49935-6).
For oft befoir I haif hard wyvis sa,
Gif it be suith I can nocht say on deid,
That airlie *spurning* causis rycht lait speid (Stewart III,367,54712-4). NED Spurn, v.[1], 1b.

SPURRING.

Vntymous *spurring* spillis the steid (Montgomerie C 16,397, cf. S 28,378: speid). Kelly 343(29); Oxford 683; Ramsay 237(1); Tilley S794.

SPY.

fyrst *spy* bayth and try bayth (Montgomerie S 36,496).

STAFF.

And maid a stalwart *staff* to strik him selfe doune (Dunbar 94,384).

Sum bringis ane *staffe* for to brek his awin heid (Rolland *Seages* 130,4050). Apperson 601: Stick(2); Fergusson 52(455); Kelly 182(43); Lean IV,43; NED Staff, sb.[1], 5; Oxford 617; Ramsay 181(2), 193(9); Tilley R153, S802. See WAND (2) below.

STAKE.

stark as ony *staik* (Stewart III,177,48285). Cf. Tilley S809.

STALK.

Hir bodye small wes widderit and berent
as is the *staik* (?*stalk*) quhilk someris drouth opprest (Maitland Quarto 202,49-50).

STAND.

Quha *standis* weill, he suld nocht steire (Wyntoun VI,170,5878). Apperson 599: Stand(2); *Gest Hystoriale of the Destruction of Troy,* ed. G.A. Panton (EETS, 39, 56, 1869-74) 69,2076-7; Lydgate, *Troy* I,197,1849. See SIT above.

STAR.

(1) So monye *starris* ar nocht in nichtis sein . . .
As I thocht of dolouris (Maitland Quarto 106,80-3). Whiting, *Ballad* 31. Cf. Chaucer, *HF* 1254; NED Star, sb.^{1}, 1b; Whiting, *ED* 327(308); Wilstach 70. See DROPS above.

(2) Wyth merse of gold, brycht as the *stern* of day (Dunbar 114,52).
Withoutin low, als bricht as ony *sterne* (Stewart II,395,32084). NED Star, sb.^{1}, 1b, quot. c 1450; Whiting, *Ballad* 31.

(3) Whair ilk gilt mailȝe glemit as ane *sterne* (*Clariodus* 79,902).

(4) . . . þe haly man,
þat as a *starne* clerly schane (*Legends* II,309,166-7; Douglas IV,105,2, 210,1-2; *Clariodus* 200,292, 208,542; Stewart I,7,210-1, 304,9634, II,22,20812). Chatterton II,83; NED Star, sb.^{1}, 1b.

(5) The stanneris clere as *stern* in frosty nycht (Dunbar 113,36). Cf. Chatterton II,142; Chaucer, *CT* I(A),267-8.

(6) With basnet brycht quhilk bemit lyke ane *sterne* (Stewart I,309,9776).

STEED.

The *steid* is stollin, steik the dure; lat se
Quhat may avale; God wait! the stall is tume! (Douglas I,107,25-6).
Ouir lait it is the stabill dure to steik,
Quhen sturdie *steid* is stollin and far to seik (*Sat. Poems* 161,27-8).
quhairfoir the proverb auld I put in vre
quhen *stead* is stollin then steik the stable dure (Maitland Quarto 243,5-6).
To lait the stable dur I steik,
quhan as þe *steid* is stowin (Montgomerie S 14,176-7). Apperson 598-9; Bradley 80; Fergusson 106(706); Hardie 465; Henderson 132; Hyamson 326; Kelly 285(7); NED Stable door; Oxford 587; Ramsay 242(37); Taylor 40-1; Tilley S838; Whiting, *ED* 130, 144, 283.

STEEL.

(1) I salbe clengit clene as *steill* (Scott 94,30).

(2) My name is Constance, firmer than the *steill* (J. Stewart 238,154). Robert Smith, *Poems of Controversy* (1714), ed. T. G. Stevenson (Edinburgh, 1869) 74.

(3) Suppois that thi hart wer hard as ony *steill* (Stewart II,433,33296). NED Steel, sb.^{1}, 2a; Tilley S839; Whiting, *ED* 327(309); Wilstach 193.

(4) Of bernis bald that stalwart wer as *steill* (Stewart II,472,34485). Cf. NED Stalwart, 1, 2.

(5) Stiffer than *steill* (Henryson 123,538; Stewart III,201,49068).
And spair hir nocht, thocht scho war stif as *steill* (Rolland, *Seages* 247,8045; Bannatyne III,260,39). Tilley S839; Whiting, *ED* 327(309).

(6) baith styth and stark as *steill* (*Alexander* IV,364,8661; Stewart III,280,51752). Cf. C. Horstmann, *Altenglische Legenden, Neue Folge* (Heilbronn, 1881) 245,159: strong.

(7) als trew as *steill* (Harry 275,1274; *Eger* 243,1003; Dunbar 49,14; Stewart I,59,2004, 593,18419, II,301,29140, 639,39823, III,431,56907; Bannatyne IV,65,17; Montgomerie C 159,43-4). Apperson 647; Hyamson 348; NED Steel, sb.^{1}, 2b; Oxford 672; Tilley S840; Whiting, *Chaucer* 174, 271, *ED* 327(309).

(8) Trest as the *steill* (Dunbar 98,19; Stewart I,451,14085, II,559,37271). Cf.

Chaucer, *Romaunt B* 5146: trust; Tilley S840; Whiting, *ED* 327(309).

STOCK.

(1) and strukken als dum as the *stok* he satt upon (Melvill I,256). Lydgate, *Albon* 150,1380, *Troy* I,301,5475.

(2) *Stok* still as ane stane (*Golagros* 4,108). NED Stock still.

STOMACH.

sic gettis ay, as settis ay
stout *stomakis* to the bray (Montgomerie S 36,484-5). Fergusson 91(1205); Kelly 287(22); Tilley H326.

STONE.

(1) A litill *stane* oft, as men sayis,
May ger weltir ane mekill wane (Barbour I,272,24-5). Aleman IV,5: a little stone in the way, overturnes a great Waine; Apperson 373; Tilley S884. See THING (4) below.

(2) All kynd of thing wes lichtar than the *stone,*
That wald nocht birne, with thame away hes tone (Stewart II,76,22387-8). Cf. Apperson 639: Too heavy or too hot; Chaucer, *CT* III(D),1435-6; Oxford 26: Bear it away; Tilley N322.

(3) So fenȝeit fals and with so littill feir
And quhair thay go thay beir the slaik *stane* (Bannatyne IV,33,30-1). Cf. Apperson 679: Whetstone; John Jamieson, *An Etymological Dictionary of the Scottish Language* Slaik, sb.; Oxford 704; Tilley W298.

(4) left na *stan* onturned (Melvill I,141). Apperson 358; Hyamson 329; NED Stone, 16c; Oxford 359; Tilley S890.

(5) þat wyf has tynt & barnis fre,
as thing wes sprongyn of þe *stan* (*Legends* II,83,473-4). *King Horn* in W.H.French and C.B.Hale, *Middle English Metrical Romances* (New York, 1930) 55,1025-6; *Sir Perceval of Galles* in French and Hale 564,1042-3; NED Stone, 16e; Oxford 616.

(6) That I, within the wallis cald as *stone* (*Kingis Quair* 26,103; *Clariodus* 117,130, 134,668). Apperson 106; Chaucer, *BD* 123; Green 22; Hyamson 92; NED Stone, 3c; Tilley S876; Whiting, *Ballad* 31-2, *ED* 327 (313); Wilstach 61.

(7) I fell down dead as any *stone* (*Eger* 207,429).
That *stane*-ded till the erd he draf (Barbour I,180,471; *Legends* II,404,237, 406,276, 438,214,222; *Alexander* I,37,1164, IV,387,9398, 394,*cont.*,9637). NED Stone, 3c; Whiting, *Ballad* 31, *Chaucer* 174, 271, *ED* 327(313); Wilstach 83.

(8) Voyd of curage, and dolf as ony *stane* (Douglas IV,2,21). Cf. NED Dowf.

(9) ane heirar dull as *stane* (Dunbar 32,9; Stewart II,682,41247). *Pecuniae Obediunt Omnia: Money Does Master All Things* (York, 1696) 37; NED Stone, 3c.

(10) he brak þe hartis hard as *stane* (*Legends* I,403,22; Henryson 50,1393; *Clariodus* 163,1597; *Ballatis* 194). Apperson 284; Chaucer, *LGW* 2554, *CT* IV(E),1990; Hyamson 177; NED Stone, 3c; Oxford 278; Tilley S878; Whiting, *ED* 327(313). See HEART (4) above.

(11) W^t hairt als havy as *stone* (Bannatyne III,286,6). *Le Morte Arthur*, re-ed. J. D. Bruce (EETS ES, 88, 1903) 24, 761; Lydgate, *Siege of Thebes*, ed. A. Erdmann and E. Ekwall (EETS ES, 108,125, 1911-30) I,41,952.

(12) as sad as *stone* (*Roswall* 4,56; Stewart II,682,41247). Cf. NED Sad, 7a, Stone, 3b.

(13) Thairfor be we als sikker all

As *stane* closit in castell wall (*Alexander* I,10,303-4).

(14) still as any *stone* (*Kingis Quair* 19,72; *Golagros* 4,108; *Lancelot* 31,1032; Douglas II,86,12; Stewart II,660,40533; Rolland, *Seages* 132,4122).

stondis *stone* stille (*Awntyrs* 158,580; *Legends* I,21,491, 192,79, II,452,340, 456,481; Wyntoun V,342,2583, VI,328,741; *Troy* 276,1757; Stewart I,315,9967, 385,12045,12061, 493,15350, 586,18195, 637,19709, II,380,31578, 550,36985, 552,37028, 611,38928, III,428,56818). Apperson 602; NED Stone, 3a; Tilley S879; Whiting, *Ballad* 32, *Chaucer* 175, 271, *ED* 328(313).

(15) als stupefact as *stone* (Montgomerie C 111,xlv,7).

(16) als trew as *stane* (Bannatyne II,283,219). Chaucer, *Romaunt B* 5248; NED Stone, 3b; Whiting, *Ballad* 32, *ED* 328(313).

(17) it stode als a *stane* (*Awntyrs* 125,109). R.L[inche], *Love of Dom Diego* (1596) in Arber VII,236. Cf. Whiting, *ED* 328(313).

(18) and thair stak as ane *stane* (Rolland, *Seages* 95,2881).

(19) *stane* blynd (*Legends* I,196,230, 234,420, II,342,1322; Bannatyne III,71,30). Chaucer, *Romaunt B* 3703, *CT* IV(E), 2156; NED Stone, 3c, Stone-blind; Whiting. *ED* 327(313).

STONE WALL.

it is impossibill to break the Scottis in battell as they stand, mor nor to break ane *stane wall* (Pitscottie II,98,8-10). Cf. General Barnard E. Bell's "There is Jackson standing like a stone wall," at the battle of Bull Run, July 21, 1861, and Jackson's subsequent contention that Bell was referring to his brigade (*Dictionary of American Biography* IX,556-7).

STORM.

(1) The *storme* approches quhen ye Poills are fairest.
The langer spairit, the plaigue is ay the sairest (*Sat. Poems* 208,134-5). Cf. Apperson 604: Always a calm before a storm; Oxford 4; Tilley C24.

(2) Bot lyke ane *storme* efter ane plesand morrow,
Sone was our solace changit in to sorrow (Lindsay I,108,90-1).

STOT.

The man may ablens tyne a *stot*
That cannot count his kinsch (Montgomerie C 39,1099-1100). Cheviot 140: He may tine a stot that canna count his kine; Fergusson 102(1387): The devil rignes in his coble horne that cannot count his awin kinch; Henderson 92; NED Stot, sb.[1], 2, quot. 1597. See KINSH above.

STRANGER.

Thai [fools] goif on *strangeris* and thai keik,
Ande al thar faltis one thaim thai seik (*Foly* 63,407-8). Cf. Jente 263; Oxford 624.

STRAW.

(1) Strow nocht thi *stra* in flytaris fyre,
For byrnand wordis bettis Ire (*Consail* 67,39-40).

(2) Sho stottis at *strais*, syn stumbillis not at stanis (Montgomerie C 130,36). NED Stot, v., lb, quot. c 1590. Cf. Apperson 606: To stumble at a straw and leap over a block; Cheviot 143: He starts at straes, and lets windlins gae; Fergusson 52(453): He stumbles at a strea and loupes at a brea; Henderson 120; Kelly 151(192), 288(28): Start at a Straw, and loup o'er a Bink; Oxford 627; Ramsay 186(113); Tilley S922.

(3) Thow wenis to draw the *stra* befoir the cat! (Henryson 70,2010). Apperson 87: Cat(39); Cheviot 162, 373; Fergusson 64(519); Kelly 180(30); Oxford 506; Ramsay 194(45); Tilley P406.

(4) Thairfoir of this mater a *stray* I lay (Henryson 137,241).
Heir will I stand ane quhile and lay ane *stra* (Stewart I,19,652).
Heir mon I la ane *stra* into this steid,
And of Banquho sum mentioun for to mak (Stewart II,678,41106-7). Apperson 354: Lay; NED Straw, sb.^{1}, 9b; Tilley S919; Whiting, *ED* 352(671).

(5) But me all vertews skairs awails ane *stro* (J. Stewart 238,154).

(6) That I count nocht my lyff a *stra* (Barbour I,63,320).
I cowntyt noucht þe toþir twa
[Wicis] þe walew of a *stra* (Wyntoun IV,295,2169-70).
Thy fervent words compt I nocht a *stro* (Douglas IV,162,8). Chaucer, *BD* 718-9, 1237-8; NED Straw, sb.^{1}, 7a; Oxford 78: Care.

(7) As for the king I cure him nocht twa *strais* (Lindsay II,175,1729).
To saif his life I wald not cuir twa *strayis* (Rolland, *Court* 123,391). Kissel 36(167d); NED Straw, sb.^{1}, 7a; Tilley S917; Whiting, *ED* 365(876).

(8) It semis it deiris him nocht ane *stra* (*Alexander* II,143,1652).
sic luif dow nocht a *stra* (Douglas II,169,7). NED Straw, sb.^{1}, 7a; Whiting, *ED* 365(876).

(9) His rycht thairof wes neuir the les ane *stra* (Stewart III,155,47573).

(10) He wald nocht priss his liff a *stra* (Barbour I,155,505).
Now prys I nocht the oist of Ynd
The leist *stra* that men mycht find (*Alexander* III, 321,7359-60). Oxford 78: Care. Cf. NED Straw, sb.^{1}, 7a.

(11) Quhen that wes done he rakit nocht ane *stra* (Stewart I,295,9366). Chaucer, *BD* 887; Roxburghe I,478,92: reckon.

(12) He susseis not thre *strais* (*Sat. Poems* 130,76). NED Sussy, 1a.

(13) *Stra* for this ignorant blabring imperfyte (Douglas II,4,13, III,206,19). NED Straw, sb.^{1}, 7b; Whiting, *Chaucer* 192, *ED* 365(876).

(14) Thy pissant kingdome is nocht worth ane *stro* (Bannatyne II,12,103, 129,95). Apperson 458(33); Berrey 275.2; NED Straw, sb.^{1}, 7a; Oxford 624-5; Partridge 571; Tilley S918; Whiting, *Chaucer* 192, 277, *ED* 365(876).

See DUST above, WINDLESTRAW below.

STREAM.

(1) Agane the *streme* no moir than wald he stryve (Stewart II,434,33337).
thinkand it was follie to stryue against the *stryme* (Pitscottie I,66,24).
Quha stryvis with nature is in þe estait
of him that stryvis againe the *streme* and wind (Maitland Quarto 205,127-8).
for vaine ȝe ar agains the *streame* to strywe (J. Stewart 233,132). Apperson 606; Fergusson 112(894), 117(1655); Jente 662; Kelly 220(346), 267(87); NED Stream, 2f; Oxford 627; Ramsay 216(69); Tilley S927; Whiting, *Ballad* 36, *ED* 366(877).

(2) The mair ye stop the *streame* within,
with gretter force the flud will ryn (Burel 47).
It is as he shold stope the *streame*, or sporne against the sone [?stone] (*Sat. Poems* 5,22).
The more ye stope *streames* the higher they flowe,
the hastie blastes do oft revive flame;
The more ye Lope trees the higher they growe (*Sat. Poems* 19,475-7). *Jacob's Well*, ed. A. Brandeis (EETS, 115, 1900) 5,22-4; Tilley S929. See FLOOD (2) above.

STRIFE.

ffle ay fra *stryfe* a sweit thing is peiss (Bannatyne III,9,40-1; Maitland 160,41: for ane sweit; Fortescue 264, [34]: Flee ay from fedde, for swete thinges are payse).

STRING.

(1) Ane threfald *string* is straitar on ane bow,
Nor singill cord quhilk is of better tow (Stewart I,136,4541-2). *Ecclesiastes* iv,12: a threefold cord is not quickly broken.

(2) all strak on a *string* and soundet a harmonie (Melvill I,78). Thomas Tusser, *Fiue Hundred Pointes of Good Husbandrie* (1580), ed. W. Payne and S. J. Herrtage (London, 1878) 115,31: For carman and collier harps both on a string.

(3) ane mistoneit *string* confoundis all zour harmonie (Winzet I,20). Cf. Tilley S935.

STROKE.

And in old stories he heard say,
That both in earnest and in play,
It were better who might it hint,
Get the first *strake* nor the last dint (*Eger* 277,1545-8).

STURT.

Sturt follows all extreams (Montgomerie C 49,1426). Cheviot 307; Kelly 286(11); Oxford 628.

SUCCESS.

ewerie man iudgit that suddand and prosperous *succes* sould haue ane schort end (Pitscottie I,63,1-3). Cf. Apperson 607: Sudden rising hath a sudden fall.

SUN.

(1) rycht as the *sone* schynis on the sudly schaw
And eik the rane vpoun the ryell ross
Sa aft tymis lufe cheisis ane vnlyk choiss (Bannatyne III,341,5-7). Cf. NED Sun, 1e(h); Oxford 631: Sun is never the worse for shining on a dunghill *and* Sun shines upon all alike; Tilley S982, 985.

(2) And, as leo sais, þane his face
þane þe *sone* fer brichtair wes (*Legends* I,25,637-8). Chaucer, *CT* V(F), 385; NED Sun, 1d, quots. *a* 1225, *a* 1300; Whiting, *Ballad* 32, *ED* 328 (316); Wilstach 35.

(3) In his inarming cleir as ony *sonne* (Clariodus 343,1969). Tilley S969; Whiting, *Ballad* 32, *ED* 328(316).

(4) And als fresch in hir beautes and array
As þe bricht *sonne* at rising of þe day (*Quare* 196,37-8). Cf. Lydgate, *Fall* II,574,3683: Fressh, yong and lusti as any sonne sheene; NED Sun, 1d.

(5) but now it is as patent as the *sone* is at noune day (Bannatyne, *Memoriales* 3).

(6) Hys habyt as the schene *son* lemand lycht (Douglas III,321,21).

(7) Now his estait schynis like the *sone* beme (Douglas I,74,23).
And schynis as the *Sone* (*Ballatis* 53).
And schynis as the *Sone* sa cleir (*Ballatis* 164). Chaucer, *CT* V(F),170, VII,879 (B 2069); NED Sun, 1d; Whiting, *ED* 329(316).

(8) Out throw that wall, without Impediment, pas,
Siclyke as doith the *Sone* baime throw the glas (Lindsay I,381,6172-3).
Schyning as the *sone* in glas (Maitland 198,38). *Guy of Warwick*, ed. J. Zupitza (EETS ES 42, 49, 59, 1883-91) 454,92,5; *Richard Coeur de Lion*, ed. K. Brunner (Vienna,1913) 84,75-6 and p.453. Cf. Love-

lich III,146,431-2; *Rouland and Vernagu,* ed. S. J. H. Herrtage (EETS ES, 39, 1882) 56,683-5.

See APOLLO, PHOEBUS above.

SUPPER.

See NIGHT (5) above.

SWALLOW.

Swift as ane *swalloun* throw Albeoun it flaw (Stewart I,74,2503, II,170,25232, 247,27545, III,57,44346-7; Bannatyne IV,43,33). Laud 157,5303, 202,6830; NED Swallow, sb.^{1}, 1b; Tilley S1023; Whiting, *Ballad* 32.

SWAN.

(1) Richt as þe *Swan* for sorrow singis
Befoir hir deid a litill Space (Maitland 365,21-2).
I feir at last to sing the *suanlyk* song (J. Stewart 214,57).
As sweitlie singing *swan,* when deathe his dayes till end did bring (Melvill II,468).
The Moderatoris *cygnean* songe (Melvill II,720). Apperson 612-3; Chaucer, *PF* 342, *LGW*,1355-6; NED Swan, 2b; Oxford 634; Tilley S1028; Whiting, *Ballad* 36, *ED* 366(880).

(2) The Lady was as white as *Swan* (*Eger* 309,2085; Makculloch 154,1038). Gower, *CA* II,247,797; NED Swan, 2a; Whiting, *Ballad* 32, *ED* 329(319).

SWEAR.

Inne-to proverbe seyde oft I-wyss:
That he þat *swerys* craftely,
Mansweris craftely for-thy (*Troy* 245,590-3).
For leif to *suere* is leif to lee (*Consail* 76,378).
He þat vsis maist to *sweir* Is no^t best trowd (Bannatyne III,8,15-6; Maitland 159,15; Fortescue 263,[11]: is not best traned). Cf. Apperson 613: He that will swear will lie; Oxford 635; Tilley S1030.

SWEET.

(1) Bot leit the *sueit* ay the sour to gud sesone bring (Dunbar 91,289). Cf. Apperson 614: Sweet meat; Oxford 635; Tilley M839; Whiting, *ED* 199, 242.

(2) Quha gustis *sweit,* and feld nevir of the sowre,
Quhat can [he] say? How may he seasoun juge? (Douglas I,109,13-14). Chaucer, *TC* i,638-9.

(3) This drink wes *sweit* ȝe fand in Venus tun!
Sone eftir this it sal be staill and soure (Douglas I,113,9-10). Cf. [R. Johnson], *The Golden Garland of Princely Delight* (13th ed., London, 1690) F7: Love's sweet they find enfold sowre care; Kelly 297(98): Sweet in the on taking, but soure in the off putting; E. Ward, *A Collection of Historical and State Poems* (London, 1717) No. 7, *The Poetical Entertainer,* Numb.1, 39: But as such sweet delights at last, Are always bitter to the tast.

(4) Quhy suld he haf þe *sweit* had nocht þe sowre? (*Thre Prestis* 16,226).
Quho sups the sour, And that vithout desdaine,
Is vordiest to haif the *sueit* at vill (J. Stewart 126,4). Apperson 613-4; Oxford 137: Deserves not; Tilley S1035; Whiting, *ED* 267.
See SOUR (2) above.

SWIKE.

It is oft sene I say the deirly brother
That euerie *swik* oft tymes beswikis vther (Rolland, *Seages* 130,4055-6). Cf. NED Swike, sb.^{1}.

SWINE.

(1) a *swyne* þ^t is ry^t ffatt Causss hir awin deid (Bannatyne III,9,38-9).

Ane *swyne* þat is fat is caus of his awin deid (Maitland 160,39).
A *Swyne* that is over fatte, is cause of his owne dedde (Fortescue 264, [33]). Apperson 615; Oxford 637; Tlliey S1043.

(2) The Scottis all as *swyne* lyis droukyn thar (Harry 130,658; Douglas III,227,24, 233,18; Stewart II,430,33186, 431,33226, 632,39577). Apperson 167: Drunk; NED Swine, 1b; Tilley S1042; Whiting, *Ballad* 32, *ED* 329(320).

(3) als fat as ony *swyne* (*Ballatis* 105). [Sir Benjamin Rudyerd], *Le Prince d'Amour, or The Prince of Love* (London, 1660) 137.

(4) And fand him lyand lyk a *swyne,*
Bayth bak and syde bespewit with wyne (*Sat. Poems* 389,1086-7). NED Swine, 1a(a), quot. 1596.

(5) Slepand as *swyn* (Harry 151,357; Asloan II,133,214; Stewart II,432,33264, 632,39564). Chaucer, *CT* II(B),745; NED Swine, 1b. Cf. Apperson 577: Pig(9).

(6) Into the streit tha la stickit like *swyne* (Stewart II,422,32941). *Otuel,* ed. S. J. Herrtage (EETS ES, 39, 1882) 109,1502. Cf. Chaucer, *CT* VI(C), 556; Whiting, *Ballad* 32, *ED* 329(320).

(7) Had sene ȝow thair ly swetterand lyke twa *swyne* (Lindsay I,104,58). NED Swetter.

(8) Thay tumyll our lyk *swyne* (Scott 87,80).

(9) Through full gluttre in swarff swappyt lik *swyn* (Harry 151,349).

See sow SB. above.

SWORD.

He schew me nocht of Goddis word,
Quhilk scharper is than ony *sword* (Lindsay I,125,45-6).
The wyse man sayis thair [women's] toungis ar schairp
As ony *sword* is wrocht with hand (Rolland, *Seages* 213,6872-3).
Ȝour word, as *suord,* is sair (Montgomerie S 209,29). Cf. Apperson 711: Word (16): Words cut more than swords; NED Sword, 2, quot. 1513; Oxford 729; Roxburghe V,324: words, were sharp as swords; Tilley W839; Wilstach 343. See WORD (7) below.

TAIL.

(1) And his awin *taill* hard on the heillis him hittis (Rolland, *Seages* 232,7550).

(2) hir Uncles war begyning to steir thair *taill,* and to truble the hoill Realme of France (Knox II,330-1). NET Stir, 1b.

(3) and then to quhisper that your *taill* may not hear you (Fergusson, *Tracts* 21).

TAILOR.

(1) For, quhill the greit sie flowis and ebbis,
Telyouris will nevir be trew (Dunbar 123,17-8). Cf. Apperson 317: Hundred tailors, 417: Miller(10); Fergusson 106(719); Kelly 235(43); Oxford 342: Knavery, 375: Little to sew, 525: Put a miller; Tilley K152, M957, T22, 25. See MILLER above.

(2) Betuix a *telyour* and ane sowtar,
A prick lous and ane hobbell clowttar (Dunbar 123,4-5).
gif þair be ony in þis houss
That beiris þe nedill gorrit the lowss (Bannatyne II,283,219-20).
Betuix twa *telȝeoris* / a Lowiss (Bannatyne III,37,8).
Telȝeoris ar tyrranis in kelling of Lyiss (Bannatyne III,37,14). Cheviot 181; *British Apollo* II(1708-10) no. 30, Gg^2; Henderson 124; NED Pricklouse; Roxburghe VI,320,35, 351,33, VII,171,30, 475, 478, 479; *The Ten Pleasures of Marriage* (1682), ed. J. Harvey (London, 1922) 41.

TAKE.

(1) Thairfor, I reid, ye *tak* thame as ye find (Henryson 124,566).

Ffor as I mene,
So *tak* me (Scott 38,3-4).

As ȝe fynd me
So *tak* me (Scott 39,43-4).

For Gentilmen will *tak* it as thay find (Rolland, *Court* 11,281). Cheviot 309; NED Ford, 1, quot. 1575, Take, 42b; Oxford 642; Tilley T29; Whiting, *ED* 90.

(2) For mony ane man hes bene *tane*
And syne delyuerit weill agane (*Alexander* II,152,1949-50).

TALE.

(1) A gud *taill* evill tald Is spilt in the telling (Bannatyne III,10,66-7; Maitland 161,63; Fortescue 265, [59]). Apperson 262-3; Fergusson 17(167); Kelly 244(9); NED Tale, 4, quot. 1546; Oxford 642; Tilley T38.

(2) the *taill* is euill may nocht be hard (Montgomerie S 48,654). Cf. Apperson 505: Poor(5); Oxford 511; Poor man's tale; Tilley M486.

(3) "Schir," said the husband, "remember of this thing:
Ane leill man is not tane at halff ane *taill*" (Henryson 79,2287-8). NED Tale, 3, quot. *c* 1470. Cf. Cheviot 128: Hauf a tale is enough for a wise man; Fergusson 38(316); Ramsay 193(22): I ken by your hauf tale what your hale tale means; Tilley H39; Whiting, *ED* 186.

TALKATIVE.

bewar ȝit, ȝe ar ȝit,
mair *talkattiue* nor trowit (Montgomerie S 46,637-8). Cf. Tilley W828: Where many words are, the truth goes by.

TAR.

(1) Quhose stynkand strandis, blak as *tar* (Lindsay I,303,3482). Berrey 32.7; Hardie 466; N. I. White, *American Negro Folk-songs* (Cambridge, Mass., 1928) 139,454.

(2) To tig with *tar*, Syne get þe war
It is ewill merchandyce (Maitland 357,51-2). NED Tig, 1.

TAR-BARREL.

Scho blinkis als brycht as ane *tar barrell* (Dunbar 66,12).

TEMPEST.

Thar fortone failȝeis as *tempest* (*Foly* 65,472).

TENT.

Tak *tent* in tyme and nocht delay (*Philotus* 112,254). Cf. NED Tent, sb.², 1. See TIME (7), (8) below.

THERE.

Now *thair* now heir, now hie and now deuallis,
Now to, now fra, now law, now magnifyis,
Now hait, now cauld, now lauchis, now beuaillis,
Now seik, now haill, now werie, now not aillis,
Now gude, now euill, now weitis, and now dryis,
Now thow promittis, and rycht now thow denyis,
Now wo, now weill, now firme, now friuolous,
Now gam, now gram, now lowis, now defyis,
Inconstant warld and quheill contrarious (Douglas I,9,6-14).

See FORTUNE (7), MAN (23), NOW above, TODAY (1), WORLD (5) below.

THIEF.

(1) as quiet as a *theif* Bannatyne II,254,2).

(2) the grettest *theives* var convoyit away and war aduerteisit and sum puir theives war tane for it is the fassioun of the countrie that ane

theiff wll aduerteis ane vthir (Pitscottie II,307,6-9). Cf. *The Catechism of Thomas Becon,* ed. J. Ayre (Cambridge, 1844) II,600; [R.C.], *A World of Wonders* (London, 1607) 81; M. Drayton, *Idea,* 14, in S. Lee, *Elizabethan Sonnets* (2 vols., London, 1904) II,188; Jente 274; Oxford 375: Little thieves.

THIG.

he þat is vsd to *thig* Is laith to leif the craft (Bannatyne III,9,45-6; Maitland 160,46; Fortescue 264,[38]: He that vseth moste to figge, is lothe to lose his crafte [Note says that *figge* means "to fidget"]). Cf. NED Thig, 2.

THING.

(1) For fair *thingis* oftymis ar fundin faikin (Henryson 97,2834). Fergusson 96(801); Oxford 187; Tilley T198. See FOWL (7) above.

(2) for temporale *thing* lestis nocht ay (*Legends* I,123,504).
No erdly *thing* bot for a tyme may lest (Makculloch 156,16).
Sen erdlie *thingis* will nocht ay endure (Maitland 24,85).
Tilley T177; Whiting, *ED* 115, 270.

(3) for all *thingis* feidis that we doe think most suir (Maitland Quarto 203,86).

(4) Lo! how litill *thing* may gere
Gret harme fall in mony wyss,
As men has sene, and seis oftsyss (Wyntoun V,398,3108-10). Cf. Whiting, *ED* 9. See STONE (1) above.

(5) Sen schort *thynge* is mare pleyssande,
And to be herde is mare likande (Wyntoun V,149,25-6). See PROLIXITY above.

THINK.

And he did *think* mair then he said (*Roswall* 15,386). Gower, *CA* II,93,2106; Kelly 183(50): I will do as Mackissock's Cow did, I'll think more than I'll say; Oxford 395; Tilley L367. See WORD (11) below.

THISTLE.

thy judgment, scharpe as *thirsall* (Melvill II,431). Whiting *ED* 330(328).

THOLE.

and quhay weill *tholis* al ourcummys (*Consail* 67,41). Cheviot 149: He that tholes overcomes; Henderson 79. See PATIENCE (1) above, THRONESS below.

THORN.

(1) Als so scharpe als any *thorne* (*Awntyrs* 147,389). Apperson 561; Tilley T230; Whiting, *Ballad* 32, *ED* 330(329).

(2) Welth, wardly gloir, and riche array
Ar all bot *thornis* laid in thy way (Dunbar 146,13-4). NED Thorn, 2, quot. 1500-20.

THOUGHT.

(1) Sen word is thrall, and *thocht* is only free ("Good Counsel" in *Kingis Quair* 51,15).
Sen *thocht* is frie (Maitland Quarto 214,1). Apperson 627; Henderson 143; Kelly 336(286); NED Thought[1], 3b; Oxford 652; Ramsay 236(3); Tilley T244; Whiting, *ED* 112.

(2) Quha castis his *thocht* to sindrynes,
In ilk think it is þe les (Wyntoun V,328,2403-4). Cf. Oxford 683; Tilley U11.

(3) Als swift as *thocht* (Douglas I,41,27). W. Tyndale, *Doctrinal Treatises,* ed. H. Walter (Cambridge, 1848), I,450; Chatterton II,234. Cf. Apperson 518: Quick as thought; Green 30; Hyamson 287; NED Thought[1], 3; Tilley T240; Wilstach 309.

(4) Bot waistis away as dois a *thocht* (Bannatyne II,53,4).

THREAD.

All thing bygane scho countis not worth ane *threid* (Rolland, *Seages* 245,8004). Cf. NED Thread, 2, quot. 1470-95; Whiting, *ED* 367(894).

THREESOME.

for it is nocht possibil to gar *thresum* keip consel, and speciale in causis of trason (*Complaynt* 131,34-6). NED Threesome, A, quot. 1549. Cf. Apperson 628: Three may keep counsel if two be away; Fergusson 96(827); Kelly 301(1); Oxford 330; Ramsay 236(5); Tilley T257.

THRICE.

For it is said that all things thryfis bot *thrise* (Rolland, *Seages* 141,4444). Cheviot 33; Fergusson 12(107); Kelly 26(154); Oxford 9; Tilley T175. See TIME (14) below.

THRIFT.

Thou drank thy *thrift* (Dunbar 17,443). Cf. NED Drink, v.[1], 8.

THRILDOM.

And *thryldome* is weill war than deid (Barbour I,269).

THRILLAGE.

And or we suld be in *thrillage*
Ȝit better de for oure heretage (Wyntoun V,338,2551-2). Cf. Whiting, *ED* 39.

THRONESS.

Hereby may men ensampill ta,
How men þare avne fortoune may ma;
For *thranes*, with a steidfast thocht
To thole anoyes, quhasa mocht,
May oftsyss vnlikly thing
Richt weill to þar purpos bring (Wyntoun VI,122,5221-6). See THOLE above.

THUMB.

The Clerk was like to byte his *thowmis* (*Sat. Poems* 304,266). NED Thumb, 5e(a); Oxford 46: Bite; Tilley T273.

THUNDER.

(1) His bost & brag, more aufull than the *thounder* (Lindsay I,17,445).

(2) als fers as ony *thundir* (Douglas II,225,14). Cf. Chatterton II,219: thunderbolt.

(3) Sone doun the bra Sym braid lyk *thunder* (Scott 14,161). *Huon* 538,11.

(4) Ane rak of fartis, lyk ony *thunner* (Dunbar 124,35).
Lyke *thunder* quhisland flew into the air (Stewart II,118,23662). NED Thunder, 1, quot. 1500-20.

(5) The raschis of speiris did as the *thunder* rare,
Lyke as the darding rumbling in the aire (*Clariodus* 24,723-4). Roxburghe VI,322,129, VII,21,9.

THUNDER-CRACK.

That countering wes lyke ane *thunder crak* (Stewart I,249,8012, 434,13561, II,411,32576).

The palice reirdit lyke ane *thunder crake* (*Clariodus* 3,50).

TIDE.

Tyd will not tarie; speid or it be spent (Montgomerie C 178,46). Apperson 633: Tide(3); Fergusson 94(777); NED Tide, 13b; Oxford 658; Tilley T323; Whiting, *ED* 92, 147, 148, 213, 271. See TIME (4) below.

TIGER.

(1) More cruel than any *tygre* (Knox III,298). Cf. Chaucer, *CT* IV(E), 1199: egre.

(2) Thought ye as *tygris* be terne (Dunbar 91,261; Bannatyne IV 36,15). NED Terne, a.[1], 1, Tiger, 2a, quot. 1748.

(3) Quhairfor alse wod as ony *tiger* fell
He set on him (*Clariodus* 353,2306-7). Lydgate, *Troy* III,809,1264.

(4) [An]d birnying as þe *tigir* ay in hete (*Quare* 211,557). Cf. *The Poems and Prophecies of William Blake* (Everyman's Library, London, n.d.) 28: Tyger, Tyger, burning bright In the forests of the night.

(5) So fairis he as ane *tyger* woode (*Clariodus* 148,1116). Lydgate, *Troy* II,465,2468-9).

(6) Lyke as ane rageand wyld *tygyr* onstabill
Amang the febill bestis onfensabill (Douglass III,263,21-2). Cf. Lydgate, *Albon* 141,850: Lyke . . . tygyrs in theyr rage.

(7) For as ane *tyger* that beine fearse and wode,
He on them ruschit(*Clariodus* 318,1174-5).

TIME.

(1) as þe wyse ecclesyastes
sais in his buk . . .
þat *tyme* is to hald men stil,
& tyme als to spek with skyl (*Legends* II,142-3,645-50). Apperson 634: Time(9); *Ecclesiastes* iii,7; Jente 684; Oxford 660; Tilley T316.

(2) and the *tyme* consumis al thing (*Complaynt* 171,20-1).
For I haif hard in adagies of auld,
That *tyme* dois waist and weir all things auay (Montgomerie C 127,9-10). Aleman I,79: The time (wee see) weares away, and we must weare with it, III,150: Time and Absence, weare out all things; *The Works of Francis Beaumont and John Fletcher,* ed. A. H. Bullen (4 vols., London, 1904-12) I,397: Time, that wears all things out; Tilley T326. Cf. Apperson 634: Time(13); Oxford 659; Whiting, *ED* 141, 163.

(3) Tyme quicklie slippis (Montgomerie S 211,25). Cf. Apperson 634: Time(17): Time fleeth away without delay; Jente 208: Time flies; Oxford 659; Tilley T327; Whiting, *ED* 130, 137, 213.

(4) *Tyme* Tareis no man Tyme goith as a gyss (Bannatyne II,209,21). Apperson 634: Time(15); Kelly 301(3); Oxford 658; Ramsay 236(9); Tilley T323, 334; Whiting, *ED* 111, 130, 136, 271. See TIDE above.

(5) *tyme* will try the treuth (Knox II,296).
For, fra þat *tyme* and treuthe þair talis haue tryit (*Sat. Poems* 254,5).
tyme will try all thingis (Bannatyne, *Memoriales* 3).
tyme will try and declair the treuth (Bannatyne, *Memoriales* 4).
What will succeid *tyme* will try (Bannatyne, *Memoriales* 32).
Tyme will try (Bannatyne, *Memoriales* 37, 41, 247).
Ʒit trying *tyme,* the touchstone of my treuth (Montgomerie C 111,xlv,13). Apperson 635: Time(26); Fergusson 94(793); Kelly 306(35); Oxford 660; Ramsay 236(10); Tilley T336, 338; Whiting, *ED* 113, 136, 237, 273, 295.

(6) till *Tyme,* the parent of treuth, try the same (Colville 110). Apperson 634: Time(20): Time is the father of truth; Oxford 659; Tilley T329a; Whiting, *ED* 285.

(7) As it is said rycht oft, in mony ryme,
All things gois weill quhen it is tane in *tyme* (Stewart I,136,4533-4).

(8) Till Tak our *tyme,* quhill wee may get it,
For now thair is na man to let it (Lindsay II,87,711-2).
Tak *tyme* quhill tyme is for tyme will away (Bannatyne II,208-11,16,24, etc.).
Tak *tyme* in tyme and no^{t} diffar
quhen tyme is past ȝe ma do war (Bannatyne III,44,16-7, cf. II,324,4; Maitland 344,1-2).
Tint *tyme* we may not get again (Montgomerie C 30,816).

Tak *tyme* in tym, or tyme will not be tane (Montgomerie C 127,1, etc.).
Tak *tyme* in tyme (Montgomerie C 131,64).
Tak *tym* in tyme, vhill tyme is to be tane,
Or ȝe may wish, and want it vhen ȝe wald (Montgomerie C 178,41-2).
Tak *tym* in tym, for tym will not remane,
Nor come agane, if that it once be lost (Montgomerie C 187,8-9).
Tak *tym* in tyme, or tym be tint (Montgomerie C 228,17).
in tyme for to take tent,
and nocht quhan *tyme* is past, repent,
ay by repentance deir (Montgomerie S 30,405-7).
tak *tyme* in tyme, or tyme be tynt,
for tyme will nocht remane (Montgomerie S 36,478-9). Apperson 634: Time(7); Chaucer, *CT* II(B),19-32; Fergusson 94(795), 103(1401); Kelly 301(2); Oxford 660; Ramsay 225(7); Tilley T312-3; Whiting, *ED* 130, 139, 147, 290. See TENT above.

(9) all thing had *tyme* (Bannatyne II,209,45). Apperson 192: Everything hath its time; Cheviot 99; Jente 63; Oxford 180,659: Time for all things; Taylor 64; Tilley T314; Whiting, *ED* 75, 245.

(10) wo is him can not bewar in *tyme* (Henryson 63,1789). Cf. Apperson 697(25); Oxford 718: Wise that is ware; Tilley T291.

(11) To try in *tyme* take tent (Scott 20,23). Cf. Oxford 205: First try, 675: Try before; Tilley T595.

(12) A toppe befor, bot beld behind hir [*Time's*] bak (Montgomerie C 127,4). Apperson 635: Time(29); NED Time, 25; Oxford 658; Tilley T311. See OCCASION above.

(13) Remeid in *tyme* and rew nocht all to lait (Dunbar 150,5). NED Remede, quot. 1500-20. Cf. Whiting, *ED* 136: Take hede in tyme, 150, 197, 282.

(14) anis ȝet we wil assay,
and þe thred *tyme* al-þire-beste (*Legends* I,94,1072-3). *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight*, ed. J. R. R. Tolkien and E. V. Gordon (Oxford, 1925) 52,1680: þrid tyme þrowe best, and p. 109. Cf. Apperson 626; Cheviot 347; Kelly 331(235); Oxford 651; Tilley T319. See THRICE above.

(15) Waistis all welth and tinis the precious *time* (Rolland, *Court* 25,325).
persauis thow nocht quhat pretious *tyme*
thy slowthing dois ourfleit? (Montgomerie S 40,536-7). Cheviot 360: There's naething mair precious than time; Fergusson 98(836); Tilley N302.

(16) Be wyiss in *tyme* and traist that this is trew,
Or dreid efter it mak ȝow all to rew (Stewart I,539,16774-5).

TINDER.

Hait *Torrida Zona*, as dry as ony *tundyr* (Douglas III,96,12; Lindsay I,17,442). NED Tinder, 1β; Tilley T344.

TOAD.

(1) als blak as ruch as ony *taid* (Bannatyne II,281,152). Nashe II,326, 23-4 and IV,294.

(2) Bursin and boldin ilkane lyke ane *taid* (Stewart II,434,33329). Cf. Apperson 614: Swell like a toad; Oxford 636; Tilley T362.

TOD.

(1) be scho wylie as ane *tod* (Bannatyne IV,17,29). Apperson 688: Wily as a fox; NED Tod, sb.¹, 1b; Tilley F629; Whiting, *ED* 313(129): fox.

(2) That man be vyse and subtile lyk a *tod* (*Sat. Poems* 341,226). [Sir Benjamin Rudyerd], *Le Prince d'Amour, or The Prince of Love* (London, 1660) 114: O thou death, more subtile then a Fox.

(3) Nocht bot ane *Tod* in ane Lambskin to creip (*Thre Prestis* 26,414).

Sum in ane lambskin is ane *tod* (Dunbar 80,37, cf. 53,59-60).

As foxe in a lambis fleise fenye I my cheir (Dunbar 95,423). NED Tod, sb.^{1}, 2. Cf. Whiting, *ED* 102. See WOLF (3) below.

(4) Bischope Adamsone keipit his castle, lyk a *tod* in his holl, seik of a disease of grait fetiditie (Melvill I,137).

The Bischope haid lurked a yeir or twa lyk a *tod* in his holl (Melvill I,272). Cf. T. Cranmer, *Writings and Disputations,* ed. J. E. Cox (Cambridge, 1844) I,14: The fox is sore hunted that is fain to take his burrow; NED Tod, sb.^{1}, 1b.

(5) Out of his hoill weill houndit lyke ane *tod* (*Sat. Poems* 172,78).

See FOX above.

TO-DAY.

(1) *This day,* ful prude; the morne, no thyng to spend (Lindsay I,62,216).

To day ane man, is fresche and fair,
To morne he lyis seik and sair,
Syne dulfullie is domeit to dede:
Euin lyke as in the feild ane flour,
The day is sweit, the morne is sour,
Sa all this wratcheit warld sall feade (*Ballatis* 30).

This day ane lorde The morne ane pure begeir (Bannatyne II,192,31).

Behauld the Instabilitie
of þis fals warld and how it gais
This day ane man set vp on hie
To morne set doun amang his fais (Maitland Quarto 47,9-12). Kissel 3(8); NED To-day, 1b, quot, 1567. Cf. Apperson 636; Burton I,319(i,ii,iii,10); Oxford 662; Pepys II,236,4; Tilley TM404; Whiting, *ED* 196, 287. See MAN (23), NOW, THERE above, WORLD (3) below.

(2) Also for me I hald it but ane scorne
To sueir *to da* the thing we brek the morne (Stewart I,44,1487-8). Cf. Chaucer, *CT* I(A),830-1.

TO-MORN.

For wnfayr thingis may fall, perfay,
Alss weill *to-morn* as ȝhisterday (Barbour I,6,123-4).

TONGUE.

(1) quha rewlis weill his *toung* he may be comptit wyiss (Bannatyne III,8,17-8; Maitland 160,7; Fortescue 263,[13]: is holden for). [Sir John Mennes], *Wit and Drollery* (London, 1661) 51: he's wise that holds his tongue. Cf. Apperson 696(8): A wise head makes a still tongue; Oxford 621.

(2) And said wicked *toung* was euill to steir (*Alexander* II,211,3818). Cf. Breton I, a, 20: A wicked tongue doth say amisse.

(3) Ane silkin *toung,* ane hart of crueltie,
Smytis more sore than ony schot of arrow (Henryson 100,2922-3). Cf. H. E. Rollins, *An Analytical Index* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1924) 2466: A smooth toung and a falce heart; Tilley T391.

(4) And let ilk man keip weill ane *toung* (Lindsay I,45,200).

Let euerie man keip weill ane *toung*
And euerie woman tway (Lindsay II,39,76-7, 188,2241-2).

See FACE (1) above.

TO-NIGHT.

His chance *to nycht* it may be thyne to morrow (Dunbar 148,5). Apperson 637: To-day me, to-morrow thee; Cheviot 391; NED To-night, 1b, quot. 1500-20; Oxford 312: I to-day; Tilley T371.

TOOTH.

(1) thou labourest nowe, with *tothe* and nayle (Knox III,298).

Contending with *tuith* and naill (as is the prouerb) (Winzet I,16,11-2). Apperson 641; Kelly 327(199); Oxford 200: Fight; Tilley T422.

(2) Magre his *teith* (*Alexander* IV,371,8900).

spyte of thair *teith* (*Sat. Poems* 260,84). Apperson 597: Spite; NED Tooth, 5; Tilley S764; Whiting, *Ballad* 36, *ED* 367(904).

TOPAZ.

Crysp haris, brycht as . . . *topace* (Douglas IV,81,13).

Hir hair as . . . *topasis* was hewit (Douglas I,19,12).

TOUCHSTONE.

a *toche stone* is eche vse that mai thie care recure (*Sat. Poems* 6,41, 26,687, 29,810). NED Touchstone, 1b. See TIME (5) above.

TOUGH.

It may nocht mend the ane myte to mak it so *teugh* (*Golagros* 36,1069).

Howbeid I maid it sumthing *tewch* (Lindsay II,98,1910, 114,2047; Bannatyne II,205,37, III,17,42). Chaucer, *CT* VII,379 (B,1569); NED Tough, 8.

TOW.

And sa this *tow* hes put upon our rok,
And brought our fredom under boundage yok (Melvill II,426). Apperson 642; Chaucer, *CT* I(A),3774-5; Cheviot 136; Henderson 124; Kelly 182(44); NED Tow, sb.^{1}, 2b; Oxford 667; Ramsay 193(10); Tilley T450-1; Whiting, *ED* 367(907).

TOWER.

Strong as ane *toure* againis the speiris poynt (*Clariodus* 148,1121).

TRAITOR.

Sen amang Christis awin twelf we se
Ane *tratour* was in Companie (*Sat. Poems* 304,289-90).

TRAJAN.

See OCTAVIAN above.

TREASON.

(1) i loue bot the *trason* that cumis to my effect, and louis nocht the tratours that committis the trason (*Complaynt* 105,11-3, 19-22).

Lyking þe *treasoun*, not þe trato^{rls} (*Sat. Poems* 247,88). Apperson 644; Oxford 669; Tilley K64.

(2) *treason* under tryst (Melvill I,294). Apperson 648; Oxford 673: Trust; Tilley T594; Whiting, *ED* 28,73. See TRIAL below.

(3) And nane may *treson* do titar than he
That man in trowis l[e]awte (Barbour I,131,529-30). Cf. Apperson 649: Trust(7); Chaucer, *CT* IV(E),1785; Oxford 673. See FOE (1) above, TRUST (2) below.

TREE.

(1) a *tre* is best bowd quhen þat it is ȝoung (Bannatyne III,8,16-17; Maitland 159,16: eith bowit; Fortescue 263,[12]: A bowe is best bowyd). Cf. Tilley T632; Whiting, *ED* 120, 229. See WAND (1) below.

(2) Sik *trie*, sik fructe, all tyme ve se (*Sat. Poems* 335,34). Hazlitt III,240,205; Oxford 670: Tree, Like; Skelton I,239,156-7; Tilley T494. See FRUIT (1), GENTLENESS above.

(3) A wickit *tre* gude fruct may none fur^{t} bring (Bannatyne IV,55,176). *The Whole Workes of W. Tyndall, Iohn Frith, and Doct. Barnes* (London, 1573) [II], Hhh.ii.v (p. 268), col. 1; *The English Works of John Fisher*, ed. J. E. B. Mayor (EETS ES, 27, 1876) 185,12-3; Nashe II,309,27-8); Tilley T486.

(4) for the gritest green *tre* that standis hiest on the montane, is haistyar

blauen doune vitht the vynd, nor is the smallest treis that grouis in the valeyse (*Complaynt* 170,31-4). Cf. Kelly 24(140); Oxford 295; Ramsay 163(51): A short tree stands lang; *Twelfth-Century Homilies,* ed. A. O. Belfour (EETS, 137, 1909) I,130; Tilley C208, T509.

(5) And lyk the fructles *tre* Is wit but gud doing (Bannatyne II,108,7). Cf. Palsgrave 449: Wherto shulde a man norisshe trees that wyll beare no frute?

(6) Tha hurt the *tre* that wald offend the fruit (Stewart I,37,1245).

(7) Quhen that ane *tre* is hewin fra the rute,
On it no moir thair will grow leif or frutt (Stewart I,538,16754-5). Cf. Chaucer, *TC* iv,770: rooteles moot grene soone deye.

(8) for blood as drye as any *tree* (*Eger* 192,180, 201,316; Asloan II,47,1482). Thomas Cranley, *Amanda,* ed. Frederic Ouvry (London, 1869) 66: wither'd tree.

(9) Thy laithly lymis are lene as ony *treis* (Dunbar 10,182; Stewart II,193,25912). *Emaré* in W. H. French and C. B. Hale, *Middle English Metrical Romances* (New York, 1930) 434,365; NED Tree, 3b.

(10) as þat I vmquhyle wald be
hard frosyne as ony *tre* (*Legends* I,325,1005-6).

(11) [That a]s þe *tree* is by the wormis frete (*Quare* 211,555).

See FRUIT, GOD (8), HILL (3), STREAM (2) above.

TRIAL.

for *tryall* oft in trust dois tresone schawe (Montgomerie S 210,12). See TREASON (2) above, TRY below.

TRITTLE.

Now *trittyll,* trattyll, trolylow,
Quod the thrid man (Lindsay I,46,245-6).

Trittill Trattill, scho ma not steir (Lindsay II,384,1488).

be euery wane manis *trittil* trattilis (Winzet II,82). Fergusson 103(1411); NED Trittle-trattle.

TROILUS.

Trew *Troilus,* vnfaithfull Cressida (Douglas I,22,28).

Trustie *Troyalus* (J. Stewart 72,70). Sir W. Scott, *Kenilworth* (Historical Romances of the Author of Waverley [Edinburgh, 1822], VI,57).

See SAMSON above.

TROW.

Thow mon *trow* in sum man or thow hes ill lyfe (Bannatyne III,9,47-8).

He man *trow* in sum man or leif an ewill lyf (Maitland 160,48).

Thow mon *trow* som man, or have an yll lyfe (Fortescue 264,[40]). *Works of John Taylor the Water Poet, Not Included in the Folio Volume of* 1630 (Spenser Society, 1873) II,9,19: *He is ill to trust who will trust no body,* the Proverbe tells us. Cf. Chaucer, *TC* i,687-93.

TRUE.

. . . ȝe know ȝour sell,
All is not *trew* that everie man dois tell (*Clariodus* 71,627-8). Cf. Apperson 647(15): It must be true; Fergusson 62(508): It is true; Kelly 5(26): All Cracks may not be trow'd; Oxford 672: True that all men say; Tilley M204, 503.

See FASHION, LIE (2) above.

TRUST.

(1) no man *trustis* moir nor he seis (Colville 122). Cf. Apperson 649: Trust(6); Tilley T557.

(2) Is nayne in warld, at scaithis ma do mar
Than weile *trastyt* in borne familiar (Harry 5,111-2).

Me to begyle quha hes mair craft and gin
Than thay in quhome my *traist* ay maist is in? (*Thre Prestis* 49,1143-4). See FOE (1), TREASON (3) above.

TRY.
And *try* before you trust, I warn (*Sat. Poems* 81,347).
First *try* the treuth, then may ȝe trow (*Philotus* 103,19). Apperson 651: Try(2); Fergusson 69(907), 102(1381); Oxford 675; Ramsay 237(23); Tilley T595; Whiting, *ED* 221, 273. See TRIAL above.

TUN.
(1) Of ane twme *Twn,* nane can draw out licour,
Nor of ane fule to make a wise *Doctour* (Rolland, *Seages* 7,168-9).
(2) And all his bodie swellit lyke ane *tun* (Stewart II,558,37224). Cf. NED Tun la(β).

TUNE.
Preistis, change zour *tone,*
And sing in to zour mother tung (*Ballatis* 197). NED Tune, 4b; Taylor 65; Whiting, *ED* 337(446). See NOTE above.

TURN.
(1) Then trou the taill that treu men oft hes tauld—
A *turne* in tyme is ay worth other tuay (Montgomerie C 127,11-2, 177,40). Cheviot 28: A turn well done is twice done; Kelly 44(278); Ramsay 164(13). Cf. Henderson 28: He doubles.
(2) Cum help to quyte ane gude *turne* for ane uther (Henryson 55,1557). Apperson 470-1; Bradley 96; Cheviot 34; Hardie 464; Kelly 269(12); NED Turn, 23; Oxford 257; Ramsay 154(30); Tilley T616.

TURTLE.
That was the *Turtour* trewest,
Ferme, faithfull and fast (*Howlat* 51,127-8).
The trewe *Turtour* and traist (*Howlat* 57,287; Lindsay I,77,725; Rolland, *Seages* 234,7622; *Sat. Poems* 96,14; Bannatyne III,339,25-7; Maitland Quarto 89,42, 91,91, 103,18; Montgomerie C 137,44, 190,46-8, 193,13).
Als trew as *turtill* on [?or] stone (Bannatyne III,291,23).
Thay [women] shaw thame lyke ane *turtill dow,* and bytis as ane hound (Rolland, *Seages* 31,757).
The *turtill* for the loss of maik thay say
doeth neuer rest bot workis hir awin decay (Maitland Quarto 249,3-4, 13-4). Apperson 646; Chaucer, *PF* 355, 582-8; NED Turtle, sb.^{1}, 1; Oxford 671; Tilley T624; Whiting, *Ballad* 37, *ED* 331(345).

TWINKLING.
& þis merwale alson cane be
as man mycht *twinkil* with his e (*Legends* II,64,594-5).
Were ouerthrawe In *twinklyng* of an eye (*Kingis Quair* 40,163; Irlande 140,16; Dunbar 110,85, 118,235, 144,29; Douglas I,42,6; Asloan II,139,403; Stewart I,415,12955; Lindsay I,9,161, 365,5616, 374,5930, 380,6164; Knox III,356; Rolland, *Seages* 22,450; *Sat. Poems* 82,5, 235,286; *Ballatis* 27; Bannatyne II,257,43; J. Stewart 241,167; Hume 38,145). Apperson 653; Chaucer, *Mars* 222, *CT* IV(E),37; Gower, *CA,* III, 108, v.5935; Kissel 35(157); NED Twinkling, vbl. sb.^{1}, 3b; Oxford 678; Tilley T635; Whiting, *Ballad* 36, *ED* 368(919).

TWO.
(1) Quhen *twa* arguis, in ane or thay conclude
Of force thair talk mon be contrarious (Rolland, *Seages* 4,98-9). *Modern Language Notes* LXIII(1948) 535(171).

(2) So wight in world was never none,
But where *two* meets them alone,
And departs without company,
But one must win the victorie (*Eger* 283,1607-10).
(3) Ȝe ar bot ane estait and we ar *twa,*
Et vbi maior pars ibi tota (Lindsay II,269,2835-6). Fergusson 100(1326): Tuo wil bring in the thrid; Kissel 35(155). Cf. Chaucer, *CT* VI(C), 824-5; Tilley T642.

TYKE.
(1) Bot ony feith as fals as ony *tyke* (Stewart I,215,6966).
(2) He stinckett lyk a *tyk* (Dunbar 61,48). *Guy and Colebrande* in *Bishop Percy's Folio Manuscript,* ed. J. W. Hales and F. J. Furnivall (3 vols., London, 1867-8) II,541,407. Cf. Whiting, *ED* 310(95).
(3) wald ly down lyk tyred *tyks* (Melvill I,41). Cf. Tilley D441; Whiting, *ED* 310(95).
(4) The thrid, "be thrawing of þe throt,
Lyk a *tyk* on a trie" (Montgomerie S 158,396-7).
See DOG above.

UNCALLED.
Ȝea, I half hard anither ȝit,
"Quha cum *uncallt,* unservd suld sit" (Montgomerie C 38,1082-3). Cheviot 78; Fergusson 42(346); Kelly 77(6); Oxford 104; Ramsay 170(17), 187(14); Tilley C537. Cf. Apperson 658: Unbidden; Jente 268.

UNJUST.
Bot I persaue this Prouerb is richt trew,
The *Iniust* oft the Innocent dois persew (Rolland, *Seages* 84,2487-8).

UNKINDNESS.
Auld *kyndnes* past / Suld no^{t} be forȝett (Bannatyne III,9,52-3).
vnkyndnes by past may nocht be forȝet (Maitland 161,53).
Onkindeness bye past, wolld be forgete (Fortescue 264,[45]). Cf. Oxford 471: Old love will not be forgotten.

UNSET STEVEN.
See MAN (18) above.

URCHEN.
That, as ane *hyrcheoune,* all his rout
Gert set out speris all about (Barbour I,312,353-4). Cf. NED Hurcheon, Urchin, 1.

URE.
See FORTUNE (1) above.

USE.
(1) As *vse* is haldin ane vþir nateur (Bannatyne II,177,48). Nashe II,302,26-7; Tilley C932. Cf. Henderson 31; Kelly 272(36); Oxford 474: Once a use. See CUSTOM, MANNER (1) above.
(2) Fore nan may cum to his office
but *oyss* that makis thir masteris wys (*Ratis* 7,221-2).
Vse wald perfytnes mak but moir (*Sat. Poems* 303,260). Apperson 509: Practice; Fergusson 108(890); Oxford 684; Ramsay 238(6); Tilley U424. Cf. Whiting, *ED* 53.

VAIL.
Thai wald defend, avalȝe que *valȝe* (Barbour I,213,147).
Help me, Mary! for certis, *vailȝe* que vailȝe (Douglas III,7,9, 207,32, 342,31; Lindsay I,61,161: quod, 171,951). NED Vail, v.^{1}, 2d. See AVAIL above.

VANE.
Of this fals failyeand warld I tyre,
That evermore flytis lyk ane *phane* (Dunbar 31,94-5).

Lyke wauering thane [*vane*], thy proces vane
Will brew the bitter gall (*Sat. Poems* 163,84-5). NED Phane, Thane (Fane[1], quots. 1500-20, 1570); Rxoburghe I,146,77-9; Tilley V16).

VANQUISHED.
he þat is *vincuste,* ma nocht do (*Legends* I,165,536).

VEINS.
For quhen the *vanys* fillit ar,
The body vorthis hevy euirmar (Barbour I,168,173-4). Cf. Apperson 38: Belly(13); Cheviot 396; Oxford 33; Tilley B303; Whiting, *ED* 73, 80, 111.

VICE.
Vicis oft syis thai ar sib togidder,
That on ane vice followis ay ane uther (Stewart I,166,5461-2). Cf. Apperson 460: No vice goes alone; Fergusson 84(679): Of ane ill, comes many. See CUMBER, MISCHIEF (1) above.

VICTUALS.
Thay cary *victualles* to þe toun
That werst dois dyne (Scott 48,56-6). Cf. Apperson 566: Who is worse shod than the shoemaker's wife? Oxford 432: More bare; Tilley S387.

VIRE.
Goith to o knycht, als swift as ony *vyre* (*Lancelot* 32,1091, 97,3288).
This virgine sprent on swiftlie as a *vyre* (Douglas II,260,12). NED Vire, sb.[1].

VIRTUE.
(1) I counsail the mak *vertew* of ane neid (Henryson 121,478).
I haif hard sa that greit terrour and dreid
Causis ane man [to] mak *vertu* of neid (Stewart II,652,40245-6).
make *Vertew* of neid (Maitland Quarto 214,4-5).
How to make *vertew* of thy neid
Sen that necessitie hes no law (Maitland Quarto 124,15-6). Apperson 663; Chaucer, *TC* iv,1586, *CT* I(A),3042, V(F),593; Fergusson 84(677); Hyamson 354; NED Virtue, 4; Oxford 688; Taylor 66; Tilley V73; Whiting, *ED* 37, 40, 159, 232, 259, 266. See NEED (3) above.
(2) Be þis ensample ȝe may ken
That oftsyss *vertu* drawis men
Till honoure and to digniteis,
And þe contrare, as men seis,
That dignyte without vertew
In litill reput is of valew,
As sayis þe wyss clerk Bowes (Wyntoun IV,158,375-81). Chaucer, *Boece* ii,pr.6,1-20; Whiting, *ED* 44. Cf. Tilley V82.
(3) Remember than that *vertew* hes na peir (Douglas I,75,6). Cf. Oxford 687: Virtue has all things in itself *and* Virtue is the only true nobility; Tilley V78, 85.

VOYAGE.
thay say þat *wayage* neuir luckis
quhair ilk ane hes ane woit (Montgomerie S 50,682-3). NED Vote, 7a, quot. *a* 1585; Oxford 688; Tilley V99.

WAG.
Thay cure not the *wag* of ane wand (Rolland, *Seages* 213,6878). Cf. Oxford 689: Wags a wand in the water; Tilley W25.

WAIN.
And to ask mercy is to lait
Quhen þe *wayne* is at þe ȝet (Wyntoun II,58,633-4). C. Brown, *English Lyrics of the XIIIth Century* (Oxford, 1932) 130,13-4: Al to late, al to late, Wanne þe bere ys ate gate.

WALE.

Thocht I be quhylum bowsum as ane *waile* (Douglas I,112,7). Cf. NED Wale, sb.[1], 4.

WALL.

(1) constant as ane *wall* (Bannatyne II,226,61, 227,5). Chaucer, *CT* IV(E), 1047.

(2) the Erle of Anguss host stood evin as a *wall* (Knox I,212). Cf. NED Even, 2; Whiting, *ED* 331(350). See STONEWALL above.

(3) Hir visage wox als paill as ony *wall* (Douglas II,206,30; *Clariodus* 4,92).

(4) stiff as ony *wall* (Stewart III,190,48703). Lydgate, *Troy* II,441,1634.

(5) And trewth sall mak the strang as ony *wall* (Dunbar 149,39, 165,73; *Clariodus* 79,890; Stewart I,648,19994; Bannatyne II,15,188). Lydgate, *Troy* II,434,1389).

(6) Suppose thay be als wicht as ony *wall* (*Thre Prestis* 52,1249).

(7) The buschment brak about hir like ane *wall* (Stewart I,333,10522).

(8) And he in sadell sat as ony *wall* (*Clariodus* 224,1060).

(9) And stude on ilk syde as ane *wall* (*Alexander* IV,404,9951). Whiting, *ED* 331(350).

(10) And said: "quhy spurnis thow aganis the *Wall*,
To sla thy self, and mend nathing at all"? (Henryson 121,475-6).
Spurn nocht thy fute aganis the *wall* (Henryson 195,30). NED Spurn, v.[1], 2b. Cf. Oxford 552: Run one's head; Tilley H273. See STREAM (2) above.

WAND.

(1) Then thrau the *wand* in tyme vhill it is grene (Montgomerie C 233,21). Fergusson 94(789); NED Wand, 2, quots. 1457, 1592; Oxford 653. Cf. Henderson 2: Between three and thirteen, thraw the woodie when it's green; Kelly 63(54); Ramsay 169(93); Tilley W27. See TREE (1) above.

(2) I gadder the *wande* quhairof I fale (*Alexander* III,294,6487, French original: Or ai cuelli la verge dont je serai batus).
Quhill now I am dung with my awin *wand* (Stewart I,213,6908).
Sen thair awin *wand* hes dung thame than so soir (Stewart II,16,20622, 33,21131). Cheviot 132, 162, 233; Fergusson 44(388), 52(456); Kelly 150(180), 233(29); Oxford 690; Ramsay 185(89), 206(39); Tilley W24, 26; Whiting, *Ballad* 36. See STAFF above.

(3) To man obedient
evin lyik ane willie *wand* (Maitland Quarto 88,33-4).

(4) and mydlis small as *wandis* (Dunbar 114,63; Montgomerie C 143,48). NED Wand, 1b; Palsgrave 469; Tilley W23; Whiting, *ED* 331(351).

(5) Ȝour pistolis twmit and baksprent lyk a *wand* (Bannatyne II,331,52).

(6) Leicht as ane leif, and waldin as ane *wand* (Stewart I,381,11939, III,163,47823). NED Wand, 2b, quot. 1535. Cf. Lydgate, *Troy* I,215,2472.

(7) and waik as ony *wand* (Henryson 179,13; Stewart I,20,671).
Ar nou maid waek lyk willing *wandis* (Dunbar 60,22). NED Wand, 2b, Weak, 1; Whiting, *ED* 331(351).

WAR.

(1) . . . Thus wysmen has ws kend,
Ay efftir *wer* pees is the finall end (Harry 222,1315-6).
Ȝit of all *weir* peace is þe fynale end (Maitland 328,36). Fergusson 84(675); Kelly 275(60); Oxford 692; Tilley W55. See PEACE (2) above.

(2) And quhilis tuke, and quhilis wer tane;
For vre of *weire* is nocht ay ane (Wyntoun VI,116,5129-30).

It fallis in *weir* quhilis to tyne,
And for to wyn ane vthir syne (*Alexander* II,244,4877-8).
bot the ende of the *veyris* consistis in the chance of fortune (*Complaynt* 15,27-8).
all was bot chance in *weirfair,* the nycht in prosperatie, the morne in thraill (Pitscottie II,44,10-1). Whiting, *ED* 39, 271. See BATTLE, CHASE, TO-DAY (1) above.

(3) A man in *wer* may nocht all plesance haiff (Harry 96,710). Cf. Apperson 666: War(4); Tilley N46.

(4) *Warre* is a welfayre to th'inexperte (*Sat. Poems* 21,531). Apperson 667: Wars are sweet to those that know them not; Burton III,251 (iii,ii,v,3); Nashe I,171,25 and IV,101; Oxford 692; Tilley W58; Whiting, *ED* 299.

(5) Thingis in *weir* with wisdome suld be wrocht,
Thairfoir but counsall he wald do rycht nocht (Stewart I,187,6069-70). See COUNSEL (1) above.

(6) Ther is diuerse men that can blason the *veyris* in the tauerne, or at the fyir syde, amang the vulgar ignorant pepel; but i fynd nocht mony that dar haszarde ther lyue contrar ther enemeis (*Complaynt* 14,25-8). Cf. "The Vows of the Heron," in Thomas Wright, *Political Poems and Songs* (Rolls Series, London, 1859) I,21, [3-18], *Speculum* XX(1945) 263-4; *Proverbs of Alfred* 36,312-6: So is mony gedelyng, Godlyche on horse, And is þeyh lutel worþ, Wlonk bi þe glede, And vuel at þare neode; Tilley W56-7.

(7) The hetter *weir,* oft syis the sonner peis (Stewart I,15,529).

WARE, ADJ.

(1) Culd nocht be *war* in tyme quhen he wes weill (Stewart I,443,13840). Cf. Fergusson 40(324): He is wise that is ware in time; Kelly 156(223); Oxford 718; Ramsay 185(84); Tilley T291. See WELL (2) below.

(2) Wit said, Schir King be *war,* or ȝe be wa (Douglas I,110,1). J. Audelay, *Poems,* ed. E. K. Whiting (EETS, 184, 1931) 11,43, 182,1, and p.226; J. Stanbridge, *Vulgaria,* ed. Beatrice White (EETS, 187, 1932) 26,11, and p.132.

WARE, SB.

Bot say to hir, Sik *wairis* will nocht sell till a new marcatt (Knox II,70). Cf. NED Market, 1b.

WASP.

(1) as werrie *waspis* / aganis goddis word makis weir (Bannatyne II,239,126).

(2) Fra he herde his men slayne swa,
Was neuir in warlde a *waspe* sa wa (Wyntoun V,345,2659-60). Cf. Whiting, *ED* 331(352).

WAT'S PACK.

Bot *wattis pak* we bur all by and by (Bannatyne IV,26,67). Whiting, *ED* 369(932).

WATER.

(1) I seik the *watter* hett
In vndir the cauld yce (Scott 60,21-2).
Quhy soght I aye warme *water* vnder yce? (Montgomerie C 133,45).
Greit fuills, for me, I think they ar,
That seeks warme *water* vnder yce (Montgomerie C 141,11-2). Fergusson 112(896); Kelly 364(32); NED Ice, 3; Oxford 571; Ramsay 198(7); Tilley W128; Whiting, *Ballad* 24.

(2) Foull *water* quenches fyre (Montgomerie C 18,448). Apperson 232: Foul; Fergusson 32(271); Henderson 112; Kelly 104(19); NED Water, 1c; Oxford 222; Ramsay 177(52); Tilley W92.

(3) For as thow seis *watter* dois slokkin fyre (*Thre Prestis* 54,1319).

(4) Nor [is] *water* all that weitis (Montgomerie C 134,44). See GOLD (1) above.

(5) And as the drope of *water* weris the stone (Maitland Quarto 202,43).
As raynie dropis do peirce the flint
Throu falling oft, and not throu dint (Montgomerie C 228,21-2). Apperson 112: Constant; Oxford 107-8; Tilley D618; Whiting, *ED* 249.

(6) And having anys gustit how gude fischeing it is in drumly *Watter* thay can on na maner laif ye craft (Buchanan 24).
that he fissching in dromely *watters,* mycht with tim mak him self maister of the haill (Melville 43).
to won vantages be fisching in dromly *watters* (Melville 192, 271, 397).
as he had fisched that benifice in dromly *watters,* he hopped to fische mair be sik meanis (Melville 236). Apperson 217: troubled; Cheviot 212: drumly; Fergusson 64(521); drumling, 65(827): drumly; Kelly 117(32): muddy; Oxford 206: troubled, 207-8: troubled; Tilley F334.

(7) boisting to put me to the ȝet, gif I fissched any mair in his *watters* (Melville 324). See FISH, VB. above.

(8) Men deliting to swym betwix two *watters,* have often compleaned upon my severitie (Knox VI,131). NED Swim, 1b.

See FLOOD (2) above.

WAX.

(1) Teugh as the *wax* (*Eger* 233,837).

(2) It meltit as It *vax* ware (*Legends* I,148,656).
vndir hyme as *vax* moltine was (*Legends* I,356,560).
& he sonnere but delay
meltit þane *wax* in fyre away (*Legends* II,163,393-4).
And maks my hairt within me melt
Lyk *waxe* befor the fyre (Montgomerie C 133,15-6, S 20,255-6). NED Wax, sb.[1], 3a; Oxford 418; Tilley W137; Whiting, *ED* 332(355); Wilstach 258.

See NOSE (1) above.

WAY.

sen na man can schaw the richt *way* better than he that has oft tymes chancit vpon by roddis (Melville 3). Cf. Oxford 472: An old poacher makes the best keeper.

WEAKER.

The *wakar* sone the war can haif (*Alexander* I,57,1782). Apperson 671: Weak(3); NED Weak, 4b, quots. 1456, 1768; Oxford 696; Tilley W184.

WEAKEST.

The *waik* estait that tyme ȝeid to the wawes (Stewart I,60,2044).
Quhill that the *waikest* ȝeid sone to the wawis (Stewart II,275,28376, 532,36388, III,535,60331).
the strang ay, with wrang ay,
Pvsss *waikar* to [the] wallis (Montgomerie S 64,889-90). Apperson 671; Fergusson 96(820); Hyamson 357; Kelly 322(154); NED Weak, 4b; Oxford 697; Ramsay 232(120); Taylor 67; Tilley W185; Whiting, *ED* 30, 227.

WEALTH.

(1) Quha in *welth* takis no heid
He sall haif falt in tyme of neid (Bannatyne III,43,5-6, cf. II,324,10). Cf. Tilley W196; Whiting, *ED* 89.

(2) As suith is said, that wyiss men sais thair till,
That ouir grit *welth* makis wit for to gang will (Stewart I,443,13835-6).
Oftymis *welth* garris wisdome to go will (Stewart II,202,26180). Cf. Apperson 671: Wealth makes wit waver; Cheviot 387; Fergusson 108(873); Kelly 340(5); Oxford 697; Tilley W201.

WEAPON.
Thair *wapynis* all quhilk war bayth hard and teuche,
Hes maid thame all in somes to thair pleuche (Stewart I,171,5592-3). *Isaiah,* ii,4; *Micah,* iv,3; NED Soam, 1, quot. 1535, Ploughshare, 1.

WEATHERCOCK.
(1) My mynd als lycht is euirmoir on flocht,
As *woddercok* or any womanis thocht (Stewart II,651,40209-10).
That is nocht licht lyk *weddercok* in wynd (Maitland 54,166). Fergusson 57(713); Oxford 698; Tilley W223; Whiting, *ED* 332(357). Cf. Apperson 703: A woman is a weathercock; Oxford 723; Tilley W653.
(2) For thay [women] ar sad as *Widdercock* in Wind (Henryson 124,567. NED Weathercock, 1.
(3) Cheangyng als oft as *woddercok* in wynd (Lindsay I,67,368). Apperson 91: Changeable; Chaucer, *Against Women Unconstant* 12-3; Kissel 19(76); NED Weathercock, 1; Oxford 698.
(4) Turnand her volt lyke *woddercok* in wind (*Sat. Poems* 326,32). Fergusson 50(429), 57(713); NED Weathercock, 1.
(5) Bot wavers lyk the *widdircok* in wind (Montgomerie C 130,39, 178,56). Apperson 670: Wavering, quot. 1672; Tilley W223.

WEB.
In deid I trow, to say to ȝow,
He had ane vthir *wob* to spin (Rolland, *Seages* 198,6365-6). Cf. NED Spin, 3b.

WEDDING.
See BAND (1) above.

WEDGE.
Nocht mindit to keip this man to be ane *wage* of his awin wood to ryis him (Colville 115).
For if .q. (the King) faill, thair can not be suche a *vage* to ryis him by, as a vage of his awin wood (Colville 119).
it is best to ryis him with a *vage* of his awin wood (Colville 120).
God plucked out from amangs the Jesuits a *wadge* of thair awin timber, wherwith to rent and cross thair deceaits (Melvill I,72). Aleman III,129; making me a wedge out of the same piece of wood; *Journal of Celtic Studies* I (1949), 121(10); *National Proverbs: Ireland* (London, 1913) 38: a wedge from itself splits the oak-tree; Alexander Nicolson, *A Collection of Gaelic Proverbs and Familiar Phrases* (2nd ed., Edinburgh, 1882) 202; Thomas F. O'Rahilly, *A Miscellany of Irish Proverbs* (Dublin, 1922) 95(299): A Wedge of itself splits the elm.

WEED.
(1) They grew, as did the *weid* abufe the corne (Lindsay I,69,453).
in the same the dornel and cokill apeir to surmount the wheit and gud seid (Knox IV,267).
and lat no moir the *weid* ourga the corne (Bannatyne II,231,86). Apperson 672-3; Fergusson 94(794); Kelly 319(131); Kissel 14(58); NED Weed, sb.[1], 1d; Oxford 699; Ramsay 232(123); Tilley W242; Whiting, *ED* 84.
(2) Of stinkand *weidis* maculate
No man may mak ane Rois Chaiplat (Lindsay I,118,11-2). Kissel 15(61). Cf. Apperson 571: Silk purse; Bradley 89; Hardie 465; Hyamson 317; Oxford 589.

(3) and walluid as the *weid* (Henryson 140,350, 205,21; Stewart I,21,695; Bannatyne II,143,22, III,286,21). NED Wallow, v.²; Whiting, *Ballad* 32.

(4) So paill of hew and wan as ony *weid* (Stewart III,214,49511).

(5) Bot sen I se na plesure permanabill,
Bot as the *weid* it widderis sone away (*Sat. Poems* 193,5-6).

WEIGHT.

He is worth to her his *waight* in gold (*Eger* 290,1154, 308,1228). Apperson 714; Oxford 734; Tilley W253; Whiting, *ED* 346(584).

WEIRD.

Bot *werd*, that to the end ay driffis
The varldis thingis (Barbour I,87,148-9). Cf. NED Weird, 1.

WELCOME.

See HOMELY above.

WELL.

(1) He levis *weill* that levis into eis (Stewart II,653,40278). Cf. Oxford 718: Wise that knows, quot. 1493.

(2) Quhen men ar *weill* that tyme is to be war (Stewart II,435,33369).
Quhillis ȝe ar *weill* I wish ȝou to be war (Montgomerie C 130,57). See WARE, ADJ. (1) above.

(3) Thai [fools] can nocht wone quhen thai ar *veill* (*Foly* 63,425).
Thairfoir thy tail is trew into al tyde,
Quhair ane fairis *weil* the langer sould he byde (*Thre Prestis* 48,1125-6).
Quhen men ar *weill* best is to hald thame so (Stewart II,394,32056). Cheviot 157, 397; Fergusson 40(322); Kelly 169(328), 357(143); Oxford 700; Ramsay 184(77), 242(32); Tilley H512. Cf. Apperson 674: Well(2), quot. 1589; Whiting, *ED* 114.

WELLAWAY.

His sory sang was oche and *wallaway* (*Sat. Poems* 31,4).
My sorrie song is, oh and *welauay* (Montgomerie C 106,xxxiv,8).
Quhilk sall ȝour bairnies gar sing *wallaway* (*Sat. Poems* 35,133, 386,988).
Blak *walloway* mon be ȝoʳ sang (*Sat. Poems* 400,72). NED Wellaway; Whiting, *Ballad* 36, *ED* 363(842).

WELSHMAN.

He maid it lyk a *Wealchmā* hose (*Sat. Poems* 377,737). *Ballads from Manuscripts*, ed. F. J. Furnivall (2 vols., London,1868-72) I,206,813-4; Erasmus, *The praise of Folie*, trans. Sir Thomas Chaloner (London, 1549) M iiiᵛ; NED Welshman, 3; Oxford 702.

WHALE.

Sic fartingaillis on flaggis als fatt as *quhailis* (Dunbar 153,71). Chaucer, *CT* III(D),1930.

WHALEBONE.

Your finyearis small, quhyt as *quhailis bane* (Henryson 206,29; Makculloch, 138,603-4, 147,868-9; Dunbar 54,33; Stewart I,107,3602, 421,13147; Bannatyne II,143,30). Apperson 680: White(4); NED Whalebone, 1; Tilley W279; Whiting, *Ballad* 32, *ED* 332(359). See BONE (3) above.

WHEEL.

(1) As to the text according neuer a deill,
Mair than langis to the cart the fyft *quheyll* (Douglas IV,171,29-30). Apperson 210; Cheviot 407; third; Hardie 468; Hyamson 142; Oxford 200; Tilley W286; Wilstach 570.

(2) they can do no moir than the *wheillis* can do without the extrie (Bannatyne, *Memoriales* 15).

(3) bot tolterand, turnand as a *quheill* (*Foly* 63,426). Hazlitt I,176,157.

WHELK.
(1) Thay ar als wantoun as ane *wilk* (Lindsay II,388,1500). Cf. Tilley W291.
(2) I compt not all your werkis wirth ane *wilk* (Douglas I,110,15).

WHIP.
See BLINK above.

WHISTLE.
Thay say he can baith *quhissill* and cloik,
And his mouth full of meill (*Sat. Poems* 131,83-4). Cheviot 129: He canna haud meal in his mouth and blaw; Fergusson 55(655): He can hold meal in his mouth & blow; NED Whistle, v., 1, quot. 1570; Tilley M782.

WHORE.
quha spendis his gud on a *hure* he hes bayth skay^t and schame (Bannatyne III,8,9-10; Maitland 159,9; Fortescue 263,[9]). Fergusson 38(314); Kelly 163(281); Ramsay 189(51): He that in bawdry wastes his gear, baith shame and skaith he will endure; Tilley G57.

WICKER.
As with the wynd wavis the *wickir*
Wavis this warldis vanite (Dunbar 20,14-5). NED Wicker, 1b.

WIFE.
(1) be thow jolous of thy *wyfe* scho will do þe war (Bannatyne III,9,48-9; Maitland 160,49: be þe war; Fortescue 264,[41]: Be not jelouse over thy wyfe, for she will wyrke the warre).
(2) Bot he mycht weill better haif done
To do as Catone kend his sone:
"[Traw] nocht thi *wif* on thi seruand
Quhen scho is wantonly wrythand;
For wiffis oft hatis on gret manere
His þat hire husband is deire" (Wyntoun IV,74,5099-104). Cato 598(8).
(3) that my doctrine was no *wyffes* fables (Knox I,170). Cf. Apperson 465: Old wives' tales; NED Old Wife, 1; Oxford 473; Tilley W388; Whiting, *ED* 356(743).
See WOMAN below.

WILDGOOSE.
War in compear a *wild-gus* for a wran (Melvill II,430).

WILES.
For waik men ay man helpit be with *wyllis* (Stewart III,207,49267).
As wyss men sais, as I traist ȝe ken,
That oftymes *wyllis* helpis rycht waik men (Stewart III,227,49955-6). Cheviot 400; Fergusson 108(869); Kelly 341(22); Oxford 709; Ramsay 243(3); Tilley W391.

WILL, SB.
(1) Let not your *will* over-gang your wit (*Eger* 261,1305).
Lat nocht ȝour *will* no moir exceid ȝour wit (Stewart I,561,17468). *Reliquiae* I,197; Skelton I,206,102; *Titus and Vespasian*, ed. J. A. Herbert (Roxburghe Club, London, 1905) xxvii; Whiting, *ED* 298. Cf. Cheviot 400: Will and wit strive wi' you; Kelly 347(60); Oxford 720.
(2) "Ane thrawart *will*, ane thrawin Phisnomy.
The auld Proverb is witnes off this Lorum—
Distortum vultum sequitur distortio morum."
"Na" (quod the Taid), "that Proverb is not trew;
For fair thingis oftymis ar fundin faikin" (Henryson 97,2830-4). Jakob Werner, *Lateinische Sprichwörter und Sinnsprüche des Mittelalters* (Heidelberg, 1912) 21(115).

WILL, VB.
Quha *will*, quha Nill (Rolland, *Court* 122,345).

nill they *will* they (Melvill I,383). NED Will, v.[1], 50b; Tilley W401; Whiting, *ED* 370(948).

WIND.

(1) And to the tovn spurris als fers as *wynd* (Douglas IV,57,8). Roxburghe VIII,303.

(2) on wingis swift as *wynd* (Douglas II,186,21, 238,8, III,165,32, IV,149,27, 158,23; Lindsay II,302,2861). Hyamson 334; NED Wind, 7; Tilley W411; Whiting, *Ballad* 32, *ED* 332(366).

(3) and als vnstable as the *wind* (Bannatyne II,204,2). Lydgate, *Fall* III,688,500.

(4) Wod wraith as the *wynd* (*Golagros* 26,770). Apperson 689: Wind(2); NED Wind, 7; Oxford 736; Whiting, *ED* 333(366).

(5) Ane mylk quhyt steid that ambilit as the *wynd* (Douglas I,91,6). W. Horman, *Vulgaria* (London, 1519) 171, 249ᵛ; Whiting, *Ballad* 32.

(6) Purpos dois change as *wynd* or rane (Dunbar 29,27).
Thare was the god of *wyndis,* Eolus,
With variand luke, rycht lyke a lord unstable (Dunbar 115,122-3).
And howe fansye abides no longer then she lust,
But as the *wynde* dothe often chang and is not for to trust (*Sat. Poems* 28,770-1). NED Wind, 7; Tilley W412; Whiting, *ED* 332(366).

(7) that waistes as *winde* and faster wears then flame wᵗʰ fier is wrought (*Sat. Poems* 6,64). *Altenglische Legenden,* ed. C. Horstmann (Heilbronn, 1881) 46,38; Whiting, *ED* 332(366).

(8) Quhas fals behechtis as *wind* hyne wavis (Dunbar 45,59). Whiting, *ED* 333(366).

(9) With that the Cadgear, wavering as the *wind* (Henryson 75,2168). Apperson 670; Oxford 695; Tilley W412; Whiting, *ED* 333(366).

(10) All Welth in Eird, away as *Wind* it weiris (Henryson 121,467).

(11) Bot as the *wind* will wend away (Henryson 195,12). Vernon II,465,30; Whiting, *ED* 332(366).

(12) bot foirseing ane storme, sche began to seik ane new *wynd* (Knox I,420).

(13) An awld proverb in stories did I fynd
quhilk solone said that prudent man of witt
q he na man sould spitt Aganis þe *wynd*
In dreid it cum on him þat did it spitt (Bannatyne IV,77,36-9). Henderson 81. Cf. Apperson 596; Spit(4); Oxford 502, 615; Tilley H355-6, W427.

(14) I wrassill with the *wind* (Montgomerie C 151,4, 166,53, S 23,280-1). Cf. Tilley W431; Whiting, *ED* 370(954): fight with.

(15) Of this mater to speik, it wer bot *wind* (Henryson 8,159).
To ga to him I wait bot *wind* in waist (*Thre Prestis* 49,1159). *The Bagford Ballads,* ed. J. W. Ebsworth (2 parts, Hertford, 1878) I,519*; Whiting, *Ballad* 36, *ED* 332(366).

(16) nor, for feir of stormie *wound* or wather, leave af to saw and schear the Lord's land (Melvill I,287). Cf. Kelly 134(68).

WINDLESTRAW.

Ȝe are our red for *windil strayis*
That dar noᵗ spill the lairdis bed (Bannatyne III,34,27-8). Cheviot 150: He that's rede for windlestraes should never sleep on leas; Fergusson 40(328); Kelly 134(68); NED Windlestraw, 1; Oxford 536; Ramsay 189(68); Tilley W452.

WIND MILL.

Her Erss gaid evin lyk ane *wind mill* (Lindsay II,382,1440). Cf. Whiting, *ED* 333(367).

WINDOW.

Thir Bishops cums in at the North *window*
And not in at the dur nor ȝit at the ȝet (*Thre Prestis* 26,408-9).

This wer the way to cum in at the dur to be ane minister in the Kirk of God, quhilk our Salveour spekis of; quhare now be tyrannie and avarice (for the maiste part) as it wer thevis, or bryganttis, we creip in at *wyndois* or bak durris (*Quintin Kennedy, Ane Compendius Tractive* [1558] in David Laing, *The Miscellany of the Wodrow Society* [Edinburgh, 1844] I,152). NED Window, 4b. Cf. Apperson 692: Window(2); Oxford 103; Tilley W456.

WINE.

And causit hym to drynk wycht *wyne*,
Quhilk men to Lychorye doith Inclyne (Lindsay I,303,3504-5). W. Horman, *Vulgaria* (London, 1519) 65; Kissel 11(47). Cf. Apperson 693: Wine(20); Chaucer, *CT* III(D),464-6; Tilley T395, W485; Whiting, *Ballad* 37.

WINK.

quhen scho *winkis* I sall nod
Scho sall no^{t} begyle me be god (Bannatyne IV,17,30-1).

WINTER.

Bot when that gowne comes hame agane,
Winter salbe butt wind and raine (*Sat. Poems* 387,1024-5). See RIVER above.

WISDOM.

Sen better is ane *wisdom* that is bocht
Than other tua that gottin ar for nocht (Stewart I,113,3820-1).
Nott worthe is *witt* quhill it be derlie bocht (Montgomerie S 210,3).
God's word believe, when ever it's teatch'd we aught,
Bot then it's best, when it is deirest coft (Melvill II,498). Apperson 700: Wit(15); Cheviot 401; Fergusson 22(183); Kelly 269(7), cf. 356(132); Oxford 58, 720; Ramsay 243(9-10); Tilley W545; Whiting, *ED* 78, 272.

WISE MAN.

(1) *wysmen* of fulys has rycht knawlege
as in a meroure thar wysage (*Consail* 77,401-2).

(2) *Wyse men* desiris, commounle,
Wyse men into thair companie (Lindsay I,186,1527-8). Kissel 13(52); *Proverbs* xiii,20. Cf. Apperson 697: Wise(23).

(3) And *wyss mennys* etling
Cummys nocht ay to that ending
That thai think it sall cum to (Barbour I,24,583-5).
And *wiss menis* etling cumis nocht
Till sic end as thai weyn alwayis (Barbour I,272,22-3). Cf. NED Ettling, 1; Tilley M335. See FOOL (1) above.

(4) The *wyser man* the better can be bourd (*Thre Prestis* 29,492). Cf. Apperson 696: Wise(20): He is not a wise man that cannot play the fool; Cheviot 261: Nane can play the fool sae weel as a wise man; Fergusson 82(662); Kelly 140(107), 267(80); Oxford 718; Ramsay 215(33); Tilley M321, 428.

(5) Sen want of *wyse men* makis fulis to sit on binkis (Henryson 189-91, 8, 16, etc.). Cheviot 108; Fergusson 32(273); Henderson 22; Hislop 99; Kelly 105(29); Oxford 691; Ramsay 177(51); Tilley W30.

WISEST.

The *wysest* will in wowing raif (*Philotus* 149,1246). Cf. *Ecclesiasticus* xix,2: Wine and women will make men of understanding to fall away. See LOVE, VB.(1) (1) above.

WISHERS.

but *wischeris* and walderis (another MS: nedderis) are but evile houssehaderis (Melvill II,783). Apperson 699; Fergusson 108(870); Henderson 97; Kelly 358(153); NED Woulder; Oxford 719; Tilley W539.

WIT.

See WISDOM above.

WOE.

Quhan *vo* is past, veill vill returne againe (J. Stewart 37,273). Lydgate, *Troy* I,157,471-2.

WOLF.

(1) He wold give the *wolf* the weddir to keip (Bannatyne, *Memoriales* 111). Fergusson 36(291); Henderson 147; Kelly 368(67); Oxford 238-9; Tilley W602. Cf. Chaucer, *TC* iv,1373-4; Oxford 723.

(2) boyth the Princes holding the *wolf* by the earis (Colville 109).
Sed lupum auribus tenet (Colville 172). Apperson 702(15); Oxford 722; Tilley W603.

(3) . . . bot ȝet he
wykyt *wolfe* wes withine,
& heylyt in a lame-skine (*Legends* I,472,504-6).
bot he is *wolf* in lamskine hyd (*Legends* II,135,378; Lindsay II,374,3322; *Sat. Poems* 203,45, 346,6).
Thaire *wolfis* hertis, in lambis liknesse (*Kingis Quair* 34,136).
Quhat holynes is thare within
Ane *wolf* cled in ane Wodderis skin? (Lindsay I,360,5442-3, II,375,4264).
Devouring *woulves* into sheip skynnes,
Hurkland with huides into our neck (Knox I,73).
ane *wolfe* and semis ane Lam (Rolland, *Seages* 115,3547).
Attend and tak gude keip
To thame that cumis to the,
In to the habite of ane scheip,
With subtell Sermonis slie.
For doutles thay ar inwartlie,
Fals *wolfis* vnder cot (*Ballatis* 150).
Let a *woulfe* be neuer so well cled with a shepe's skin (Fergusson, *Tracts* 36). Apperson 701; Fergusson 54(469); Hyamson 362; Kissel 27(118); NED Sheep, 2a(b), Wolf, 9f; Oxford 723; Tilley W614; Whiting, *ED* 246, 333(370). See LAMB (4), TOD (3) above.

(4) Like wode *wolffis* ilkane drew vtheris blude (Stewart I,545,16976, 637,19691, III,395,55691).
Wod as ane *wolf* (Stewart II,422,32926). NED Wood,*a.*, 3a.

(5) til þai as *wolfis* lowd can rare (*Legends* I,217,312).

(6) for, as the *wolffe* with Ravenynge grace
The sillie shepe do Scater aside,
I chast them still (*Sat. Poems* 21,547-9). Cf. *Arthour and Merlin*, ed. E. Kölbing (Leipzig, 1890) 115,4047-8; Robert of Gloucester I,385,5299; Whiting, *ED* 333(370).

(7) Quhylis lyke a wylde *wolf* quhylis as a Dow als tame (Rolland, *Seages* 245,8006).

WOMAN (WIFE).

(1) And scho rycht sone and suddantly,
As *wemen* hes ane haistie ansuer sone (Stewart II,570,37640-1). Tilley W670; Whiting, *ED* 174. Cf. Gayton 7: Ladies wits being best upon the sodaine.

(2) For *wyues* defence is lytle worth (*Alexander* III,344,8104). Cf. Whiting, *Ballad* 39: A woman's wit's sun oercum.

(3) A *woman* keipit in fetter Is ane ewill tressour (Bannatyne III,9,27-8).

Ane *woman* keipit in cage Is ane ewill tressour (Maitland 160,28).
A *woman* tyed in fett^{r}, that is an evill tresor (Fortescue 264,[23]). Cf. *The goodli History of the moste noble & beautifull Ladye Lucres of Scene* (1567) in *The Hystorie of the moste Noble Knight Plasidas and other Rare Pieces* (Roxburghe Club, London, 1873) 132: it is as easy to kepe a woman agaynst her wyll as a flocke of flyes in the hete of the sonne, excepte shee bee of her selfe chaste; Alexander Barclay, *The Ship of Fools,* ed. T. H. Jamieson (Edinburgh, 1874) I,167.

(4) for quhen *woman* wald do sic myse
with man, and refusit Is,
þar is no ber so fell no thra,
quhan hyr quhelpis ar tan hir fra (*Legends* I,68,171-4.
quhen *wemen* settis hir lykyne
of ony man, hyme to wyne
In sic degre with hyr to syne,
gyf he ne wil consent hir til,
fra scho haf lattyn hym wit hir wil,
was neuir lenx þat schuttis fyre,
mare fulfillit of breth & yre,
quhen hir qwhelpis ar tan hir fra,
to chas þe takaris, þaim to sla,
þan scho sal be to purches Il
til hyme þat denyit hir wil (*Legends* II,138-9,504-14). Cf. Head 102: a woman's love despised will turn into extreme hatred; Whiting, "The Devil and Hell in Current English Literary Idiom," *Harvard Studies and Notes in Philology and Literature,* XX(1938) 220-1, *ED* 269.

(5) and a *woman* þat is fair Is no^{t} happin gude (Bannatyne III,8,19-20).
Ane *woman* þat is fayr may happin be gude (Maitland 160,19).
A *woman* gyf she be fayre, may hap to be good (Fortescue 264,[15]). Cf. Oxford 28: Beauty and honesty seldom agree; Tilley B163. See FAIRNESS above.

(6) a *woman* tho^{t} scho be meik Scho is ill to knaw (Bannatyne III,8,7-8; Maitland 159,7: seme meik . . . ewill; Fortescue 263,[7]: gyf she be myke, is evill).

(7) for *weman* are of brynnand wil
ay þare ȝarninge to fulfil,
& with wordis cane rycht wele
our-cum mene hard as stele (*Legends* I,267,405-8).
Wyfis wald haue all thair will (Douglas III,145,10).
As *wemen* will, the thing that tha desire,
Into thair mynd burnis hetter nor fyre,
Bayth da and nycht withoutin ony eis,
Quhill that tha get the same thing that tha pleis (Stewart II,639,39813-6).
Thay [*women*] couet nocht bot ay to haue thair will (Rolland, *Seages* 246,8013).
For *wyffis* will haue þair will
Thocht ȝe and I had sworne (Maitland II,67,123-4). Apperson 707: Woman (58); Oxford 726; Tilley W723; Whiting, *ED* 32, 238, 267.

(8) Rycht mekle help in ane gude *woman* lyis (Stewart III,402,55948).
For it is said sen first the warld began,
Thair is greit help into ane gude *woman* (Rolland, *Seages* 239,7793-4). Cf. *Proverbs of Alfred* 37,339-42: Ich hit ne segge nouht for-þan Þat god þing ys god wymmon Þe mon þe hi may icheose And icouere over oþre; Tilley W628; Whiting, *ED* 20.

(9) Socrates said gyf ȝow will leif at eiss tell neuer þi counsall to *wemen* for þai can kepe nain (Asloan I,275,27-8). Tilley S196. Cf. Apperson 621: Tell(4); Oxford 723: Woman conceals; *Proverbs of Alfred* 35,267-79; Tilley W649.

(10) Quhen *wemen* speikis fairest thay ar maist fals found,
Thay gar sweit licour swym aboue, and gall is at the ground (Rolland, *Seages* 31,755-6).
For quhen thay [*women*] speik fairest, thair taill is ay falsest (Rolland, *Seages* 114,3523-4).

(11) For redly wilys in *women*
Sonnar apperis þan in men (Wyntoun II,181,499-500). Cf. Chaucer, *CT* IV(E),2421-4; Lovelich III,37,627-30; Tilley W711.

(12) Vareable and changeand thingis bene *wemen* ay (Douglas II,211,12). E. Ward, *A Collection of Historical and State Poems* (London, 1717) no.8(4),14: For Woman is by Nature giv'n to Change. Cf. Tilley W698. See OLD MEN (1), WEATHERCOCK (1), (2) above.

(13) knawin of *wemen* the facultie
That thay ar nocht constant in thair quallitie (Pitscottie I,10,18-9). Whiting, *ED* 276. Cf. Apperson 707: Woman (66); Oxford 724; Whiting, *ED* 167, 250.

(14) This calls vs to reporte, and proves the proverbe trewe,
That *wemens* wills are sonest wone in that they after rewe (*Sat. Poems* 7,101-2).

(15) . . . The suth weyll has beyn seyn,
Wemen may tempt the wysest at is wrocht (Harry 226,1454-5).
Quhilk hes bene the occasioun,
Sen syne, that mony nobyll men,
Be the euyll counsall of *wemen,*
All uterlye distroyit bene (Lindsay I,227,974-7).
The sapient salomon, with *wemen* was confoundit,
Thocht he was wysest that euer nature wrocht (Lauder 39,9-10). Kissel 10(36). See WISEST above.

(16) As *wemen* will, thair toung gois so wyde,
Fra thair luifaris nothing in erth can hyde (Stewart II,514,35825-6). Cf. Tilley W701.

(17) For I trow traistly, that gretyng
Cummys to man for mysliking;
And that nane may but [anger] gret,
Bot it be *wemen,* that can wet
Thair chekys, quehen thaim list, with teris,
The quethir weill oft thaim na thing deris (Barbour I,70-1,515-20). Apperson 707: Women laugh; Chaucer, *CT* III(D),401-2; Kelly 189(98); [Edward Phillips], *The Mysteries of Love & Eloquence* (3rd ed., London, 1685) 177; Oxford 726; *Proverbs of Alfred* 36-7,321-8; Tilley W713, 716, 720.

WONDER.

For *wonder* lestis bot nyne nycht into toun (Stewart II,443,33590). Apperson 446; Chaucer, *TC* iv,588; Cheviot 402; Fergusson 108(881); Kelly 48(303); NED Nine, 3a, 4b; Oxford 726; Tilley W728.

WOOD.

Anis *wod* and ay the war (*Sat. Poems* 260,101). Cheviot 40; Fergusson 8(60), 85(1116); Henderson 21, 103; Kelly 271(30); Oxford 475; Ramsay 160(31); Tilley W745.

WOODBINE.

Bot, like *wodbind*, thay war baith wrappit (Lindsay I,172,991). Cf. Chaucer, *TC* iii,1230-3.

WOOL.

(1) . . . hir den,
Als warme as *woll* (Henryson 15,358-9). Apperson 667; NED Wool, 1f; Tilley W751.

(2) quhit as *wow* (Gau 63,30). NED Wool, 1f.

WORD.

(1) Few *wordis* may serve the wyis (Dunbar 32,24). Apperson 209; Fergusson 34(281); Oxford 199; Whiting, *ED* 121. Cf. Kelly 10(51), 49(315), 169(326); NED Word, 22; Tilley W781; Whiting, *ED* 73, 129.

(2) These fayre *woordis* pleased our foollis (Knox I,222-3).
Feid the simpill with fair *wordis* (Bannatyne, *Memoriales* 12).
And Heavin but a conceat to mak foolles fean (Melvill I,202). Cf. Cheviot 104; Fergusson 35(430); Jente 610; Oxford 188; Tilley W794; Whiting, *Ballad* 23, *ED* 31, 93. See HIGHT above.

(3) be nocht our-changabile in thi thocht
That *word* and deid contrary nocht (*Consail* 71,195-6).
Ȝit clerkis bene in subtell *wordis* quent,
And in the deid als schairp as ony snaillis (Douglas I,28,11-2; cf. Chaucer, *CT* III(D),707-10).
And gar thy *worde* and deid aggre (Maitland 209,62).
Bot quhair þat *wordis* and deiddis aggre
Trust weill þat freind and credeit me (Maitland 288,35-6).
Mony ar godis *word* will schaw
That ar far contrair in þair deidis (Maitland 318,29-30).
he was a man of *word* and deid (Melville 47).
speiking monie fair *vordis* bot neuir doing ane guid deid (*Catholic* 84,24-5). Cf. Apperson 141, 710: Word(7); Cheviot 359; Fergusson 98(832); Henderson 142; Kelly 20(117); NED Word, 4; Oxford 135, 729; Tilley D333, W802, 820; Whiting, *ED* 78. See DEED (1) above.

(4) Noght onely in thy *word;* for word is noght,
Bot gif thy werk and all thy besy cure
Accord thereto (*Kingis Quair* 33,132).
Quharfore men suld do as thai say,
That werk folow the *word* alway (*Foly* 54,71-2).
Wordis wᵗout werkis availȝeis noᵗ a cute (Scott 4,109).
Lat workes beir witnes: vaine *wordis* sould haue na place (*Sat. Poems* 330,152).
And lat ȝour werks and *wourds* aggre togidder (Lauder 23,638). Jente 202, 747; NED Word, 4, quot. c 1560; Whiting, *ED* 185. See WORD (15) below.

(5) O kingis *word* shuld be o kingis bonde,
And said It is, a kingis word shuld stond (*Lancelot* 50,1671-2). Apperson 710(9); Oxford 300: Honest man's; Taylor 69; Tilley M458. See SAW above.

(6) Nocht neidfull is men sowld be dum;
Na thing is gottin but *wordis* sum (Dunbar 32,26-7). Apperson 170: Dumb man; Oxford 161; Tilley F418. Cf. Apperson 593: Spare to speak; Fergusson 8(50): A dumme man holds all. See MAN (4) above.

(7) Far manliar ane slayis with thair *word*

Ma men, ȝe wait, no other knyfe or sword (Stewart II,116,23600-1). *Ancren Riwle*, ed. J. Morton (London, 1853) 74: mo sleað word þene sweord, *Modern Language Review*, XXX (1935) 503. Cf. Apperson 711: Words cut more than swords; Henderson 18; Oxford 729; Tilley W839. See SWORD above.

(8) Sum fair *wourdis* will gif wald se þe hing (Maitland 22,31). Cf. Palsgrave 579: He gyveth me fayre wordes and yet he hateth me lyke poyson.

(9) But a fair tale it may be shown,
Another in the heart be known (*Eger* 299,1901-2).
Here ar many fair *wordis*: I can not tell what the heartis ar (Knox II,345). Cf. Fergusson 81(1059): Mony fair words but few of them trew. See HEART (7) above.

(10) Thair thoughtis blak, hid vnder *wordis* quhite (*Kingis Quair* 34,136).
With fenyeit *wirdis* quhyte (Dunbar 121,48).
And his dissemelit slekit *wordis* quhyte (Douglas II,62,22). Chaucer, *TC* iii,1567; Lydgate, *Troy* I,192,1661, II,518,4272, III,824,1796; NED White, *a.*, 10. Cf. Cheviot 419; Kelly 158(235).

(11) Few *words* they said, but many thought (*Eger* 285,1664). [R.C.], *A World of Wonders* (London, 1607) 313: As for swine, they speak neuer a word, yet the whoresons think neuer a whit the lesse; Thoms 465: though he said little, he thought the more. See THINK above.

(12) A wickit *word* may sumquhile mak
Full gret tinsall, as it did here (Wyntoun VI,56,4318-9). Whiting, *ED* 23.

(13) Bot *wordes* past out cummis not againe (Maitland Quarto 214,4). Apperson 710: Word(4); Oxford 728: Word spoken; Tilley W777.

(14) Thair *word* and thocht accordis nocht togidder,
Gladlie will sa the thing nocht for till do (Stewart III,270,51414-5). NED Word, 4.

(15) þare-for ȝoure *wordis* ar bot wynd (*Legends* II,360,77).
For *word* but writ as vynd our-gais (*Foly* 52,15).
The Quene regarded his *wordis* as wynd (Knox II,392, 421).
Wourdis ar bot wynd, I say in deid,
Withoute gude werks of thame proceid (Lauder, *Tractate* 15,395-6). Apperson 710: Word(14); Fergusson 108(871); NED Wind, sb.^{1}, 14a; Oxford 729; Ramsay 243(15); Tilley W833; Whiting, *ED* 8, 77, 87, 184, 194, 283, 296, 332(366).

(16) Sen *Word* is thrall ("Good Counsel" in *Kingis Quair* 51,15). Cheviot 299.

WORK.

(1) Auld creased *workis* payit w^t crackit crownes (*Sat. Poems* 367,434). Cf. NED Crazed, 1.

(2) For wyfis sayis, lukand *werkis* ar licht (Henryson 6,102).
Ȝit haue I hard oft said be men na clerkis,
Till idill folk full lycht beyn lukand *warkis* (Douglas, IV,227,27-8). Cf. Cheviot 202: Ill workers are aye gude onlookers.

See FOUNDED, WORD (4) above.

WORLD.

(1) The *warld* it waggis I wat not how (*Sat. Poems* 128,1).
If he be wysest, with the *world* that waggis (Montgomerie C 100,xxiii,3).
. . . he hard ane busteous Bugill blaw,
Quhilk, as he thocht, maid all the *warld* to waig (Henryson 32,839-40).
Ane horne he blew, . . .
Quhilk all this *warld* with weir hes maid to wag (Henryson 111,195-6). Whiting, *ED* 371(963). Cf. Apperson 360-1; Kelly 240(89); NED Wag, 7c, World, 3a; Oxford 732; Ramsay 194(26); Tilley W879.

(2) Ther is mony that speikis of the *varld*, & ȝit thai vait nocht quhat thing is the varld (*Complaynt* 32,18-9). Cf. Apperson 535: Many talk of Robin Hood; Kelly 255(94); Oxford 611; Ramsay 213(29); Tilley R148. See BOW, SB. (3) above.

(3) All *warldly* thing has nocht bot a sesoune (Harry 48,9).

So nixt to summer winter bein;
Nixt efter confort cairis kein;
Nixt dirk mednycht the mirthefull morrow;
Nixt efter joy aye cumis sorrow:
So is this *warld* and ay hes bein (Dunbar 141,16-20).
Now day up bricht, now nycht als blak as sabill,
Now eb, now flude, now freynd, now cruell fo;
Now glaid, now said, now weill, now in to wo;
Now cled in gold, dissolvit now in as;
So dois this *warld* transitorie go (Dunbar 151,19-23).
So ma ȝe weill knaw be experience,
That all this *warld* hes bene full of variance;
Vmquhill in plesure and prosperitie,
Vmquhill in pane and greit penuritie;
Ay like the se that flowis ouir the sand,
Neuir ane stait that stabill ȝit did stand;
So is the warld ay ordand for to be,
With mony wall of greit aduersitie (Stewart III,525,60040-7).
Lo such is this *warldis* glore
Now law now he
Nothing stable we se
In this warld of variance (Bannatyne IV,295,440-3). Cf. *Altenglische Legenden,* ed. C. Horstmann (Paderborn, 1875) 117,135-7, 123,346-7; Fergusson 100(861); Hazlitt, III,181,273-4; Oxford 732; Pepys VII,302; Tilley W897, 903; Whiting, *ED* 17, 127. See MAN (23), NOW, THERE, TODAY (1) above.

See GOD (5) above.

WORSHIP.

For men *worship* byis oft dere,
And purchessis pryse in places sere (*Alexander* II,221,*cont.,* 4147-8).

See GOLD (13) above.

WOUND.

(1) A *wound* quhen it is grene Is the soner heilit (Bannatyne III,9,50-1; Maitland 161,51: best halit; Fortescue 264,[43]: best to be healid). Apperson 273: Green(2); Oxford 266-7; Tilley W927. Cf. Kelly 12(64); Ramsay 157(19).

(2) . . . for long ore he be fonde,
Holl of his leich, that schewith not his *vound* (*Lancelot* 4,105-6). Chaucer, *TC* i,857-8: For whoso list have helyng of his leche, To hym byhoveth first unwre his wownde. Cf. Apperson 300-1: Hide nothing; Oxford 294; Tilley P261.

WRENK.

For euerie *wrink,* forsuith, thow hes ane wyle (Henryson 69,1987).
For euerilk *wrink* thair hes he fund ane wyle (Stewart I,379,11882).
ffor every *wrynk* luk þat ȝe haif a wyle (Bannatyne IV,74,19). NED Wrenk, 1.

WRETCH.

(1) But in that we have perceaved the old proverbe to be trew, "Nothing can suffice a *wreche*" (Knox II,129). Cf. Chaucer, *TC* iii,1373-9; NED Wretch, 4; Tilley N163.

(2) Now quhen ane *wreche* is sett to he estait.
or ane begger brocht to dignite
Thair is non so prowd pompouss and elait
Non so vengeble and full of crëwelte
Woyd of discretioun mercy and pete
ffor churliche blud seindill dois recure
To be gentill be way of nature (Bannatyne II,187,1-7). Cf. G. M. Vogt, *Journal of English and Germanic Philology,* XXIV (1925) 121-3. See SERVANTS above.

WRIGHT.

He maid alse monie peices of thair theis,
As dois a *wricht* small spaillis of the treis (*Clariodus* 146,1069-70).

YEAR.

(1) Langer lestis *ȝeir* nor ȝule (Bannatyne III,18,12).

(2) A man may covet many a *year,*
That many (?may) right hastilie appear (*Eger* 305,2009-10). Cf. Fergusson 62 (488): It will come in an houre that will not come in a year; Kelly 193 (126); Tilley H741.

(3) sewine *ȝere* (*Legends,* I,11,153, 261,170, II,117,621, 119,691, 121,770; *Alexander* IV,436,10981, 441,8; *Rauf* 104,662, 106,725; *Eger* 231,802, 233,827; Henryson 72,2064; Dunbar 79,97, 170,22; Douglas I,101,5; Stewart, I,131,4384, 167,5505, 569,17708,17721; Lindsay II,360,3083; *Complaynt* 108,1; Knox II,442, VI,210; Rolland, *Seages* 109,3360, 256,8367; *Sat. Poems* 300,147; Bannatyne II,269,23, 270,56, 283,208, III,7,52, 31,14, 38,4; Bannatyne, *Memoriales* 12, 91, 287; Pitscottie I,99,7, II,77,3-4; Maitland 237,6; Montgomerie S 156,368, 164,494). Apperson 559; NED Seven, A, 1d; Tilley Y25; Whiting, *Chaucer* 191, 276, *ED* 362 (827), 436 (829).

YESTERDAY.

No man may ganecall *ȝistirday* (Bannatyne IV,22,70). Apperson 78: Call (3); Oxford 737; Tilley Y31; Whiting, *ED* 87, 127.

YOUNG.

Thoght ȝe be ȝong, ȝit once ȝe may be ald (Montgomerie C 178,45). Cf. Whiting, *ED* 53, 302.

YOUNG MAN.

(1) A *ȝong man* chiftane witless
A pure man spendar getles
A auld man trechoʳ trewᵗless
A woman lowpar landless
Be sanct Ieill // sall nevir ane of thir do weill (Bannatyne III,43-4,11-5, cf. II,324,1-3; Maitland 344). Cf. Apperson 719: Young (4); *Reliquiae* I,316.

(2) Speke softer and be not sa bald!
For *ȝoung men* that to armes tais
Sould lytill speke, how euer it gais (*Alexander* II,125,556-8).

YOUTH.

(1) ffor wysemen sais quha dois in *ȝowith* Inbring
In aige he sall grit stormes do ouresett (Bannatyne II, 134,66-7). Cf. Kelly 297 (100): Spare when you're young, and spend when you're old; Oxford 610; Ramsay 224 (26); Tilley S710.

(2) Misgovernit *ȝowth* makis gowsty age (Bannatyne IV,14,29). Cheviot 284: Reckless youth maks ruefu' eild, cf. 231: Lazy youth mak's lousy age; Fergusson 15 (139): Ane reckles youth makes ane goustlie age, 86 (733); Henderson 41; Kelly 284 (14); Ramsay 220 (1); Tilley Y40.

YULE.

(1) Bot Ʒule is ȝoung, thay say upon Ʒule euin (Rolland, *Court* 27,372). Cheviot 429; Kelly 378(156); Oxford 740; Ramsay 250(55). Cf. Apperson 721: Yule(4); Oxford 740: Yule is good; Tilley Y54.

(2) It is eith to cry *Ʒule* on ane vder manis coist (Bannatyne III,8,24-5; Maitland 160,24: hailȝule; Fortescue 264,[20]). Apperson 721; Fergusson 62(495); Kelly 183(55); NED Yule, 3; Oxford 122; Ramsay 200(37); Tilley Y53.

(3) that *Yuill* comoun they thought to repey weill now at Pasch (Melvill I,274). Cheviot 31: A Yule feast may be done at Pasche; Fergusson 14(126); Kelly 27(162); Oxford 740; Tilley F146.

(4) That I suld be an *Youllis* yald (Dunbar 46-8,6,12, etc., and p. 207). NED Yaud.

Form and Essence in the Philosophy of St. Thomas

ARMAND MAURER C.S.B.

THE pages which follow make no pretension to treat of St. Thomas' notions of form and essence in all their aspects. A large volume would be required for that. Their aim is simply to study several paragraphs in the Angelic Doctor's Commentary on the *Metaphysics*[1] which raise a specific problem concerning the essence of material substances: Is their essence identical with their form? What is the status of matter with regard to the essence? Is it included in it as an integral part, or is it in some way extrinsically related to it? St. Thomas recognizes that philosophers have given different answers to these questions, and in the section of his Commentary under consideration he outlines them briefly, giving at the same time his own views. We shall follow him in his exposition of the opinions of his predecessors, commenting on its historical accuracy; finally we shall see his own solution to the problem and its doctrinal significance.

I. AVERROES AND ARISTOTLE.

The first opinion regarding the essence of material substances St. Thomas attributes to the Arabian philosopher Averroes and to some of his followers. In brief, it is that the essences of such substances are identical with their forms to the exclusion of matter. The whole essence of the species is the form; for example, the whole essence of man consists in his soul. There is only a logical distinction, therefore, between the form "humanity" and the form "soul." They are really identical. The soul is called the "form of the part" (*forma partis*) inasmuch as it perfects matter and brings it into actuality. Humanity is called the "form of the whole" (*forma totius*) inasmuch as through it the whole composite is determined and fixed in the species. Matter and the material parts of the composite are not included in the essence nor are they included in the definition signifying the species, but only the formal principles of the species.[2]

If we turn to Averroes' Commentary on the *Metaphysics* we see that this is indeed the sense of his doctrine, although some of the terms used by St. Thomas to express it are not to be found there. In particular, it does not seem that Averroes used the expressions *forma partis* and *forma totius*.

The Arabian philosopher follows Aristotle very closely in distinguishing three meanings of the term "substance." It signifies first of all, he says, the matter of the composite of matter and form. Secondly it means the form. Thirdly it designates the composite itself of form and matter. However, even though all these three can be called substance, only the form can be called the essence or quiddity. Form is the substance of the thing in the sense that it indicates its essence. Matter is a part of the composite but it does not belong to the essence. It is simply the subject underlying and receiving the form. Hence it includes form in its definition, but the definition of the form as the very essence of the thing does not include matter. From his examples it is clear that matter in this context is not simply individual matter but matter in general, for example, in the case of man, flesh and bones.

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[1] *In VII Meta.* 9, ed. Cathala, revised by R. Spiazzi (Rome, 1950), nn. 1467-1469.

[2] . . . sciendum est quod circa definitiones rerum, et earum essentias, duplex est opinio. Quidam enim dicunt quod tota essentia speciei est ipsa forma, sicut quod tota essentia hominis est anima. Et propter hoc dicunt quod eadem secundum rem est forma totius, quae significatur nomine humanitatis, et forma partis, quae significatur nomine animae, sed differunt solum secundum rationem: nam forma partis dicitur secundum quod perficit materiam, et facit eam esse in actu: forma autem totius, secundum quod totum compositum per eam in specie collocatur. Et ex hoc volunt quod nullae partes materiae ponantur in definitione indicante speciem, sed solum principia formalia speciei. Et haec opinio videtur Averrois et quorumdam sequentium eum. *Loc. cit.*, n. 1467. Cf. *De Ente et Essentia* 2, ed. Baur (Monasterii, 1933), p. 19; *In IV Sent.*, d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 2, ad 2^{m}; *Opera Omnia* 11 (Paris, 1874), p. 298; *Contra Gentiles* IV, 81 De humanitate. On the "followers" of Averroes, cf. *infra*, p. 168.

Borrowing an example from Aristotle, Averroes says that the form "concavity" does not include matter in its definition. "Snubness" however does, because it is concavity in the nose or in the flesh of the nose. The nose, then, is part of the substance signified by snubness, but it is not part of the definition of the form of concavity. It is simply the subject of this form.[3]

The case of man is similar to this. Man is a substance in the sense of a composite of form and matter. Soul is his form and body his matter. The very essence of man, however, lies in his form, namely his soul, and not in his matter. Matter is simply the subject receiving the form which is his quiddity. Consequently we cannot say without qualification that the quiddity of man is identical with man. In one sense it is and in another it is not. The quiddity of man is the form of man and his very being (*esse*). It is not the man composed of matter and form:

> . . . quidditas hominis est homo uno modo, et non est homo alio modo; et est forma hominis, et non est homo qui est congregatus ex materia et forma.[4]

According to St. Thomas, however, this is contrary to Aristotle's intention: *Sed videtur esse contra intentionem Aristotelis.*[5] It should be noticed that he does not here assert that it is contrary to his very words, but contrary to his intention. In interpreting Aristotle St. Thomas will say that a conclusion is according to his intention if he thinks it can be deduced from his principles, even though it is not to be found in so many words in his writings. For example, he knew perfectly well that Aristotle never explicitly taught the doctrine of creation.[6] Yet he asserts that Averroes was wrong in thinking that Aristotle proved creation to be impossible. It is not according to Aristotle's *intention* that something must always come from something and not from nothing, for creation follows necessarily from his own principles.[7]

So too in the question of the essence of material substances, St. Thomas thinks that Averroes' interpretation is not in accord with Aristotle's intention, for there is a principle in his *Metaphysics* leading to the opposite view. The Stagirite says in Book VI that natural things differ from mathematicals precisely in that the former have sensible matter in their definition while the latter do not.[8] Now, St. Thomas argues, if sensible matter is included in their definition, it must be included in their essence, for the definition signifies the essence. Sensible matter cannot enter into the definition of a material substance by way of addition, as something outside its essence, for only accidents, not substances, are defined in this way. So it follows that sensible matter is a part of the essence of natural substances, not only as to individuals but also as to their species.[9]

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[3] Si igitur hoc nomen substantia dicitur simpliciter de materia substantiae compositae ex materia et forma et de forma ejus et de composito, tunc forma substantiae dicetur esse substantia rei, cum ipsa declaret essentiam illius; materia vero dicitur secundum considerationem ad substantiam compositam ex materia et forma esse pars substantiae, secundum considerationem vero ad substantiam declarantem essentiam rei non dicitur esse pars substantiae, sed esse deferens formam in suam definitionem, verbi gratia, simitas, cujus definitio est concavitas in naso, aut in carne nasi; nasus enim est pars substantiae ejus quod significat hoc nomen simitas, quod est congregatio nasi et simitatis, et non est pars definitionis concavitatis, sed est subjectum ei . . . forma praedicatur per se de habente formam, secundum quod declarat quiditatem ejus substantiam; materia vero non praedicatur de habente formam vera praedicatione, ne dum ut praedicetur per se; idolum enim non dicitur esse cuprum, nec homo caro, nec simus nasus. Averroes, *In VII Meta.* t. c. 34; *Opera Omnia* VIII (Venice, 1574), fol. 184-D-G.

[4] Averroes, *op. cit.*, t. c. 21; fol. 171I; cf. t. c. 35; fol. 186I-K.

[5] St. Thomas, *In VII Meta.*, 9, n. 1468.

[6] Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.* I, 44, 2. For a study of St. Thomas' thought on this question, cf. A. Pegis, 'A Note on St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica*, I, 44, 1-2', *Mediaeval Studies VIII* (1946), 159-168.

[7] Cf. St. Thomas, *In VIII Phys.*, 2, n. 4; ed. Leonine (Rome, 1884), p. 367.

[8] Aristotle, *Meta.* VI, 1, 1025b28 ff.; cf. St. Thomas, *In VI Meta.*, 1, nn. 1155-1161.

Of course Averroes knew as well as St. Thomas the Aristotelian distinction between the manner in which the natural philosopher and the mathematician define their objects. He realized that the mathematician does not include sensible matter in his definitions while the natural philosopher does.[10] Still, he did not draw the conclusion of St. Thomas, namely that sensible matter must be contained in the quiddity of a material thing. He always asserted that although such matter is a part of the composite substance and is necessarily included in the natural philosopher's definition of it, it is not contained in the quiddity of that substance. The quiddity is the form alone without matter.

It is not difficult to see why Averroes never drew the conclusion of St. Thomas. His aim in commenting on Aristotle was simply to state the authentic doctrine of the Stagirite, which for him was identical with philosophical truth;[11] and Aristotle himself never seems to have drawn the conclusion. On this point Averroes appears to have simply stated in his own terms the thought of Aristotle.

According to Aristotle, matter, form and the composite of matter and form are each in their own way *οὐσία*.[12] *Οὐσία* then, in his terminology corresponds to *substantia* in the Latin version of Averroes' Commentary. The Aristotelian term *τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι* corresponds to Averroes' *quidditas*. It designates, Aristotle says, *οὐσία* without matter.[13] It is primary substance (*πρώτη οὐσία*) and is identical with form (*ϵ ος*).[14] A recent historian has described the Aristotelian phrase *τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι* in this way:

> . . . the phrase presents the notion of a cause opposed to the unintelligible matter (which is the principle of contingency and change), and so expresses the formal, intelligible perfection of a thing. It implies that the form is the fundamental Being of the thing, and that whatever else may be in the thing derives its Being from the form. The form is designated by the peculiarly Aristotelian expression as the element in the thing which is that thing's necessary and unchangeable Being, in contrast in the physical order to the matter and the composite (both of which are changeable), and in the logical order to the generic characteristics (which are not necessarily restricted to the species in question). A thing is its generic nature, its matter and the composite. They are *what* it *is*. But what it necessarily and unchangeably and definitely *is*, is its form. The genera, the matter, or the composite may be the *what-is* of the thing. But only its form can be its *what-IS-Being* (*τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι*).[15]

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[9] Dicit enim superius in sexto quod res naturales habent in sui definitioni materiam sensibilem, et in hoc differunt a mathematicis. Non autem potest dici quod substantiae naturales definiantur per id quod non sit de essentia earum. Substantiae enim non habent definitionem ex additione, sed sola accidentia, ut supra est habitum. Unde relinquitur quod materia sensibilis sit pars essentiae substantiarum naturalium, non solum quantum ad individua, sed etiam quantum ad species ipsas. Definitiones enim non dantur de individuis, sed de speciebus. St. Thomas, *In VIII Meta.*, 9, n. 1468. Cf. 11, n. 1528: Definitio vero significat quid est res.

[10] Cf. Averroes, *In VI Meta.*, t. c. 2; fol. 146A-F.

[11] St. Thomas on the other hand had a twofold preoccupation in his commentaries: to read Aristotle correctly and to reach beyond him to philosophic truth. Cf. M. D. Chenu, *Introduction à l'étude de saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Montreal, Paris, 1950), p. 27.

[12] Aristotle, *Meta.*, VII, 10, 1035a1.

[13] Aristotle, *op. cit.*, 7, 1032b14.

[14] Aristotle, *loc. cit.*, 1032b1-2.

[15] J. Owens, *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics* (Toronto, 1951), p. 94. Cf. W. D. Ross, *Aristotle's Metaphysics* I, (Oxford, 1924), pp. cvi, 127.

If this is true, it seems that Averroes' identification of form with quiddity or essence is authentically Aristotelian. In making it, moreover, he was simply following in the steps of the classical Greek commentators on Aristotle, who recognized that for the Stagirite τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι or essence is form as distinct from matter.[16] Indeed even in the Middle Ages there were some who agreed with Averroes' interpretation of Aristotle on this point. Perhaps they are the followers of Averroes mentioned above by St. Thomas.[17] Among their number St. Albert is the most important—at least the young St. Albert writing his Commentary on the *Sentences*.[18] Adam of Buckfield's unedited Commentary on the *Metaphysics* also shows the influence of Averroes on this as on other points of doctrine.[19] Even more striking, however, is the evidence of Averroes' interpretation in the *Sapientiale* of Thomas of York, which cites the Arabian philosopher at great length on the identity of form and quiddity.[20]

If this interpretation of Aristotle is correct, certain statements in the *Metaphysics,* which at first sight are difficult to understand, become quite clear. For example, he says in one place that the definition of man does not include bones, sinew and flesh; only the parts of the form are parts of the definition.[21] Again, the definition of man is the definition of the soul.[22]

When he writes in this way, Aristotle is by no means denying what he said in Book VI of the *Metaphysics* about sensible matter appearing in the natural philosopher's definition of a natural substance. He is simply pointing out that such a definition is of a composite substance (σύνολος οὐσία) and not a definition of a substance in terms of its τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι.[23] In the latter sort of definition matter will not be present, for it is not part of the essence. The natural philosopher, however, is concerned with matter as well as with form. In his definitions, then, matter will be *added to* form. His objects of study are things constituted by addition (τὰ ἐκ προσθέσεως).[24] The objects of mathematics are different from those of the natural philosopher, for they are constituted by abstraction; that is to say sensible matter is deliberately left out of consideration.[25]

For Aristotle, then, there is a sense in which a composite substance has a definition including matter and form, and it is precisely this sort of definition that the natural philosopher formulates. What is significant from our point of view, however, is that such a definition is not one of the very essence of the thing. The essence is the form alone. The natural philosopher, unlike the mathematician, defines his objects in terms of matter because the forms he studies are not independent of matter; they imply a relation to it. Nevertheless, the essence of what he defines is form alone.

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[16] Cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias, *In Aristotelis Metaphysica Commentaria;* ed. M. Hayduck (Berlin, 1891), p. 490, ll. 27-29; Asclepius, *In Metaphysicorum Libros A-Z Commentaria;* ed. M. Hayduck (Berlin, 1888), p. 398, l. 37—p. 399, ll. 1-2; Themistius, *In Libros Aristotelis De Anima Paraphrasis;* ed. R. Heinze (Berlin, 1890), p. 22, ll. 4-6.

[17] Cf. *supra*, p. 165. Siger of Brabant does not follow Averroes on this point. Cf. his *Questions sur la Métaphysique* VII, 14; ed. C. Graiff (Louvain, 1948), p. 376. The fourteenth century Averroist, John of Jandun, does. Cf. his Questions on the *Metaphysics* VII, 12 (Venice, 1505), fol. 96.

[18] Cf. *infra*, p. 170.

[19] Adam quotes some of the characteristic statements of Averroes, such as: forma praedicatur per se de habenti formam et declarat quidditatem ejus substantialem; materia autem non praedicatur de habenti formam [vera] praedicatione. Adam of Buckfield, *Sententia super Meta.* VII; *Ms.* Balliol 241, fol. 40^{rb}. Cf. *supra*, note 3.

[20] Amplius ipse Aristoteles in VII *Meta.*, cap. 14a (1035a1-9), secundum expositionem Averrois, manifeste vult quod forma dicatur substantia rei, cum ipsa declarat essentiam illius. Materia autem est pars integritatis, non essentiae rei; forma vero est essentia. Unde et materia dicitur uno modo pars rei et alio modo non, secundum ipsum Averroem. Secundum vero considerationem ad substantiam compositam ex materia et forma, est materia pars substantiae. Secundum vero considerationem ad substantiam declarantem essentiam rei, non dicitur esse pars substantiae, sed comparens et definiens formam et suam definitionem. Thomas of York, *Sapientiale* III, 4, *Ms.* Florence, cod. *Conv. sopp.* A. 6.437, fol. 96^{v}.

[21] Aristotle, *Meta.*, VII, 10, 1035a17-33.

[22] Aristotle, *op. cit.*, 11, 1037a24-29.

[23] Elsewhere he says that the definition of the sunolon or composite will not refer to matter for that is indefinite. Cf. Ch. 11, 1037a27. On this point, cf. *infra*, p. 171.

[24] Aristotle, *De Caelo* III, 1, 299a16-17.

[25] Cf. M. D. Philippe, 'Abstraction, addition, séparation dans la philosophie d'Aristote', *Revue Thomiste* 48 (1948), 468; J. Owens, *op. cit.*, pp. 239-240. For the definition of composite substances, cf. O. Hamelin, *Le système d'Aristote* (Paris, 1920), pp. 119 ff.

It thus appears that an act of addition is required for the natural philosopher to grasp his object, as an act of abstraction is needed for the mathematician to grasp his.[26] Such a distinction, however, has no place in St. Thomas' philosophy, in which, as we shall see, the essence of a material thing includes both form and matter. It is significant that when St. Thomas comments on Aristotle he mentions the role of *addition* in natural philosophy,[27] but it plays no part in his own philosophy, where there seems to be no place for it.

II. AVICENNA AND ST. THOMAS.

A second opinion concerning the essence of material substances is attributed by St. Thomas to Avicenna. According to this view the essence of such substances is composed of matter and form; it does not consist in form alone. Sensible matter enters into the essence of the species, so that form is but a part of the quiddity, not the whole. Of course it is not a question of the essence being composed of this particular form and this particular matter, for the individual, such as Socrates and Callias, is composed of these; but rather of form and matter in general, as soul and body make up the essence of the species man. According to this opinion, St. Thomas says, the "form of the whole" (*forma totius*), which is the quiddity itself of the species, differs from the "form of the part" (*forma partis*) as whole from part.[28]

On several other occasions St. Thomas attributes the same doctrine to Avicenna.[29] However, the expressions *forma partis* and *forma totius* do not seem to appear in the Latin translation of Avicenna's works.[30] In his *Metaphysics* the form is said to be always a part of the quiddity (*forma enim semper est pars quidditatis in compositis*), while the quiddity is said to be the composition itself of form and matter.[31] Avicenna does not here call the quiddity a form; the form, however, is said to be a part of the quiddity, which is related to it as a whole.

St. Thomas adopted this Avicennian doctrine in his early work, the *De ente et essentia*,[32] and maintained it to the end of his career.[33] In one place in his

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[26] Cf. M. D. Philippe, *art. cit.*, 466-9; J. Owens, *op. cit.*, pp. 239-240.

[27] St. Thomas, *In III De Caelo et Mundo*, 3, nn. 4-5; ed. Leonine (Rome, 1886), p. 236. In his commentary on the *Metaphysics* St. Thomas says that definition by addition is not definition of a composite but of a form with its proper matter: Et propter hoc, sicuti accidentia definiuntur ex additione subjectorum, ita et forma ex additione propriae materiae. Cum igitur in definitione formae ponitur materia, est definitio ex additione; non autem cum ponitur in definitione compositi. *In VII Meta.*, 9, n. 1477.

[28] Unde est alia opinio, quam sequitur Avicenna; et secundum hanc forma totius, quae est ipsa quidditas speciei, differt a forma partis, sicut totum a parte: nam quidditas speciei est composita ex materia et forma, non tamen ex hac forma et ex hac materia individua. Ex his enim componitur individuum, ut Socrates et Callias. *In VII Meta.*, 9, n. 1469.

[29] *In I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 5, a. 2; ed. Mandonnet I (Paris, 1929), p. 229; *In IV Sent.*, d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 2, ad 2^m; ed. Vives II (Paris, 1874), p. 298.

[30] With regard to the term *forma totius*, Fr. Roland-Gosselin writes: Je ne l'ai pas rencontrée dans la traduction des oeuvres d'Avicenne. *Le 'De Ente et Essentia' de S. Thomas d'Aquin* (Le Saulchoir, Kain, 1926), p. 22, note 1. I have found neither it nor the expression *forma partis*.

[31] Definitio enim compositorum non est ex sola forma. Definitio enim rei significat omne id ex quo constituitur ejus essentia. Unde contingit ut contineat materiam aliquo modo. Et per hoc cognoscitur differentia inter quidditatem et formam; forma enim semper est pars quidditatis in compositis; omnis vero simplicis forma est ipsum simplex, quoniam non est ibi complexio. Compositorum vero forma non est ipsa composita, nec est eorum quidditas. Ipsa composita non est forma, ideo quia constat quod pars est eorum; quidditas vero est id quod est, quicquid est forma existente conjuncta materiae, quod quidem amplius est quam intentio formae. . . . Ergo forma est unum eorum quae conveniunt in hac compositione; quidditas vero est ipsa compositio complectens formam et materiam. Avicenna, *Meta.*, 5, 5, (Venice, 1508) fol. 90^{ra} F.

[32] *De Ente et Essentia* 2, pp. 19-20.

[33] Cf. *Compendium Theologiae* 154, *Opu-*

Commentary on the *Sentences* he contrasts it with Averroes' and calls it the "truer" doctrine.[34] Perhaps this qualification is a reflection of the non-committal attitude of his teacher St. Albert towards the two views in the same place in his Commentary on the *Sentences.* There St. Albert simply mentions the teachings of Avicenna and Averroes without showing any preference; or if any is shown, it is to Averroes', which he mentions last and which, significantly, he takes as the authentic interpretation of Aristotle:

> Si autem cum Averroe et Aristotele sentiamus quod forma totius est forma materiae, ratione tamen differens, sicut videtur velle in septimo *Primae Philosophiae* . . .[35]

In his own Commentary on the *Metaphysics,* however, St. Albert's interpretation seems to have undergone a change. There he distinguishes between the two meanings of form as quiddity, and as distinct from matter and part of the composite. Certain persons, he says, call the second form the quiddity, for instance the soul of man his quiddity, but this is an improper way of speaking.[36]

In his later writings St. Thomas does not qualify his acceptance of Avicenna's position. In his *Summa contra gentiles,* in the parallel place to the Commentary on the *Sentences* mentioned above, he drops the "truer" and simply makes the Avicennian doctrine his own.[37] He does the same in his Commentary on the *Metaphysics,* where he also presents it as the teaching of Aristotle in Chapter 10 of Book VII of the *Metaphysics*: *Et haec est sententia Aristotelis in hoc capitulo.*[38]

If we examine St. Thomas' commentary on this Book, we see how consistently he maintains this interpretation. However, it sometimes entails forcing the meaning of Aristotle's text. For example, in Chapter 10 the Stagirite determines what parts are to be included in a definition. He distinguishes between parts of the form (εἶδος) and parts of the composite of form and matter (σύνολον). He concludes that parts of the form alone are parts of the definition, and he explicitly adds that by the form he means the quiddity (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι).[39] Here the identification of quiddity and form as distinct from matter is expressly stated.

The Moerbeke translation of this passage used by St. Thomas is as follows:

> Pars igitur quidem est et speciei (speciem autem dico quod quid erat esse) et simul totius ejus quod ex specie et materia ipsa.[40]

Moerbeke used *species* to translate the Greek εἶδος, which is said to be identical with *quod quid erat esse,* the literal rendering of τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. This together with matter is said to constitute the whole or composite.

Commenting on this text, St. Thomas says that *species* includes matter, at least universal matter, and it is distinguished from form alone. When Aristotle asserts that the composite whole is composed of form (εἶδος, *species*) and matter, St. Thomas interprets this matter to be *individual* matter. To say that the composite is constituted *ex specie et materia* means for him that the nature of the species is in this determinate matter.

> Sic igitur patet quod materia est pars speciei. Speciem autem hic intelligimus non formam tantum, sed quod quid erat esse. Et patet etiam quod

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scula omnia 2; ed. Mandonnet (Paris, 1927), p. 106.

[34] Cf. *In IV Sent.,* d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 2, ad 2^{m}; ed. Vives II (Paris, 1874), p. 298. This text is incorporated into the Supplement to the *Summa Theologiae* q. 79, a. 2, ad 2^{m}.

[35] St. Albert, *In IV Sent.,* d. 44, a. 11; ed. Borgnet (Paris, 1894), p. 561.

[36] St. Albert, *In VII Meta.,* 1, 1; ed. Borgnet (Paris, 1890), pp. 401-2. Cf. *In II Phys.,* 2, 2 (Paris, 1890), p. 123.

[37] *Contra Gentiles* IV, 81 De humanitate.

[38] *In VII Meta.,* 9, n. 1469.

[39] Aristotle, *Meta.,* VII, 10, 1035b32.

[40] Cathala-Spiazzi edition of St. Thomas' Commentary, p. 361, n. 626.

> materia est pars ejus totius, quod "est ex specie et materia," idest singularis, quod significat naturam speciei in hac materia determinata.[41]

St. Thomas' distinction, however, between *species* and *forma* is not found in Aristotle's text. There *species* is form (εἶδος), because it must be added to matter to form the composite whole; it does not itself include matter. Clearly St. Thomas must force Aristotle's text to have it say that matter is included in the *species*.

In the same Chapter Aristotle explicitly identifies the soul of animals with their form (εἶδος) and quiddity (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι).[42] Moerbeke's translation of this passage of the *Metaphysics* runs as follows:

> Quoniam vero animalium anima est forma ipsorum (haec enim substantia est animati), quae secundum rationem substantia est et species et quod quid erat esse tali corpori . . .[43]

We find here the same identification of form and quiddity. Aristotle expressly tells us that the soul, which is the form of the animal, is its quiddity. St. Thomas does not deny it in his commentary on the text, but interprets it to mean that the soul is the quiddity of an animal because the organic body can only be defined through the soul:

> Corpus enim organicum non potest definiri nisi per animam. Et secundum hoc anima dicitur quod quid erat esse tali corpori.[44]

Once more the Angelic Doctor is obliged to interpret Aristotle's text in a forced way in order to bring it into line with his own thought.

Again, Aristotle says, "When I speak of substance (οὐσία) without matter, I mean the quiddity (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι).[45] Although the statement seems to apply generally to all quiddity, St. Thomas interprets it to mean the quiddity of an artificial thing in the mind of the producer: *Et ista species sive substantia sine materia est quam dixit supra quod quid erat esse rei artificiatae.*[46]

One more example may be cited. In Chapter 11 of Book VII Aristotle says that in a sense there is a definition of a composite substance (σύνολον) and in another sense there is not. There is no definition of it with its matter for that is indefinite; but there is a definition of it with reference to its primary substance (πρώτη οὐσία), for instance, in the case of man the definition of the soul. For, he adds, the substance (οὐσία) is the indwelling form (εἶδος) which with the matter constitute the composite substance (σύνολος οὐσία).[47]

Moerbeke's translation of this is as follows:

> Hujus (scil. totius) autem est aliqualiter ratio et non est. Nam cum materia, non est. Indeterminatum enim est. Secundum autem primam substantiam est, ut hominis quae animae ratio. Substantia namque est species, quae inest, ex qua et materia, tota dicitur substantia.[48]

What is the "matter" which does not enter into the definition of a composite substance because it is indeterminate? It would seem to be that which unites with form (for instance the soul) to constitute the composite whole. Now this is prime matter, which, since it has no determinate characteristics, cannot enter into the definition.[49]

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[41] *In VII Meta.*, 10, n. 1491.

[42] Aristotle, *loc. cit.*, 1035b14-16.

[43] Cathala-Spiazzi edition of St. Thomas' Commentary, *ibid.*

[44] St. Thomas, *loc. cit.*, n. 1484.

[45] Aristotle, *op. cit.*, 7, 1032b14.

[46] St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, 6, n. 1407. However, Averroes himself interprets this statement of the *Metaphysics* to mean that form without matter is form in the soul, and form in matter is form outside the soul. Still, form is here understood as quiddity. Cf. Averroes, *In VII Meta.*, t. c. 23; fol. 174B.

[47] Aristotle, *Meta.*, VII, 11, 1037a26-30.

[48] Cathala-Spiazzi edition of St. Thomas' Commentary, p. 366, n. 639.

Such an interpretation, however, is impossible for St. Thomas, for it implies that the *species* or form to which the definition corresponds does not itself include matter. It implies that this form is the quiddity, which Aristotle constantly identifies with the form (εἶδος) or primary substance of a thing. But then the quiddity does not contain matter. According to St. Thomas' interpretation the quiddity or species of a material thing does include universal matter, but not individual matter. So he understands Aristotle to mean that the matter which is indeterminate and hence not included in a definition is *individual* matter:

> Cujus quidem compositi aliquo modo est definitio, aliquo modo non est. Quia si accipiatur "cum materia", scilicet individuali, non est ejus definitio, quia singularia non definiuntur, ut supra est habitum. Cujus ratio est, quia talis materia individualis est quid infinitum et indeterminatum. Materia enim non finitur nisi per formam. Sed compositum acceptum "secundum primam substantiam," idest secundum formam, habet definitionem. Definitur enim compositum acceptum in specie, non secundum individuum.[50]

These are illustrations of the difficulty one has in trying to interpret the Aristotelian text as St. Thomas does. The text is indeed obscure, especially in its Latin translation, but it does not lend itself easily to the view that matter, even in the sense of universal matter, is included in the very quiddity of a material thing. A reasonably coherent view of being emerges from the Aristotelian *Metaphysics*, and in it the notion of τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι plays a central role.[51] It is the formal, intelligible perfection of a thing; the element which is its necessary and unchangeable being. As such, it is the thing's form. In the physical order it is contrasted with the matter and with the composite of matter and form. In the logical order it is the specific difference, contrasted with the generic determination. The Aristotelian concept of *what* the thing is (τὸ τί ἔστιν) is not identical with the concept of τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, for the latter is what the thing is necessarily and immutably and as intelligible to the intellect. The thing is its matter as well as its form. They are included in *what it is* (τὸ τί ἔστιν),[52] but because matter is unintelligible in itself and the root of change, it does not enter into the thing's very quiddity or τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι.

From the very beginning of his career St. Thomas adopted a somewhat different attitude. The notion of quiddity which we find in his *De ente et essentia* differs significantly from that of Aristotle, even though he presents them to us as identical.[53]

The name quiddity, he tells us in that work, is derived from what the definition signifies: *Quiditatis vero nomen sumitur ex hoc quod per definitionem significatur.*[54] Essence sometimes has the same meaning.[55] Hence whatever is included in the definition of a thing is included in its quiddity or essence.

Starting with this notion of quiddity it is not difficult for the Angelic Doctor to prove that matter must be contained in the essence of material substances. For the definition of these substances not only contains form but also matter; otherwise there would be no difference between definitions in natural philosophy and in mathematics.[56] Is it possible that matter is included in the definition of material substances and still is not contained in their essence? That is the crucial point. Can matter be present in the definition as *added to* the essence or as a being outside the thing's essence? As we have seen, the Aristotelian view seems to be that in the natural philosopher's definition of a material substance matter is added to the quiddity, which is the form alone. St. Thomas rejects this, however, for according to him it entails a confusion of the way in which accidents and substances are defined. The mode of definition by addition implies that matter is contained in the definition simply as the subject of the essence, and that the essence, being incapable of separate definition, is imperfect. But this is the way accidents, not substances, are defined. Hence St. Thomas concludes that the essence of natural substances cannot be form alone but the composite of form and matter.[57]

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[49] Cf. W. D. Ross, *Aristotle's Metaphysics* II (Oxford, 1924), p. 205.

[50] St. Thomas, *In VII Meta.*, 11, n. 1530.

[51] Cf. J. Owens, *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics* (Toronto, 1951).

[52] Cf. J. Owens, *op. cit.*, p. 93; L. Robin, *Aristote* (Paris, 1944), p. 88.

[53] . . . nomen essentiae a philosophis in nomen quiditatis mutatur. Et hoc est quod Philosophus frequenter nominat "quod quid erat esse", id est hoc per quod aliquid habet esse quid. St. Thomas, *De Ente et Essentia* 1, p. 16.

[54] *Loc. cit.*, p. 17.

[55] *Op. cit.*, 2, p. 19.

He looks for confirmation of this in Boethius. According to a dictum often quoted in the Thirteenth Century, Boethius maintained that οὐσία signifies the composite of matter and form,[58] and οὐσία, he tells us on the authority of Cicero, is the same in Greek as *essentia* in Latin.[59] But as Father Roland-Gosselin remarks, the famous dictum of Boethius cannot be found in the work to which it is attributed, his Commentary on the *Categories*.[60] Instead we read there that matter, *species* and the composite of the two are all called substance.[61] As we have already observed, this is good Aristotelian doctrine, if substance is understood as οὐσία. Οὐσία is a broad term designating not only the composite but also matter and form. St. Thomas' notion of essence, therefore, it not equivalent to the Aristotelian concept of οὐσία.

Still another consideration leads St. Thomas in the *De ente et essentia* to the conclusion that the essence of a natural substance embraces both form and matter. Although essence has the meaning of quiddity, or that which the definition signifies, it is also, and more particularly, defined in reference to existence. It is that through which and in which a being has *esse*: *essentia dicitur secundum quod per eam et in ea ens habet esse.*[62] Again, essence is that according to which a thing is said to be: *Essentia autem est secundum quam res esse dicitur.*[63] Now the *esse* of a composite substance does not belong only to the form or to the matter, but to the composite:

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[56] Neque etiam forma tantum substantiae compositae essentia dici potest, quamvis hoc quidam asserere conentur. Ex his enim quae dicta sunt patet quod essentia est id quod per definitionem rei significatur. Definitio autem substantiarum naturalium non tantum formam continet, sed etiam materiam; aliter enim definitiones naturales et mathematicae non differrent. *Ibid.*

[57] *Ibid.* St. Thomas specifies here that the essence is not the relation between form and matter or something added to them—a sort of *tertium quid* resulting from their union. Sometimes he uses expressions which would seem to suggest that the essence is a sort of *tertium quid. E. g.*: ipsa natura quae relinquitur ex conjunctione formae cum materia, ut humanitas. *In I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 5, a. 2, p. 229. But this is to be understood in the light of his explanation in the *De Ente et Essentia*. Cf. *Contra Gentiles* IV, 81: De humanitate vero, non est intelligendum quod sit quaedam forma consurgens ex conjunctione formae ad materiam, quasi realiter sit alia ab utroque. Possibly in his *De Ente et Essentia* he is clarifying a point which remains rather ambiguous in Roger Bacon's Questions on the *Metaphysics*. Bacon denies against Avicenna that the essence is the composite of matter and form, but rather results from their composition. Cf. R. Bacon, *Quaestiones supra libros Primae Philosophiae Aristotelis;* ed. Steele (Oxford, 1930), pp. 208-9. Some texts of Bacon are quoted in Roland-Gosselin, *Le "De Ente et Essentia" de S. Thomas d'Aquin* (Le Saulchoir, Kain, 1926), p. 6, note 1.

[58] *De Ente et Essentia* 2, p. 20.

[59] *Ibid.* Cf. Boethius, *De duabus naturis* 3; PL 64, 1344C. On the derivation of the word *essentia*, cf. E. Gilson, 'Notes sur le Vocabulaire de l'Etre', *Mediaeval Studies* VIII (1946), 152-5; M.-D. Roland-Gosselin, *op. cit.*, p. 8, note 2.

[60] M. -D. Roland-Gosselin, *op. cit.*, p. 8, note 1.

[61] Cum autem tres substantiae sint, materia, species, et quae ex utrisque conficitur undique composita et compacta substantia... Boethius, *In Cat. I, de Substantia;* PL 64, 184A.

[62] *De Ente et Essentia* 1, p. 17.

[63] *Op. cit.*, 2, p. 21.

> . . . esse substantiae compositae non est tantum formae nec tantum materiae, sed ipsius compositi.[64]

Hence the composite of form and matter and not the form alone is the complete principle through which the thing exists. Moreover, if the essence is that according to which a thing is said to be and to be a being, it cannot be form or matter alone, for whatever is composed of several principles is given its name not from one of them but from the composite.[65] It follows from this that the composite alone is the essence.

St. Thomas adds that form alone is in its own way the *cause* of the *esse* of the composite, but this does not entitle it to the name of essence.[66] He seems to have in mind here a doctrine similar to that of Thomas of York, who says that form alone must be the essence because it gives *esse* to the substance. Thomas writes in his *Sapientiale*:

> Forma enim est pars quae cum fuerit, est res; id est, ad cujus esse sequitur esse rei. Ex quibus manifestum est quod forma dat esse rei. Constat autem quod illud quod esse dat alicui essentia ejus et quidditas est. Quare essentia et quidditas substantiae singularis est forma.[67]

According to St. Thomas, however, even though the form alone causes the *esse* of the substance, it is still only a part or principle of the composite, and so it is not the complete principle through which and in which the being has *esse*. Only the composite fits this description. It alone then is the essence.

The concept of essence at which we have now arrived with St. Thomas is quite different from that of Aristotle and Averroes. Essence or quiddity is viewed in relation to the act of existing (*esse*), of which it is simply the formal determination and specification. Essence is nothing in itself without *esse*, except in the mind conceiving it.[68] *Esse* is the act of the form and of the composite substance.[69] Hence form or quiddity is no longer, as it is for Aristotle, the supreme act and the ultimate principle of being and intelligibility.[70] Being and intelligibility no longer ultimately derive from form to matter and to the composite, but rather from *esse*. For *esse* is the actuality of all acts and the perfection of all perfections.[71] It is also the root of all intelligibility, for anything is knowable in the measure in which it has *esse*.[72] Indeed, how could it be otherwise in a philosophy like St. Thomas', in which God, who is at the peak of actuality and intelligibility, is *Ipsum Esse Subsistens?*

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[64] *Ibid.* Esse autem non convenit formae tantum nec materiae tantum, sed composito: materia enim non est nisi in potentia; forma vero est qua aliquid est, est enim actus. Unde restat quod compositum proprie sit. *Contra Gentiles* II, 43. The essence conceived as *quo est* must be distinguished from the essence conceived as *quod est* or the subject of existence; *e.g.* humanity from man. Humanity is conceived by *precision* as the formal principle of man, and it is related to it as part to whole. In both senses, however, essence includes both form and matter. For the distinction between them, cf. *De Ente et Essentia* 3, pp. 30-32; *In I Sent.*, d. 23, q. 1, a. 1, pp. 555-6; *In VII Meta.*, 5, nn. 1378-9; *Quodlibet* 2, 4; *Sum. Theol.* 1, 3, 3. In the latter two texts St. Thomas distinguishes humanity from man as essence from supposit. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the thorny problem of this distinction.

[65] Unde oportet quod essentia, qua res denominatur ens, non tantum sit forma neque tantum materia, sed utrumque, quamvis huiusmodi esse suo modo sola forma sit causa. Sic enim aliis videmus, quae ex pluribus principiis constituuntur, quod res non denominantur ex altero illorum principiorum tantum, sed ab eo, quod utrumque complectitur. *De Ente et Essentia* 2, p. 21. In still another sense, St. Thomas says: ens dicitur ab actu essendi. *De Veritate* I, 1; cf. *In IV Meta.*, 2, n. 558. In this sense, ". . . being is that which is 'be-ing', in virtue of the very 'to be' which it exercises." E. Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers* (Toronto, 1949), p. 179.

[66] Cf. *supra*, note 65. Both form and essence are in their own ways principles of *esse*. They are principles *quo est*. Only the form, however, is the cause of the *esse*, for it gives *esse* to matter as a formal cause. Potest enim dici "quo est" ipsa forma partis, quae dat esse materiae. . . . Potest etiam dici "quo est" ipsa natura quae relinquitur ex conjunctione formae cum materia, ut humanitas. *In I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 5, a 2, p. 229.

[67] *Sapientiale* III, 4; *Ms.* Florence, *cod. Conv. sopp.* A. 6,437, fol. 96^v. It does not seem that St. Thomas knew the *Sapientiale* when he wrote the *De Ente et Essentia*, for both were being written about the same year, 1255. Thomas of York died about 1260. Cf. E. Longpré, 'Fr. Thomas d'York', *Arch. Fran. Hist.*, XIX (1926), 881.

[68] *De Potentia* 3, 5, ad 2^m. Cf. L.-M. Régis, *L'Odyssée de la Métaphysique* (Montreal, 1949), p. 35.

[69] Ad ipsam etiam formam comparatur ipsum esse ut actus. Per hoc enim in compositis ex materia et forma dicitur forma esse principium essendi, quia est complementum substantiae, cujus actus est ipsum esse. *Contra Gentiles* II, 54. Cf. E. Gilson, *Le Thomisme* (Paris, 1944), p. 49; *Being and Some Philosophers* (Toronto, 1949), p. 175.

Once this viewpoint is adopted, not only are the notions of being and essence radically transformed, but the situation of matter relative to the essence undergoes a change. As long as essence is regarded from the standpoint of intelligibility, as *what* a thing is necessarily and immutably, it will tend to be focused in the form to the exclusion of matter, for matter is in itself unknowable and the root of change. On the other hand, as soon as it is regarded "existentially", in relation to existence, matter will be seen as not foreign to essence, for what the thing *is*, is not form, but a composite of form and matter.

What is more, it now becomes possible to see that matter enters into the essence even regarded from the viewpoint of intelligibility. The existence of each being is a gift of God, created out of nothing according to an intelligible pattern which is a divine idea. In the case of a material being, matter forms a part of that intelligible pattern, so that even though strictly speaking there is no divine idea of prime matter, for in itself it neither exists nor is knowable, still there is a divine idea of the composite, which includes prime matter.[73] Although unintelligible in itself, prime matter is thus essential to the full intelligibility of the composite and enters in full right into the essence of a material being.

It appears that Aristotle was prevented from seeing this, at least in clear fashion, just because he was not aware that the material world is brought into existence from nothing, and that the existence thus conferred on it is its supreme actuality of being and the source of its intelligibility. Like his master Plato he considered matter eternal, and form the ultimate perfection of being and knowability.[74] However much he may have differed from Plato in his conception of matter and form, he shared with him these fundamental views, which dominate his notion of quiddity as form.

However, even though Aristotle identified quiddity with form, we find tendencies and suggestions in his philosophy which point to the integration of matter in quiddity. It is these which St. Thomas seizes upon and develops, leading the Stagirite into avenues unknown to himself.

Aristotle tells us that definition manifests *what-is* and substance (*τί ἐστι καὶ οὐσία*).[75] Commenting on this, St. Thomas says:

> . . . definitio est manifestativa eius quod quid est et substantiae, idest essentiae cuiuslibet rei.[76]

For him, the *what is* and substance manifested by the definition can only be the essence. And since what is manifested by the definition of a material substance is a composite of matter and form, both must be embraced in that essence. Thus the connection of matter with form in the definition leads St. Thomas to the conclusion of their integration in the essence.

The reference to matter in the definition was seen by Aristotle. W. D. Ross notes that he originally describes essence as substance without matter and constantly identifies it with form as opposed to matter. Still, he goes on to point out, the Stagirite was aware of the need of defining the essence of a "materiate universal" in reference to the kind of matter in which alone that essence can be embodied, for example man in reference to his dominant parts, such as heart or brain.[77] This "unsuspected implication of matter in essence",[78] which Aristotle never seems to have clearly seen, is precisely what St. Thomas brings into the light. His achievement in this regard rests upon an Aristotelian principle, but its full accomplishment remains his own. We can say of it, as Prof. Gilson says of his doctrine of creation:

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[70] Cf. J. Owens, *op. cit.*, pp. 94, 213-226.

[71] St. Thomas, *De Potentia*, 7, 2, ad 9^{m}.

[72] Unumquodque, quantum habet de esse, tantum habet de cognoscibilitate. *Contra Gentiles* I, 71.

[73] St. Thomas, *De Veritate*, 3, 5; *Sum. Theol.* I, 15, 3, ad 3^{m}.

[74] For Aristotle's doctrine of form, cf. J. Owens, *op. cit.*, especially pp. 213-226.

[75] *Posterior Analytics* II, 3, 90b4, 91a1. By translating Aristotle's *what-is* in this context by "essential nature" the Oxford translation gives a "scholastic" turn to Aristotle's statements.

[76] *In II Post. Anal.*, 2, n. 10; ed. Leonine (Rome, 1882), p. 334. Cf. *In VII Meta.*, 12, n. 1537.

> On ne saurait dépasser plus clairement les conclusions d'Aristote au nom d'un principe aristotélicien.[79]

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[77] W. D. Ross, *Aristotle's Metaphysics* I (Oxford, 1924), pp. civ, cvi. Cf. Aristotle, *Meta.*, VII, 10, 1035b25-26.

[78] W. D. Ross, *op. cit.*, p. cv.

[79] E. Gilson, *L'Esprit de la philosophie médiévale* I (Paris, 1932), p. 243, note 15.

Jois Among the Early Troubadours: Its Meaning and Possible Source*

A. J. DENOMY C.S.B.

THE word *jois,* apparently, was introduced into Provençal by the first known troubadour, Guillaume IX, Duke of Aquitaine.[1] At least, there is no trace of this development of Latin *gaudium* in the earliest extant monuments of Provençal literature before the appearance of his lyrics.[2] From that time on, *jois* largely displaces the native *gaugz,* though not wholly so.[3]

In its ordinary usage, *jois* is related to the passion of love. Subjectively, it denotes the feeling, emotion or passion arising from the possession or the expectation of the gifts of love:

> del joi qu'eu ai, ne vei ni au
> ni no sai que·m dic ni que·m fau.[4]

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[1] Vincenzo Crescini, *Manualetto provenzale* (2nd ed., Verona, 1905), p. 21, holds that *jois* is a borrowing from the North of France as does O. Schultz-Gora, *Altprovenzalisches Elementarbuch* (Heidelberg, 1906), p. 22 and Robert Karch, *Die nordfranzösischen Elemente im Altprovenzalischen* (Diss. Heidelberg, Darmstadt, 1901), p. 27. Alfred Jeanroy, *Les Chansons de Guillaume* IX (2nd ed., Paris, 1927), p. xii, and C. H. Grandgent, *An Outline of the Phonology and Morphology of Old Provençal* (Boston, 1909), p. 24, assert that the word is Poitevin in origin. F. Settegast, 'Joi in der Sprache der Troubadour', *Berichte über die Verhandlungen der königl. Sachs. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften,* XLI (1889), 152-153, denies that *jois* is a French borrowing and argues that it is unlikely that the Provençal troubadours would borrow from the French a word to express a concept which plays so important a role in their lyrics. On the contrary, *joi, gaug* and *jai* are three dialectal forms—which dialects he does not say—which were taken over into the poetic language of the troubadours. In their original dialects, all three had the general meaning of joy. With their entrance into the language of the troubadours, a differentiation was made. *Joi* was used by the troubadours who felt the need of a special word to designate the higher and nobler types of joys allied to love; *gaug* was used for the general meaning while at the same time it was utilized to express, too, the joy arising from love. Difficulties of rime moreover at times dictated the frequency of *joi* as against *gaug.*

[2] No examples of the development of *gaudium* appear in the *Boèce.* Cf. Vladimir Rabotine, *Le Boèce provençal, étude linguistique* (Strasbourg, 1930), pp. 39, 64. In the *Chanson de sainte Foy,* ed. Antoine Thomas, (Paris, 1925), it appears as *gauiz, gaui, ed. cit.,* lines 142, 357, 394, 452. In the *Evangile de saint Jean,* ed. Karl Bartsch, *Chrestomathie provenzale* (6th ed., Marburg, 1904), pp. 9-18, *gaudium* appears as *jaus, jauis* in the nominative singular and as *jau* in the oblique; *ed. cit.,* p. 13, line 44; p. 16, lines 5, 8, 11, 19. The *Evangile* is assigned by Bartsch to the eleventh century, *ed. cit.,* p. 13; by C. Hofmann, *Gelehrte Anzeigen der Bayer. Akademie der Wissenschaften,* July, 1858, 73-78, to the end of the eleventh or beginning of the twelfth; by Paul Meyer *Romania,* I (1871), 383, and A. Porschke, *Laut- und Formenlehre des Cart. du Limoges vergleichen mit dem Sprache des Ueber des Joh. Evangeliums* (Breslau, 1912) to the early twelfth century. There are no examples of the development in the religious poems attributed by Joseph Anglade as probably anterior to Guillaume IX, *Histoire sommaire de la littérature méridionale au moyen âge* (Paris, 1921), p. 16, and edited by Bartsch as of the eleventh century, *ed. cit.,* pp. 19-23. The word does not appear either in the first twenty five chapters—up to 1128—printed and collected by Clovis Brunel, *Les plus anciennes chartes en langue provençale* (Paris, 1926), pp. 1-28.

[3] Alegret, for example, uses the word but once and it appears as *gaug,* ed. J. M. Dejeanne, *Annales du Midi,* XIX (1907), 225. Bernard de Ventadour of Limousin uses the word *joi* 83 times as against once for *gaug;* Peire d'Auvergne, *joi* 23 times, *gaug* 8; Peire Vidal of Toulouse, *joi* 38 times as against 27 for *gaug.* This would lend credence to Karch's theory that *joi* was a borrowing made by the troubadours from the northern borderland, where the influence of French was strong. Cf. *op. cit.,* p. 27.

[4] With the joy that I feel, I neither see nor hear nor know what I am told nor what is done to me. Bernard de Ventadour 13, 20-21; ed. Carl Appel, *Bernard von Ventadorn, seine Lieder* (Halle, 1915), pp. 76-77. **Jois in** its original, subjective sense as a passion occurs infrequently but rather more so than Settegast would lead one to believe. Cf. *art. cit.,* 120. Especially is this true of Bernard de Ventadour, cf. 7, 27; *ed. cit.,* p. 42; 27, 30; p. 158; 35, 2; p. 199; 41, 6; p. 234; 44, 10; p. 260, etc.

It may express, too, the pleasure and the delight aroused by the contemplation of nature, a delight that induces the poet to song and to the consciousness of his own particular joy of love:

> Li prat vert e·il vergier espes
> M'ant si fait ab joi esbaudir
> Per qu'ie·m sui de chant entremes.[5]

More often, *jois* designates the objective delight or pleasure that love brings or promises, whether it be concrete or abstract:

> Totz lo joys del mon es nostre,
> Dompna, s'amduy nos amam.[6]

In certain cases both the subjective and objective colorings are present and it is difficult to know whether the poet is alluding to the pleasurable sensations of love or to its objective felicity and delight:

> Entre joi remaing et ira
> Ades quant de lei mi partis.[7]

Since the beloved is the source of joy, the word is used to designate her:

> Las! e viure que·m val,
> s'eu no vei a jornal
> mo fi joi natural
> en leih . . .[8]

She is, as Settegast remarks, like the sun that diffuses its light and is itself the light:

> joi ai de lui, e joi ai de la flor
> e joi de me e de midons major;
> daus totas partz sui de joi claus e sens,
> mas sel es jois que totz autres jois vens.[9]

In fact, the troubadours used *jois* as a *senhal* for their ladies.[10]

There is, however, a meaning the troubadours gave to *jois* other than the conventional ones noted above. As used by them, *jois* is neither the passion of joy, its source nor the objective delight of it. On the contrary, it expresses rather a habit or quality engendered by or accompanying love, a habit or quality associated by them with *Amors, Jovens, Pretz.*[11] It is used by the troubadours in this way hardly less frequently than in its usual senses that present no difficulty of translation or comprehension. A typical example are the opening lines of a lyric by Arnaut de Mareuil:

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[5] The green meadows and the thick orchards have so completely made me grow gay with joy that I have set myself to sing. Marcabru, XXXIX, 5-7, ed. J. M. Dejeanne, *Poésies complètes du troubadour Marcabru* (Toulouse, 1909), p. 191. Cf. Jaufré Rudel, I, 1-7, ed. Alfred Jeanroy, *Les Chansons de Jaufré Rudel* (Paris, 1915), p. 1; 3, 1-8; *ed. cit.*, p. 6; Bernard de Ventadour 31, 1-7; *ed. cit.*, p. 195; etc.

[6] All the joy of the world is ours, lady, if we love each other. Guillaume IX, VIII, 27-28; ed. Alfred Jeanroy, *Les Chansons de Guillaume IX* (Paris, 1913), p. 21. Cf. VII, 10-12, *ed. cit.*, p. 17; Piere d'Auvergne IV, 9-12, ed. Rudolph Zenker, *Die Lieder Peires von Auvergnes* (Erlangen, 1900), p. 89; *ibid*, 20-22; Bernard de Ventadour I, 9-10, *ed. cit.* p. 3; 12, 36; p. 71; 17, 41-42, p. 100, etc.; Jaufré Rudel III, 24, *ed. cit.*, p. 7; Marcabru XXXII, 5-8, *ed. cit.*, p. 112.

[7] I remain (torn) between joy and sadness as soon as I leave her. Cercamon IX, 29-30, ed. Alfred Jeanroy, *Les Poésies de Cercamon* (Paris, 1922), p. 28. Cf. V, 39-40, *ed. cit.* p. 17; Jaufré Rudel VI, 9-13, *ed. cit.*, p. 16; Bernard Marti 1, 53, ed. Enest Hoepffner, *Les Poésies de Bernart Marti* (Paris, 1929), p. 3; Bernard de Ventadour 4, 17-20, *ed. cit.*, p. 22; 23, 18-19, p. 135; etc.

[8] Alas! what does life avail me if I never see my pure, true joy abed. Bernard de Ventadour 28, 33-36, *ed. cit.*, p. 167. Cf. Guillaume IX, IX, 1-2, *ed. cit.*, p. 21; Cercamon V, 39-40, *ed. cit.*, p. 17; etc.

[9] Settegast, *art. cit.*, 120. I have joy at it (bird) and at the flower, of myself and of my lady more so. From every side I am enclosed and surrounded by joy, but she is a joy that surpasses all other joys. Bernard de Ventadour 39, 5-8; *ed. cit.*, p. 220.

[10] Thus Bernard de Ventadour calls his lady *Fis-Jois*, 19, 52, *ed. cit.*, p. 112; Daude de Pradas, *Joy Novelh;* XI, 8, ed. A. H. Schutz, *Les poésies de Daude de Pradas* (Toulouse, 1933), p. 50.

Si cum li peis an en l'aiga lor vida
l'ai eu en joi e totz temps la·i aurai,
c'Amors m'a faich en tal dompna chausir
don viu jauzens sol del desir qu'ieu n'ai,
tant es valens que, quan ben m'o cossir,
m'en nais orguoills e·m creis humilitatz;
mais si·ls ten joins amors e jois amdos,
que ren no·i pert mesura ni razos.[12]

Love of a woman of worth keeps the lover in a state of joy. That permanent condition of bliss is the lover's natural abode just as water is the natural sphere of the fish.

Alfred Jeanroy recognized *jois* taken in this sense as that *divinus afflatus* of which Cicero spoke,[13] a sort of mystical exaltation which has as its source and object at one and the same time the beloved and love itself,[14] a certain habit of the soul which engenders those virtues comprised under *cortezia.*[15] Both Jeanroy and Joseph Bédier[16] resume pretty well the conception of *jois* made before them by Claude Charles Fauriel:

> Partout où l'amour existe, et dès qu'il existe, il se manifeste par une certaine disposition d'âme, par une impulsion toute particulière à laquelle les troubadours donnent le nom de *joy*. . . . Le mot de *joy* . . . pris à la rigueur, et dans l'acceptation philosophique qu'il a certainement au moins quelquefois, exprime quelque chose d'expansif et d'énérgetique, une certaine exaltation heureuse du sentiment et du charme de la vie. . . .[17]

Settegast equated *jois* to love; not love as a passion but as a principle and ideal, a moral force influencing the life of the courtly company. It manifested itself as a cult of womankind and so is, at the same time, *Frauendienst* as well as *Liebe.*[18] Whereas love is a power directing the life and feeling of the soul, joy is an ideal or principle ruling the social and moral life through the idea of honor and service to woman. In this way it connotes the idea of *Fauendienst* which love does not.[19] For Eduard Wecchsler, *jois* is a remnant of two strains: heathen custom and pagan religion.[20] It springs from the sensual joy that is inherent in all primitive peoples and from the Greek εὐδαιμονία and ἡδονή first formulated as the moral norm of Greek culture by Democritus and the starting point of Aristotle's *Ethics*.[21] *Jois* is simply the same sensual joy of sexual love derived from the Germanic May festivals[22] raised to a rule of life and the source of all virtues under Greek influence. It is this joy that was sung of by the troubadours in open and determined contrast and defiance to the asceticism of the Church.[23]

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[11] Cf. Pretz e Jovens e Jois dechai, Marcabru XXIX, 17, *ed. cit.*, p. 134; Que Pretz e Joys e tot quant es, e mays, / N'auran aisselh qu'en seran poderos. Cercamon V, 9-10, *ed. cit.*, p. 15; de chantar me gic e'm recre, / e de joi e d'amor m'escon. Bernard de Ventadour 43, 59-60; *ed. cit.*, p. 254, etc.

[12] Arnaut de Mareuil VIII, 1-8, ed. R. C. Johnston, *Les poésies lyriques du troubadour Arnaut de Mareuil* (Paris, 1935), p. 44. Just as the fish spend their life in water, I spend mine and shall spend it always in joy, because Love has made me choose a lady whence I live joyous merely from the desire I have for her. So worthy is she, that when I ponder over it, pride surges forth in me and my humility increases; but love and joy holds them fast to such an extent that moderation and right judgement do not vanish.

[13] Cf. *De Natura deorum* 11, 66: Nemo vir magnus sine aliquo adflatu divino umquam fuit. Amor primum has virtutes suadet quibus homo, supra humilia elatus, quaecumque grandia, quaecumque generosa affectando omnibus sese venerandum simul et invidendum praebet. Ex eo enim oritur divinus ille afflatus, *gaudium*, illud quod omnes virtutes gignit. *De Nostratibus medii aevi poetis* (Paris, 1889), p. 31.

[14] *Les Chansons de Guillaume IX*, pp. xvi-xvi.

[15] Omnes virtutes quibus ea efficitur quam vocabant *cortesia* et quae, in summo, naturae singulariter repugnant, aliquo animi habitu nascuntur quem vulgo appelabant *joy*, ipsum amoris vi compositum. Aestus est animi quidam mirus, quo homines supra viles sensus extolluntur vividoque impetu in omnia pulchra generosaque impelluntur, vel si videantur non sine amentia tentari possunt. Qui tali aestu impletur, nihil nisi illam cogitat quam amat cujusque gratia omnia amittere non recusaret. *De Nostratibus medii aevi poetis*, p. 54.

[16] Cf. *Revue des deux mondes*, May, 1896, 169 ff.

[17] *Histoire de la poésie provençale* II (Paris, 1846), pp. 499-501.

[18] *Art. cit.*, 125.

It is the purpose of the present article to weigh these opinions and to amplify, if possible, the indications of previous studies on the nature of *jois* by an examination in their context and in themselves of the instances of the word so used.[24] These instances are drawn from the earlier troubadours who helped to establish and mould the concept for their immediate successors and from other troubadours who maintained and continued the tradition established by their predecessors.[25] It may be that, with a clearer and more extended idea of *jois*, we may be able to trace it back to the source or sources from which the troubadours drew the main elements for their concept.

II

Guillaume IX, Duke of Aquitaine, the first troubadour known to us, devoted one of his lyrics to *jois*. Jeanroy describes the poem as an enthusiastic hymn in honor of joy, a hymn that predicates the existence of the thing and the word.[1] In it Guillaume uses the word in several senses: as the source of his joy, his lady; as the concrete emotion or passion, as the abstract objective felicity that love engenders; finally, as the quality or condition of soul accompanying requited love or, at least, the knowledge and hope that his love will be returned.

Guillaume tells us that, joyfully, he is falling in love with a lady whom he desires:

Mout jauzens me prenc en amar
Un joy don plus mi vuelh aizir.[2]

Apparently he has been joyless since he expresses the wish 'to return to joy', to reestablish himself in that state or condition which love brings in its train. Therefore, it behooves him to direct his love to the best possible object:

Et pus en joy vuelh revertir
Ben dey, si puesc, al mielhs anar.[3]

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[19] *Art. cit.*, 126-127.

[20] *Das Kulturproblem des Minnesangs*, Band I *Minnesang und Christentum* (Halle, 1909), p. 35.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 49.

[22] Cf. Herman Suchier, 'Der Troubadour Marcabru', *Jahrbuch für rom. und eng. Sprache und Literatur*, XIV (1875), 119 ff. and 2173 ff. Gaston Paris saw in *joi* rather a remnant of the pleasure of love as exemplified in the Romance May Festival, *Romania*, XII (1883), 516 ff.

[23] *Das Kulturproblem des Minnesangs*, p. 50. Cf. also p. 321.

[24] Pierre Belperron's book *La "Joie d'Amour"* (Paris, 1949) is not germane to our purpose. He does not touch on the technical question of joy as such; he is concerned with the origins and nature of Courtly Love and with the troubadours and their poetry. For him, *joy* is a new sentiment, unknown to the ancients and to the Christian Middle Ages, which apart from its sexual aspect, creates the 'joie d'aimer'—a sentimental exaltation which transcends desire by spiritualising it and which raises the lover beyond the common level of man. *Op. cit.* p. 49.

[25] We do not propose to differentiate between the forms that *gaudium* took on in the speech of the troubadours. That has been sufficiently studied by Settegast.

[1] *Les Chansons de Guillaume IX, duc d'Aquitaine* (Paris, 1913), p. xvii.

[2] IX, 1-2, *ed. cit.*, p. 21. Greatly rejoicing do I begin to love a joy I want greatly to possess.

[3] *Ibid.*, 3-4, *ed. cit.*, pp. 21-22. And since I desire to return into joy, I ought, if I can, search out the best (i.e. the best possible object).

He cannot boast of good qualities or claim as his own any good repute, but if any joy, any inchoate germ of joyousness, ever bloomed and fructified, then he is sure that his will surpass all others:

Ieu, so sabetz, no·m dey gabar
Ni de grans laus no·m say formir,
Mas si anc nulhs joys poc florir,
Aquest deu sobre totz granar
E part los autres esmerar,
Si cum sol brus jorns esclarzir.[4]

He goes on to characterize his lady, matchless in worth and beauty, most gracious and affable. He who succeeds in attaining the joy that love of her achieves may well live on indefinitely:

E deu hom mais cent ans durar
Qui·l joy de s'amor pot sazir.[5]

For the joy that she inspires, the joyousness that she induces in the beloved through the granting of her love, can heal the sick. Vice-versa, the sorrow and misery that is caused by the lack of her love, by her failure to requite, can cause death to the healthy man, can make a fool of the wise man, make the ugly handsome and the courtly to be a vilain:

Per son joy pot malautz sanar,
E per sa ira sas morir
E savis hom enfolezir
E belhs hom sa beutat mudar
E·l plus cortes vilanejar
E totz vilas encortezir.[6]

Since a fairer or sweeter creature cannot be found or seen or pictured, the poet asserts his determination to hold fast to her in order that his heart may be reinvigorated and his body renewed. If she is willing to grant him her love, he is ready to accept it, to be thankful to her, to conceal it, to do her will in all things and to advance her praise. So great is his fear of irritating her, he does not dare to send her any message through a third party, nor does he dare manifest his love so great is his fear of failure. She should have his best interests at heart since she knows that only through her may he be cured.

In his other poems that have come down to us, Guillaume uses *jois* frequently to express the same permanent condition of blessedness to which he wishes to return. Amid the beauties of spring, the flowering meadows and orchards, the gushing rivers and fountains, everyone cannot but take delight in the joy in which he delights:

Pus vezem de novelh florir
Pratz o vergiers reverdezir,
Rius e fontanas esclarzir,
　　Auras e vens,

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[4] *Ibid.*, 7-12, *ed. cit.*, p. 22. I, you know, am not wont to boast nor can I attribute to myself great praise, but if any joy ever was able to flourish, this one ought to bear fruit above all others and shine forth beyond the rest just as a dark day that grows bright.

[5] *Ibid.*, 23-24; *ed. cit.*, p. 23. And the man who can obtain the joy of her love should live more than a hundred years.

[6] *Ibid.*, 25-30; *ed. cit.*, *ibid.* Through the joy that originates from her the sick man can grow well, and through the sadness that originates from her, the healthy man can die, the wise man become a fool, the handsome man lose his good looks, the most courteous man become a vilain and every boor become a courtier.

Ben deu quascus lo joy gauzir
Don es jauzens.[7]

In this general introduction to his poem, there is no question of the poet's personal experience. As a matter of fact, Guillaume goes on to say that he has never had much success in love, that it has ever been his destiny not to enjoy those whom he has loved, that he has never been able to attain his desire. Rather, he is here enunciating a general principle, that in spring especially it behooves a man to relish (*gauzir*) the habitual bliss (*joy*) that keeps him joyous (*jauzens*).[8] Guillaume seems to ascribe to *jois* a technical meaning other than its usual, normal signification. As a matter of fact, he links it up with two other words to which are ascribed such meanings: *amors* and *jovens*.[9]

In an early poem which he characterizes as more nonsensical than sensible—the dilemna as to which of two excellent steeds to choose—he says of it:

Et er totz mesclatz d'amor e de joy et de joven.[10]

We know that *amors* was conceived of as the font and origin of all wordly worth and excellence, that *jovens* was that moral quality that constituted perfection embracing as it did especially the virtues of liberality, fidelity and purity. In its association with these two, *jois* would seem to be used likewise in a technical sense.

On the eve of his painful separation from his lands and his son, a prey to worry over the ultimate fate of both, and especially that of his son, Guillaume commends both to the care of Foucon d'Anjou.[11] He asks pardon of his fellows he may have wronged, bids farewell to the life that he has known—a life characterized by *proeza* and *joi*. Now that he is approaching the end of his life, he resigns himself to the will of God that he renounce the pomp and chivalry he has loved so much. He begs his friends to pray for him after his death:[12]

Qu'eu ai avut joi e deport
Loing e pres et e mon aizi.[13]

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[7] VII, 1-6, *ed. cit.*, p. 16. Since we see, anew, the meadows bloom or the orchards grow green again, rivers and fountains grow clear, winds and breezes, indeed everyone ought to take delight in the joy with which he is joyous.

[8] The editor translates *jauzens*: qui lui est departie. *Jauzens*, however, is the nominative singular, modifying the subject of *deu*. It is the subject *quascus* who is rejoicing, full of bliss.

[9] Cf. A. J. Denomy, '*Fin' Amors*, the Pure Love of the Troubadours, Its Amorality, and Possible Source', *Mediaeval Studies*, VII (1945), 149-151; '*Jovens*: the Notion of Youth among the Troubadours, its Meaning and Source', *Mediaeval Studies*, IX (1949), 3-9.

[10] I, 3; *ed. cit.*, p. 1. And it will be a complete mixture of love and joy and youth.

[11] His departure is occasioned by a pilgrimage he entered upon when his excommunication was lifted about 1117, cf. Dom. Bouquet, *Receuil des historiens des Gaules et de la France* XII (Paris, 1877). p. 406. Diez denies that this poem is a Crusade poem but admits that it was composed on the occasion of one, cf. *Leben und Werke der Troubadours* (Zwickau, 1829), pp. 15-16. In view of lines 27-28, 32, 37, the poem seems, rather, to have been composed before the author's death at a time when he was acutely conscious of his approaching end. Begging the pardon of his fellow men and of Our Lord, speaking of himself as setting forth to meet Him before Whom all sinners finally stand, the poet's resignation to God's will, his plea for prayers after his death—all of these indicate a poem composed before death rather than a pilgrimage. The *fais* of line 31, then, would not mean excommunication as Jeanroy (*ed. cit.*, p. 40) conjectures, but the burden of this life, and that of his sins.

[12] The text: XI, 38, *ed. cit.*, p. 28, reads: Que vengan tut e m'onren fort. 'To honor' in this case, after his death and because he has had joy and merrymaking, does not seem to make sense with the context which indicates that he is leaving all in favor of a future, better life. It seems to me that the reading of *R*:

Totz mos amicx prec c'a la mort
Sian de mi e m'oron fort

or that of *N*: Veignon tuh sai a meu conort are preferrable and more in accordance with the context: the plea of a repentant Christian at the point of death for prayers for the sins of omission or commission during his life.

[13] XI, 39-40, *ed. cit.*, p. 29. For I have had joy and merriment, far and near and in my home.

He concludes with what may be termed his swan-song to his former way of life:

Aissi guerpisc joi e deport
E vair e gris e sembeli.[14]

I think we can understand what Guillaume has in mind when he speaks of merriment and princely raiment. These are the material luxuries and the diversions of the courtly life he has lead. He is abandoning these and in addition the natural habitual inner felicity and revelry that he has known.

Guillaume meant, then, by *jois* a habitual condition or state of bliss, one which may be lost through lack of love. This *jois* has the power to invigorate and renew body and soul, literally to heal the sick just as its opposite *ira,* sorrow brought on by lack of love, is capable of causing a well man to die, a wise man to be a fool. It is a condition belonging to a way of life characteristic of the courts and is intimately connected with other constituent elements of Courtly Love.

Like Guillaume IX, Cercamon wrote a poem on *joy*: *Puois nostre temps commens' a brunezir.* It is really a treatise on *fin' Amors* and the reward that it brings with it. Against the gloom and depression that comes with the advent of fall, the poet exhorts the cultivation of the joy of love as an antidote and to keep one's spirits high:

Per joy d'amor nos devem esbaudir.[15]

Those who serve love will be doubly rewarded a thousand-fold: they will attain Worth and Joy:

Aquest amor no pot hom tan servir
Que mil aitans no·n doble·l gazardos:
Que Pretz e Joys e tot quant es, e mays,
N'auran aisselh qu'en seran poderos.[16]

Such love is won by patience and fortitude. Only a chosen few attain it. It is *fin' Amors,* far out of the reach of cowards, the proud and the avaricious. False troubadours, by their praise of false love, mistaking lust for love, deceive and corrupt. They cause men and women to follow after lust and to cultivate Evil to the detriment of Youth and Prowess. They cause men to become avaricious and unhospitable. Since they cannot be corrected, leave them to God. As for himself, the poet has fallen in love with the fairest of women. He sees her but seldom but because of her, he is happy and joyous:

Petit la vey, mas per ella suy gays
Et jauzions, e Dieus m'en do jauzir.[17]

In concluding, Cercamon contrasts the sadness of love with its joyousness. He who is sorrowful and heavy of heart when face to face with love is fearful and fainthearted. He bears an unsufferable burden that may well cause his death:

Cercamon dis: "Qi vas Amors s'irais
Meravill'es com pot l'ira suffrir".
Q'ira d'amor es paors et esglais
E be·n pot hom trop viure ni murir.[18]

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[14] *Ibid.,* 41-42, *ed. cit., ibid.* So I abandon joy and merriment and minever and furs and sables.

[15] V, 6, ed. Alfred Jeanroy, *Les poésies de Cercamon* (Paris, 1922), p. 14. We ought to make merry through the joy of love.

[16] *Ibid.,* 7-10, *ed. cit.,* p. 15. No man can so serve this love that his reward does not double a thousand-fold, for those who possess it will derive from it Worth and Joy and everything that is and more.

[17] *Ibid.,* 41-42, *ed. cit.,* p. 17. I see her but seldom, but through her I am joyful and joyous and may God grant that I may have pleasure of her.

[18] *Ibid.,* 49-52, *ed. cit., ibid.* Cercamon says: 'Who grows sad face to face with love, it is wondrous how he can endure the

On the contrary, joy is the gift that pure love affords to those who steadfastly cultivate it:

Q'anc bon' Amors non galiet ni trais,
Anz dona joi als arditz amoros.[19]

Like Guillaume IX, Cercamon makes use of the term *jois* to denote the source of his love (line 39), the objective feeling to which love gives rise (line 56), and the state or condition that is the reward of pure love (lines 6 and 9). He couples *joy* with *Pretz,* the interior with the exterior, just as Guillaume had linked it with *proeza* and *deport.*

As may be recalled,[20] Guillaume IX had expressed the desire to revert or to return to joy. Cercamon gives vent to that same determination to retrieve his joy and in the context it is plain that the poet means a stable and enduring condition or state of joy accompanying love. He had been silent and as though asleep. His poetry had not been heard. But now, in the face of winter and the biting winds, he is awakening and resolved to recover his joy. It is useless for him to fly from it for there never was a day but that he was endowed with it. It has gushed forth to the depths of his heart so that he goes about as though bereft of his senses, bewailing the need and the desire of a great love:

Mas era·m vau ja reveilhan,
Et irai mon joi recobran
Contre l'ivern e·l freig aurei.
De joi n·m cal fugir enan,
C'anc un sol jorn no·n fui garnitz,
Et es m'al cor prion sorzitz,
Si qu'entre gens vau sospiran
Lo dezirier c'ai d'amor gran,
Ni dorm ni veil, ni aug ni vei.[21]

Again, Cercamon speaks of the companionship of joy as though it were some habit or quality. In a tirade against wantonness and lustful lovers, he laments that, because this state of affairs prevails, the fair weather of spring is of no avail to him in his song. He has not joy, nor does he gain it, nor does he rejoice in its companionship:

Mout mi val pauc lo temps cortes,
Q'eu non ai joi ni non l'ades,
Ni de sa compagnia no·m laus.[22]

It is the passing of this same spirit of joy, coupled with love and mirth, that causes the poet's despair in his tenson with Guilhalmi:

"Car vei fenir a tot dia
[L'amor], lo joy e·l deport,
E no·m socor la clerzia,
Non puesc mudar no·m cofort
Co fay, can conois sa mort,

---

sadness'. For the sadness of love is fear and terror and a man can live too long or die from it.

[19] *Ibid.*, 55-56, *ed. cit.*, p. 18. Never does pure love betray or deceive, rather does it grant joy to those who are courageous lovers.

[20] Cf. *supra*, p. 180.

[21] III, 4-12, *ed. cit.*, p. 8. But now I am awakening and I shall recover my joy in spite of the winter and the cold wind. From now on, it is of no avail for me to fly from joy for never was there a day that I was not filled with it, and it has surged up deep in my heart so that I keep sighing among people the desire that is in me of a great love; I sleep not neither do I keep awake, nor do I hear neither do I see.

[22] IV, 5-7, *ed. cit.*, p. 11. The courtly season is of very little worth to me because I do not possess joy nor do I draw near it, nor do I rejoice at its company.

Lo signes, que bray e cria
E·n mou son sonet per fort,
Que·l cove fenir sa via,
E plus no·i a de conort."[23]

In his *planh* on the death of Guillaume X, count of Poitou, Cercamon seems to characterize *jois* as a quality opposed to wickedness. Since the death of the count, the poet laments that he is saddened and grieved at the sight of Youth in decline, Evil in the ascendancy and Joy on the downgrade:

Lo plaing comenz iradamen
D'un vers don hai lo cor dolen;
Ir' e dolor e marrimen
Ai, car vei abaissar Joven:
Malvestatz puej' e Jois dissen
Despois muric lo Peitavis.[24]

A further indication that Cercamon considered *jois* as a habit appears later in the same poem. Addressing the Gascons, he sympathizes with them in the loss of their lord. As a result, Youth bewails its misery since now it has no one to whom it can repair except Lord Alfonso who has attained joy. *Jovenz* connotes those men united in their pursuit of the virtues comprised under the abstract *Jovens*: liberality, fidelity and purity.[25] Alfonso's is the sole court wherein such men may find shelter and patronage and the reason is that he has won joy:

Gasco cortes, nominatiu,
Perdut avez lo segnoriu,
Fer vos deu esser et esqiu,
Don Jovenz se clama chaitiu,
Qar un non troba on s'aiziu,
Mas qan n'Anfos, q'a joi conquis.[26]

The authenticity of the poem *Per fin' Amor m'esjauzira* has been called into question.[27] According to Alfred Jeanroy, it is close in chronology to Cercamon's authentic work and hence may serve to further our knowledge of joy of the troubadours of this period. *Jois* emerges as a permanent condition, a habit of the soul induced by love. The poet declares he will be joyous through love no matter the season of the year. Always will he be disposed towards such love. At the present time, he does not know whether he will be able to abide in joy or whether his beloved will wish to retain him as hers:

Per fin'Amor m'esjauzira
Tant quant fai chaut ni s'esfrezis;
Toz tems serai vas lei aclis,
Mas non puosc saber enquera
Si poirai ab joi remaner,

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[23] VII, 1-9, *ed. cit.*, p. 23. "Because I see love, joy and merriment expire every day and because the clergy do not help me, I cannot help but console myself as does the swan, when it knows its death is near at hand; it screams and shrieks and utters fearfully its cry, because it behooves it to end its life and because there is no other consolation."

[24] VI, 1-6, *ed. cit.*, p. 19. I begin this lament sadly with a verse whence my heart is broken; I am sad, sorrowed and grieved because I see Youth in decline: Evil ascends and Joy descends since the death of the man of Poitou.

[25] Cf. A. J. Denomy, '*Jovens*: the Notion of Youth among the Troubadours', *Mediaeval Studies*, XI (1949), 10-13.

[26] VI, 31-36, *ed. cit.*, p. 21. Courteous, renowned men of Gascony, you have lost your lordship, (a loss) that must be hard and cruel for you. Whence Youth proclaims itself wretched for it does not find anyone to shelter it except Lord Alphonsus who has acquired joy.

[27] Cf. *ed. cit.*, pp. iv, v and especially note 3.

O·m voldra per seu retener
Cella cui mos cors dezira.[28]

He would leave all to serve her; if he were ordered to leave her, he would die. She is his sole hope and of her he thinks continually. Yet she is hardly to be won because, whereas everyone else submits to love, she is intractable. Yet, the poet reflects, a lady cannot be of worth, not even through riches and power, unless the joy that arises from love animate her. Thus joy is not only a habit but the principle of human excellence:

E domna non pot ren valer
Per riquessa ni per poder
Se jois d'amor no l'espira.[29]

Cercamon has added to our knowledge of the nature of the joy of the troubadours in advancing and amplifying the concept of it derived from Guillaume IX. For him, as for Guillaume, joy is a permanent quality of joyousness accompanying love. It is a stable condition of the lover, one which the poet wishes to retrieve when lost and in which he desires to abide. It is a quality intimately associated with *Jovenz* and *Pretz* and opposed to *Malvestatz* and the source and principle of human excellence.

Except for a few significant exceptions, Jaufré Rudel uses the term *jois* in its usual signification as a passion aroused by love,[30] the source of his joy, the beloved,[31] and the objective delight of love or of nature.[32] In the poem *Belhs m'es l'estius e·l temps floritz,* however, the word denotes a permanent state or habit arising from love which is productive of worth and excellence. Jaufré relates how he had strayed from the way of pure love and how his aberration had since been a source of worry and anxiety to him. Now he has rid himself of the burden of false love and has returned to the practice of *fin' Amors.* Therefore, the wintry weather is more pleasing to him than the summertime because it is at this time that more of joyousness has fallen to his lot:

Mas ieu tenc l'ivern per gensor
Quar mais de joy m'i es cobitz.[33]

In his new and pure love, the poet is joyful and joyous, restored to the excellence he had lost through false love. Pure love is the source of this beatitude which in its turn is the source of his worth:

Er ai ieu joy e suy jauzitz
E restauratz en ma valor.[34]

Like Guillaume IX and Cercamon,[35] he has returned to the state or condition of joy that he had lost. Therefore, those whose advice he had followed in his predicament hold him high in their regard:

Mout mi tenon a gran honor

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[28] VIII, 1-7, *ed. cit.*, p. 26. I shall rejoice through pure love when it is warm as well as when it grows cold. Ever shall I be submissive to it, but I do not know as yet if I shall be able to abide in joy or whether she whom my heart desires will wish to keep me as her own.

[29] *Ibid.*, 18-20, *ed. cit.*, p. 27. And a lady cannot be of any worth whether through wealth or might unless the joy of love be her inspiration.

[30] VI, 9-13, ed. Alfred Jeanroy, *Les Chansons de Jaufré Rudel* (Paris, 1915), p. 16.

[31] III, 26, *ed. cit.*, p. 7.

[32] *Ibid.*, 5-6, *ed. cit.*, p. 6.

[33] IV, 3-4, *ed. cit.*, p. 9. But I consider the winter to be more pleasant, because then more of joy has fallen to my lot.

[34] *Ibid.*, 8-9, *ed. cit.*, *ibid.* Now I am joyous and am rejoiced and reestablished in my worth.

[35] Cf. *supra*, pp. 180, 184.

Tug silh cui ieu n'ey obeditz
Quar a mon joy suy revertitz.[36]

Elsewhere Jaufré declares that the consolation of a love that is a cause of worth is preferable as a teacher of song to the glories of nature. Let shepherds and children have their pipes; his choice is that love through which he may at once be joyous and in a state of joy. Having been made joyful through love, he is rejoicing:

Pro ai del chan essenhadors
Entorn mi et ensenhairitz:
Pratz e vergiers, albres e flors,
Voutas d'auzelhs e lays e critz,
Per lo dous termini suau,
Qu'en un petit de joy m'estau,
Don nulhs deportz no·m pot jauzir
Tan cum solatz d'amor valen.
Las pimpas sian als pastors
Et als enfans burdens petitz,
E mias sion tals amors
Don ieu sia jauzens jauzitz![37]

The power of love as the source of the habit of joy is expressed again in the poem *Quan lo rossinhols el folhos.* Amid the glories of nature, the poet experiences a great joy that comes to rest in his heart. Its cause is the love of a worthy lady. Night and day, love of her occupies his thoughts. That love is the source of his wondrous joy. He takes pleasure in it, made joyous through the love that gives forth joy:

D'aquest' amor suy cossiros
Vellan e pueys sompnhan dormen,
Quar lai ay joy meravelhos,
Per qu'ieu la jau jauzitz jauzen.[38]

Jaufré Rudel does not add to any great extent to our appreciation of the concept of joy among the early troubadours. In his poems, he uses the word to indicate a permanent state of bliss, a habit provoked by true love which gives rise to goodness.

The poet Marcabru repeatedly personifies *jois* and brings it into close association with *Amors, Jovens, Proeza, Pretz* and *Deport.* As such, it becomes a sort of quality or attribute which is proper to those who love purely. The relationship of Love to Joy is clear: love is its source. If one were to cease loving, if one were to cease putting one's mind on pure love, joy would disappear and the quality of Youth would be shamed:

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[36] *Ibid.*, 22-24, *ed. cit.*, p. 10. All those whom I have obeyed in the matter hold me in high honor because I have come back again into my joy.

[37] III, 1-12, *ed. cit.*, p. 6. I have plenty of masters and mistresses of song about me,—meadows and orchards, trees and flowers, the trilling of birds, their songs and their chirping throughout the delightful fragrant season so that I have some joy; nevertheless there is no diversion that can make me rejoice as much as can the solace of a virtuous love. Let shepherds and small frolicking children have their flutes; let mine be such loves whence joyous I may be in a state of joy. Jeanroy translates the last line 'qui me permettent de procurer et de recevoir de la joie'. We are dealing with the present active participle *jauzens* modifying *ieu*—to be actually enjoying, and the past participle passive *jauziztz* which coupled with 'sia' should denote a state.

[38] I, 15-18, *ed. cit.*, p. 2. I am absorbed in thought concerning that love, wakeful and then dreaming as I sleep, because in her I have wondrous joy; wherefore, in a state of joy, do I delight in her who actually gives joy. Jeanroy translates 'C'est alors que ma joie est merveilleuse, car alors je la possède, recevant et donnant du plaisir'. There is no question of possession here be it physical or intentional. Moreover *jauzen* is in the oblique case modifying *la.* It is the beloved who gives joy, who is its source. *Jauzitz* modifies the subject *ieu*—he who has been already rejoiced, who is in the state of joy.

Cuidador d'amor volatgier
Son de folla cuida mainier,
Qu'en mil no·n trob una corau
D'aqestas amors cuidairitz,
    Pero cuidar
    Non dei blasmar
Del tot, que Jovens for' aunitz;
Si cuiars d'Amor fos oblitz
Jois fora tombatz en canau.[39]

Love is the very root of joy and joy is its effect and outgrowth:

C'Amors a signifianssa
De maracd' o de sardina,
E[s] de Joi cim' e racina.[40]

The love which is productive of joy must be true love (*Amors*) not false love or lust (*Amars*). Those troubadours lie who equate them and who claim that pure love betrays and deceives him who refuses to love falsely. He who cultivates pure love is rewarded by the possession of Joy, Patience and Moderation:

Per so·n port ir' e pesanssa
C'aug dir a la gen frairina
C'Amors engan' e trahina
Cellui cui Amars reneia;
Menton, que lor benananssa
Es Jois, Sofrirs e Mesura.[41]

This state of joyousness, arising from love, assuages the bitterness of the lover separated from the beloved and uncertain of her constancy:

E fassa caut o freidura,
Trastot m'es d'una mezura
Amors e Joys, d'eyssa guiza.
On plus n'ay meilhor coratge
D'amor, mielhs m'es deslonhada,
Per qu'ieu no·m planc mon dampnatge?
Qu'aitals es ma destinada
Que Joys e Bon' Aventura
Mi tolh un pauc de rancura
Que m'es ins el cor assiza.[42]

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[39] XIX, 37-45, ed. J. M. L. Dejeanne, *Poésies complètes du troubadour Marcabru* (Toulouse, 1909), pp. 90-91. Those who have their minds on inconstant love belong to a senseless frame of mind, because among a thousand of such loves pondered upon I do not find a one that is sincere. But I must not blame thinking on love entirely, because Youth would be dishonored; if putting one's mind on Love were forgotten, Joy would have perished (*lit.* fallen into the canal).

[40] XXXVII, 31-33, *ed. cit.*, p. 180. Because Love has the significance of emerald or of sardonyx, it is the height and root of Joy.

[41] *Ibid.*, 19-24, *ed. cit.*, p. 179. Wherefore am I sad and grieved when I hear the brotherhood say that Amors (true love) deceives and betrays him who foreswears Amars (false love). They lie for their gain is Joy, Patience and Moderation.

[42] XXVIII, 12-21, *ed. cit.*, p. 131. Whether it be warm or cold, Love and Joy are one to me in exactly the same way. There where is my greatest yearning for love, it (i.e. love) has withdrawn away further from me. Why do I not complain of my loss? Because such is my lot that Joy and Good Fortune take away from me the little bit of bitterness that has come to rest in

It is his good fortune that he has another beloved in mind whose love is certain and pure. It is to her that he will turn should pride or lack of pity turn his first lady from him. That love is secure and stable which is impregnated with pure joy:

S'ieu lieys pert per son folhatge,
Ieu n'ay autra espiada,
Fina, esmerada e pura,
Qu'aitals amors es segura
Que de fin joy es empriza.[43]

Where joy does not exist or, at least, does not dominate, then there is no ennobling such as must follow upon love. This state of joyousness, then, is the condition, the substratum or *sine qua non* of man's progress in virtue. Everything follows its natural bent,—the perverse man or woman cannot but act perversely and irrationally, for after all, the evil tree brings forth evil fruit. Therefore, if one thinks evilly, then its fruit will result in the worse possibly evil. And the reason is that Joy is not in the ascendancy:

Greu er ja que fols desnatur,
Et a follejar non recim
E folla que no·is desmesur;
E mals albres de mal noirim,
De mala brancha mala flor
E fruitz de mala pesansa
Revert al mal outra·l pejor,
Lai on Jois non a sobransa.[44]

An echo of the ennobling effect of Joy is seen in the opening lines of a poem in praise of pure love and in condemnation of the wretches who refuse to love purely:

Pus mos coratges s'es clarzitz
Per selh Joy don ieu suy jauzens.[45]

Marcabru pictures Joy as incompatible with evil and vice. Joy cannot coexist with evil:

Proeza·s franh et avoleza·s mura
E no vol Joi cuillir dinz sa clauzura.[46]

In a poem lamenting the banishment of Prowess from the world, Marcabru satirizes complacent husbands, shameless wives and misers. He begins by lamenting his failure to hear the song of the birds in spring and to see the verdure and blossoms. Instead, he hears the frightening outcry of Joy complaining of the abuses heaped upon her by Evil:

Non auch chant ni retentida
Ni non vei brondel ab flor,
Empero si ai auzida
Una estraigna clamor,
De Joi que·is plaing, ses ufana,

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my heart.

[43] *Ibid.*, 31-35, *ed. cit.*, p. 132. If I lose her through her frivolity, I have discerned another, true, chaste and pure because such love is stable that is rooted in perfect joy.

[44] XIII, 33-40, *ed. cit.*, pp. 54-55. It will be difficult always for the senseless person to go against his nature and not to begin again to act senselessly, and for a senseless woman not to be intemperate; and a bad tree springs from bad sustenance, an evil flower from an evil branch and the fruit of evil thought reverts to evil, beyond the very worst, there where Joy is not uppermost.

[45] XL, 1-2, *ed. cit.*, p. 196. Since my spirit has been illumined through that joy with which I am joyous. Cf. XXX, 33-35, *ed. cit.*, p. 139.

[46] IX, 21-22, *ed. cit.*, p. 38. Prowess is shattered and baseness walls herself in and will not welcome Joy within her keep. Cf. XXXII, 86-87, *ed. cit.*, p. 156.

Cui Malvestatz disciplina.
Proeza es forbandida,
E son malvatz li meillor.[47]

Joy belongs to Youth, the quality of perfection among courtly lovers. If Youth falls from its high estate, then it is bereft of its most prized possession—Joy. It is baseness that is the cause of this:

Jovens fo ja bautz apellatz,
Mas aras es si recrezutz
Que jamais non er tant honratz
Per que Jois li sia rendutz,
C'Avoleza l'a si conques
C'anc de pois no·n poc erebir
Que·is parti de lui Dreitz ni Fes.[48]

As a matter of fact, Marcabru often links up Youth and Joy together as companion habits or qualities. In the castle of Prowess, besieged by the followers of Evil, are found Joy and Youth, her companions:

Pres es lo castells e·l sala,
Mas qu'en la tor es l'artilla
On Jois e Jovens e silla
Son jutjat a pena mala;
Qu'usquecs crida "fuec e flama!
Via dinz e sia prisa!
Degolem Joi e Joven
E Proeza si' aucisa".[49]

Love and Joy are dependent upon Youth. *Jovens* is the father of the world and Love is its mother. Together they engender all the human excellences comprised under *Proeza*. But let Youth fail, then Love is gone and loses its inheritance which is Joy:

Tant cant bos Jovens fon paire
Del segle e fin' Amors maire,
Fon Proeza mantenguda
A celat et a saubuda,
Mas er l'ant avilanada
Duc e rei et emperaire.
Qu'ieu sui assatz esprovaire,
Deffendens et enquistaire,
E vei cum Jovens se tuda,
Per que Amors es perduda
E de Joi deseretada
E cum Amors es cujaire.[50]

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[47] XXXII, 7-14, *ed. cit.*, p. 174. I do not hear song nor cadence, not do I see a branch in flower, but I have heard a strange outcry from Joy whom Evil is ill-treating, lamenting without bombast. Prowess is banished and the most virtuous are evil.

[48] XXXIX, 36-42, *ed. cit.*, p. 193. Youth was once called high-spirited, but now it is so recreant that never will it be honored to such an extent that Joy be given it. For baseness has so conquered it that, since that time, it has not been able to prevent that Justice and Fidelity separate themselves from it.

[49] XI, 17-24, *ed. cit.*, p. 43. The castle and the armory are captured except that there is resistance in the tower where Joy and Youth and she are doomed to evil suffering. For everyone shouts out 'Fire and flame! Make a way within and let it be captured. Let us throttle Joy and Youth and let Prowess be killed.' Cf. also XXII, 1-6, *ed. cit.*, p. 107; XLIV, 1-2, *ed. cit.*, p. 208.

[50] V, 37-48, *ed. cit.*, p. 21. As long as true Youth was father to the world and pure Love its mother, Prowess was maintained secretly and publicly, but now dukes and kings and emperors have debased it. Be-

Jovens is destroyed by two vices: wantonness, lack of fidelity in love and by miserliness.[51] So also Joy disappears when these vices are present. Where there is lack of trust, Worth, Youth and Joy cannot stand. The shepherdess explains this to the poet who asks her love, a love that she has placed elsewhere:

"Bella, fich m'ieu, pois Jois reviu
Ben nos deven apareillar".
"Non devem, don, que d'als pensiu
Ai mon coratg' e mon affar".
"Digatz, bella, del pens cum vai
On vostre coratges estai?"
"A me fe, don, ieu vos dirai,
S'aisi es vers cum aug comtar,
Pretz e Jovens e Jois dechai
C'om en autre no·is pot fiar"[52]

In an attack upon lascivious husbands, Marcabru berates them for their lust and infidelity. Joy and Youth have become untrue to their natures and by their treachery and fickleness have given rise to evil:

Eras naisson dui poilli
Beill, burden, ab saura cri
Que·is van volven de blanc vaire
E fan semblan aseni;
Jois e Jovens n'es trichaire
E malvestatz eis d'aqui.[53]

Not only is this condition of joyousness incompatible with lust and faithlessness, it is also abolished by avarice and lack of largesse. Liberality is the brother of Youth. The swerving of Youth from its rightful path and the silent withdrawal of largesse are ascribed to the non-possession of Joy and Youth:

Desviatz de son cami
Jovens se torn' a decli,
E Donars qu'era sos fraire,
Va s'en fugen a tapi,
C'anc dons Costans l'enganaire
Joi ni Joven non jauzi.[54]

A miser does not love Joy. Marcabru ascribes the reason to an erroneous way of thinking—intentness on lust which destroys Joy:

Cuidan s'en van lo tort sentier
Siulan tavan per esparvier
E laisson la dreita carrau
Per lo conseill dels garaignitz

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cause I am a passable essayer, defender and seeker (of it) and I see how Youth is doing away with itself, wherefore Love is lost and disinherited of Joy and (I see) how Love is troubled.

[51] Cf. A. J. Denomy, '*Jovens*: the Notion of Youth among the Troubadours', *Mediaeval Studies*, XI (1949), 6-8.

[52] XXIX, 8-18, *ed. cit.*, p. 134. 'Fair one, I said, since Joy lives again, indeed we ought to enter into union'. 'We ought not, sir, because my heart and my concern are turned in thought elsewhere'. 'Tell me, fair one, how goes the thought where your heart is turned?' 'By my faith, sir, I shall tell you—if it is true as I hear tell—Worth and Youth and Joy perish since one cannot put his trust in another.'

[53] XVII, 25-30, *ed. cit.*, pp. 72-73. Now two colts come to life, handsome, frolicksome and with sorrel manes that keep changing from white to vair and cause them to look like asses. Joy and Youth are thereby tricksters and Evil issues thence.

[54] *Ibid.* 7-12, *ed. cit.*, pp. 71-72. Turned aside from its road, Youth falls into decline and Largesse which used to be its brother, steals stealthily away for never did Sir Constans, the deceiver, enjoy Joy or Youth.

Que fan cuidar
Al ric avar
So don Jovens es marchezitz,
E Jois es entre·ls francs faillitz.[55]

When through deceit, faithless wives foist the children of other men upon their husbands, thence arises avariciousness because not one of them has any attachment to Joy and its exterior manifestation *Deport*:

Eyssamens son domnas trichans
E sabon trichar e mentir,
Per que fan los autrus enfans
Als maritz tener e noyrir;
D'aqui naisso·l malvat avar
Qu'us non ama Joy ni Deport
Ni n'auza hom entr'elhs parlar.[56]

It is Marcabru's contention that the failure to prize Joy and Merriment is the reason why the nobility of France is shattered and lacking in Prowess. They have failed to heed the call to the Crusade because they have not cherished these two qualities:

E·l critz per aquest lavador
Versa sobre·ls plus rics captaus
Fraitz, faillitz, de proeza las,
Que non amon Joi ni Deport.[57]

Joy and largesse are linked intimately together. Only those who love purely possess them. When Youth is deceived by Evil, when husbands indulge in infidelity, then Joy is stunned and largesse but little cultivated:

Lo pretz del dan e del barat,
De calque part sia vengutz,
Ant moillerat;
Et ieu ai lo lor autreiat,
E Jois es entr' els esbauditz[58]
E Donars alqes mantengutz.[59]

Marcabru makes use of the word *jois* to signify a permanent state or habitual quality of mind arising from pure love. It is a habit whose roots are love and which depends on the quality of Youth for its existence. Where Joy does not prevail, then love cannot realize its ennobling effects. It is, as it were, the basic condition or substratum of Prowess. Failure to abide in joy and to exercise its exterior manifestation of high spirits and merrymaking results in debility, enervation and weariness in the practice of prowess. Joy cannot coexist with baseness because it is a property of Youth. When Youth has the ascendency, then Joy prevails in the pure lover. But let Youth be destroyed by the contrary vices of lust, faithlessness and avarice, then Joy is dispelled because of its dependence on it.

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[55] XIX, 64-71, *ed. cit.*, p. 92. Thinking evilly they go following the wrong road whistling after a fly as if it were a sparrow-hawk. They leave the correct road through the advice of niggardly persons who cause the wealthy miser to give heed to that by which Youth is made a matter of barter and Joy is made to disappear from among the noble-hearted.

[56] XXXIV, 22-28, *ed. cit.*, p. 166. Women likewise are tricksters and know how to cheat and lie; wherefore do they make their husbands maintain and support other men's children. From this spring the base misers because not a one loves Joy nor Merriment nor does a man dare to speak about such things among themselves.

[57] XXXV, 60-63, *ed. cit.*, p. 171. And the blame for this 'lavador' falls upon the mightiest lords who are broken, remiss, empty of prowess because they have no love of Joy or Merriment.

[58] *Esbauditz* does not seem to make sense. Cf. XXII, 9, *ed. cit.*, p. 107; XXXIX, 6. *ed. cit.*, p. 191, for the meaning 'to enliven'. The opposite meaning is required as the context shows. It is the poet's contention throughout the poem that false love destroys Joy and Largesse. Manuscript *a* reads *per zo car ies iois iauzitz*. Perhaps the reading is an error for *aburzitz* (XIX, 4, *ed. cit.*, p. 89) or some such word to express the meaning expected.

[59] IV, 37-42, *ed. cit.*, p. 15. The payment for the injury and the trafficking goes to the husbands, from whatever direction it may come. As for myself, I grant it to them, and Joy is [benumbed] amongst them and Largesse maintained but little.

It is that habit of joyousness that Bernard de Ventadour seems to have in mind when he declares his poetry matchless because he holds and maintains his internal and external faculties in the joy that springs from pure love:

Chantars no pot gaire valer,
si d'ins dal cor no mou lo chans;
ni chans no pot dal cor mover,
si no i es fin' amors coraus.
per so es mos chantars cabaus
qu'en joi d'amor ai et enten
la boch' e·ls olhs e·l cor e·l sen.[60]

The poem that follows is in praise of *fin' amors,* its worth as the source of all good, and in condemnation of that vulgar, requited love which is so often made a matter of barter. The poet himself loves a fair lady purely. He is not without hope of being loved in return. All he asks is that he be allowed to serve her. In the *tornada* Bernard states that his poem is perfect and true to nature. That man who understands its subject matter is good; better is he who hopes for or anticipates the joy of the pure love with which it deals. As for himself, he comprehends it, bespeaks and puts it into practice, and looks forward to the joy to which it gives rise;

Lo vers es fis e naturaus
e bos celui qui be l'enten;
e melher es, qui·l joi aten.
Bernartz de Ventadorn l'enten,
e·l di e·l fai, e·l joi n'aten.[61]

This joy of love to which the poet directs his body and soul is something different from the emotion or feeling of joy. It connotes a state of heart, a habit resultant upon love. It is the beloved who keeps him in this state of joyousness through the love and desire she inspires in him:

A! tan doussetamen me pres
la bela qui·m te jauzion,
qued eu no·m posc saber vas on
re mais tan ben amar pogues.[62]

ai! tan grans enveya m'en ve
de cui qu'eu veya jauzion,

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[60] 15, 1-7, ed. Carl Appel, *Bernart von Ventadorn, seine Lieder* (Halle, 1915), p. 85. Composing cannot be of avail unless the composition originates from within the heart. The composition cannot originate from the heart unless there be in it pure love. That is why my composing is superior because I keep and aim my mouth and eyes, my heart and mind towards the joy of love.

[61] *Ibid.,* 50-54, *ed. cit.,* p. 87. The poem is perfect and true to nature and excellent is he who understands it; and better is he who looks forward to the joy of it. Bernard de Ventadour understands it and he composes it, declaims it and looks forward to the joy of it.

[62] 5, 15-18, *ed. cit.,* p. 28. Ah! so tenderly did she receive me, the fair one who keeps me joyous, that I could not conceive whence I could ever love anything so much.

meravilhas ai, car desse
lo cor de dezirer no·m fon.[63]

He appeals to the lady who inspires this joyousness:

bona domna jauzionda
mor se·l vostr' amaire.[64]

Joy and love go hand in hand. Bernard often links them together.[65] In anguish at his heartless and merciless lady who will not allow him to love and serve her, the poet tells her that he is giving up composing poetry and that he is renouncing joy and love:

Tristans, ges no·n auretz de me,
qu'eu m'en vau, chaitius, no sai on.
de chantar me gic e·m recre,
e de joi e d'amor m'escon.[66]

In another poem, however, he takes the opposite tack and denies that he will ever relinquish joy and love for any hardship that may follow from them:

Ja no crezatz qu'eu de joi me recreya
ni·m lais d'amar per dan c'aver en solha,
qu'eu non ai ges en poder que m'en tolha,
c'amors m'asalh, que·m sobresenhoreya.[67]

Bernard classes joy with worth and merit. In his *tenson* with Peire he declares himself against love because he has served a worthless lady. It is such as her that have destroyed the effects of pure love:

Peire, qui ama, desena,
car las trichairitz entre lor
an tout joi e pretz e valor.[68]

Because love is the source of all that appertains to prowess, Bernard would prefer the joyousness to which it gives rise to the mastery of the whole world:

Per re non es om tan prezans
com per amor e per domnei,
que d'aqui mou deportz e chans
e tot can a proez' abau.
nuls om ses amor re no vau,
per qu'eu no volh, sia mia
del mon tota·lh senhoria,
si ja joi no·n sabi' aver.[69]

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[63] 43, 5-8. *ed. cit.*, p. 250. Ah! so great longing comes upon me for whomever I may see giving joy that I marvel that my heart does not burst immediately with desire.

[64] 44, 53-54, *ed. cit.*, p. 262. Good lady, giver of joy, your lover pines to death.

[65] Cf. 42, 5-7, *ed. cit.*, p. 241; 43, 59-60; p. 254; 44, 9-12; p. 260.

[66] 43, 57-60, *ed. cit.*, p. 254. Tristans, you will never gain more (songs; cf. *ed. cit.*, note 57, p. 256) from me, because brokenhearted I go off I know not where. I relinquish and abandon song and I hide from joy and love.

[67] 42, 8-10, *ed. cit.*, p. 241. Never believe that I forsake joy nor have done with love for any injury that I am wont to have from it; I am absolutely unable to withdraw myself from it, since love assails me that completely dominates me.

[68] 2, 46-48, *ed. cit.*, p. 12. Peire, the man that loves is out of his mind because the dissembling women have, between them, foredone joy and worth and excellence.

[69] 21, 25-32, *ed. cit.*, pp. 119-120. By nothing is man made more excellent than by love and the service of women, for thence arises merriment and song and all that pertains to goodness. No man is of value without love; wherefore I do not desire that all the mastery of the world were mine if I were never able to have joy of it (*i.e.* love).

The state of joyousness is the condition of man's worth. That man who does not abide in joy and who does not direct his affections and desires towards love is an evil man:

Ben es totz om d'avol vida
c'ab joi non a son estatge
e qui vas amor no guida
so cor e so dezirer.[70]

Thus *jois*, the effect and outgrowth of love, is the sphere in which man must move and have his being if he is to be a good man. Bernard goes further and declares that man cannot be of worth unless he loves and is joyous:

Can vei la flor, l'erba vert e la folha
et au lo chan dels auzels pel boschatge,
ab l'autre joi, qu'eu ai en mo coratge,
dobla mos jois e nais e creis e brolha;
e no m'es vis c'om re poscha valer,
s'eras no vol amor et joi aver,
pus tot can es s'alegr' e s'esbaudeya.[71]

For Bernard de Ventadour, *jois* at times denotes a habit which has its origin in pure love and which pervades the lover's whole being. It is the beloved who maintains him in this constant state of joyousness through the love and desire she inspires. This condition of joyousness is the basis or foundation, the groundwork of man's excellence. He who does not abide in joy and direct his mind and his desires towards love is an evil man; he cannot be of worth.

The best outline of Peire d'Auvergne's concept of joy as a state or condition and its necessity for moral worth is given in his poem *L'airs clars e·l chans dels auzelhs.*[72] In the exultant springtime, nature puts into the poet's mind to compose an easily understood poem such as may be sung by anyone who cares. Let knights sing it because singing brings gaiety and he who is not joyous when nature affords the time for it, loses the greatest boon of his lifetime:

per qu'ara chanten cavalier
que chans aporta alegrier,
e pert de son segle lo mais
qui segon sazo non es gais.[73]

It is the poet's contention, moreover, that sadness and great vexation of mind do not produce goodness or prowess. They result, rather, in damage and disorder. Just as all evil arises from cupidity, so every black deed has its origin in habitual mournfulness. Therefore, he who desires to be joyful, let him hold to the straight path and leave sadness and gloomy bearing to the evil and wicked:

Doncs qui de gaug a dezirier,
tenga a dreit so semdier

---

[70] 23, 9-12, *ed. cit.*, p. 135. Every man indeed leads a wretched life who has not his abode in joy and who does not direct his heart and his desire towards love.

[71] 42, 1-7, *ed. cit.*, p. 241. When I see the flower, the green grass and the foliage, and when I hear the song of the birds amid the thicket, together with the other joy that I have deep in my heart, my joy doubles and springs to life and grows and blooms; and I do not see how a man can be of any worth if now he is unwilling to possess love and joy since all creation grows glad and merry.

[72] Ed. Rudolf Zenker, *Die Lieder Peires von Auvergne* (Erlangen, 1900), pp. 83-94.

[73] I, 9-13, *ed. cit.*, p. 83. Therefore let knights now sing because singing brings gaiety and the man who is not gay according to the season of the year loses the major part of his lifetime.

e l'ira e l'avol parven lais
als malvatz malfachors savais.[74]

Peire speaks of two kinds of joy: *gaug ufanier* and *gaug entier,* ephemeral, transitory joy and complete, perfect joy. One arises from sense pleasure, the other from perception and knowledge; one is born of sense, the other of the mind; one results in degradation, the other in growth and increase of worth:

Mas dels dos jois es ops:[75] sens
    e reconoissensa;
e l'us es abaissamens
e l'autre creissensa.[76]

If a man has given himself up to the world and to the pursuit of its delights, let him turn where he will, wherever the world most strongly calls him, he will find that only that worldly action is pleasing which is done with no need of repentance to follow:

E s'om s'es lo mon seguens,
vir se on mais l'agensa,
qu'aiselh sos faitz es grazens
qu'es ses repentensa.[77]

The man who cultivates the empty, vain joy of sense to the exclusion of the true joy of the mind and heart is compared to a dog who lets fall its prey into the water, seduced by its reflection there:

qu'aitals es de gaug ufanier,
qui·lh sec e defug l'autr' entier,
cum del can cui cazec del cais
la carns, quan l'ombra el' aigua·l trais.[78]

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[74] *Ibid.,* 21-24, *ed. cit., ibid.* Therefore he who desires joy, let him hold to his path precisely and let him relinquish sadness and base mien to the wicked, evil malefactors.

[75] The editor has emended the line to read: *Mas dels dos jois a ops*: *sens / e reconoissensa,* following the suggestion of Carl Appel, *Provenzalische Inedita aus Parisier Handschriften* (Leipzig, 1890), p. 290. He translates: Aber zwei Dinge braucht Freude: Verstand und Selbsterkentniss (*ed. cit.,* p. 155) and confesses that he is unable to follow the line of thought of the whole stanza: der Gedankenzusammenhang in diesen Vers ist mir nicht recht klar (*ed. cit.,* p. 176). In his review of Appel's *Inedita,* Emil Levy had pointed out that the manuscript reading should be retained, *Literaturblatt für germanische und romanische Philologie,* XIV (1893), 18, as did Jules Coulet in his review of Zenker's edition, *Annales du Midi,* XIV (1902), 377. The latter translates: Mais pour ce qui est des deux sortes de joies, il faut de la raison et du discernement. It seems clear that the poet has in mind the distinction between merely sensual love with its sense pleasure which degrades and the joy that arises from the perception of the mind which ennobles. The latter—pure love—is the constant preoccupation of the troubadours. As his predecessors had done, Peire seeks to distinguish lust and pure love which entails sense pleasure as well. Cf. A. J. Denomy, *'Fin' Amors*: the Pure Love of the Troubadours, Its Amorality and Possible Source', *Mediaeval Studies,* VII (1945), 183, 205.

[76] I, 25-28, *ed. cit.,* p. 84. Joy has need of two things: sensation and cognition; and the one is degradation and the other enhancement.

[77] *Ibid.,* 29-32, *ed. cit., ibid.* And if one follows the world, let him turn wherever most it attracts him, because its deed is pleasing only when it is done without repentance. Jules Coulet, *ibid.,* translates: et si l'on vit selon le monde, qu'on aille vers celle que l'on préfère. La joie qui fait agréer toutes ses actions (c'est-à-dire les actions qu'elle inspire) est celle qui ne laisse pas de regrets. He supposes that the subject of *agensa* is *joi* and that *sos* refers to *joi.* The poet, however, is here concerned with the world and its adherents and is trying to point out the disinction between the debasing joy of sense to be found there and the ennobling joy of mind. The subject of *agensa* is the world and *sos faitz* refers to wordly actions. Only such action is *grazens* which brings no reason for repentance in its train. For another but similar interpretation, cf. O. Schultz-Gora, *Literaturblatt* XXIII (1902), 72.

[78] *Ibid.,* 33-36, *ed. cit., ibid.* For such a man is an adherent of empty joy who pursues it and retires from the other which is perfect, just like the dog from whose jaws the meat falls when its reflection in the water attracts its attention. Cf. Zenker's translation, *ed. cit.,* p. 155 and note, *ed. cit.,*

Peire is concerned, as his master Marcabru had been, with true love *bona amors* (line 41), the true joy to which it gives rise on the one hand, and love that is fickle and deceitful *amars* (line 44), with its resultant vain and transient joy on the other. The man who has set his mind on worldly joy, the closer he approaches it, the more it eludes him. The poet has set his hopes on a love that is faithful and without deceit. The reason is that the joy which arises from the latter belongs to him who gives himself to love without dissimulation, fickleness or gloominess. Only then does his worth and renown increase and flourish day by day. Just as the rose on the rosebush surpasses in beauty all other flowers in the garden, so the state of joy that has its source in true love surpasses all other joy that ever was or is:

Que·l sieus jois gensetz esjau
selhui qui·l s'autreja
senes fenh' e semblant brau
e ses vair' enveja,
qu'ades a quasqun jornau
sai viu e verdeja
sa valors ab ver lonc lau,
cui totz pretz sopleja;
que, cum resplan roz' en rozier
gensetz d'autra flor de vergier,
sobra sobre totz jois sos jais
del maior gaug qu'anc nasc ni nais.[79]

It is Peire's teaching that joyousness which has its source in true love is ennobling, a force for increase in human worth; conversely, that habitual gloominess, heaviness of spirit are the source of dark deeds and the characteristics of evildoers. If, then, we read Peire's *Bel m'es, quan la roza floris*[80] with that teaching in mind, its import becomes somewhat clearer.[81] It is, really, that the indifference of the nobles of his day towards the Crusades is the direct outcome of their failure to cultivate true love, the source and font of human excellence, and to enjoy that state of joyousness that is basic for increase in moral worth.

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p. 176: Ich verstehe: ‘Mancher prählt mit Freude, d. h. ist reich an Freude, da, sie nachlauft, und einen andern flieht sie ganzlich etc.

[79] *Ibid.*, 49-60, *ed. cit.*, *ibid.* For its joy (of pure love) better rejoices him who gives himself over to it without pretence and harsh seeming and inconstant desire, for then daily does his value live and grow green with true praise which every worth supplies. For just as the rose on the rosebush is more splendid than any other flower in the garden, so does its joy (of true love) surpass every joy in reference to the greatest joy that ever arose or arises.

[80] X, *ed. cit.*, pp. 107-108.

[81] The editor is somewhat puzzled by the apparent lack of connection between stanzas II and III with their praise of the King and their exhortation to the Crusade on the one hand, and stanzas IV and V with their reproaches levelled against the person who sets at naught the joy of this world and their philosophy of love on the other. In explanation, he appeals to what, according to him, was a procedure in the composition of later *sirventes*: to couple two quite heterogenous themes within the same poem. He notes that even in Peire's time this method was not unusual and points to Marcabru's *Auzetz de chan com enans' e meillura* (ed. Dejeanne, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-38). There stanzas I-IV deal with the ascendancy of evil and the sad state of *proeza*, stanzas VII-XI with the praise of the Counts of Poitou, Alfonso of Toulouse and Alfonso of Leon without any reference to the foregoing stanzas (*ed. cit.*, pp. 190-191 and p. 46).

On the contrary, an examination of Marcabru's poem shows that there is a very close connection between the two sections. The poet attacks evil, the parsimony of the wealthy, notes that Youth is turned aside from its path and that Joy finds no reception, only to praise by contrast the worth of Count Guillaume X of Poitou and Count Alfonso of Toulouse and to threaten that if he does not find a welcome with the latter, he will turn to Alfonso of Castille and Leon, the noble, openhearted, courteous and generous king. He prays the King of Kings to enlighten him on what to expect from the latter.

It is perfectly true that Peire has copied his master's procedure. That procedure did not consist in linking together two quite unrelated themes into the same poem but to couple two related and dependent concepts: the depths to which nobility has fallen and then to advance the reasons thereof.

The poet is concerned that laughter and gaiety have ceased because of pagan victories. Neither count nor duke are taking up the Cross. He grieves for the emperor who is failing in his pledge to many nations. The emperor weeps because joyousness is nonexistent:

> Per l'emperador me dol,
> qu'a moutas gens fai fraitura;
> tals en plora que n'a jais.[82]

Peire bids the Christians to be of good courage, to march fearlessly against the pagans until their victories carry them to Morocco. The poet then states his thesis: he who nullifies the joy of this world declines in worth, i.e. man must take part in sensual joy because he is of the earth, earthy. Unless he does so, man behaves evilly and is the son of an evil creature. He refuses to bend his neck to the yoke of his body because he has lapsed into indifference. Forever will he be reckoned among the wicked:

> Sel que·l joi del setgle delis
> vei que son pretz dezenansa;
> fils es d'avol criatura,
> que fai avol demostransa,
> e per tan non baisa·l col,
> quar gitatz es a noncura:
> estai mais entre·ls savais.[83]

Peire goes on to say that he does not state this on his own authority, so happy is he when he is face to face with joyfulness. But a love to be enduring and trustworthy demands that it embrace carnal love as well. The body is indifferent unless its master, the soul, increases in worth. Man is something more than mind and heart. Love therefore is something more than spiritual; it must embrace carnal love as well:

> Per mi non dic, tan m'abelis,
> quan vei molt gran alegransa.
> Amors vol, quan longias dura,
> e non pot aver fizansa,
> si·l carnal amar non vol;
> quar vei que cors non a cura
> mas de senhor que engrais.[84]

Peire appeals to his master Marcabru for confirmation of his teaching. That confirmation is to be had in the latter's poem: *Doas cuidas ai compaignier*,[85] wherein Marcabru castigates those who seek solely the delights of the flesh and cultivate lust, but approves and commends those who follow true love. But, then Marcabru is confronted by two 'thoughts' which give him both joy and anxiety.

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[82] X, 12-14, *ed. cit.*, p. 107. I grieve for the emperor who is failing many peoples. Such laments because he has not joy.

[83] *Ibid.*, 22-28, *ed. cit.*, p. 108. I see that that man's worth decreases who sets at naught the joy of the world. He is the son of a wicked creature who acts wickedly, and he does not bend his neck for the very reason that he has rushed headlong into indifference; henceforth let him take his stand among the evil.

[84] *Ibid.*, 29-35, *ed. cit.*, *ibid.* I do not say this of myself, so very happy am I when I see great gaiety. A long persisting love demands it, and love cannot be trusting unless it wills carnal love, because I see that the body is indifferent except to a lord who grows expansive (in worth).

The editor admits that the stanza is, for the most part, incomprehensible to him. He questions the relationship of verses 29-30 to what follows and confesses that lines 34-35 'sind mir ganz dunkel' (*ed. cit.*, p. 190). The connection seems clear enough: joyfulness is the result of love. True love cannot be trustworthy unless it entail carnal love as well as spiritual love and that is what true love does by definition. Therefore joy is to be sought in it and it alone, that is, in the love of body as well as in the love of the soul, the master of the body.

[85] Ed. J.M.L. Dejeanne, *ed. cit.*, XIX, pp. 89-92.

These two 'thoughts' are the ways one thinks on love. There is one type (*bona*) that is sweet and excites joy; there is another (*avol*) that is bitter and brings anxiety and evil in its train. Yet the whole world is replete with such thoughts; none can escape them. Marcabru's concern is to choose the true (*l'entier*) from the false (*lo frait*):

> Doas cuidas ai compaignier
> Que·m donon joi e destorbier,
> Per la bona cuida m'esjau
> E per l'avol sui aburzitz;
> D'aital cuidar
> Doutz et amar
> Es totz lo segles replenitz,
> Si qu'ieu for' ab los esmaitz
> Si tant no saubes ben e mau.
> En dos cuidars ai conssirier
> A triar lo frait de l'entier.[86]

He condemns those who think only on wanton love. Yet he cannot completely condemn thinking on both types of love; otherwise Youth would be shamed. If thinking on love were forgotten, Joy would subside and disappear:

> Cuidador d'amor volatgier
> Son de folla cuida mainier,
> Qu'en mil no·n trob una corau
> D'aquestas amors cuidairitz,
> Pero cuidar
> Non dei blasmar
> Del tot, que Jovens for' aunitz;
> Si cuiars d'Amor fos oblitz
> Jois fora tombatz en canau.[87]

Therefore, it is on Marcabru's authority, who wrote in exactly the same strain—on the necessity of love if joy is to endure—that Peire states that a man is a complete fool who does not perceive his true nature: that he is composed of both body and soul and who forgets why he is born: to love because love is the sole source in this world of human worth and excellence:

> Marcabrus per gran dreitura
> trobet d'altretal semblansa,
> e tengon lo tug per fol
> qui no conois sa natura
> e no·ill membre per que·nais.[88]

Love as the source of an habitual state of joy, joy as the basic condition of moral worth and increase in excellence, sadness as the characteristic of the evil are the themes of a third poem by Peire d'Auvergne: *De josta·ls breus jorns*

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[86] XIX, 1-11, *ed. cit.*, p. 89. Two thoughts I have as my companions that give me joy and anxiety; by the good thought, I do rejoice and by the evil one am I stupefied. The whole world is filled with such thinking, sweet and bitter, so that I should be among the senseless did I not know good and evil as well. I am concerned with choosing the sterile from the perfect among the two thoughts.

[87] *Ibid.*, 37-45, *ed. cit.*, p. 91. Cf. *supra*, note 39.

[88] X, 38-42, *ed. cit.*, p. 108. With great justice did Marcabru write poetry in the same vein and let us all consider that man as a fool who does not perceive his own nature, and who does not remember why he is born.

For a different interpretation, cf. *ed. cit.*, pp. 46, 191. The editor would refer *qui no conois sa natura* to the art of composing verse and specifically to Peire's inartistic coupling of two heterogenous themes, one political and the other moralizing, in the same poem. This he did following Marcabru's example.

e·ls loncs sers. Amid the short days and the long nights of winter, the poet sets his heart on an increase of wisdom following upon a new joyousness that flourishes and fructifies within him:

De josta·ls breus jorns e·ls loncs sers,
quan la blanc' aura brunezis,
vuelh que branc e bruelh mos sabers
d'un nou joi que·m fruech' e·m floris.[89]

The reason is that in this severe season he has fallen in love and love effects joyousness but deserts the sad and gloomy. He who rejoices in time of distress is plainly love's servant:

Qu'amors vol gaug e guerpis los enics,
et qui s'esjau a l'ora qu'es destreis,
be·m par qu'a dreit li vol esser amics.[90]

A lady has won his love whence joyfulness revives and worth is engendered:

qu'una m'a conquis
don reviu jois e nais valers
tals que denant li·m trassalhis.[91]

Although he has not asked for the gift of her love, this permanent state of joy that her love inspires renders sweet and pure the sight of her:

Tant m'es doutz e fis sos vezers
pel joi que·m n'es al cor assis.[92]

Where the joyfulness that is in her prevails, there does a man's worth mount to great heights. It is a basis or condition for increase in virtue:

So es gaugz e jois e plazers
que a moutas gens abelhis,
e sos pretz mont' a grans poders
o sos jois sobresenhoris.[93]

The dependance of increase in worth on the habitual state of joy is often repeated throughout Peire's poems. Thus in the poem in which he claims to be the first to compose *vers entiers* and defends his right to such a title, the poet expresses his delight that his verse is of so much worth. It is this permanent quality of heart and soul arising from love that has been the source and inspiration for his *vers entier* that are so true and powerful in advancing Youth:

Quar er m'abelis e m'es bel
qu·el mieu joi s'enant la jovens;
e s'ieu ren dic que lur an enviro,
aissi m'en gic, qu'uns gaugz mi creis dobliers

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[89] VI, 1-4, *ed. cit.*, p. 94. Amid the short days and the long nights when the bright air grows dark, I want my knowledge to grow and flourish from a new joy that blooms and flowers within me.

[90] *Ibid.*, 12-14, *ed. cit.*, p. 95. Love enjoins joy and flies from the cheerless and who is joyous at the very hour of distress, it is clear to me that rightfully does he wish to be her (love's) friend.

[91] *Ibid.*, 23-25, *ed. cit.*, p. 96. For one (lady) has won me whence joy is revivified and worth arises such that before her I stand thrilled (tremble).

[92] *Ibid.*, 36-37, *ed. cit.*, *ibid.* Because of the joy that has come to lodge in my heart, the sight of her is so sweet and pure to me.

[93] *Ibid.*, 43-46, *ed. cit.*, p. 97. She is a delight and a joy and a pleasure which enchants many people and his worth (i.e. the worth that her love inspires in the lover) rises to great heights there where her joy (that emantes from her) has supremacy.

Zenker (*ed. cit.*, p. 190) translates: Das ist mir Freude und Lust und Wonne, dass sie vielen Leuten gefallt, und ihr Wert steigt auf zu grosser Macht und ihre Freude herrscht über alle. Making o a conjunction does not seem to bring out the poet's thought that *pretz and jois* are interdependent.

d'un dous espic qu'es jojos consiriers,
don m'an amic ueimais li mal e·il bo.[94]

In the fond expectation of the fulfilment of his hopes, gladly does he abide and persevere in this state of joy:

D'aisi·m sent ric per bona sospeiso,
qu'en joi m'asic e m'estau volentiers,
et ab joi pic e gaug mos deziriers
et ab joi pic e gaug vuelh dieus lo·m do.[95]

Elsewhere Peire states that without joyousness there is neither great or pure knowledge nor subtle discernement. Because he has both as a result, as he says further on,[96] of pure love, then does he believe that he is in possession of joy and maintained therein against the ignorant and the restless who abominate lovers:

Quar ses gaug grans sabers ni purs
    ni genhs ginhos
  non er aut elegutz;
per que ie·m cre en cent augurs
    jauzens jojos
  e jauzens mantengutz
  contra tals gens
  cui falh sciensa e patz,
  eu vi, encens
  sobre·ls enamoratz.[97]

According to Piere, moreover, joy is not only a basic condition of ennoblement, but it causes one to be loved. This is the twofold aspect of joy to which Peire has already referred.[98] He had expressed the same idea, too, when he said that when a man is joyous in time of distress, such a man desires to be a friend of love.[99] The clearest statement of this teaching, that he to whom the joyousness of love is promised grows more virtuous and is made fit for love is to be found at the conclusion of the famous 'Nightingale' lyric, in a stanza that resumes his teaching on *bon' amors* and *joi*:

Bon' amors a un uzatge
co·l bos aurs, quan bes es fis,
que s'esmera de bontatge,
qui ab bontat li servis;
    e crezatz
    qu'amistatz
cascun jorn melhura,

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[94] III, 31-36, *ed. cit.*, p. 88. Therefore I am happy now and delighted that youth is making progress through my joy; and if I say anything that they consider antagonistic to them, I do renounce it because a twofold joy flourishes for me from a lovely germinal seed which is a joyous reflection; whence today everyone (the bad and the good) consider me a friend.

[95] *Ibid.*, 37-40, *ed. cit.*, *ibid.* Thence do I feel that I am powerful through the fond hope which lodges me in joy, and there I take my stand gladly; joyfully does my desire mount and is in raptures; joyfully does it increase and take delight; may God will to grant it to me.

I have taken *pic* as coming from **picuss*—verbal form, 3rd sing. present, with the sense of arising, and *gaug* as the 3rd singular present indicative of *gaudet*.

[96] Cf. *infra*, note 97.

[97] II, 11-20, *ed. cit.*, p. 85. Because without joy, great and true knowledge or cunning wisdom will not be heightened to any degree; therefore by a hundred omens I believe that, joyous, am I rejoicing and maintained in a state a joyousness against such people, to whom knowledge and peace are lacking, whom I see inflamed against lovers.

[98] Cf. III, 34, *ed. cit.*, p. 88 and *supra*, note 94.

[99] Cf.. VI, 13-14, *ed. cit.*, p. 95 and *supra*, note 90.

melhuratz
et amatz
es cui jois s'aura.[100]

III.

One may question and, perhaps, quarrel with the interpretation of this or that excerpt from the lyrics of the troubadours used to illustrate their concept of *jois* other than as a passion or as an objective delight in the concrete or abstract. Their cumulative effect, however, shows that there existed among them, from the very first, the notion of *jois* as a permanent state or condition of heart and soul arising from love, as a basic condition of increase in natural excellence and as a cause of love. This concept is by no means an isolated one but a general and prevalent idea. To verify its consistency and continuity, it may be well to analyze very briefly the lyrics of other poets of the Golden Age of troubadour poetry, particularly those of Guiraut de Bornelh and Arnaut de Mareuil.

The three elements that constitute the quality of joy for the troubadours are well portrayed by Arnaut de Marueil, self-styled poet of joy,[1] in the opening stanzas of three of his lyrics. The first stresses the fact that the quality of joy[2] accompanies love. He tells us that he has fallen in love with his *Gens Conquis* whom Worth and Joy and Youth govern and direct[3] and who is kept joyous and joyful through Joy and Worth.[4] This joy is a permanent and stable condition of heart and soul wherein the poet literally lives and has his being just as fishes spend their life in water. Joy is the lover's natural sphere:

Si cum li peis an en l'aiga lor vida
l'ai eu en joi e totz temps la·i aurai,
c'Amors m'a faich en tal dompna chausir
don viu jauzens sol del desir qu'ieu n'ai,
tant est valens que, quan ben m'o cossir,
m'en nais orguoills e·m creis humilitatz;
mais si·ls ten joins amors e jois amdos,
que ren no·i pert mesura ni razos.[5]

The second lyric underlines the ennobling force of joy.[6] Again the poem is addressed to his *Gens Conquis.* Arnaut lists the good qualities of mind, body and soul that follow upon joy:

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[100] IX^2, 41-50, *ed. cit.*, pp. 105-106. Pure love has a custom, just like gold, when it is very pure: it becomes purer through purity for the man who serves it with purity; be assured that love every day ennobles (him who loves) and that he is ennobled and loved to whom joy is allotted.

[1] XX, 1-4, ed. R. C. Johnston, *Les poésies lyriques du troubadour Arnaut de Mareuil* (Paris, 1935), p. 115. E mon cor ai un novellet chantar, / planet et leu e que's fai bon auzir / a totz aisselhs qu'en joy volon estar, / quar de joy es e de joy suy chantaire. In my heart I have a new little song, simple and easy to understand, and which is pleasing to those who wish to abide in joy, because its subject is joy and I am a singer of joy.

[2] Arnaut groups together joy and youth among the good qualities and ways of life: Franca res avinens, / en cui jois e jovens / e totz bon aips s'atura. XXII, 31-34, *ed. cit.*, p. 128. Noble, delightful creature, in whom youth and joy reside.

[3] Cf. VIII, 33-34, *ed. cit.*, p. 46. Dompna, cui pretz e jois e jovens guida, / ja no m'ametz, totz temps vos amarai. Lady, for whom worth and joy and youth act as guide, although you may never love me, I shall love you always.

[4] Cf. *Ibid.*, 41-42, *ed. cit.*, p. 47. Mos Gens Conquis, jois e pretz e solatz / vos tenon gai vostre cors e joios. My Gens Conquis, joy and worth and pleasure keep your heart joyful and joyous. Cf. the Countess of Die: Ab joi et ab joven m'apais / e jois e jovens m'apaia. Ed. Gabrielle Kussler-Ratyré, 'Les chansons de la comtesse Beatrix de Dia', *Archivum Romanicum*, I (1917), 161. I feed upon joy and youth and joy and youth nourish me.

[5] VIII, 1-8, *ed. cit.*, p. 44. Just as the fishes live their life in water, so do I in joy and ever shall, for love has caused me to choose such a lady whence I live in joy merely because of the desire I have of her. So of worth is she that, when I reflect deeply on it, pride arises in me and my humility increases; but love and joy keep them so allied that moderation and temperance are not lost therein.

[6] Arnaut refers to the power of joy to ennoble when he entreats his lady to return the love that he has for her: XIII, 43-49, *ed. cit.*, p. 74. Plus fora rics dels autres ama-

A gran honor viu cui jois es cobitz,
que d'aqui mou cortesi' e solatz,
enseignamenz e franques' e mesura,
e cors d'amar et esfortz de servir,
e chausimenz, sabers e conoisensa,
e gens parlar et avinens respos,
e tuich bon aips, per qu'om es gais e pros.[7]

The third poem asserts that joy brings love in its train. It is, as it were, a pre-condition to love. Arnaut establishes that truth in a concatenation of causes and effects:

Ses joi non es valors
ni ses valor honors,
que Jois adutz Amors
e Amors dompna gaia
e gaiesa solatz
e solatz cortesia.[8]

The same characteristics of the quality of joy are frequently met with in the lyrics of other troubadours of this period. For example, Peire Vidal ascribes his joy to the love he bears his beloved. He leaves his joyous heart with her who gives birth to joy and is its beginning:

Qu'om no sap tan dous repaire
Com de Rozer tro qu'a Vensa,
Si com clau mars e Durensa,
Ni on tan fis jois s'esclaire.
Per qu'entre la franca gen
Ai laissat mon cor jauzen
Ab leis que fa·ls iratz rire.
Qu'om no pot lo jorn mal traire
Qu'aja de leis sovinensa,
Qu'en leis nais jois e comensa.[9]

Daude de Pradas derives his joy from his *Joy Novelh* whom he wishes to remain nameless:

Dezir ai qe·m ven de plazer,
e·l plazers mou de bon esper,
e·l bos espers de Joy Novelh,

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dors, / si eu agues la joi qu' ieu plus volria; / de proeza ja par non trobaria, / ni nulha ren no·n fora contra me; / del grant aver qu'auri' e del saber / de paradis foran mieu li portal / e mais d'onor no·i poira caber. I should be better off than the other lovers if I had the joy that I most desire; never would be found my equal in prowess and nothing would be of avail against me; on account of the great riches and the wisdom that would come to me therefrom, the gates of paradise would be mine and no more of honor could fall to my lot. Cf. also XIX, 3-4, *ed. cit.*, p. 109.

[7] XXI, 1-10, *ed. cit.*, p. 121. That man to whom joy is accorded lives in great honor for thence arise courtliness and bliss, learning and candor and moderation, yearning for love and zeal to serve, and discretion, wisdom and knowledge, pleasant conversation and fitting rejoinder and all good qualities through which one is gay and gallant.

[8] XI, 1-6, *ed. cit.*, p. 65. There is no worth without joy nor honor without worth, for Joy occasions Love and Love a joyous lady and joyousness enjoyment and pleasure courtliness.

[9] XIX, 8-17, ed. Joseph Anglade, *Les poésies de Peire Vidal* (Paris, 1913), pp. 60-61. No lovelier place is known than (that which stretches) from the Rhone to Vence encircled as it is by the sea and the Durance; nor is there any place where such pure joy shines forth. Therefore among the noble folk have I left my joyous heart with her who causes the sad to smile. Because one cannot be wretched the day that he has her in mind for in her joy arises and has its beginning.

> e·l ioys novelhs de tal castelh,
> q'ieu non vuelh dir mas a rescos
> aisselhs qui Amors ten joyos.[10]

Peire Rogier is forthright in his insistence that the joyousness of love is a condition to ennoblement. In a poem addressed to his *Tort-n'avetz* he tells her that without joy he would be as nothing. Whatever one does except under the influence of joy and love withers, deteriorates and decays:

> Tant ai mon cor en joy assis,
> per que no puesc mudar no·n chan,
> que joys m'a noirit pauc e gran;
> e ses luy non seria res,
> qu'assatz vey que tot l'als qu'on fay
> abaiss' e sordey' e dechai,
> mas so qu'amors e ioys soste.[11]

Another troubadour lists the good works that his joyousness impels him to perform: to give people pleasure, to pay hommage to jongleurs, to love Youth, to give alms unasked:

> Joyos son ieu et ai mestier
> de far plazer a bona gen,
> d'onrar jocglars, d'amar joven,
> de dar enanz que hom no·m quier.[12]

Joy, moreover, is a defence against thinking on folly,[13] that is, thinking irrationally, and a safeguard against the influence of evil.[14]

Addressing his lady, Peire Vidal calls her his perfect joy. Hers is the joy that reanimates every goodness and the joyousness that emanates from her makes the world joyful because in her begins and increases joy:

> Fis gaugz entiers plazens et amoros,
> Ab vos es gaugz per que totz bes reviu,
> E non a gaug el mon tant agradiu,
> Que·l vostre gaugz fa lo segle joyos.
> Ab vos nais gaugz e creis devas totz latz,
> Per qu'eu n'ai gaug e Mos Bels Castiatz,
> E·m fai gran gaug, que cel mentau soven
> Lo gaug de vos e·l bel captenemen.[15]

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[10] XI, 5-10, ed. A. H. Schutz, *Les poésies de Daude de Pradas* (Toulouse, 1933), p. 50. I have a yearning which comes to me from delight and the delight has its origin in fond hope and the fond hope in Joy Novelh; the new joy originates in that manor which I do not wish to name except in secret to those whom Love keeps joyous.

[11] 5, 1-8, ed. Carl Appel, *Das Leben und die Lieder des Trobadors Peire Rogier* (Berlin, 1882), p. 51. So much have I set my heart in joy that I cannot help but sing, because joy has nourished me small and mature; and without it I would be nothing for I see quite clearly that everything else that one does decreases, deteriorates and comes to naught except what love and joy sustain.

[12] XI, 11-14, *Les poésies de Daude de Pradas, ed. cit.*, p. 50. I am joyous and I feel the necessity of doing pleasure to good folk, of doing honor to troubadours, of loving youth, of giving before I am asked.

[13] Cf. Peire de Valeria, ed. Alfred Jeanroy, *Jongleurs et troubadours gascons du XII^e^ et du XIII^e^ siècles* (Paris, 1923), p. 3. E cel qui sa joia agarda/non ha ges fol pensamen. He who thinks upon her joy has no insensate thought whatever.

[14] Cf. Raimbaut d'Orange, ed. C.Appel, *Provenzalische Chrestomathie* (Leipzig, 1920), p. 60. Aissi·m suy ferms lassatz en joy/que re no vey que·m sia croy. So completely am I caught up in joy that I do not see a thing that may be evil to me.

[15] XXVII, 41-48, *ed. cit.*, p. 88. Pure joy, perfect, pleasing and loving, yours is the joy through which everything is reinvigorated. There is not so pleasurable a joy in the world, because it is your joy which makes the whole world to be joyous. With you joy is born and grows on every side, wherefore I and my Bels Castiatz have joy; and it is a source of great joy to me because it recalls often the joy (I have) of you and of your graceful bearing.

Giraut de Bornelh cannot understand how it is possible that a man be happy without this state of joy:

C'anc no·m parec que ben anes
Celui cui jois non agrades
C'anc sens ni poders que joi bais
No m'agradet ni no m'atrais
Cobeitatz n'irada ricors.[16]

As far as he is concerned, so set upon joy is his mind and his heart that worth must be near at hand to him:

Ja per aisso no m'acol,
S'eu lai vauc, celha ni cist,
Que del tornar m'avolpilh?
C'us jois sobresenhorils,
On estai ferms mos talans,
Es, tals, per qu'eu no balans,
Don no·m pot lonhar valors,
Si·m veni' en plana bada.[17]

Without joyousness it is Giraut's conviction that one cannot love or be loved:

Aquest terminis clars e gens,
Qu'es tan deziratz e volgutz,
Deu esser ab joi receubutz
E chascus en sia jauzens,
Car ven estatz
Ab sas clartatz!
A cui no platz
Jois ni solatz,
Non es amatz
Ni amaire.[18]

In fact when it is spring, joyousness surges forth among all men, both good and bad. That man falls in love who in the wintertime had never thought of it. The poet had estranged himself from the solace of love. Now, under the influence of joy, he feels himself more in love than at any other time of his life:

E can cest crid' e cel brama,
L'us drech e l'altr' en biais,
M'es aicela sazos bona;
Qu'entrels valens e·ls savais
Sortz jois, per que tals s'amora
C'anc en invern mal no·n trais.

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[16] 14, 60-64, ed. Adolf Kolsen, *Sämtliche Lieder des Trobadors Giraut de Bornelh* I (Halle a S., 1910), p. 72. For it never seemed to me that that man whom joy did not delight was very happy, because neither sensuality nor might which abase joy have ever pleased me, nor do cupidity or mournful puissance attract me.

[17] 19, 33-40, *ed. cit.*, p. 98. If I go there, why am I fearful of returning? though she or they do not embrace me? Because a sovereign joy, wherein my inclination stands firm, is such that I do not waver; therefore worth cannot be far off from me, if it were to come to me in full measure.

[18] 8, 1-10, *ed. cit.*, p. 34. This clear, lovely weather, so desired and sought after, ought to be received joyfully and let each one be joyful over it, because summer is coming with its splendor. He is neither loved nor a lover whom joy or enjoyment does not please. Cf. Peire Vidal, XXXII, 43-46, *ed. cit.*, p. 103: Qu'us fis jois me capdela e·m nais / Que·m te jauzent en gran doussor / E·m sojorn' en fin' amistat / De leis qui plus mi ven en grat. Because a perfect joy directs me and is born within me, a joy that maintains me joyous in great gladness and keeps me in pure love of her who is most pleasing to me.

Qu'eu eis que m' er' estranhatz
De solatz,
No·m senti tan, pos fui natz,
Com fatz er', enamoratz.[19]

Two of the main themes of Guiraut de Bornelh's love lyrics are those of unrequited love and the difficulties that beset the course of true love. Hence it is that his poems are replete with reproaches against his beloved and with censures and remonstrances against those who impede the fulfilment of his love. It is his lot to suffer the pangs of unrequited and impeded love, to undergo the privation of the great gifts that it bestows. Among the foremost of these is *jois*. Thus his lady gives him every indication that she loves him and yet she treats him deceitfully just as if he were perfidious; the joy that he expects from her escapes him:

Ab semblan me fai dechazer
Amors e·m dona marimen;
Car semblan m'es del joi c'aten
Que ja·l cor no·m n'eslaire,
Car en trop ric repaire
Bels semblans me guida
Que·m ditz que jauzida
N'aurai ses falhia.
Mas so·m dechai,
Don fort m'esmai,
Car l'us semblans m'abriva lai
E l'altre·m desvia.[20]

Again Giraut complains that he serves a lady faithfully who will not accept his love nor set him free.[21] Because he will not swerve from his fidelity to her, because she will not return his love, love will not render him joyous:

Mas car no·m vir ni no·m biais,
No vol Amors qu' eu sia gais.[22]

Joyless, loveless, he knows that death is preferrable to life because life lacks joy:

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[19] 39, 11-20, *ed. cit.*, pp. 222-224. When this one chirps and that one screeches, one tunefully and the other discordantly, that time of the year is pleasing to me; for joy surges forth among the worthy and the evil with the result that a man falls in love who in winter never felt its anguish. I myself, who had estranged myself from pleasure, never felt myself so in love since the day I was born as I do now.

[20] 31, 1-12, *ed. cit.*, p. 174. Deceitfully Love causes me to decline and causes me anxiety, because it seems to me that my heart is not yet enlightened by the joy that I expect; the reason is that fair mien that told me that I would have joy there without fail leads me to too lofty a place. But it slips away from me whence I am very much dismayed, because one demeanor leads me there and the other deflects me away.

[21] Cf. 18, 22-24, *ed. cit.*, p. 92. Giraut complains that because of his lady's insincerity, he has become weak and flaccid just like an unloved lover who has renounced joy: Tan sui vas enfrevolitz / com cel desamatz amans, / que de joi se desraia.

[22] 6, 7-8, *ed. cit.*, p. 24. Because I do not swerve or digress, Love does not want me to be joyous. On the other hand, Giraut tells us of a lady whom he serves and loves faithfully. Deceitfully she has retained him in her service; may she therefore wish his joy and salvation: E pos m'a retengut / C'alhors no·m mut / Volha c'aia joi e salut. 25, 39-41, *ed. cit.*, p. 132.

Jois is frequently linked with the gifts that arise from love and the qualities to which it gives rise: Giraut de Bornelh: *jois e salutz* 11, 9, p. 52; 52, 8, p. 328; 55, 10, p. 348; 76, 1, p. 480; *jois e chans e solatz* 42, 14, p. 246; *solatz, jois e chantars* 63, 1, p. 402; *jois e chans* 41, 12, p. 236; *jois e·l chans* 70, 5, p. 440; *jois e chans e solatz e cortesia* 47, 1-3, p. 290; *benanans' e jai* 43, 5, p. 254; *pretz e bobans e jois* 48, 59-60, p. 304; Peire Vidal: *amors e jois* IX, 5-7, p. 23; XIII, 40-42, p. 38; XXXVII, 50, p. 120; *joi e amor e jovens* XXIII, 41-43, p. 73; *joi e benestansa e valor* VI, 23-24, p. 14; *joi e chantar* XXIII, 6-7, p. 72; XXIX, 50-51, p. 95; *joi e amor, pretz e valor* XXXIII, 26-27, p. 105; Daude de Pradas: *Pretz e Valor, Joi e Jovens* V, 48, p. 25; *joi e joven* VI, 40, p. 29; *solatz e cortesia, chans e deportz, Jois e Merces* IV, 6-7, p. 83.

Per qu'eu conosc e sai qu'es vers
Que viure·m val menhs que morirs?
Pos que·lh sofranh jois e jauzirs
E·m falh amors e sos poders!
Per qu'eu sospir e planh e plor?
Car jois no·m val ni no·m socor;
Qu'eu sui aquel c'am melhs e mais
E no manei ni tenh ni bais.[23]

In a phrase that recalls Guillaume IX, Cercamon and Jaufré Rudel,[24] the poet begs that his beloved allow him to make their love known to a confidant. Thereby their love will be made more certain and thereby may he derive comfort in conversing with him about the joy with which he is filled:

A preiar
L'agra, si·lh plagues,
Pos per leis sui en joi tornatz,
Que fos nostra bon' amistatz
Per un amic saubuda.[25]

For want of love, Giraut lays the blame on the evils of his day—avarice, neglect of song and joy, injustice on the part of the nobles, lack of appreciation of beauty and pleasure. All of these derive from the fact that men have ceased to cultivate love, the origin of joy and worth:

De chantar Ab deport
Me for' eu totz laissatz;
Mas can sui ben iratz,
Estenh l'ir' ab lo chan
E vauc me conortan.
Qu'esters no fora patz
Entre l'ir' e·l coratge
Qu'es contr' un mal uzatge,
Que nais e poi' e creis,
Qu'er' es falhitz domneis,
Don sol om esser gais,
E pretz no pot ni jais
Revenir entretans.[26]

Giraut sees the world turned topsy-turvy, worth disappearing from amongst men great and small, leaders turning aside from what is to their honor and leading their followers to evil and contention.[27] He is called a fool who wants to recall the joyousness of days gone by:

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[23] 6, 25-32, *ed. cit.*, p. 26. Why do I know and perceive that it is true in my case that to live is worse than dying? Because joy and enjoyment are lacking to it (life) and love and its forces fail me. Why do I sigh and lament and weep? Because joy is of no avail to me and does not help me; because I am he who loves best and most and yet I do not fondle or hold or embrace (her).

[24] Cf. *supra*, pp. 180, 184, 186.

[25] 41, 65-69, *ed. cit.*, p. 242. If it had pleased her, since through her I am returned to joy, I should have asked her that our pure love be made known to a confidant.

[26] 72, 1-12, *ed. cit.*, p. 454. In spite of its delight, I would have completely given up singing; except that when I am quite sad, I quench my sadness with song and am comforted. Otherwise there would be no peace between the despondency and the courage which is directed against an evil custom that is arising, growing and increasing; for now the service of women, whence one was once accustomed to be joyous, is fallen into decline and worth and joy cannot meanwhile recover.

[27] Nobility that is joyless is unrighteous and devoid of worth. C'oi sabers ni paratges / Non es que no nualh, / Pos alegransa·i falh, / E no·s chamje viatz, / e que·us valra rictatz, / Si ja no·us alegratz? / Qu'emperis e renhatz / Es ses joi paubretatz. 42, 61-68, *ed. cit.*, pp. 248-250. Today wisdom and

Al sen dels ancessors,
Can aondava jais,
No valc un ou enais,
Qu'era qui ri ni vol aver solatz,
No l'es grazit, ans es fols apelatz.[28]

Were it not that his lady commands him, never could the fair weather of spring and its delights entice him to be joyful and to compose his lyrics. For he is in absolute agreement with her that now, unlike the olden days, joy fails and thereby is worth and nobility lessened:

Si per mo Sobre-Totz no fos,
Que ditz com chan e sia gais,
Ja·l suaus tens, can l'erba nais,
Ni pratz ni rams ni boscs ni flors
Ni durs senher ni van' amors
No·m poirian metr' en eslais!
Mas d'aisso·m tenh ab lui
Que, pos jois falh e fui,
Merma pretz e barnatz,
E, pos les poestatz
S'estranheron de jai,
De can que·l peier fai,
No fo per me lauzatz
. . . .
Cela vetz era·l segles bos,
Can per tot er' acolhitz jais
E cel grazitz cui n'era·l mais
E pretz s'aveni' e ricors.[29]

IV.

It is quite apparent that *jois,* used as a permanent and stable quality of soul accompanying or induced by human love, as the sole condition of human ennoblement, cannot be equated to *delectatio* or *gaudium,* passions of the sensitive soul of man. These are *movements* or *activities* of the soul consequent on the apprehension or possession of a loved good. They perfect the faculty concerned in the acquiescence of possession in a passing way, but they cannot be considered as the *sine qua non* of man's advance in human virtue. One must look elsewhere, then, for the origin of such a novel conception.

In the Christian doctrine of grace, the corollary of the Church's teaching on original sin, there are certain features which appear to be paralleled by the main characteristics of *jois* as conceived by the troubadours. The similarity has so much substance that it may be well to call attention to it and to suggest the possibility that the troubadours based their peculiar idea of joy on that of grace.

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nobility are as naught since they lack gladness and unless there be a rapid change, what will puissance avail you if you do not cast care aside (if you do not rejoice)? For sovereignty and kingship without joy are indigence.

[28] 46, 35-39, *ed. cit.*, p. 284. According to the conception of our ancestors, at a time when joy abounded, unhappiness was not worth a straw, but now that man who smiles or who wants enjoyment is no longer revered but is called a fool.

[29] 73, 1-20, *ed. cit.*, p. 462. Were it not for my Sobre-Totz who commands that I sing and be joyous, neither the lovely weather when the grass sprouts, the green fields or verdant branches, woods or flowers, a stern master or a vain love could ever set me in motion. But in this I agree with her that, since joy fails and vanishes, worth and nobility diminish and that, since rulers have estranged themselves from joy, whatever the worse may do, he was never praised by me. . . . In those days the world was good when joy was welcomed by all and when he who had the most (of joy) was revered and when worth and possessions were seemly.

The troubadours need not have been trained theologians to be familiar with the teaching on grace; they need simply to have been Christians familiar with a fundamental and elementary doctrine of the Christian economy.

In the course of his writings, especially against the heresies of Pelagianism and Semipelagianism, St. Augustine developed the doctrine of grace inherent in the Holy Scriptures. His was the authority that dominated the Church in the time of the troubadours; he was the *doctor gratiae*. It was his teaching that the Church of their era and prior to them for centuries knew and taught. The great Councils and the Popes considered him the authentic and authoritative interpreter of the Scriptures and the traditions of the Church in that regard.[1] I am, therefore, taking St. Augustine as a guide in sketching the Church's teaching on grace, not necessarily because the troubadours, or any one of them, were directly familiar with his teaching, but because it was that teaching that was known generally and taught at their time.

God created man in the state of original justice. This consisted in the rectitude of his human nature, in the subordination of what is inferior to what is superior, that is in the subordination of the body to the soul, of concupiscence to the will, of the will to God.[2] To obey God, not to feel in one's members the law of the flesh warring against the law of the spirit was man's original condition.[3] This rectitude of nature was a special gift superadded to man's human nature.[4] There was in man the natural concupiscence of the flesh but that concupiscence was controlled by divine grace.[5] In Paradise, man enjoyed God, shared in His goodness. His joy was a perpetual one maintained by an ardent charity, a sincere faith and a right conscience.[6] Man possessed grace from the very instant of his creation. Although St. Augustine does not use the word in his description of grace, its sanctifying qualities clearly emerge: through it man was justified, illuminated and sanctified.[7] In Paradise, too, man merited reward of God.[8] Without grace, no merit was possible;[9] without the help of God, man could not live well even in Paradise.[10]

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[1] Cf. J. B. Kors, *La justice primitive et le péché originel* (Paris, 1930), p. 1.

[2] Faciebat quippe hoc ordo justitiae, ut quia eorum anima famulum corpus a Domino acceperat, sicut ipsa eidem Domino suo, ita illi corpus ejus obediret, atque exhiberet vitae illi congruum sine ulla resistentia famulatum. Hinc et nudi erant, et non confundebatur. *De peccat. merc. et rem.* II, 22; PL 44, 172. Cf. *De nupt. et concup.* I, 3; PL 44, 415.

Properly speaking, man's nature is that which he possessed before original sin: . . . ad naturam talem referatur, qualis sine vitio primitus condita est; ipsa enim vere ac proprie natura hominis dicitur. *Retract.* I, 10, 3; PL 32, 600.

[3] Cum itaque primorum illorum hominum fuerit prima justitia obedire Deo, et hanc in membris adversus legem mentis suae legem concupiscentiae non habere. . . *De pecc. merc. et rem.* II, 23; PL 44, 173.

[4] Nos autem non substantia sua genuit, creatura enim sumus, quam non genuit, sed fecit, et ideo, ut fratres Christi secundum modum suum fecerat, adoptavit. Iste itaque modus quo nos Deus, cum jam essemus ab ipso non nati, sed conditi et instituti, verbo suo et gratia sua genuit ut filii ejus essemus, adoptio vocatur. *Contra Faustum* III, 3; PL 42, 215. Cf. also *De Civitate Dei* XIII, 13; PL 41, 386.

In an improper sense, nature designates the actual state in which man is born after original sin: Translato autem verbo utimur, ut naturam dicamus etiam, qualis nascitur homo. *Retract.* I, 10, 3; PL 32, 600.

[5] Cur autem non creditis, hominibus in paradiso constitutis ante peccatum divinitus potuisse concedi, ut tranquilla motione et conjunctione vel commixtione membrorum sine ulla libidine filios procrearent; aut in eis saltem libido talis erat, cujus motus nec praecederet, nec excederet voluntatem? *Contra Jul.* IV, 5, 35; PL 44, 757. Quid est gustato cibo prohibito nuditas indicata nisi peccato nudatum quod gratia contegebat? Gratia quippe Dei magna ibi erat, ubi terrenum et animale corpus bestialem libidinem non habebat. Qui ergo vestitus gratia non habebat in nudo corpore quod puderet, spoliatus gratia sensit quod operire deberet. *Ibid.*, IV, 16, 82; PL 44, 781. Cf. also *De pecc. merc. et rem.* I, 16, 12; PL 44, 120; *De Genesi ad litt.* XI, 32, 42; PL 34, 447; *De Civitate Dei* XIV, 17; PL 41, 425.

Bien que Augustin ne distingue pas expressément ce que l'on nomme aujourd'hui grâce sanctifiante de ce que l'on nomme grâce actuelle, il attribue, sans aucune doute possible, cette dernière à l'homme tel que Dieu l'avait créé. Adam jouissait, pour persévérer dans le bien, d'une grâce telle que celle dont nous jouissons pour nous libérer du mal. Et. Gilson, *Introduction à l'étude de saint Augustin*, (3e éd., Paris, 1949), p. 194.

[6] Vivebat itaque homo in paradiso...fruens Deo, ex quo bono erat bonus...gaudium verum pepetuebatur a Deo, in quem flagrabat charitas de corde puro et conscientia bona et fide non ficta. *De Civitate Dei* XIV, 26; PL 41, 434.

By Adam's sin of disobedience, a voluntary aversion from God to creatures, man's nature was changed and vitiated.[11] That original sin, a disorder of man's nature transmitted by Adam to his posterity,[12] brought in its train two consequences: the revolt of the body, uncontrolled by reason, against the spirit,[13] and ignorance, the blindness of the heart to what is demanded by the rectitude of man's nature.[14] In original sin there is to be distinguished the evil of the sin and its culpability. The evil lay in concupiscence and ignorance, in the disorder effected in man's nature, the insubordination of the flesh against the spirit on the one hand;[15] and on the other, the culpability or responsibility of the evil that beset our nature.[16]

To repair the vitiated and vicious nature, to regain the justice lost to man through original sin, the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity assumed human form, instituted the Sacraments, suffered and died on the Cross. Through grace, God extends His hand to fallen man to raise him from his fall and to recreate the primitive order destroyed by sin.[17] That grace is a special aid given to man by God adapted to the needs of his fallen nature. It is the totality or ensemble of God's gratuitous gifts whose purpose it is to make possible man's salvation, to reestablish perverted nature and to enable man to recover what he had lost through Adam's sin.[18] Therefore the essential characteristic of grace is that it is supernatural and its effect will be to render supernatural again man's actions perverted from their end by original sin. That grace is given to man through the Sacrament of Baptism. Once acquired, it can be lost through personal sin and then be reestablished through the Sacrament of Penance.

For our purpose, it will be sufficient to sketch briefly the teaching of the Church at the time of the troubadours, especially from St. Augustine, on grace and justification on three specific points: that grace is an abiding and permanent quality inhering in the soul of man; that it is the principle of good works, the basic conditions of merit and increase in sanctity; that charity, the greatest of all graces, is moreover a virtue of the soul, the most excellent of virtues, without which all other virtues are powerless—that it is the source and fountain of all good.

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[7] Eo quippe ipso cum ab illo non discedit, (Dei) ipsa praesentia justificatur, et illuminatur, et beatificatur, operante et custodiente Deo, dum obedienti subjectoque dominatur. *De Genesi ad litt.* VIII, 12, 25; PL 34, 383.

Ce que l'on nomme aujourd'hui la grâce sanctifiante, l'adoption de l'homme par Dieu qui fait que ses créatures deviennent ses enfants, n'était que le plus précieux et le plus magnifique de ses dons. E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, p. 193.

[8] Sic enim oportebat prius hominem fieri, ut et bene velle posset, et male; nec gratis, si bene; nec impune, si male. *Enchiridion* CV; PL 40, 281.

[9] Quamvis sine gratia nec tunc (in paradiso) ullum meritum esse potuisset. *Ibid.*, CVI; PL 40, 282.

[10] ...ita bene vivere sine adjutorio Dei, etiam in paradiso, non erat in potestate. *De Civitate Dei* XIV, 27; PL 41, 435. Cf. also *De corr. et grat.*, chs. 10-12; PL 44, 732-739.

[11] ...quando ille (primus homo) propria voluntate peccatum illud grande peccavit, naturamque in se vitiavit, mutavit, obnoxiavit, humanam. *Op. imperf. contra Jul.* IV, 10; PL 45, 1401.

[12] Restat ut in illo primo homine peccasse omnes intelligantur; quia in illo fuerunt omnes quando ille peccavit, unde peccatum nascendo trahitur, quod nisi renascendo non solvitur. *Contra duas epist. Pelag.* IV, 4, 7; PL 44, 614. Cf. also *Opus imperf. contra Jul.* I, 48; PL 45, 1070; *ibid.*, II, 7; PL 45, 1144; *ibid.* II, 178-9; PL 45, 1218-9.

[13] Quod igitur in membris corporis mortis hujus inobedienter movetur, totumque animum in se dejectum conatur attrahere, et neque cum mens voluerit exsurgit, neque cum mens voluerit conquiescit, hoc est malum peccati, in quo nascitur omnis homo. *De pecc. merc. et rem.* I, 29, 57; PL 44, 142.

[14] Caecitas igitur cordis, qua nescitur quod justitia vetet, et violentia concupiscentiae, qua vincitur etiam qui scit unde debeat abstinere non tantum peccata...*Opus Imperf. contra Jul.* VI, 17; PL 45, 1539. Cf. also *Contra Jul.* VI, 16, 49; PL 44, 850-1; *ibid.*, V, 3, 8; PL 44, 787.

[15] Istam vero legem peccati...propterea vocavi iniquitatem, quia iniquum est ut caro concupiscat adversus spiritum. *Contra Jul.* II, 5, 12; PL 44, 682. Cf. also *Opus imperf. contra Jul.* III, 167; PL 45, 1517.

[16] ...quia et ipsum originale voluntas ejus effecit, qui primus ea, qua natura humana vitiata est, voluntate peccavit; ita ut quidquid hominum nasceretur per carnis concupiscentiam, quae reorum confusione velata est, liberum non fieret a reatu, nisi renasceretur per Spiritus gratiam. *Opus imperf. contra Jul.* IV, 95; PL 45, 1394.

[17] Cf. *De lib. arb.* II, 20, 54; PL. 32, 1270.

[18] Cf. *Epist.* 177, 7; PL 33, 767-8; *Epist.* 194 III, 8; PL. 33, 877; *Epist. 217* III, 11; PL 33, 982.

By baptism and at the Sacrament of Penance, past sin and its guilt is wiped away, man is made pleasing once again to God and equipped with the means of attaining eternal beatitude. He is transferred from sin to justice, from death to life.[19] Along with this justification and remission of sin, there is effected a new life, a renovation accomplished by the infusion of grace by the Holy Spirit.[20] Grace effects a sort of divinisation communicated to our nature by the Holy Spirit.[21] It causes a certain ressemblance with Christ, a transformation into God.[22] This renovation,[23] revivification,[24] justification[25] is a state of elevation above man's natural capacities and perfection after his fall. It makes us partakers of the Holy Spirit who penetrates our very being[26] and whom we receive as a gift.[27] This gift is not something passing but brings with it into the soul of man a permanent and habitual union with the mystical body of Christ and that even in the souls of unbaptized infants.[28] It inheres in us[29] and by it we are made blest.[30] Man is made just not by the justice by which God is just, but by that by which man is made just by God and which inheres in us and becomes ours.[31]

The souls of the just are the temples of the Holy Spirit.[32] Sanctity is measured by the intensity of the divine presence,[33] a presence that is anterior to all free acts.[34] By grace we are made the sons of God and participants of His Divine Nature:[35]

> La grâce, en effet, est en nous comme un principe de vie supérieure, une participation de la nature divine, mais elle nous guérit aussi de notre misère originelle. Dans l'homme blessé par le péché, la grâce du Christ apparaît

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[19] Quemadmodum in illo (Christo) vera mors facta est, sic in nobis vera remissio peccatorum; et quemadmodum in illo vera resurrectio, ita in nobis vera justificatio. *Enchiridion* LII; PL 40, 256.

[20] Non per solam peccatorum dimissionem justificatio ista confertur, nisi auctoribus vobis. Justificat quippe impium Deus, non solum dimittendo quae mala facit, sed etiam donando charitatem, ut declinet a malo, et faciat bonum per Spiritum sanctum. *Opus imperf. contra Jul.* II, 165; PL 45, 1212. Cf. *De gratia chr.* XXI, 22; PL 44, 371.

[21] Iste itaque modus, quo nos Deus, cum jam essemus ab ipso non nati, sed conditi et instituti, verbo suo et gratia sua denuit ut fiilii ejus essemus, adoptio vocatur *Contra Faustum* III, 3; PL 42, 215.

[22] Ad imaginem autem Dei factum hominem...sed secundum spiritualem conformationem factum esse hominem ad imaginem Dei...Filii ergo Dei sunt homines renovati ad ejus imaginem, et ei similes facti. *Contra Adamantum* V, 2; PL 42, 136.

[23] Cf. *Ephes.* iv, 23.

[24] Cf. *ibid.*, ii, 5.

[25] Cf. *I Cor.* vi, 11.

[26] Cf. *ibid.*, vi, 19.

[27] Non enim sunt naturaliter dii, quicumque sunt facti atque conditi ex patre per filium dono Spiritus sancti. *De fide et symbolo* IX, 16; PL 40, 189.

[28] Sicut ergo ille in quo omnes vivificantur, praeter quod se ad justitiam exemplum imitantibus praebuit, dat etiam sui spiritus occultissimam fidelibus gratiam, quam latenter infudit et parvulis. *De pecc. merc. et rem.* I, 9, 10; PL 44, 114-5; Cf. *Contra Jul.* VI, 23, 70; PL 44, 866.

[29] ...ab uno vero Deo et optimo...ut gratiam, qua illi cohaerendo beati simus. *De Civitate Dei* VIII, 10, 2; PL 41, 235.

[30] Adfuit ergo...non per gratiam visitationis et operationis, sed per ipsam praesentiam majestatis. *Sermo* CLXXXII, 2; PL 39, 2088.

[31] ...sic et Dei gratiam per Jesum Christum Dominum nostrum, justitia Dei dicitur, non qua justus est Dominus, sed qua justificat eos quos ex impiis justos fecit. *Sermo 131*, 9; PL 38, 733.

[32] Quamobrem Deus, qui ubique praesens est, et ubique totus, non in omnibus habitat, sed in eis tantum quos efficit beatissimum templum suum, vel beatissima templa sua, eruens eos a potestate tenebrarum, et transferens in regnum Filli charitatis suae, quod incipit a regeneratione. *Epist. 187* XII, 35; PL 33, 846.

[33] Cum igitur qui ubique est, non in omnibus habitet, etiam in quibus habitat, non aequaliter habitat...et unde in omnibus sanctis sunt alii aliis sanctiores, nisi abundantius habendo habitatorem Deo? *Ibid.*, 17; PL 33, 838.

[34] Dicimus ergo in baptizatis parvulis, quamvis id nesciant, habitare Spiritum sanctum. *Ibid.*, 26; PL 33, 841.

[35] Cf. *Epist. 140*, 10; PL 33, 542.

> comme un principe de libération, un affranchissement de la servitude des passions naissantes ou invétérées.[36]

The state of justice can be lost and is *de facto* lost by mortal sin.[37] St. Augustine teaches that it is in the power of the just to sin and that all do not persevere;[38] those who simulate justice and profess to be the sons of God are not so in reality because they have not persevered in justice.[39] On the other hand, grace may increase in intensity through good works. St. Peter advised the Christians to grow in grace;[40] St. Augustine says of the just that they have put on justice, some more and some less,[41] but that that justice grows.[42]

St. John had taught that without Christ it is impossible to do anything.[43] St. Augustine reiterates time and time again the necessity of grace in order that man's works may be meritorious before God. Without God's help, we cannot will a good work; without His cooperation, our works are worth nothing.[44] On the contrary, left to ourselves, we possess but the power to do evil: to sin and to lie.[45] Even the virtues of the pagans, real moral virtues though they were, had but the appearance of Christian virtues since they were sterile of supernatural worth.[46] After the fall, the virtues that remained in man retrieved their supernatural value only through the special help of God, a help that was adapted to the needs of fallen nature.[47] There is no true or perfect virtue without grace.[48] To live well, even to begin to believe in God, man needs the merciful and gratuitous grace of God to prepare his will to believe.[49] Of ourselves we may will and believe, but it is God who grants us to believe and to will the good that we do.[50] Thus in the just man, good works become in a certain way spontaneous and connatural.[51] Grace alone gives man the power to do good.[52]

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[36] Henri Rondet, *Gratia Christi* (Paris, 1948), p. 103.

[37] Justus non poterit vivere in justitia sua in quacumque die peccaverit. *I Cor.* x, 12.

[38] Cf. *De corr. et grat.* VIII, 17; PL 44, 925-6.

[39] Non erant filii, etiam quando erant in professione et nomine filiorum? non quia justitiam simulaverunt; sed quia in ea non permanserunt. *De corr. et grat.* IX, 20; PL 44, 923.

[40] *Pet.* iii, 18; Cf. *II Cor.* ix, 8-10.

[41] Et induti sunt sancti justitia, alius magis, alius minus. *Epist. 167* III, 13; PL 33, 738. Cf. *supra*, note 33.

[42] Nam si pro diversitate meritorum baptisma sanctum est, quia diversa sunt merita, diversa erunt baptismata; et tanto quisque aliquid melius putatur accipere, quanto a meliore videtur accepisse... diversarum gratiarum sunt, non omnes paria merita habent; sunt alii aliis sanctiores, sunt alii aliis meliores. *Tract. VI in Johan.*, 8; PL 35; 1428.

[43] *John* xv, 5.

[44] ...tamen sine illo vel operante ut velimus, vel cooperante cum volumus, ad bona pietatis opera nihil valemus. *De grat. et lib. arb.* XVII, 33; PL 44, 901. Cf. Ac per hoc gratiam Dei...sic confiteatur qui vult veraciter confiteri, ut omnino nihil boni sine illa, quod ad pietatem pertinet veramque justitiam, fieri posse non dubitet. *De grat. chr.* XXVI, 27; PL 44, 374.

[45] Nemo habet de suo, nisi mendacium atque peccatum. *In Johan.* V, 1; PL 35, 1414.

[46] Proinde virtutes, quas sibi habere videtur, per quas imperat corpori et vitiis ad quodlibet adipiscendum vel tenendum, nisi ad Deum retulerit, etiam ipsae vitia sunt potius quam virtutes. Nam licet a quibusdam tunc verae et honestae putentur esse virtutes cum ad se ipsas referuntur, nec propter aliud expetuntur; etiam tunc inflatae ac superbae sunt; et ideo non virtutes sed vitia judicanda sunt. *De Civitate Dei* XIX, 25; PL 44, 656.

[47] In ista enim colluvie morum pessimorum et veteris perditae disciplinae, maxime venire ac subvenire debuit coelestis auctoritas, quae voluntariam paupertatem, quae continentiam, benevolentiam, justitiam, atque concordiam, veramque pietatem persuaderet, ceterasque vitae luminosas validasque virtutes; non tantum propter civitatis terrenae concordissimam societatem; verum etiam propter adipiscendam sempiternam salutem, et sempiternam cujusdam populi coelestam divinamque rempublicam, cui nos cives adsciscit fides, spes, charitas; ut quamdiu inde peregrinamur, feramus eos si corrigere non valemus, qui vitiis impunitis volunt stare rempublicam, quam primi Romani constituerunt auxeruntque virtutibus, etsi non habentes veram pietatem erga Deum verum, quae illos etiam in aeternam civitatem posset salubri religione perducere; custodientes tamen quamdam sui generis probitatem, quae posset terrenae civitati constituendae, augendae, conservandaeque sufficere. Deus enim sic ostendit in opulentissimo ac praeclaro imperio Romanorum, quantum valerent civiles etiam sine vera religione virtutes, ut intelligeretur hac addita fieri homines cives alterius civitatis, cujus rex veritas, cujus lex charitas, cujus modus aeternitas. *Epist. 138* III, 17; PL 33, 533. Cf. *De Civitate Dei* V, 18, 3; PL 41, 165 and *ibid.* 19; PL 41, 165-66.

[48] Quia nec virtus nobis erit, nisi adsit ipse quo juvemur. *Epist. 155*, 6; PL 33, 669.

[49] Quapropter ut in Deum credamus, et pie vivamus, non volentis neque curentis, sed miserentis est Dei; non quia velle non debemus et currere; sed qui ipse in nobis et velle operatur et currere...*Epist. 217* IV, 12; PL 33, 983...confiteamur gratia Dei praeveniri hominum voluntates, et per hanc eas potius praeparari, quam propter earum meritum dari. *Ibid.* VI, 25; PL 33, 987.

St. Augustine teaches that it is the constant tradition of the Church that we cannot glory in what we have or do, since it is God who gives us all we have received. The doctors of the Church testify that even our thoughts are not in our power[53] and it is *de fide* that without grace it is impossible that man may merit or that his works be of worth.[54] Our perseverance in good, our ability to will and to do good are to be attributed to God's grace. In the state of sin, man is spiritually dead. It is only when he is converted and justified that his works merit a reward before God.[55] Through his good works he then may grow in justice.[56]

God is not only the object of our love but He is love itself.[57] Through the action of the Third Person of the Blessed Trinity, the eternal fruit of the infinite love of the Father and Son, man is made to share in this love which is God.[58] Charity is diffused in our hearts through the Holy Spirit who is given to us.[59] By that love God dwells in us in order that we may love Him and that He may love Himself through us by moving and exciting us to love of Himself.[60] By charity God makes man the gift of Himself,[61] and He dwells in our souls as He does in heaven.[62]

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[50] Nostrum est credere et velle, illius (Dei) autem dare credentibus et volentibus facultatem bene operandi per Spiritum sanctum. *Quarundam propos. Epist. ad Roman.* LXI; PL 35, 2079. Cf. *Retract.* I, 23, 2; PL 32, 621.

[51] Sed si plus delectat pulchritudo illa et intima et sincera species castitatis, per gratiam quae est in fide Christi, secundum hanc vivimus, et secundum hanc operamur; ut non regnante in nobis peccato ad obediendum desideriis ejus, sed regnante justitia per charitatem cum magna delectatione faciamus quidquid in ea Deo placere cognoscimus. *Epist. ad Galatas*, 49; PL 35, 2140.

[52] Liberum arbitrium non evacuatur per gratiam, sed statuitur, quia gratia sanat voluntatem, qua justitia libere diligatur. *De spirit. et litt.* XXX, 52; PL 44, 233.

[53] Isti tales tantique doctores dicentes non esse aliquid, de quo tanquam de nostro, quod nobis Deus non dederit, gloriemur; nec ipsum cor nostrum et cogitationes nostras in potestate nostra esse; et totum dantes Deo, atque ab ipso nos accipere confitentes, ut permansuri convertamur ad eum; ut id quod bonum est, nobis quoque videatur bonum, et velimus illud...haec utique gratiae Dei tribuunt, Dei munera agnoscunt, ab ipso nobis, non a nobis esse testantur. *De dono persev.* XIX, 50; PL 45, 1025.

[54] Si quis sine gratia Dei credentibus, volentibus, desiderantibus, conantibus, laborantibus, vigilantibus, studentibus, petentibus, quaerentibus, pulsantibus nobis misericordiam dicit conferri divinitus, non autem ut credamus, velimus, vel haec omnia, sicut oportet, agere valeamus, per infusionem et inspirationem sancti Spiritus in nobis fieri confitetur, et aut humilitati, aut obedientiae humanae subiungit gratiae adiutorium, nec, ut obedientes et humiles simus, ipsius gratiae donum esse consentit, resistit Apostolo dicenti: *Quid habes, quod non accepisti?* et: *Gratia Dei sum id, quod sum.* Conc. Arausicanum (529), Canon. 6. Ed. Henrico Denzinger, *Enchiridon Symbolorum* (Freiburg, 1911), p. 81. Cf. also can. 9; *ibid.* p. 82.

[55] Sed misericordia et gratia Dei convertit hominem...ut justificetur impius, hoc est ex impio fiat justus, et incipiat habere meritum bonum, quod Dominus coronabit, quando judicabitur mundus. *Epist. 214*, 4; PL 33, 970.

[56] Unde intelligimus malos accipere potestatem ad damnationem malae voluntatis suae, bonos autem ad probationem bonae voluntatis suae. *De spirit. et litt* XXXI, 54; PL 44, 235.

[57] Non est autem dictum, Domine charitas mea; aut tu es charitas mea; aut Deus charitas mea; sed ita dictum est: *Deus charitas est. De Trinitate* XV, 17, 27; PL 42, 1080.

[58] Spiritus itaque sanctus de quo dedit nobis, facit nos in Deo manere, et ipsum in nobis; hoc autem facit dilectio. Ipse est igitur Deus dilectio...Deus igitur Spiritus sanctus qui procedit ex Deo, cum datus fuerit homini, accendit eum in dilectionem Dei et proximi, et ipse dilectio est. Non enim habet homo unde Deum diligat, nisi ex Deo. *De Trinitate* XV, 17, 31; PL 42, 1082.

[59] Caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per Spiritum sanctum qui datus est nobis. *Rom.* v, 5.

[60] Quid, aut in quo Charitas Dei diffusa est in corde humano?...ne putaret quisque a se sibi esse quod diligit Deum, continuo addidit, *per Spiritum sanctum qui datus est nobis.* Ut ergo ames Deum, habitet in te Deus, et amet se de te; id est, ad amorem suum moveat te, accendat te, illuminet te, excitet te. *Sermo 128* II, 4; PL 38, 715.

[61] Charitas usque adeo donum Dei est, ut Deus vocetur. *Sermo 156* V, 5; PL 38, 852. Cf. *Sermo 186* III, 7; PL 33, 818.

[62] Quisiquis habet charitatem, utquid illum mittimus longe, ut videat Deum? Conscientiam suam attendat, et ibi videt Deum. Si charitas ibi non habitat, non ibi habitat Deus; si autem charitas ibi habitat, Deus ibi habitat. Vult illum forte videre sedentem in caelo; habeat charitatem, et in eo habitat sicut in caelo. *Enarr. in Ps. 149*, 4; PL 37, 1951.

Charity is a grace, a gift of God, supernatural in origin.[63] It is moreover the first of all gifts, the grace par excellence. So intimately do grace and charity cohere in the soul of the just that St. Augustine would seem to deny a real distinction between them. He asserts, for example, that it is the gift of charity alone that divides the sons of the eternal kingdom, i.e., those endowed with grace, from those of perdition.[64] The schismatics, moreover, do not share in the reward promised those who suffer persecution for justice's sake, because justice does not exist in them since they lack charity.[64a] Suppress charity, and all other gifts and graces vanish;[65] with charity, all other gifts of nature and grace become living and fruitful.[66] There is no more perfect gift than charity. Paraphrasing the words of St. Paul to the Corinthians,[67] St. Augustine goes on to show that there is nothing so great as this gift without which other gifts are powerless to lead us to God.[68] It alone has the power to sanctify our lives and to lead us to the eternal kingdom.[69] It alone is the way that leads to the happiness to which our souls aspire:[70]

> Les voies de la raison, de la science, de la vertu, de la sagesse convergent vers le but convoité. Mais elles sont barrées par endroits et coupées avant le terme. La charité suit leur direction, mais sur un plan supérieur où aucun obstacle ne saurait l'arrêter et au point extrême où elles se rejoignent elles les continue allègrement et monte toujours plus haut vers les espaces infinis où Dieu reside. C'est le sentier divin où l'âme entrainée par l'amour s'élève comme sur des ailes vers son bonheur, avec, cette fois, la certitude de l'atteindre.[71]

Charity is not only grace which constitutes justice; it is a virtue[72] exercising and radiating its divine fire especially on the will[73] to strengthen it and to orientate it towards the good.[74] It inflames and excites its courage[75] and finally moves it towards God the object of its love.[76]

Charity differs from earthly love in that it finds its object within itself, infused therein by the Holy Spirit.[77] The will does not seek its delight in an object exterior to itself but finds it within itself, in charity itself.[78] In this way, charity is, so to speak, the generator of its delight.

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[63] Sed opus est ut habeas charitatem, habeas fidem, habeas spem...et haec ipsa tria sunt...Et haec ipsa dona Dei sunt. *Sermo 105* IV, 5; PL 38, 620. Cf. alo *De grat. et lib. arb.* XVIII, 37; PL 44, 903-4; *ibid.*, XIX, 40; PL 44, 905.

[65] Credendo de Scripturis Deus tibi dedit charitatem, magnum donum, charitatem omnia superantem. *Sermo 145*, 4; PL 38, 793. Nullum est isto Dei dono excellentius. Solum charitatis est, quod dividit inter filios regni aeterni et filios perditionis aeterni. *De Trinitate* XV, 18, 32; PL 42, 1082. Cf. Charitas Dei (ipsa est verissima, plenissima, perfectissima justitia). *De nat. et grat.* XLII, 49; PL 44, 271. Charitas ergo inchoata, inchoata justitia; charitas provecta, provecta justitia est; charitas magna, magna justitia est, charitas perfecta, perfecta justitia est. *Ibid.* LXX, 84; PL 44, 290.

[64a] Neque schismatici aliquid sibi ex ista mercede promittant; quia similiter ubi charitas non est, non potest esse justitia; dilectio enim proximi malum non operatur; quam si haberent, non dilaniarent corpus Christi, quod est ecclesia. *De sermone Domini in monte* V, 13; PL 34, 1236.

[65] Detrahe charitatem, nihil prosunt caetera. *Sermo 138* II, 2; PL 38, 764.

[66] Adde charitatem, prosunt omnia. *Ibid.*

[67] *II Cor.* xiii, 1 ff.

[68] Dantur et alia per Spiritum sanctum munera, sed sine charitate nihil prodest. *De Trinitate* XV, 18, 32; PL 42, 1082. Cf. also *Sermo 138* II, 2; PL 38, 764; *Sermo 142* VIII, 9; PL 38, 783.

[69] Nullum est isto dono Dei excellentius. . . . Nisi ergo tantum impertiatur cuique Spiritus sanctus, ut eum Dei et proximi faciat amatorem, a sinistra non transfertur ad dexteram. *De Trinitate* XV, 18, 32; PL 42, 1082.

[70] Semitae dictae sunt Dei, quia multa praecepta sunt; et quia eadem multa praecepta ad unum rediguntur quia plenitudo legis charitas, propterea viae istae in multis praeceptis in unam colliguntur, et una dicitur quia via nostra charitas est. *Enarr. in Ps. 141*, 7; PL 37, 1357.

[71] Gustave Combès, *La charité d'après saint Augustin* (Paris, 1934), p. 63.

[72] Quae est virtus animae. Ipsa charitas. *Enarr. in Ps. 103* II, 3; PL 37, 1353. Cf. also *Sermo 304* V, 4; PL 38, 1397.

[73] Ecce etiam charitas quantulacumque in nostra voluntate consistit. *Epist. 147* XVII, 44; PL 33, 616.

[74] Quasi vero aliud sit bona voluntas quam charitas. *De grat. chr.* I, 21; PL 44, 371.

[75] Istam charitatem, id est, divina amore, ardentissimam voluntatem. *In epist. Joan.* XVII, 34; PL 35.

[76] Charitatem voce motum animi ad fruendum Deo propter ipsum. *De doctr. chr.* III, 10, 6; PL 34, 72.

Earthly love, urged on by concupiscence, directed hardly and with difficulty by reason, is difficult to regulate. It is as unstable as are its objects. It runs from excess to excess, changing with the varied pleasures that attract it. It is not so with charity. Charity has but one object, permanent and invariable. It proceeds towards that object under the direction of the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit is not content to anticipate and guide the will; it protects it from possible deviations, regulates its movements, disciplines its activity in order that it may the more surely attain its object.[79]

This regulating action of the Holy Spirit gives charity its specific note of virtue. Each of its motions towards God is directed precisely in order that it lose nothing of the ardor that animates it. On the contrary, the delight that charity procures grows in the measure that it is repeated and renewed. The reason for this, evidently, is that mysterious force which, putting the will under a sweet, suave pressure, augments its intensity and its energy to action. Thus the will is lead to repeat its acts of love. Insensibly the will acquires the habit of making its acts of love and thus little by little charity, while remaining the greatest of graces, becomes the most beautiful of virtues.[80]

Briefly and generally St. Augustine defines charity:[81] it is a virtue by which we love what ought to be loved.[82] In a series of further definitions he makes more precise what he means. Charity is love of what is eternal and what can be loved eternally.[83] The most perfect charity is God and the soul that loves God.[84] Its essential character is to absorb all the affections of the heart towards one end, union with God.[85] That union is not sufficient; it must afford delight, the enjoyment of the object loved.[86]

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[77] Manifestum est quia hoc agit Spiritus sanctus in homine ut sit in illi dilectio et charitas. *In epist. Johan.* VI, 9; PL 35, 2025.

[78] Cum quo ergo facit Deus suavitatem, id est, cui propitius inspirat boni delectationem; atque, ut apertius id explicem, cui donatur a Deo charitas Dei. *Enarr. in Ps. 118* XVII, 2; PL 37, 1548.

[79] Ita suavitati salubriter additur disciplina. Non enim quantulaecumque suavitati vel bonitati, hoc est, charitati sanctae poscenda et optanda est; sed tam magna, et sub ejus pressura non possit exstingui, sed sicut ingens flamma sub impetu venti, quanto magis reprimitur, tanto ardentius excitari. *Ennar. in Ps. 118* XVII, 2; PL 37, 1548.

[80] Quid autem est pietas, nisi Dei cultus? et unde ille colitur, nisi charitate? Charitas igitur de corde puro et conscientia bona et fide non ficta, magna et vera virtus est, quia ipsa est et finis praecepti . . . quia sicut mors animam avellit a sensibus carnis, sic charitas a concupiscentiis carnalibus. . . Cur ergo non dicimus, qui hanc virtutem habet, habere omnes. . . An quanto magis est in homine, tanto magis est virtute praeditus; quanto autem minus, tanto minus inest ei virtus, quia ipsa est virtus; et quanto minus inest virtus, tanto magis est vitium. *Epist. 167*, 11; PL 33, 737-8. Cf. also *De spirit. et littera* I, 29; PL 44, 233. Sub quo timore anima laborans, quando concupiscentiam malam non vicerit, nec timor ille quasi custos severus abscesserit; per fidem confugiat ad misericordiam Dei, ut det quod jubet, atque inspirata gratiae suavitate per Spirtitum sanctum faciat plus delectare quod praecipit, quam delectat quod impedit. Ita multa multitudo dulcedinis ejus, hoc est, lex fidei, charitas ejus conscripta in cordibus atque diffusa, perficiatur sperantibus in eum, ut anima sanata non timore poenae, sed amore justitiae operetur bonum.

[81] Nous pouvons tenter maintenant de la définir, car sous la forme divine qui l'enveloppait, nous voyons se dégager sa figure humaine. Gustave Combès, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

[82] Et ut generaliter breviterque complectar quam de virtute habeam notionem quod ad recte vivendum attinet, virtus est charitas, qua id quod diligendum est, diligitur. *Epist. 167*, 15; PL 33, 739. Cf. *83 Quaest.* XXXV, 2; PL 40, 24.

[83] Charitatem voco, quae amantur ea quae non sunt prae isto amanti contemnenda; id est, quod aeternum est, et quod amare ipsum aeternum potest. *83 Quaest.* XXXVI, 1; PL 40, 25.

[84] Deus igitur et animus quo amatur, charitas proprie dicitur. *Ibid.*

[85] Si igitur diligentibus Deum omnia procedunt in bonum; et summum bonum, quod etiam optimum dicitur, non modo dilligendum esse nemo ambigit, sed ita diligendum ut nihil amplius diligere debeamus. *De morib. eccl.* XI, 18; PL 32, 1319.

[86] Charitatem voco motum animi ad fruendum Deo propter ipsum. *De doctr. chr.* III, 10, 16; PL 34, 72.

V.

It is quite true that charity and Courtly Love have nothing in common except that they may be considered as species of the generic concept of love on a par with Platonic love, mother love, *hyperdulia,* lust and so on. They differ radically to such an extent that Courtly Love could not have had its origin or be patterned on the love of God.[1] However, setting aside their differences, the parallels they evoke in the nature of man, each in their own level, are at least striking. By the diffusion of charity in the soul of man, man's original sin is forgiven and he is justified, that is he is elevated to the state of grace. He is maintained in that state by grace, an abiding quality which inheres in his soul. Grace enables man to merit before God. Without grace there is no true virtue nor growth in worth. It is the *sine qua non* of good. This gift of God may be lost through personal sin, an aversion from the love of God to the love of persons and to the love of things. The penitent sinner may regain it at the Sacrament of Penance through the fresh diffusion of charity by the Holy Spirit.

Like charity and grace, joy and Courtly Love are inextricably bound together.[2] The habit of joy is induced and accompanies the exercise of love.[3] Love is accounted the font and source of human excellences but the joy which accompanies it or which it brings in its train is the *sine qua non* of these excellences.[4] It is Courtly Love which maintains the lover in joy.[5] This joy is conceived of as a permanent state or quality inherent in the soul of the lover.[6] Without it, there can be no worth or good;[7] it is the condition of worth and all good.[8] Joy can be lost through evil,[9] especially through lust[10] and avarice,[11] but it is regained again through the cultivation of a fresh love or by relinquishing a false love.[12] The resultant joy is a new life.[13]

In the spiritual order grace plays a role parallel to that of joy in the purely human order. Just as grace is a permanent quality or habit infused into the soul along with charity, so joy is a stable quality that possesses the soul of the lover. Just as grace is the *sine qua non* of good works, so joy is the *sine qua non* of human worth. Only the just, that is the person in the state of grace, can act virtuously and advance in merit before God; only the lover, that is the person who possesses joy, can be of worth before the world and advance in human excellence. Without grace, no work is of merit; without joy, no act is of value. Just as grace can be lost through loss of charity, so joy can be lost through lust or failure to cultivate true love. Just as justice or the state of grace can be regained by the re-infusion of charity, so joy can be regained through the cultivation of a fresh love.

It is interesting to substitute grace for joy, charity for love in some of the excerpts from the troubadours analyzed above. *Ceteris paribus,* it brings out in a striking way the parallelism of grace and joy in the two different levels of the nature of man: the spiritual and human.

> Ben es totz om d'avol vida
> c'ab *gratia* non a son estage
> e qui vas *caritas* no guida
> so cor e so dezirer.[14]

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[1] Cf. A. J. Denomy, 'An Inquiry into the Origins of Courtly Love', *Mediaeval Studies,* VI (1944), 188 ff.

[2] Cf. p. 184, n. 23; p. 188, n. 42; p. 194, n. 66.

[3] Cf. p. 187, n. 38; p. 188, n. 40; p. 200, n. 90; p. 204, n. 10.

[4] Cf. p. 190, n. 50; p. 194, n. 69; p. 203, n. 7.

[5] Cf. p. 184, n. 19; p. 185, n. 28; p. 187, n. 37; p. 193, n. 60.

[6] Cf. p. 194, n. 67; p. 202, n. 5; p. 204, n. 10.

[7] Cf. p. 186, n. 29; p. 189, n. 44; p. 190, n. 48; p. 193, n. 60; p. 195, n. 71; p. 204, n. 11.

[8] Cf. p. 195, n. 70; p. 197, n. 79; p. 201, n. 97.

[9] Cf. p. 189, n. 46; p. 191, n. 52; p. 198, n. 83.

[10] Cf. p. 192, n. 56.

[11] Cf. p. 205, n. 16.

[12] Cf. p. 180, n. 3; p. 184, n. 21; p. 186, n. 34; p. 187; n. 36.

[13] Cf. p. 186, n. 34; p. 204, n. 15.

[14] p. 195, n. 70.

qu'una m'a conquis
don reviu *gratia* e nais valers
tals que devant li·m tralhis.[15]

Er ai ieu *gratia* e suy *in statu gratiae*
E restauratz en ma valor.[16]

E mals albres de mal noirim,
De mala brancha mala flor
E fruitz de mala pesansa
Revert al mal outra·l pejor,
Lai on *gratia* non a sobransa.[17]

I do not suggest that joy is grace, that it is Augustinian, that it is Christian in concept or that it has any relation to charity. I do suggest that there was at the troubadours' hands a concept, a thought-pattern, a mould of thought to which they might have fitted their novel idea of joy resultant on or accompanying love as an abiding quality or habit of the soul, the *sine qua non* of human worth. That could be found in the Christian teaching of grace. Divorce that teaching of its supernatural content and consider it as a device for a concept that is based on rational and natural love,[18] and you approach very nearly their idea of joy. To speak in the language of the later scholastics, one might say that joy is to Courtly Love in the natural order as grace is to charity in the supernatural order.

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[15] P. 200, n. 91.
[16] P. 186, n. 34.
[17] P. 189, n. 44.
[18] Cf. A. J. Denomy, 'The *De Amore* of Andreas Capellanus and the Condemnation of 1277', *Mediaeval Studies*, VIII (1946), 144 ff.

Mediaevalia

I. Cardinal Humbert of Silva Candida and Auxilius: The 'Anonymous Adversary' of *Liber I Adversus Simoniacos*.

CARDINAL HUMBERT'S *Libri III adversus simoniacos*[1] has always held a place of the very first importance in the literature of the eleventh-century reform movement. It is the chief work of the man, who was not only the leading representative of the so-called Lorraine program of reform,[2] but also, according to authoritative opinion, the leader of the Roman Curia in the critical years before his death in 1061.[3] Humbert begins his work in the form of a dialogue between a *Correptor* and a *Corruptor,* although he does not carry this device consistently even through *Lib.* I. He abandons it entirely in the following books. It is with the identity of this adversary in *Lib.* I that the present note is concerned. For it has been generally recognized, and is indeed made perfectly clear by Humbert himself, that he was not creating a fictitious partner in debate—as often done when the dialogue was used in didactic and polemical writings—but was attacking the tract of a real but unknown adversary, to whom the role of *Corruptor* was assigned.[4]

But while the historical character of this adversary is a matter of general agreement, the question of his identity is not. Without attempting to review the question in any detail, but merely to indicate the elements of the problem and something of its literary background for the reader's convenience, the following positions may be taken as representative of more recent opinion since the appearance of the critical edition in 1891. At that time Fr. Thaner, in his *Introduction,*[5] called attention to the fact that some of the arguments and texts, which Humbert attributes to his adversary, had already been used by St. Peter Damiani in his *Liber gratissimus,* written in 1052, although he did not state as his own opinion that the *Liber gratissimus* was the tract that Humbert was refuting.

Some writers since then have continued to hold that the tract itself and its author, who was unknown to Humbert himself, both remain unknown to us. Thus Carl Mirbt,[6] who reports an earlier effort to reconstruct the lost tract and conjectures that it was written only shortly before Humbert's reply. Similarly

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[1] ed. F. Thaner, MGH, Libelli de lite I (Hannover, 1891), pp. 95-253, which is cited hereafter by page and line.

[2] Cf. A. Fliche, *La réforme grégorienne* I (Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, études et documents, VI, Louvain, 1924), pp. 265 ff.

[3] Thus A. Michel, *Papstwahl u. Königsrecht oder das Papstwahl-Konkordat von 1059* (Munich, 1936), pp. 60 f.; *idem,* in *Lex. für Theol. u. Kirche* V (1933), pp. 194 ff., for the best brief notice and literature, including the author's earlier studies, which have contributed greatly to a better knowledge of Humbert's influence; *idem, Die Sentenzen des Kardinals Humbert, das erste Rechtsbuch der päpstlichen Reform* (Schriften des Reichsinstituts für ältere deutsche Geschichtskunde, MGH, VII), Leipzig, 1943, on Humbert as compiler of the *Collection in 74 Titles; idem, Die folgenschweren Ideen des Kard. Humbert u. ihr Einfluss auf Gregor VII,* in *Studi Gregoriani per la storia di Gregorio VII e della Riforma Gregoriana,* ed. G. Borino, I (Rome, 1947), pp. 65-92; *idem, Pseudo-Isidor, die Sentenzen Humberts u. Burkard von Worms im Investiturstreit,* in *Studi Greg.* III (1948), pp. 149-161, where the author replies to some doubts expressed on Humbert's authorship of *Die Sentenzen.*

[4] *Adv. simon., Praef.:* Ne sibi sapiens videatur, respondere stulto cogimur, qui titulo frontis tractatus, immo latratus sui eraso nomineque suppresso impudenter persuadere conatur non separandum a vili pretiosum . . . (100, 36); *ibid.,* Quilibet ergo sit acerrimus iste coniector, inimicus tamen Dei esse convincitur, etiamsi in aliquibus eius videatur defensor . . . (100, 45, f.); I, c. 7: Unde se quoque nolente Spinosulus iste suae perversae intentionis initium, progressionem et finem procedente disputatione noscitur iam revelare . . . Constat enim eum pertinaciter defendere ab hereticis et specialiter a symoniacis ordinatos . . . (111, 16).

[5] *Lib. de lite* I, p. 99.

[6] *Die Publizistik im Zeitalter Gregors VII* (Leipzig, 1894), p. 11; also p. 147, where he speaks again of the 'unbekannte *Gegner Humberts.'*

Max Manitius[7] holds that Humbert was answering the now lost writing of an anonymous adversary. Finally, Gerhart Ladner[8] denies flatly that *Adversus simoniacos* was written against Damiani, but rather against an anonymous writer closely related to his thought.

Other writers, on the other hand, have been inclined to see Damiani's tract as the object of Humbert's invective. L. von Heinemann, in the *Introduction* to his edition of the *Liber gratissimus,* listed Humbert, on the basis of a single passage, among the later controversialists who used the *Liber gratissimus.*[9] Given the importance of *Lib. I adversus simoniacos* for the question of reordinations, Louis Saltet[10] reconsidered the problem and listed the parallels between the texts of Humbert and Damiani. He concluded that the tract which Humbert was refuting depended closely on the *Liber gratissimus* and suggested that it was perhaps a modified edition of Damiani's work. Substantially the same view was shared by J. P. Whitney.[11] Finally, Anton Michel, accepting the identification of Damiani's *Liber gratissimus* as beyond question, considers this fact an element in setting a terminal date for the composition of *Lib. I adversus simoniacos.*[12] Thus the violence of Humbert's language against his adversary would make it difficult to date its appearance after Damiani entered the Roman Curia as Cardinal-Bishop of Ostia in 1057.

This difference of serious opinion reflects the uncertainty of the evidence itself and was enough to make it clear that further study of the texts of Humbert and Damiani alone held little promise of a solution. An entirely new approach to the problem was made possible by W. K. Firminger,[13] who established the fact of Damiani's dependence in the *Liber gratissimus* on a tract of Auxilius (*flor.* 891-912), the defender of the ordinations of Pope Formosus, and who ventured to suggest the same Auxilius as the adversary with whose treatise Humbert is concerned in the *Adversus simoniacos.* This proposal, which, as far as I find, was never followed up and has been somewhat strangely passed over, awaited only to be tested by an examination of the texts. In what follows are set out the passages in which Humbert, in cc. 1-8, presents or refers to his opponent's tract, with corresponding *loci* in Auxilius, *De ordinationibus a Formoso papa factis.*[14]

HUMBERT	AUXILIUS
Lib. I adv. simon.	De ordin. a Formoso pp. factis
c. 1 *Correptor.* In ipso controversiae suae vestibulo praefixis aliquot ad defensionem sui suorumque capitulis, . . . seductus seductor tandem violentus	Cf. cc. 1–24.

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[7] *Geschichte der lateinischen Literatur des Mittelalters* III (1931), p. 24: Er (H) antwortet hier auf die verlorene Schrift eines Spinosulus . . . Die Schrift *Adv. simon.* ist Antwort an einen Unbekannten.

[8] *Theologie u. Politik vor dem Investiturstreit* (Veröffentlichungen des Oesterreichischen Instituts für Geschichtsforschung, II, Baden, 1936), pp. 52 ff.

[9] *Lib. de lite* I, p. 17. The text cited is *Adv. simon.* I, c. 7, quoted in note 4 *supra.* Manitius, *op. cit.*, p. 22, in his brief notice on *Lib. gratiss.*, repeats Heinemann's list of writers who used the *Lib. gratiss.* This I take to be a slip, since the identification of Damiani as the *Spinosulus* of *Adv. simon.* I, c. 7 would be a patent contradiction of his own opinion that the *Spinosulus* remains unknown (*v.* note 7 *supra*).

[10] *Les réordinations* (Etudes d'hist. des dogmes et d'ancienne litt. ecclésiastique, 2nd ed., Paris, 1907), p. 193.

[11] *Peter Damian and Humbert,* in *Hildebrandine Essays* (Cambridge, 1932), pp. 120 and 123.

[12] *Papstwahl u. Königsrecht,* p. 5; on the apparent contradiction in Manitius, as noted here by Michel, *v.* note 9 *supra.* Cf. also *Die Sentenzen des Kard. Humbert,* p. 7, note 5, where the same view on the date of *Lib. I adv. simon.* is restated (Fall 1054/1056).

[13] 'St. Peter Damiani and 'Auxilius',' *The Journal of Theological Studies,* XXVI (1924-25), 79.

[14] ed. J. Morin, PL 129, 1059-1074; his tract *Infensor et Defensor,* ed. J. Mabillon, *ibid.*, 1073-1102. The date 911 is given for both tracts by M. Manitius, *Gesch. der latein. Literatur* I (1911), p. 439.

ab insidiarum cuniculis emergit atque in haec argumenta . . . repente erumpit (103, 35).	
Corruptor. His ergo relectis capitulis, o iustitiae dilectores, liquidius audistis, quod a pseudoepiscopis ordinatio facta posset rata consistere (103, 42).	c. 24 His ergo relectis capitulis, o justitiae dilectores, audistis liquidius, quod a pseudoepiscopis ordinatio facta possit rata consistere (1068B).
Correptor. Veneficorum est mortiferi poculi ora aliquantulo melle imbuere . . . Quod iste calumpniator fecisse arguitur, ubi ordiens tendiculas capitulorum, quae quaquaversum emendicando et suae disputationis foribus praefigendo corruperat, infit (104, 1):	Cf. cc. 1-15.
Corruptor. Abhinc praeclara secuntur testimonia, quibus papae Formosi ordinatio rata et legitima esse monstratur (104, 7).	c. 16 (*tit.*) Ab hinc praeclara sequuntur testimonia, quibus papae Formosi ordinatio rata et legitima esse monstratur . . .
Correptor. Hanc sententiolam suam, . . . velut ex maximae et primae synodi auctoritate falso praetitulavit ex concilio Niceno (104, 10).	Cf. c. 6 (*tit.*) . . . ex concilio Nicaeno (c. 15). [Note that the whole discussion in cc. 2-15 moves about this Nicene canon—its reconciliation with the earlier (!) decretal of Ps. Anterus, c. 2, excerpted in c. 1, and the refutation of the stricter legislation of the Council of Sardica, c. 1, given in c. 11.]
idem, Quodsi capitulum illud idcirco ex concilio Niceno putavit praetitulandum, quia aliquot capitula eorum quae subiunxit ex illo concilio sint, vel admonitus cognoscat nullum inibi se subiecisse praeter solum de Catharis capitulum (104, 21).	Cf. c. 23 (*tit.*) Nicaena synodus clericos qui cathari dicuntur, ita recipi jubet (c. 8).
c. 2 *idem,* Praemisso Leonis papae . . . capitulo, errorem suum corroborare conatur ex eo, quasi de symoniacis aut certe de aliis hereticis aliquis illic ei fuerit sermo et non potius de catholicis . . . (104, 28).	Cf. c. 16 (*tit.*) . . . S. Leonis papae, quod pseudoepiscopi sint adjiciendi, et eorum ordinatio possit rata consistere. *Nulla ratio sinit* . . . (*Coll. Dionys.-Hadr.*, c. 15, PL 67, 288). Jaffé 544.
(cc. 2-4 discuss this text of St. Leo, with digressions.)	
c. 5 *idem,* Sed hinc iam ad discussionem propositi capituli revertamur et b. Leonem illic pseudoepiscopis commemorantem non contra symoniacos . . . (108, 15).	Cf. c. 16 *supra.* [Note the characteristic reading *consueto judicio* (1066B), as in *Adv. simon.* (108, 44).]
c. 7 *Corruptor.* Audistis etiam, quia, sicut denuo quisquam baptizari non	c. 24 (following 'His ergo relectis . . . consistere' *supra*) Audistis etiam quia

debet, ita nec denuo in eodem ordine consecrari potest (110, 30).	sicut denuo quisque baptizari non debet, ita nec denuo in eodem ordine consecrari potest (1068B).
Correptor. Quis dicit aut sentit denuo aliquem in eodem ordine consecrari posse? Absit a nobis sic sapere. Inter alia equidem, quae super hoc a sanctis patribus accepimus, etiam b. papae Gregorii capitulum propositum debita veneratione suscipimus (110, 33).	Cf. c. 17 (*tit.*) S. Gregorii papae, quia sicut denuo baptizari quisquam non potest, ita denuo in id ipsum consecrari, ad Joannem episcopum Ravennatis Ecclesiae. *Illud autem . . . non valet consecrari.* Jaffé 1198.
c. 8 *Corruptor*. Unde supra in canonibus apostolorum, quos sanctus Ysidorus recipiendos esse confirmat: *Si quis episcopus . . . neque clericos esse possibile est* (112, 3).	c. 18 (*tit.*) Unde supra in canonibus apostolorum. *Si quis episcopus . . . neque clericos esse possibile est* (c. 68, with lacuna, as noted by Humbert); also Auxilius, *Infensor et Defensor*, c. 5: Sanctus namque Isidorus in praef. canon. coll. (c. 4, ed. Hinschius, p. 17) apostolorum canones recipiendos esse confirmat (PL 129, 1082B).
Correptor. Cum dicit: 'Unde supra', patet quod praecedens capitulum s. Gregorii supposito capitulo apostolorum ideo conjungat . . . (112, 9).	Cf. cc. 17-18 *supra*.
idem, Manifeste enim impugnat . . . sanctam Nicenam synodum, quae etiam capitulum, quod nobis freneticus ille putavit ad defensionem sui in subsequentibus obiciendum, continet: in quo Cathari . . . (112, 27).	Cf. c. 23 *supra*.
c. 9 *idem*, Itaque in sanctorum patrum apostolorum canonibus, quos hic noster contradictor auctoritate sancti Ysidori recipiendos esse superius dixit . . . (114, 5).	*Infensor et Defensor*, c. 5 *supra*.

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I think that Humbert's use of Auxilius is reasonably clear from the texts themselves. Humbert opens with reference to the canonical authorities amassed by Auxilius to justify his position. In each of his four appearances the lines of the *Corruptor* are supplied from Auxilius. Two of his arguments, the first and third, are taken from Auxilius' summation (c. 24), one is supplied by a title (c. 16), and the fourth by a title and text (c. 18). A discussion of the corresponding authorities occupies the *Correptor*, St. Leo in cc. 2-6, St. Gregory in c. 7, and *Canon. Apost.* 68 in c. 8. The *Corruptor* does not appear again, nor do I find any later reference to, or dependence on, the work of Auxilius. I confess to some difficulty in following Humbert's argument in c. 1, charging misuse of Nicene authority, given the fact that he had before him the tract of Auxilius in the form that we know it. Perhaps it will be clearer to others. I can only suggest the possibility that the *De ordin. a Formoso pp. factis*, cc. 1-15—which really constitute the first part of the treatise (defending the translation of bishops) and are chiefly concerned with *Conc. Nicaen.*, c. 15, quite properly presented by

Auxilius, *c.* 6 (*versio Dionysiana*)—bore a general heading referring to the Council of Nice in some manuscripts. Finally, it will be noted that the final utterance of the *Corruptor* (*c.* 8) is augmented by a phrase found in the *Infensor et Defensor*. This is slim evidence that Humbert also knew this little dialogue, although his use of *defensor*[15] in reference to his adversary might seem to some to lend this support. Here again our limited knowledge of the fate of Auxilius' text dictates reserve. The title may well have been augmented by another hand. What is certain is that the phrase on 'St. Isidore' comes from Auxilius.

It remains to say a word about Humbert's use of Damiani. Although not a primary concern here, this question has for long had a part in the problem. In addition to the texts given above, which may safely be set aside, some arguments refuted in the later chapters of *Lib. I adversus simoniacos* have also been pointed out to show dependence on the *Liber gratissimus*.[16] A comparison of the texts is not convincing.[17] It may be remarked in general that the question of the validity of orders conferred by a simonist was the subject of extended and lively debate, which was carried on both orally and in writing.[18] It is undoubtedly true that there were no important arguments unknown to Damiani and Humbert, the two chief representatives of, and our best witnesses for, the respective positions. It is not thereby true that they invented the arguments, or introduced the *auctoritates*, or were the only ones to use them. The contrary by all indications would seem rather to have been the case. Of this contemporary background of the conflict our knowledge is very limited. To take parallels as proof of direct dependence, without further evidence, seems, in the circumstance, at best a risky procedure. With the *Liber gratissimus* in circulation, it is difficult to imagine that Humbert did not know it. It is my present opinion, however, that there is no evidence in the text that he did.

Apart from the literary question, it is of some interest to see Auxilius, a century and a half after his spirited and intelligent defense of the ordinations of Pope Formosus,[19] playing a nameless role in the pressing theological controversy at the opening of the investiture contest. He served both Damiani and Humbert, in different capacities, nor is there reason to suppose that his little tract was known only to them. His defense of the translation of bishops is also of interest. In his systematic treatment of this subject (*cc.* 1-15), he is at least a forerunner of the

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[15] *Adv. simon., Praef.* (101,2), quoted in note 4 *supra.*

[16] Cf. L. Saltet, *Les réordinations*, p. 193, note 2, num. 5-6.

[17] The following objections are refuted by Humbert, *Lib.* I: (1) c .14, based on Greg. I, *Reg.* IX, 109 (123, 27). This text is not used in *Lib. grat.* (2) *ibid.*, Greg. I, *Hom.* I, 17 *in Evang.*, two excerpts (124, 13 and 16). *Lib. grat.*, c. 28 has two excerpts from the same homily, of which the second coincides with the second of Humbert. (3) c. 19, 'deposition presupposes ordination' (131, 2). *Lib. grat.*, c. 34, has the same argument (67, 21). (4) *ibid.*, 'If an ordaining simonist does not really ordain, then the one "ordained" cannot be deposed, which renders the canons vain (131, 42). *Lib. grat.* has not this argument. (5) c. 21, *Obiectio*: . . . cui vero iuste largitus est (Spiritus sanctus), hic, si iustus est, iuste potest habere, quoniam bonus a malo bonum bene accepit (135, 1). Compare *Lib. grat.*, c. 24 (*tit.*) Quod male ordinati episcopi consecrationis gratiam aliis habent, sed sibi non habent (52). But see also *Coll. Dionysio-Hadriana, Decret. Anastasii*, c. 8 (*tit.*) Quod mali bona ministrando sibi tantummodo noceant, nec Ecclesiae sacramenta commaculent (PL 67, 314); reproduced by Auxilius, *De ordin. a Formoso factis*, c. 20, and paraphrased *ibid.*, c. 24 (PL 129, 1068C). In none of these several places do I find any verbal dependence on *Lib. grat.* Similarly, when Humbert denied the validity of simoniacal orders conferred *sive gratis sive non gratis*, as in *Lib.* I, c. 8 (113, 34), c. 15 (125, 31) and c. 19 (132, 16), he was using the current terms of the debate.

[18] *Lib. grat., Praef.*: De his itaque, qui gratis sunt a symoniacis consecrati, quanta iam per triennium in tribus Romanis conciliis (A. 1049, 1050, 1051, *ed.*) fuerit disceptatio, quamque perplexa atque confusa dubietas et in his partibus cotidie ventiletur, sanctitatem vestram latuisse non arbitror . . . (18, 2); and *Adv. simon.* I, c. 21: . . . verbis et scriptis sic praedicent (134, 44).

[19] Cf. L. Saltet, *op. cit.*, pp. 156 ff.; A. Schebler, *Die Reordinationen in der "altkatholischen" Kirche* (Kanon. Studien u. Texte, X, Bonn, 1936), pp. 200 ff.

Gregorian canonists, who were confronted with the same problem of reconciling the discordant canons in the matter, both spurious and authentic.[20] Whether he had any direct influence here may well deserve to be explored.

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II. Maimonide et la Philosophie de l'*Exode*.

L'ÉVÉNEMENT philosophique le plus important qui se soit produit depuis la fin de la philosophie grecque est probablement la distinction introduite par saint Thomas d'Aquin entre deux ordres d'actualité, celui de la forme, qui correspond à la spécification des êtres et celui de l'*esse* qui correspond à leur existence. Les origines de cet événement sont mal connues. On sait pourtant que, dans sa *Métaphysique* VIII, 4, Avicenne affirmait que Dieu n'a pas d'essence: *Primus igitur non habet quidditatem.* Faisant allusion à ce texte dans son *De ente et essentia,* V, au début, saint Thomas le commentait en ces termes: "Et c'est pour quoi l'on trouve des philosophes qui disent que Dieu n'a pas de quiddité ou d'essence, parce que son essence n'est autre chose que son *esse*".

Bien que l'histoire de cette doctrine n'ait pas été écrite, on peut tenir pour extrêmement probable que l'origine en remonte, au dela d'Avicenne, à Alfarabi qu'il a si souvent suivi et que, par une suite de théologiens musulmans soucieux d'interpréter le dogme de la création, elle se rattache finalement à l'enseignement du livre de la *Genèse.* Averroès a si souvent objecté à la doctrine de la distinction d'essence et d'existence dans les créatures son origine religieuse, c'est-à-dire non philosophique, qu'il est difficile de douter qu'une même origine explique la notion d'un Dieu tout existence et, par suite, exempt de quiddité.

Quoi qu'il en soit de ses origines, la doctrine apparaît pleinement constituée chez Avicenne, où elle s'exprime sous une double forme: Dieu, ou le Premier, est existence pure; les créatures, au contraire, ne sont en elles-mêmes que des essences possibles auxquelles l'existence survient (*accidit*) en vertu de la nécessité du Premier. C'est ce que les Latins du XIII^{e} siècle exprimeront en disant que, pour Avicenne, l'existence est un accident de l'essence créée. Les uns le critiqueront sur ce point, comme saint Thomas d'Aquin par exemple, mais d'autres le suivront, non sans retoucher parfois le langage dont il avait usé.

Entre Thomas d'Aquin et Avicenne se place Maimonide, le Rabbi Moyses bien connu des lecteurs du Docteur Angélique et pour qui lui-même éprouvait le respect que tout grand théologien porte à tout autre grand théologien. Soucieux d'interpréter avant tout la tradition du monothéisme juif, Maimonide insiste avec une force extrême sur l'unité de Dieu et c'est pour mieux l'assurer qu'il souligne l'absolue simplicité de son essence, au point de lui refuser tout attribut. Dans son *Guide des Egarés* I, 57, Maimonide démontre que même l'existence n'est pas un attribut de Dieu.Il est vrai que, dans le même texte, il prend pour accordé que, chez tous les autres êtres, "l'existence est un accident survenu à ce qui existe", sur quoi son admirable traducteur et commentateur, Salomon Munk, dont nous suivons ici le texte, établit aussitôt en note que cette doctrine, étrangère à Aristote, provient d'Avicenne et que c'est précisément au nom d'Aristote que le Commentateur l'a plus tard contredite.

Si l'existence était un accident de l'essence, Maimonide ne pouvait admettre qu'elle fût en Dieu un attribut sans compromettre la parfaite simplicité de l'essence divine. Il suffit d'ailleurs de lire son développement pour voir sous quel aspect il envisage le problème. Comme celui d'Avicenne, son point de départ est la considération de l'être créé. En tant qu'elle est causée, l'essence de la créature n'implique pas son existence. Tout ce dont l'existence a une cause est donc tel que son existence s'ajoute pour ainsi dire à sa quiddité. Il n'en va pas ainsi de Dieu, car il est l'existence nécessaire. Assurément il existe, mais non par son existence: "Son existence est sa véritable essence; son essence est son existence". En un mot, Dieu n'*a* pas l'existence, il l'*est.*

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[20] Cf. K. Hofmann, *Der "Dictatus Papae" Gregors VII* (Görres- Gesellschaft . . . Veröffentlichungen der Sekt. f. Rechts- u. Staatswissenschaft, LXIII, Paderborn, 1933), pp. 112 ff. (for *Dict. papae* 13: Quod illi liceat de sede ad sedem necessitate cogente episcopos transmutare.)

On remarquera aussitôt combien Thomas d'Aquin se tiendra ici plus près du théologien juif que du philosophe arabe, car lui-même ne dira pas, avec Avicenne, que Dieu n'a pas d'essence, mais plutôt, avec Maimonide que son essence est son existence même. Il est vrai, et la différence est importante, que Thomas d'Aquin ne suivra pas Maimonide sur la voie d'une théologie purement négative. Il le critiquera même expressément sur ce point (*Sum.Theol.* I, 13, 2), mais on n'entend pas moins déja un son thomiste dans la phrase où Maimonide dit de Dieu, dans le chapitre suivant du *Guide* (I, 58): "Nous ne saisissons de Lui autre chose sinon qu' IL EST, qu'il y a un être auquel ne ressemble aucun des êtres qu'il a produits, qu'il n'a absolument rien de commun avec ces derniers". Souvenons nous du texte du *Contra Gentiles* I, 30: "Nous ne pouvons saisir ce que Dieu est, mais ce qu'il n'est pas, et quel rapport soutient avec lui tout le reste".

Si l'on peut supposer une origine biblique de cette doctrine chez Avicenne, il est tout à fait certain que Maimonide lui-même l'a immédiatement accueillie comme une expression fidèle de la révélation divine. Tel est en effet, selon lui, le sens du nom que Dieu lui-même s'est donné dans l'Ecriture, lorsqu'il s'est nommé Yahweh, nom qui ne devait être prononcé que dans le sanctuaire et auquel devait correspondre, dans l'esprit du prêtre qui le prononçait, l'idée d'un Dieu entièrement différent de ses oeuvres. S'engageant ici sur le terrain de l'exégèse philosophique, notre docteur juif devient d'une prudence remarquable au moment d'imaginer ce que pouvait bien être pour ses prédécesseurs le sens de ce nom. Pourtant, dit-il, d'après la manière dont il devait être prononcé et ce que l'on sait de la langue hébraique, celui qui le disait devait l'entendre comme signifiant "l'existence nécessaire". D'après ce qui précède, ce nom signifiait donc l'essence même de Dieu. En effet, l'existence est son essence. Le nom divin Yahweh signifie donc: le nécessairement existant (*Guide* I, 61).

Tel est le sens du fameux *Tetragrammaton,* mais d'où ce nom vient-il? A cette question Maimonide répond, comme on pouvait s'y attendre, qu'il vient de Dieu lui-même, et plus précisément des paroles bien connues qu'on lit au livre de l'*Exode* (iii,13) où, répondant à Moyse qui lui demandait son nom, Dieu dit: "Je suis CELUI QUI SUIS". Sur quoi, ajoutant au texte sacré son propre commentaire, Maimonide fait observer que ce nom signifie "l'existence". En quoi donc est-il mystérieux? En ceci, qu'il reprend le sujet sous forme d'attribut. Mais pourquoi le fait-il, sinon pour affirmer que Dieu est l'existence qui est l'existence, donnant ainsi à entendre que, dans la formule qui traduit son nom, "le sujet est identiquement la même chose que l'attribut". Par où Maimonide retrouve sa propre interprétation du nom divin par excellence: "C'est donc là une explication de cette idée: que Dieu existe, mais non par l'existence; de sorte que cette idée est ainsi résumée et interprétée: l'Etre qui est l'Etre, c'est à dire l'Etre nécessaire" (*Guide* I, 63). Bref, nous ne savons pas ce que Dieu est, mais nous savons qu'il est CELUI QUI EST.

Il semble incontestable que la conjonction d'une métaphysique de l'existence et du texte célèbre de l'*Exode* se soit opérée dans la pensée de Maimonide. Il n'est guère douteux que saint Thomas, qui a lu ces textes, en ait aussitôt saisi l'importance et nous sommes certainement ici à l'une des sources de la métaphysique thomiste de l'être. La vérité sublime—*haec sublimis veritas*—dont parle solennellement la *Somme contre les Gentils* (I, 22), éclate pour la première fois aux yeux avec la plénitude du sens métaphysique dont le texte de l'*Exode* restera désormais chargé pour saint Thomas et ses disciples. Comment faire la part de ce que les théologiens musulmans devaient à la révélation juive, de ce que leur devait Maimonide et de ce que Thomas d'Aquin lui devait à son tour pour avoir ainsi conjoint les deux lumières de l'intellect et de l'Ecriture? Ce qui est du moins certain, c'est que nous revivons ici l'un des moments les plus solennels de l'histoire de la pensée occidentale, lorsque le judaïsme fit éclater le monde des substances aristotéliciennes, en soumettant l'acte de leurs formes à un Acte Pur qui n'est plus celui d'une pensée qui se pense, mais celui de l'existence en soi. Il est admirable que la métaphysique du penseur chrétien le plus profond soit devenue intégralement chrétienne par ce qu'elle avait de juif, et plus encore peut-être que le Judaïsme, si peu enclin aux spéculations abstraites de la métaphysique, ait engendré un monde philosophique nouveau en fécondant le cosmos d'Aristote et de ses commentateurs grecs. La pensée chrétienne du XIII^e siècle n'a pas simplement utilisé l'univers du péripatétisme, elle l'a métamorphosé du dedans en consacrant le triomphe de la cause efficiente sur la cause finale. Elle a fait de chaque être un existant fait à l'image et ressemblance de l'Acte Pur d'exister.

Maimonide a certainement mis Thomas d'Aquin sur la voie royale de la métaphysique de l'*esse*, mais saint Thomas seul l'a parcourue jusqu'au terme. Rien, dans ce que nous connaissons de lui, ne permet de penser que le théologien du *Guide* ait pressenti les conséquences fécondes que la notion existentielle de Dieu pouvait entraîner pour ce que nous nommons aujourdhui, d'un nom d'ailleurs né dangereux, l'ontologie. Fidèle à l'enseignement d'Avicenne, il ne semble pas avoir dépassé la notion d'êtres créés dont l'existence serait une sorte d'appendice accidentel qui s'ajouterait à l'essence pour la réaliser. Clairement conscient de ce qu'avait d'unique le suprême Exister que désigne le *Tetragrammaton,* il ne paraît pas avoir vu que si la cause première des êtres est telle que son essence soit l'existence, ses effets aussi doivent nécessairement l'imiter, en ceci du moins que l'acte d'exister, par lequel ils sont des êtres, soit en eux non comme un appendice de l'essence, mais comme l'acte de tous les actes et la perfection de toutes les perfections. En ce sens, c'est chez Thomas d'Aquin seul, que la théologie dégagée de l'*Exode* par Maimonide a engendré une philosophie proprement dite et donné naissance à la métaphysique nouvelle, où "la substance intégrale de l'être" est totalement actuée par son acte propre d'exister.

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III. The Use of the Term *Laqueus* by Guigo and St. Ambrose.

THE *Meditations*[1] of Guigo, the fifth prior of Grand Chartreuse and a contemporary of St. Bernard, are made up of personal reflections varying in length from one line to a paragraph. They were not written in sequence or continuity and in this they resemble somewhat the *Book of Proverbs* or the *Meditations* of Marcus Aurelius. In these 'meditations' Guigo uses several times the term *laqueus,* a snare, expanding the meaning to apply to things which one uses to meet his bodily needs. Perhaps the best example is:

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[1] PL 153, 601-632. Dom André Wilmart has edited a Latin text based on the best manuscripts with an excellent introduction and a French translation (Paris, 1936). He has rearranged the order of the 'meditations' according to topics. Some additions have been made from manuscripts to the text in Migne. An English translation by John J. Jolin, S.J., has just been published. (Marquette U. Press, Milwaukee, 1951.)

> Laqueos comedis, bibis, vestis, dormis. Omnia laqueus.[2]

I have found forty-six places in the *Vulgate* where the term occurs. Generally speaking it is used in a simple metaphor wherein the wiles and deeds of an enemy are called a snare which the fowler used to catch birds, e.g.,

> Quoniam gratis absconderunt mihi interitum laquei sui.[3]

We also find the terms: *laqueus diaboli*[4] *laqueus linguae iniquae,*[5] *laquei mortis,*[6] *laqueus oculorum,*[7] *laquei (mulieris multivolae)*,[8] also: *Fiat mensa eorum . . . in laqueum.*[9]

But Guigo in the above quotation applies the term to the use of food, drink, clothing, sleep—everything. Among the Fathers of the Church, St. Ambrose makes a somewhat similar expansion and application of the term. In his work *De bono mortis,*[10] he exhorts us to rise above earthly things, to dwell on heavenly things—to soar on high and to rise above the clouds like the eagle. It is the bird which stays on the ground which is caught in the snare. He then goes on:

> Sic quoque et anima nostra caveat ad haec mundana descendere. Laqueus est in auro, viscus in argento, nexus in praedio, clavus est in amore. Dum aurum petimus, strangulamur; dum argentum quaerimus, in visco ejus haeremus: dum praedium invadimus, alligamur . . . [11]

Again in the same work,[12] he exhorts the soul to strive for the celestial and eternal. He then says:

> Attolle animam tuam, ne eam illiciat esca laqueorum. Voluptates saeculi, escae quaedam sunt, et quod pejus est, escae malorum escae tentationum. Dum voluptatem quaeris, laqueos incurris. Oculus enim meretricis, lacqueus. Laqueus est etiam sermo meretricis, qui obducat ad tempus fauces tuas, et postea exasperat eas amaritudine conscientiae peccatricis. Laqueus est aliena possessio plena amoenitatis. Omne iter istius vitae plenum laqueorum est.

Here he enumerates as snares, in addition to money and lands in the first quotation, the pleasures of the world, the wiles of a harlot, the possessions of others which have an appeal, and then concludes by saying that every road in this earthly journey, if we keep our eyes on things below, is full of snares.

While it is quite possible that Guigo had not read these passages from St. Ambrose, yet there is a striking similarity in the expansion and application by both beyond what is found in Holy Scripture.

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IV. *Canterbury Tales, C* 310, 320: "By Seint Ronyan".

HARRY BAILLY'S oath, "By Seint Ronyan," and the Pardoner's echo of it have provoked a good deal of comment. St. Ronyan puzzled some of the scribes (manuscript variants include *damyan, Ierman, Iohn, Ivlian, marie, Ninione, Nynyan, Rinian, Rinion, Roman, Romian, rumian, Rynione, Rynyan, Symon*),[1] and he has puzzled modern editors. Some have altogether denied the existence of such a saint, making him either a product of scribal corruption or Harry Bailly's humorous addition to the calendar; some have identified Ronyan with Ronan, some with Ninian; and some, accepting one or the other of these identifications, have looked also for word-play, preferably bawdy. The most recent comments have agreed in favoring Ninian; and in the present note I shall argue that this identification is correct, that word-play, though it is possible, has not been proved, and that present knowledge of St. Ninian and his cult provides at least a minimal explanation of Bailly's oath and the Pardoner's jesting repetition of it.

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[2] Chapter V. PL 153, 610. Wilmart, number 60, p. 79.

[3] *Psalm* xxiv, 7. I give the unrevised Vulgate text since that was in use in Guigo's time.

[4] I *Tim.* iii, 7: VI, 9. Cf. II *Tim.* ii, 26.

[5] *Ecclesiasticus* li, 3.

[6] *Psalm* xvii, 6. *Proverbs* xxi, 6.

[7] *Judith* ix, 13.

[8] *Ecclesiasticus* ix, 3.

[9] *Psalm* lxviii, 23: Romans xi, 9.

[10] PL 14: 567 ff.

[11] 5. 16; PL 14, 575D.

[12] 6. 24; PL 14, 579C.

[1] John M. Manly and Edith Rickert, *The Text of the Canterbury Tales* VII (Chicago, 1940), pp. 37 f.

Hinckley, Drennan and Wyatt, and Manly are among those who have invoked scribal corruption or the humor of the Host to dispose of Ronyan.[2] "St. Ronyan and St. Madrian," says Manly, "ought to be good saints; but Harry Bailly seems to be their 'onlie begetter'." At least six, however, of the manuscript variants are common forms of the name of St. Ninian. The Bollandists remark that the saint has been known as Ringan, Trinyon, Trinian, Triman, Truinnein, Truyons, etc.;[3] and to that list others have added Rineyan, Ringen, Rinian, Rinnein, Ronyan, Ronyon, Rynnan, Rynyane, Tringan, Tronian, Tronion, Tronyon, Truinnean, Truyon.[4] Such forms have long been considered variants of a single name;[5] and after Hinckley suggested that "the form *Ronyan* . . . may be due to confusion with *Ninian*,"[6] Robinson and Brown, on the authority of G. L. Hamilton, declared that Ronyan *is* Ninian—a conclusion which has been accepted by George L. Frost.[7] Brown quotes the anonymous Fifteenth Century translation of Higden's *Polychronicon*: "Seynte Ninian otherwise callede of commune peple Seynt Ronyon." Here Trevisa's rendering has "Seint Ninian, a Bretoun"; and in another passage, not mentioned by Brown, the anonymous translation has "Seynte Ronyon," Trevisa "Nynyan þe holy man."[8] The same identification is made elsewhere:

> And in lyke wyse in Scotlande the people there haue seynt Nynian com*m*enlye called seynt Tronyon in great honoure . . . .
> . . . à *Niniâ* sive *Niniano* (quem Scotorum vulgus *Ringen* nominat) . . .
> . . . the great S. Ninian (called by the vulgar S. Ringan) . . .[9]

If one adds to these quotations modern statements of the sound-changes by which *Ninian* became *Ronyan* or *Tronyon*,[10] the old notion of a mythical Ronyan may be laid to rest forever.

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[2] Henry Barrett Hinckley, *Notes on Chaucer* (Northampton, Mass., 1907), pp. 161 f.; C. M. Drennan and A. J. Wyatt, *Chaucer: The Pardoner's Tale* (London, n. d.), p. 64; Manly, *Canterbury Tales by Geoffrey Chaucer* (New York, 1928), p. 613. Hinckley suggests corruption, but only in *C* 320.

[3] *Propylaeum ad Acta Sanctorum Decembris* (Brussels, 1940), p. 400. In an inquiry like the present one, which leads into many odd corners, it is impossible to acknowledge the source of every bibiliographical reference. I here make a general acknowledgment, noting also a special debt to the Bollandists.

[4] Cf. Alan Orr Anderson, 'Ninian and the Southern Picts,' *Scottish Historical Review*, XXVII (1948), 25-47; Donald Beaton, 'The Ninian-Columba Controversy,' *Records of the Scottish Church History Society*, V (1935), 196-207; George Calder, *Gaelic Grammar* (Glasgow, 1923), p. 161; H. H. E. Craster, *A History of Northumberland* IX, *The Parochial Chapelries of Earsdon and Horton* (Newcastle-upon-Tyne and London, 1909), p. 121; John Dowden, 'Note on Two Late Notices Relating to the Cultus of St Ninian in England,' *Proceedings of the Society of Antiquaries of Scotland*, Third Series, V (1894-95), 198-201; Carl Horstman (*sic*), ed., *Nova Legenda Anglie* I (Oxford, 1901), p. xxiii, note; W. M. Metcalfe, ed., *Pinkerton's Lives of the Scottish Saints* I (Paisley, 1889), p. 12, n. 2; James Ussher, *Britannicarum Ecclesiarum Antiquitates* (Dublin, 1639), p. 661; William J. Watson, *The History of the Celtic Place-Names of Scotland* (Edinburgh and London, 1926), pp. 293 f.; and the notes of Skeat and Robinson.

[5] Cf. Skeat's note and Manly's review of Alois Brandl, *Quellen des Weltlichen Dramas in England vor Shakespeare* (Strassburg, 1898), in *JEGP*, II (1898), 394.

[6] *Notes on Chaucer*, pp. 161 f.

[7] Cf. the notes on *C* 310 in Robinson's *Chaucer* and in Brown's edition of *The Pardoner's Tale*, and cf. Frost, 'That Precious Corpus Madrian,' *MLN*, LVII (1942), 177.

[8] Churchill Babington, ed., *Polychronicon Ranulphi Higden Monachi Cestrensis*, II, Rolls Series (London, 1869), pp. 135, 149.

[9] Horstman, *Nova Legenda* I, p. xxiii, note; Ussher, *Britannicarum Ecclesiarum Antiquitates*, p. 661; Thomas Innes (1662-1744), *The Civil and Ecclesiastical History of Scotland* (Aberdeen, 1853), p. 32.

[10] Cf. Watson, *History of the Celtic Place-Names of Scotland*, pp. 293 f.

The same evidence goes far to destroy the theory that Ronyan is Ronan. Skeat held this theory, though admitting that "of St. Ronan scarcely anything is known," and it was accepted, at least partially and with modifications, by Hinckley and Frederick Tupper.[11] The confusion of Ronan with Ninian is not new: it occurs in place-names, and indeed the Bollandists remark that Ninian has been known also as Ronan.[12] No one, however, has answered Manly's criticism of Skeat, that "nothing we know of St. Ronan explains the choice of the oath";[13] and if it can be shown that our knowledge of St. Ninian does explain that choice, the identification of Ronyan with Ronan can also be discarded.

To that task I shall address myself after a brief consideration of various puns which have been discovered in the word *Ronyan*. The possibility of word-play, which has seemed an attractive explanation why the Host is apparently proud of his oath and why the Pardoner repeats it, cannot be denied; but though the failure of Chaucerians to investigate the cult of Ninian has left the field open for the discovery of quibbles, no quibble has yet been proved. So far as I know, no argument has been built on Manly's cautiously cited Fifteenth Century instances of *runian* "as a term for a farm servant";[14] and Manly himself ignored the possibility which he must have found implicit in Brandl's notes to the Sixteenth Century plays *Respublica* and *Misogonus*. In *Respublica* V, ix, 32, Avarice swears "by Saint Tronnion!" and in *Misogonus* IV, ii, 17, a rustic given to malapropism uses the oath "Gods trunnion." Brandl took "Gods trunnion" to be "God's tri-union" or the like, that is, the Trinity;[15] and the *OED* repeats this derivation, with a query. There is something to be said for Brandl's view. Although the *OED* cites *trinunion* no earlier than 1603, *triune* from 1605, *trinune* 1620, *triunion* 1650, such terms may very well have been current in the English of the Sixteenth Century and before; *tria unum, trina unitas, trinum et unum, unitas unionis,* etc., were common scholastic coin. That the Trinity should be invoked as a saint would greatly surprise no one who had heard Heywood's pardoner proclaim among his relics the Trinity's great toe or who had heard Heywood's palmer recount his visits not only to "saynt Tronion" but to "saynt Toncumber"—Uncumber, that fabulous saint of the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries who owed her existence to a series of confusions and who owed some of her popularity to her supposed ability to uncumber wives weary of their husbands.[16] If one allows *Misogonus* its "saynt cuccold" (II, iv, 74) and "S^{t} thays" (II, iv, 252),[17] one might not care to boggle at St. Trinity; and since Harry Bailly combines boisterous humor with a little dangerous learning, one might even be tempted to find the explanation of his "Seint Ronyan" in Brandl's note to *Misogonus*. The temptation, however, should be resisted. There is no real evidence available for English *trunnion* "Trinity"; the context of *C* 310 does not demand a quibble; and less risky interpretations are at hand. If Manly's guarded scepticism of Brandl's reading of the oaths in *Respublica* and *Misogonus* is justified, he was so much the wiser not to suggest a similar reading of the words of the Host.[18]

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[11] Hinckley accepted Ronan as the saint intended in *C* 310 only. Tupper identified Ronyan with "the Scottish Ronan, on whose name in its corrupted form the Host is playing"; cf. 'Chaucer's Sinners and Sins,' *JEGP*, XV (1916), 66.

[12] Cf. George F. Black, *The Surnames of Scotland* (New York, 1946), p. 630; G. A. F. Knight, *Archaeological Light on the Early Christianizing of Scotland* I (London, 1933), pp. 141, 147; James Murray Mackinlay, *Ancient Church Dedications in Scotland: Non-Scriptural Dedications* (Edinburgh, 1914), p. 35, n. 2; *Propylaeum ad Acta Sanctorum Decembris*, p. 400.

[13] *Canterbury Tales by Geoffrey Chaucer*, p. 613.

[14] *Ibid.*

[15] Brandl, *Quellen des Weltlichen Dramas in England vor Shakespeare*, pp. 657, 664.

[16] Cf. Manly's review of Brandl and the reference there given to the *Camden Miscellany* IV, 13; St. Thomas More, *Dialogue Concerning Tyndale* II, x, in W. E. Campbell and A. W. Reed, *The English Works of Sir Thomas More* II (with reference to the *Catholic Encyclopedia* XV, p. 622 f.).

[17] Manly, in the review of Brandl, and R. Warwick Bond suggest "a canonization for the nonce of the famous courtesan"; cf. Bond, *Early Plays from the Italian* (Oxford, 1911), p. 314.

Drennan and Wyatt, far from elevating Ronyan to divinity, would reduce him to "St. Scab":

> It is hardly necessary to search the calendar of the saints for "St. Ronyan" **(O. F.** *rogne,* **a scab;** *rogneux,* a scurvy fellow; cp. *Macbeth,* I. iii. 6, "Aroint thee, witch, the rump-fed *ronyon* cries"; *Rom. of the Rose,* 553, "Without bleyne, scabbe, or *royne*"). The doctor's profession and the mention of the word "prelat" suggest to this inn-keeping humorist the addition of a new saint to the calendar, as is shown by the ironical humility of the next line . . .[19]

Though Robinson, in his note, does not mention this guess, it probably has more to recommend it than Skeat's Ronan or a play on Manly's *runian* "a farm servant." Ninian was indeed a bishop, who like the Pardoner had been to Rome and whose miracles, since he was especially revered in Scotland and northern England, would have been familiar in Berwick if not in Ware;[20] among those miracles was the healing of leprosy and the scab; and it was a widespread folk-custom in the Middle Ages to invoke against an illness a saint whose name was like that of the illness[21]—if, in France, St. Aignan (Teignan) could cure *la teigne,* St. Ronyan might possibly cure the "ronyous" Englishman.

The case, however, is not proved, for reasons similar to those which make one unwilling to accept "Seint Ronyan" as the Trinity. A like verdict must, I think, be passed on the more famous pun invented by Frederick Tupper and approved by Frost. In the heat of his controversy with Lowes, Tupper elaborated his scheme of Chaucerian irony based upon the Seven Deadly Sins by arguing that the Host praises the Physician, who has just exalted the chastity of Virginia, as a "professional stimulator of lust." For Tupper, Ronyan is not only Ronan; he is also "a frankly phallic deity with whom only the grimmest irony would couple a lauder of virginity," and this reading Frost finds "too much in the spirit of Chaucer not to be accepted."[22] The spirit of Chaucer is elusive: though Tupper, like Drennan and Wyatt, missed some of the evidence that might support his contention, neither that which he missed nor that which he collected is enough to prove his point. The particular contention draws no strength from the general theory demolished by Lowes; and Tupper's citation of "St. Ongnon, St. Raisin and St. Harenc,"[23] to which he might have added other notable saints (Jambon, Oison, Tortue) from the *sermons joyeux,* is not much to the purpose. Further exploration of the meanings of *rognon* would have been useful, or a reference to saints like Faustin in Périgueux, by whose power many women have become joyous mothers and whom "les femmes du païs appellent S. Chose";[24] but no such expedient would have remedied the basic weakness of Tupper's argument, which is the lack of conclusive English evidence for his bawdy interpretation of

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[18] Manly did not follow, and I have been unable to follow, the possible clue in his quotation from Fenton's *Tragical Discourses:* "wyth no lesse devocion then the papistes in Fraunce performe their ydolatrous pilgrimage to theyr ydoll Sainct Tronyon, uppon the Mont Auyon besides Roan" (Robert Langton Douglas, ed., *Certain Tragical Discourses of Bandello Translated into English by Geffraie Fenton* I [London, 1898], p. 232).

[19] *Chaucer: The Pardoner's Tale,* p. 64.

[20] Drennan and Wyatt: "the pardoner adopts merrily the Host's new saint."

[21] Cf. Karl Gustaf Andresen, *Ueber Deutsche Volksetymologie* (6th ed., Leipzig, 1899), p. 56; Henri Estienne, *Apologie pour Hérodote,* ed. P. Ristelhuber II (Paris, 1879), pp. 311 ff.; H. Gaidoz, 'L'Etymologie Populaire & le Folk-Lore,' *Mélusine* IV (1888-89), 507 ff.; More, *Dialogue Concerning Tyndale* II, x; Kristoffer Nyrop, ***Das Leben der Wörter,*** translated Robert Vogt (Leipzig, 1903), pp. 222 ff.; L. Sainéan, *La Langue de Rabelais* II (Paris, 1923), pp. 356 f. (with valuable references); Joseph Schätzer, 'Herkunft und Gestaltung der französischen Heiligennamen,' *Romanische Forschungen,* XXII (1908), 88 f.

[22] Tupper, 'Chaucer's Sinners and Sins,' 66; Frost, 'That Precious Corpus Madrian,' 177.

[23] Tupper, *op. cit.,* p. 106, note.

[24] Estienne, *Apologie pour Hérodote,* ed. Ristelhuber, II, p. 321, n. 3.

Ronyan. The only parallel which the *OED* affords is from an inexpert Seventeenth Century imitation of Chaucer, and though somewhat more weight may be attached to the couplet in Nashe's "Choice of Valentines," where Nashe may preserve a genuine tradition by putting "Saint Runnion" into an extremely bawdy context,[25] the last word on Tupper's conjecture may well be Robinson's: "the hypothesis is not necessary."

On the other hand, it should be said at once that any reading of the Host's and Pardoner's oath must be built on the notes of Skeat, Manly, Tupper, Robinson, Brown, and Frost. What is mainly needed to supplement them is a little more knowledge of St. Ninian and his cult, and a beginning may be made with the account in Bede:

> Namque ipsi australes Picti, qui intra eosdem montes habent sedes, multo ante tempore, ut perhibent, relicto errore idolatriae, fidem ueritatis acceperant, praedicante eis uerbum Nynia episcopo reuerentissimo et sanctissimo uiro de natione Brettonum, qui erat Romae regulariter fidem et mysteria ueritatis edoctus; cuius sedem episcopatus, sancti Martini episcopi nomine et ecclesia insignem, ubi ipse etiam corpore una cum pluribus sanctis requiescit, iam nunc Anglorum gens obtinet. Qui locus, ad prouinciam Berniciorum pertinens, uulgo uocatur Ad Candidam Casam, eo quod ibi ecclesiam de lapide, insolito Brettonibus more fecerit.[26]

Other early sources include an Eighth Century *Miracula Nynie Episcopi* and a "Hymnus Sancti Nynie Episcopi," composed at Whithorn (Candida Casa; St. Ninians) by a single author and sent to Alcuin by pupils at York; a Twelfth Century life by Ailred of Rievaulx; and a life in Lowland Scots of about 1400.[27] Precisely what historical facts underlie these narratives has been much disputed,[28] but for the present purpose the cult is more important than the life. Certainly in the Fourteenth Century, and for centuries before and after, Ninian was a great saint in Scotland, as the numerous churches dedicated to him would alone be sufficient to prove.[29] He was renowned for his miracles, which with admirable impartiality he performed for Englishmen as well as Scotsmen. When the Prince of Wales visited Dumfries in 1301, a group of Galloway men, hoping to disappoint his pilgrimage to the shrine of Ninian at Whithorn, removed the image of the saint to New Abbey; the same night it returned miraculously to Whithorn, a hundred miles across the moors.[30] Hector Boece records that when King David of Scotland was defeated at Durham in 1348,

> ane spere hede was dongin in King Dauid*is* hede wi*th* sik violence þat it

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[25] R. B. McKerrow, ed., *The Works of Thomas Nashe* III (London, 1905), p. 413. I owe this reference, and a useful criticism of my argument, to Professor B. J. Whiting of Harvard.

[26] *Historia Ecclesiastica* III, iv (ed. Plummer, Oxford, 1896).

[27] *Miracula* and "Hymnus", ed. Karl Strecker, *Poetae Latini Aevi Carolini* IV, 3; Ailred's life, ed. Alexander Penrose Forbes, *Historians of Scotland* V, *Lives of S. Ninian and S. Kentigern Compiled in the Twelfth Century* (Edinburgh, 1874); Scots life, ed. for the Scottish Text Society by W. M. Metcalfe, *Legends of the Saints in the Scottish Dialect of the Fourteenth Century* (Edinburgh and London, 1896).

[28] *Acta Sanctorum*, Sept. 16, and *Propylaeum ad Acta Sanctorum Decembris*, p. 400; Anderson, '*Ninian and the Southern* Picts' (cf. n. 4 above); Beaton, 'The Ninian-Columba Controversy' (n. 4 above); Wilhelm Levison, 'An Eighth-Century Poem on St. Ninian,' *Antiquity*, XIV (1940), 280-291; W. Douglas Simpson, 'New Light on St. Ninian,' *Archaeologia Aeliana*, Fourth Series, XXIII (1945), 78-95; W. Douglas Simpson, *Saint Ninian and the Origins of the Christian Church in Scotland* (Edinburgh and London, 1940); Karl Strecker, 'Zu den Quellen für das Leben des Hl. Ninian,' *Neues Archiv der Gesellschaft für Aeltere Deutsche Geschichtskunde*, XLIII (1922), 1-26.

[29] Cf. Mackinlay, *Ancient Church Dedications in Scotland: Non-Scriptural Dedications;* Watson, *History of the Celtic Place-Names of Scotland.*

[30] Joseph Bain, *The Edwards in Scotland* (Edinburgh, 1901), p. 34; Sir Herbert Maxwell, *A History of Dumfries and Galloway* (Edinburgh and London, 1896), p. 83.

> *mycht nocht* be drawin furth quhill he vesijt Sanct Niniane in Scotland, and þan þe wounde oppinnit, and þe hede fell oute.[21]

Among other wonders, the Scots life describes "a ferly þat in my tyme befel . . . a nobil *knycht*, . . . *sir* fargus magdouel," a great foe of the English; a recent miracle for an Englishman; and even a "ferly" for a personal friend of the author's.[22] Nor did the miracles cease with the passing of the Middle Ages or with the Reformation: in 1506 King James IV gave eighteen shillings "to ane pilgryme of Ingland that Sanct Niniane kythit miracle for"; in 1608 a miracle was wrought "at the chapel of St. Ninian, not far from where the Spey River flows into the sea"; and as late as the Nineteenth Century, it was believed that if anyone walked over "the reputed grave" of St. Ninian in the island of Sanda, he would die within the year.[23]

To the shrine of so mighty a saint, pilgrimage was naturally popular, and from the Twelfth Century until the Reformation, people of all ranks from Scotland, England, and Ireland made the journey to Whithorn. In the 1420's, James I granted general protection to all foreigners coming into Scotland on pilgrimage to St. Ninian; in 1506, the Regent Albany granted similar safe conduct to all pilgrims from Ireland, England, and the Isle of Man; and when, in the latter Sixteenth Century, pilgrimages were suppressed, Whithorn suffered more than any other town in Scotland. King Robert Bruce had been a pilgrim there in 1329; Margaret, queen of James III, in 1473. James IV had made the pilgrimage generally once a year, and often twice. In March of 1506-7, when his queen lay ill, he had gone on foot; and in the following July, she had accompanied him, out of gratitude for her recovery. In November, 1513, "the old Earl of Angus, *Bell the Cat*," was in Whithorn; James V several times in 1532 and 1533; and perhaps Queen Mary, in 1563, visited the holy place. The Whithorn of the later Middle Ages, the shrine of Ninian, may with some justice be called the Canterbury of Scotland.[24]

There is ample evidence, too, that the cult of Ninian was not confined to Scotland. In the northern and western counties of England, he was a popular saint—in Cumberland, Lancashire, Northumberland, Westmoreland, Yorkshire, and Durham; and Manly, in his review of Brandl, noted that "there was an altar to St. Tronyon in St. Andrew's church, Canterbury." Following this clue, one finds in Fifteenth and Sixteenth Century Kentish wills many references which may be, as their editors have supposed, to Ronan or to some other saint, but which I think are probably to Ninian: in the Church of St. Peter, at Bridge, the light of St. Ronyan (1522) or St. Tronyan (1533); in St. Andrew's, Canterbury, the light of St. Trynyons (1515, 1520) and the fraternity of St. Troneon (1497); in St. Mary Bredin, Canterbury, the light of St. Tronyon (1516); in the Church of St. Peter, Dover, again the light of St. Tronyon (1514); at Ewell, in the Church of St. Peter and St. Paul, the light of St. Rumani (1502; editor's query: "?Trunion": cf. St. Troman in early Sixteenth Century churchwardens' accounts of St. Andrew's, Canterbury); in the Church of St. Mary, Faversham, the light of St. Trynyan (1518); at Sandwich, in the Church of St. Clement, the light of St. Trunion (1499), and in the Carmelite Friary there, St. Thronion's altar (1499). I am the more willing to risk identifying these names with that of Ninian because the wills show also the light of St. Ninian (1528) and the altar of St. Ninian (1499), again in St. Andrew's, Canterbury; the light of St. Ninian in the Church of St. James, Dover (1499); St. Ninian's light in the Church of St. Mary, Dover (1482); and the altar of St. Ninian (1486), again at Sandwich in the Church of the Carmelite Friars.[35]

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[21] Edith C. Batho and H. Winifred Husbands, eds., *The Chronicles of Scotland Compiled by Hector Boece* II (Scottish Text Society, third series, XV, Edinburgh and London, 1941), p. 328.

[22] For the date (mid Fourteenth Century) of the "magdouel" miracle, cf. George Neilson, 'John Barbour, John Trumpour, and a Legend of the Saints,' *The Scottish Antiquary*, XI (1896), 102 ff.

[23] Forbes, *Lives of S. Ninian and S. Kentigern*, p. 300; John O'Hanlon, *Lives of the Irish Saints* VII (Dublin, London, New York, n. d.), p. 390; *New Statistical Account of Scotland* VII (Edinburgh and London, 1845), Argyle, p. 429.

[24] On pilgrimage to Whithorn, cf. 'The Priory and Cathedral of Whithorn or Candida Casa,' *Archaeological and Historical Collections Relating to Ayrshire & Galloway*, X, 171; George Chalmers, *Caledonia* V (New Edition, Paisley, 1890), pp. 411 ff.; Sir Herbert Maxwell, 'Tour of Mary, Queen of Scots, through Southwestern Scotland,' *Scottish Historical Review*, XVIII (1920), 1-13; J. Charles Wall, *Shrines of British Saints* (London, 1905), pp. 89 f.

Evidence from ecclesiastical politics in the Fourteenth Century will clinch the argument that "Seint Ronyan" is St. Ninian. At that time, the bishopric of Galloway (Candida Casa) was subject to York. England recognized the popes, Scotland the anti-popes. As a result, there were two rival bishops of Galloway, possibly three: Thomas de Rossy, a Franciscan friar; Oswald, prior of Glenluce; and perhaps "the blessed Francis Ramsay." Oswald seems to have had an adventurous career. On March 26, 1379, Richard II granted him safe conduct to pass into Scotland on church business; he received safe conduct for one year on May 22, 1382, May 13, 1383, May 6, 1384, April 29, 1385, December 8, 1385, and November 25, 1386; and on May 5, 1388, he received protection from King Richard when he fled from Scotland to England *pro salvatione vitae suae.* After that date he is found at York in 1389, 1392, 1397, 1398, and 1406; the latest notice of him, still or again in England, is for 1416.[36] It can hardly be doubted that his tumultuous affairs and those of his rivals for Candida Casa would give St. Ninian added though unpleasant fame.

Returning now to the Host and the Pardoner, one can frame an explanation of their oath by St. Ninian with moderate confidence. Certainly Chaucer might represent them both as familiar with the saint; but the Harry Bailly of the *Tales,* in all likelihood, would know him not as Ninian but by one of the "vulgar" forms of his name which early writers noted and which appear so commonly in the Kentish wills. As Frost suggested, the Host's pretense to learning is belied by his own pronunciation: "Seynte Ninian otherwise callede of commune peple Seynt Ronyon." Bailly was not the "onlie begetter" of the saint, but the grandiloquent abuser of language who could not understand *Sir Thopas* was quietly punished for his oath in the swearing of it.

Skeat and Tupper, a little altered, supply the cues for interpreting the repetition by the Pardoner. Though Skeat took Ronyan to be Ronan, he cited two very relevant passages in the works of James Pilkington, who became Bishop of Durham in 1561. In 1560, Pilkington replied "to the charge of 'diversity' among 'the gospellers' by a *tu quoque*":

> Some pray to one saint as more in God's favour, some to other. Some use Trinity Knots, and other St Katherine's. Some have St Tronion's Fast, other our Lady's, and many the Golden Fridays.

Three years later, Pilkington returned to the attack:

> Fastings were more than I know; some used St Rinian's, some our Lady's, some the Golden Fridays . . .[37]

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[35] *Archaeologia Cantiana,* XVII, 150, note, and XXXIII, 32; Arthur Hussey, *Testamenta Cantiana: East Kent* (London, 1907), pp. xiii, 36, 45, 55, 98, 100, 103, 116, 126, 281, 293, 294.

[36] William Moir Bryce, *The Scottish Grey Friars* I (Edinburgh and London, 1909), pp. 29 ff.; John Dowden, *The Bishops of Scotland* (Glasgow, 1912), pp. 364 ff., 375 f.; John A. Duke, *History of the Church of Scotland to the Reformation* (Edinburgh and London, 1937), p. 267; Arthur West Haddan and William Stubbs, *Councils and Ecclesiastical Documents* II, i (Oxford, 1873), pp. 64-67; *Rotuli Scotiae in Turri Londinensi,* etc. II (London, 1819), 14b, 43a, 52b, 61b, 72b, 76b, 86b, 93a.

[37] Quoted from Dowden, 'Note on Two Late Notices Relating to the Cultus of St. Ninian,' p. 198. Robinson gives the reference to Dowden.

Again, in 1577, Richard Barnes, the second Bishop of Durham after the Reformation, issued "Certeyne Monicions and Iniunctions," including the

> Item, that no popishe abrogated hollydaies be kept hollydaies, nor any Divine servise publiquely saide or celebrated on any suche daies, nor any superfluous faste be used as those called the Lady fast, or Saint Trinyons fast, the Blacke fast, Saint Margaret fast, or suche other, invented by the devill, to the dishonouringe of God and damnacion of the sowles of idolatrous and supersticious persons.[38]

Only an ancient and firmly established custom could have rendered a holy "gospeller" thus violent. During the whole of Lent, if we may believe a late tradition, St. Ninian was accustomed to take but the poorest food, and from Holy Thursday till after the Easter Mass he abstained totally from both food and drink. His devotees took his example. The Scots legend, which in its accounts of recent miracles lays great emphasis on the keeping of Ninian's fast, does not say that it was kept especially in Holy Week, but does record that it was

> from noon on a Friday till after mass on the following Sunday, and that this fast was kept three times in each quarter of the year,—twice, as it would seem, in successive weeks, and once at any time within the quarter, as chosen by the devotee.[39]

St. Ninian's fast, I believe, was the root of the irony in the Pardoner's repetition of Bailly's oath. To be sure, the Pardoner was inviting disaster by mocking[40] the Host's pronunciation, but that is not all. His oath alone was enough to make the gentles fear some ribaldry; for they were at a tavern when he swore by Ronyon, and Easter was just past or just at hand. At that time and in that place, no more incongruous saint than Ninian could be imagined. The Pardoner was a churl, and he swore his churl's oath with the cynical impudence which allowed him, in his tale, to attack the sins of which he himself was guilty.

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V. Sur l'Office de Saint Augustin

DANS un article sur *'Regio dissimilitudinis* de Platon à saint Bernard de Clairvaux' (*Mediaeval Studies,* IX [1947], 108-130), nous avons suivi la transmission de cette formule de Platon à Plotin, puis à saint Augustin et enfin à saint Bernard. Qu'elle soit venue à saint Bernard des *Confessions,* la chose est certaine. Qu'elle lui soit venue de là directement ou par quelque intermédiaire, il est difficile d'en décider. La présente note n'a d'autre objet que d'attirer l'attention des chercheurs sur un intermédiaire possible, dont l'existence est d'ailleurs intéressante en soi et indépendamment de saint Bernard de Clairvaux.

La propre de la Congrégation des Augustins de l'Assomption contient, aujourd'hui encore, un office de la fête de saint Augustin, célébrée le 28 août. A matines, le répons de la première leçon du premier nocturne est une transposition quasi littérale du récit des *Confessions* VII, 10, 16: *et inveni longe me esse a te in regione dissimilitudinis* . . . etc. Le répons se contente de mettre le passage à la troisième personne: *Invenit se Augustinus longe esse a Deo in regione*

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[38] *Injunctions and Other Ecclesiastical Proceedings of Richard Barnes, Bishop of Durham* (Surtees Society, XXII, Durham, 1850), p. 17.

[39] Dowden, 'Note,' 200 f.; Alphons Bellesheim, *History of the Catholic Church of Scotland,* trans. Oswald Hunter Blair, II (Edinburgh and London, 1887), p. 11.

[40] Mocking, not correcting; for the Pardoner's *Ronyon* is just as "vulgar" a form as *Ronyan.* If there is any significance in the Pardoner's alteration of the name, I do not see it. Chaucer constantly uses variant forms of proper names for the sake of metre and rhyme.

dissimilitudinis . . . etc. Le même propre contient un autre office, à la date du 11 mai, fête de la Conversion de saint Augustin. Le même répons: *Invenit se Augustinus* . . . etc. s'y rencontre à la même place, c'est-à-dire après la première leçon du premier nocturne. Notons, puisque l'occasion s'en offre, qu'on ne le trouve ni dans l'office de sainte Monique (4 mai), ni dans celui de la Translation de saint Augustin (28 ou 29 février).

Nous ignorons la date de cet office, qui ne semble pas avoir été célébré chez les Bénédictins ni chez les Cisterciens. Le sujet est d'ailleurs trop mince pour qu'il mérite une recherche spéciale, mais, précisément, nous désirons indiquer le problème aux chercheurs qui, en poursuivant d'autres études, pourraient rencontrer sur leur route des documents de nature à l'éclairer. Le texte: *Invenit se Augustinus* . . . etc., se rencontre dans les manuscrits suivants de la Bibliothèque Nationale, à Paris. Antiphonaire de Prémontré, XIIe siècle, diocèse d'Auxerre, *lat.* 9425, fol. 111 (2e répons du 1er nocturne de matines). Antiphonaire de Saint-Victor, XIIIe siècle, *lat.* 14816, fol. 259^{v} (1er répons du 1er nocturne de matines). Bréviaire de Verdun, XIIIe siecle, *lat.* 17999, fol. 358 (1er répons de matines). Bréviaire des Trinitaires de Paris, XIIIe siecle, *lat.* 1022 (1er répons du 1er nocturne de matines, fol. 148^{v}, et 5e leçon des nocturnes de l'octave, fol. 150^{v}). Bréviaire, XIIIe siècle, *lat.* 14811, fol. 469 (1er répons du 1er nocturne de matines, que l'on répète pendant l'octave). On aura sans doute chance de trouver d'autres témoins, et de plus anciens, dans les antiphonaires ou bréviaires des églises où se trouvent un chapitre canonial, ainsi que des monastères qui se réclamaient de la règle de saint Augustin.

La remarquable stabilité de la place occupée par ce texte des *Confessions*, comme premier répons du premier nocturne des matines, suggère qu'il s'agissait, dès le XIIIe siècle, d'une tradition solidement établie. C'est là qu'à une date encore inconnue, mais ancienne, la formule du *Politique* de Platon (273*d*) est venue s'incruster dans un texte liturgique chrétien. Elle y est encore, et c'est grâce aux *Confessions* de saint Augustin que, depuis tant de siècles, tant de religieux continuent de chanter ou de lire, au moins deux fois l'an, l' ἐν τῷ τῆς ανομοιότητος τόπῳ de Plotin (*Enn.* I, 8, 13).

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VI. A Note on the Traditions of St. Frediano and St. Silao of Lucca.

IN Dr. Kenney's *Sources for the Early History of Ireland*,[1] the materials on St. Frediano of Lucca and St. Cataldo of Taranto[2] occupy paragraphs nos. 40 and 41, concluding the chapter on the 'Celtic' period, while the paragraph on St. Silao of Lucca, no. 446, is found in the chapter on the expansion of Irish Christianity from the Seventh to the Twelfth century. In reality, so far as the literary tradition of these three Saints can be considered a source for the ecclesiastical history of Ireland, the first two paragraphs should have gone together with the paragraph on St. Silao. These three traditions represent three different stages of imposition of Irish associations upon continental Saints, such as is found also, at the same time, north of the Alps, in the cases of St. Livinus at Ghent, Albert at Ratisbon and Rumold at Mechlin.[3] With regard to St. Frediano, it would be hard to deny the existence of an historical tradition from the days of St. Gregory the Great.[4] With regard to St. Cataldo, the inscription on the pectoral cross found

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[1] (New York, 1929). General reference is made to this work for editions of and literature on the lives of Irish Saints mentioned in this article.

[2] See my article 'Cataldus Rachau, A Study in the Early History of Diocesan Episcopacy in Ireland', *Mediaeval Studies* VIII (1946), especially 227.

[3] See my article 'St. Albert, Patron of Cashel, A Study in the Early History of Diocesan Episcopacy in Ireland', *ibid.*, VI (1945), especially 35.

[4] PL 77, 233-6.

in his grave in 1071 makes it at least probable that there had been buried under the Cathedral of Taranto a person named Cataldus. With regard to St. Silao, there can be little doubt that the tradition of the existence of a person of that name is of the same date as the tradition of his Irish associations.

It can be shown that continental lives of Hibernised Saints are not only reflections of continental ideas on contemporary Ireland but frequently also Irish interpretations, in terms of continental thought and for continental comprehension, of political and ecclesiastical affairs in Ireland. Concerning the traditions of St. Albert and St. Cataldo, it has been shown that these are unexpected sources for the history of diocesan episcopacy in Ireland. References to Saints associated in continental tradition with Ireland and described in that tradition as archbishops in Ireland can be regarded as reflections of the internal and external changes in the metropolitan organisation of Ireland. The traditions of Sts. Forannan[5] and Silao advocate a mono-metropolitan organisation under a more than merely honorary leadership of Armagh; the tradition of St. Cataldo might reflect the idea of erecting a strong metropolitan see in the centre of Ireland, whereas the *Visio Tundali* and the *Vita sti. Albarti* quite clearly reflect the bi-metropolitan system between the synods of Rathbrassail and Kells. The tradition of St. Rumold finally introduces into this tradiition the claims of Dublin.

An important point in this development in the organisation of the Irish Church was the greater prominence attained through it by urban sees. In fact, the significance of Twelfth Century Irish-Continental hagiography as an indirect source of contemporary Irish history, rather than as a direct source of past events, can be most easily established by the study of Irish place-names referred to in the various records. It is suggested that the traditional misconception of these traditions has been due to the fact that the records were studied primarily with regard to their weird chronology, the much clearer geography being considered only secondarily. The results of this procedure are obvious in Dr. Kenney's work, which, it is feared, will mislead even scholarly investigators in this field. In assigning St. Frediano and St. Cataldo to the 'Celtic' period, Dr. Kenney suggests that we should accept the chronology of these traditions even with regard to the Irish associations, though there is no doubt that the latter were not established until the second half of the Twelfth Century. Moreover, it is significant that Dr. Kenney spoke of St. *Frediano* but of St. *Cathaldus;* either we treat both Saints as the result of Italian tradition and then refer to them by their modern Italian names, or we confine ourselves to the mediaeval sources. The "h" in the name of Cataldus was not introduced until the Seventeenth Century in deference to the Irish claim that this was a Latin form of Cathal. With regard to the third Saint, Dr. Kenney speaks of *Silaus, Silao or Sillan,* the latter name again being an attempted Irish equivalent.

The original account of the Irish associations of St. Cataldo, which so far can be constructed only from the summary by Petrus de Natalibus, was probably written shortly after the elevation and translation of St. Cataldo's relics in 1151 and before the news of the erection of four metropolitan sees in Ireland by the Synod of Kells in 1152 became generally known. Comparing this tradition with those of St. Frediano and St. Silao, we may consider the following episodes: Cataldus was born in *Catandum* in *Numenia* (Momonia), received his clerical instruction at *Lesmoria* and built a church. At the instigation of *Dux Meltridis,* the *rex insulae* tried to expel the Saint *de suis finibus,* but after the sudden death of Meltridis was converted and *ducatum illius in perpetuo concessit.* After some time, Cataldus was made archbishop. Then follows the curious account of Cataldus' establishing twelve suffragan bishops.

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[5] See 'St. Albert, Patron of Cashel . . .', 217 and 233.

The first *Vita* associating St. Frediano with Ireland was written at Lucca after 1171, because it refers to the Norman invasion of Ireland.[6] The first words: *Beatus igitur Fridianus, sicut prisci catholici tradiderunt, ex Hibernia Scotiae insula* lay claim to an older tradition of the Saint's Irish associations of which, however, there is no trace. It can be shown that this Hibernisation is contemporary with those of St. Cataldo and St. Silao.

Fridianus received his clerical education at *Candida* (Whitern) but, when his teacher there tried to murder him, *dimissa gente et patria sua abiit in Hiberniam.* These words, Colgan noted, should read *per Hiberniam,* because *Hibernia* had been described as the Saint's native country. These words also occur in the *Vita IV* and I am inclined to regard them either as a sign that the author of *Vita I* confused *Hibernia* and *Scotia* (as does the *Vita sti. Livini*)[7], or as a sign that this *Vita* is a compilation. The *Vita I* and *IV*[8] continue: *et in loco qui vocatur Machili habitum religionis sumpsit.* Colgan changed in both instances *Machili* into *Macbili* saying that there was no place in Ireland named *Machili,* whereas there were two place-names *Macbili* in Ulster. I assume that *Machili* is a corrupted Irish place-name, like *Rachau* in the tradition of St. Cataldo, following the continental tradition that considers gutturals as characteristic of the Irish language.[9] The corruption of *Rachau* from Rahen is indicative of the derivation of the tradition of St. Cataldo from that of St. Carthage. The corruption of *Machili* from *Macbili* is indicative of the derivation of the tradition of St. Frediano from that of St. Finnian of Moville, who was also educated at Candida.[10] The literary tradition of the association between St. Finnian and St. Frediano is a subject worthy of more detailed investigation as an illustration of the compilatory character of late mediaeval lives of Saints associated with Ireland.

Continuing our investigation of the connection between the traditions of St. Cataldo and St. Frediano, we note the following passages:

Vita I sti. Fridiani	*Petrus de Natalibus in st. Cataldum*
Ad magisterium Ecclesiae assumptus, tamquam bonus prelatus in spiritualibus et tem(po)ralibus cuncta egregie disponeret	Archiepiscopus electus, laudabiliter vivens, omnibus recte dispositis . . .

We shall see that these passages are of interest as accounts (1) of canonical pro-motion, (2) of canonical life and (3) of the new organisation of the material foundations of the Church in Ireland. The *Vita I sti. Fridiani* continues:

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[6] Significantly enough, Lucca now commemorates St. Frediano only on the anniversary of the translation of his relics (Nov. 18). Since O'Hanlon's work did not reach and the Bollandists have not as yet gotten to November 18, and since Dom Gougaud's *Les Saints irlandais hors d'Irlande* does not treat of Irish Saints in Italy, Tommassini's *Irish Saints in Italy* (Engl. transl., London, 1932), is our chief source of information on the tradition of St. Frediano. (Margaret Stokes's *Six Months in the Apennines* [London, 1891], quoted by Dr. Kenney, is a travel book, worthless in historical matters). Concerning Irish knowledge of St. Frediano, it may be noted that the earliest Irish reference to this Saint occurs in the dedication of H. Fitzsimon's *Catholick Refutation* (Rouen, 1608). In 1629 Patrick Fleming wrote to Hugh Ward that "our primate Peter Lombard saw the life of St. Frigidian at Lucca and took a copy; the Saint's Office is celebrated in Lucca" (O'Reilly, *Lives of Irish Martyrs and Confessors,* p. 633). In 1741 St. Frigidian's name was inserted into the first liturgical calendar for Ireland and to this day the Saint's *natale* on March 20 is observed in Ireland. The historical lessons adopted for Ireland in 1765 from the Breviary of the Canons Regular of the Lateran were based on the *Vita IV* (Kenney) as was the 1635 Office published by Colgan. The present-day lessons for the feast at Lucca still refer to *Ultonia.*

[7] See *supra,* note 3. Even in the Seventeenth Century this point was still obscure. With regard to St. Frediano, Ughelli, *Italia Sacra* I (1643), p. 794, said: Filius regis Hultoniae in partibus extremis Hiberniae vel Scotiae ut alii volunt.

[8] *Vita II, Analecta Bollandiana* XI (1892), 262, merely adds a few legends relating to Lucca.

[9] See 'Cataldus Rachau. . .', 224. In the life of St. Brigid, the name of St. Mel is referred to as *Machilla.* Cf. the Fourteenth Century *Nova Legenda Angliae,* ed. Horstmann (Oxford, 1901), p. 154.

[10] On *Candida Casa,* cf. Kenny, *op. cit.,* pp. 159 and 391.

> Episcopus illius terrae ad quendam dicti Patris locum, ut opportunitas itineris exigebat, visitando parochiam suam advenit, quem nimirum B. Fridianus honorifice et reverenter suscepit . . . ut decebat Episcopalem dignitatem.

This again is a passage of threefold interest to Twelfth Century Irish church history. Is this an illustration of the transition from the "circuits" undertaken by dignitaries of the Irish Church to canonical visitations?[11] How far does this passage reflect the transition from the old use of the term *parochia* (*paruchia Patricii* = "that league of monastic churches which regarded Patrick as founder and patron")[12] to the modern use (= district of the *sacerdos*, established in Ireland by Gilbert of Limerick)?[13] Do the words *ut decebat Episcopalem dignitatem* imply a censure of traditional Irish estimation and treatment of bishops?[14] All these questions should be considered in the light of information on Irish Church life of the Twelfth Century afforded by both Irish-Continental and Irish hagiography (and other sources) of the time. At this point the traditional study of this literature as a direct historical source is particularly inadequate.

On the occasion of his episcopal reception, St. Frediano raised a man from the dead, and this account led the writer of the *Vita I* to insert a free version of the miracles, in particular the diversion of a river, which were the core of the earlier purely Italian tradition of the Saint.[15] Transferring these miracles to Ireland, the writer of the *Vita I* added this significant information:

> cum Rex Anglie terram Scotorum occupasset, exercitui suo universaliter mandavit ut locum illum [where that miracle had taken place] venerarent.

This passage, to my knowledge, has never been considered in the dating of that text. On the other hand, an account bearing striking resemblance with the tradition of St. Cataldo is coupled with information on the kingship of Ulster:

> Arth Rex Origiall quae est provincia Hiberniae, pravorum hominum consilio ac favore quasdam Ecclesiarum possessiones quae B. viri regimine commissae erant violenter abstulit. Et licet esset Christianus, tamen ut malorum consuetudo est, eius religioni semper adversabatur. Sed B. Fridianus post longas molestias quas ab eo sustinerat praedictum Regem de possessionibus oblatis per clericos[16] et familiares suos paterne studuit. Ille a regia potestate tumidus, iniuriis affectos eos a curia expulit. (Sanctus) per semetipsum Regem adiit, Ecclesiarum possessiones constanter repetiit. Rex vero indignatus, non solum sanctum virum exaudire sed etiam audire contempsit. [Frightened by several cases of fatal disease in his family, the king promised to yield] ut decet Regalem magnificentiam. Rex cum suis curialibus ad pedes sancti viri prostratus, gratanter eius petitioni ad vota satisfecit, promisit se in obsequio suae paternitatis omni tempore devotum permanere.

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[11] Such as still mentioned in the early Twelfth Century (Kenny, *op. cit.*, p. 766). See also the reference to St. Carthage's circuit in my paper 'Cataldus Rachau. . .', 236: Episcopus consecratus visitabat parochiam suam.

[12] Kenney, *op. cit.*, p. 326. See also J. Ryan, *Irish Monasticism* (London, 1931), pp. 84, 299.

[13] PL 159, 997 and 'St. Cataldus Rachau . . .', 236. The term *provincia* (see below) corresponded in the secular sphere to the old use of the term *parochia* in the ecclesiastical order.

[14] In the *Vita s. Livini* we have an account of the reception of (the successor of) St. Augustine of Canterbury in Ireland when he came there *causa negotii*. See 'St. Albert, Patron of Cashel. . . ', 35 f.

[15] The Serchio miracle was depicted in a fresco in St. Frediano's, Lucca, and in a painting by Fra Filippo Lippi in the Accademia in Florence.

[16] In the meantime, St. Frediano had become a bishop or perhaps archbishop, the province of the secular ruler being the equivalent of the diocese of an ecclesiastical ruler (see 'St. Cataldus Rachau . . .', 236).

It is especially in regard to the part played by the king's *entourage* that this account of the triumph of ecclesiastical over secular power resembles that of the tradition of St. Cataldo;[17] as in the latter, it is immediately followed by the abrupt departure of the Saint from Ireland.

The *Vita IV*,[18] extracted by Colgan from a Cologne manuscript, not only associates St. Fridianus with the Canons Regular but also adds some Irish associations. The Saint was *filius magni Regis Ultoniae.*[19] *Ultonia enim magnum Regnum est Hiberniae.* The father is given the tribal name of *Ultach*, and the etymology of the Irish name of the Saint (*Findbarr*) is discussed. The king wanted his son to give up the Church but Fridianus went to Rome where he was received by Pope Pelagius. Staying for three months at Rome *consuetudines ecclesiasticas cum Apostolica memoriae commendavit.* May we associate this passage with the reference made to *consuetudo sacrosanctae Ecclesiae* in the *itaque*-formula of the Canons of the Synod of Cashel? Curiously enough, the *Vita IV sti. Fridiani* continues:

> Accepta itaque[20] ut moris est a summo Pontifice benedictiones, ad terram suam remeare curavit, portans secum reliquias et decreta, quae pro munere Apostolicus ei donavit, quae ad hunc dicuntur Canones S. Fridiani.

The following passage from the *Vita sti. Wironis* may be compared to the beginning of this passage:

> Moris erat apud incolas ejusdem insulae, primo pastores inter eos eligere, tum electum Roman dirigere, Apostolicis manibus ordinandum.[21]

We shall see that this *mos* is also referred to in the tradition of St. Silao. At this point, the *Vita IV sti. Fridiani* infers from the tradition of St. Finnian of Moville the information that the Saint brought from Rome *Evangelia quoque quae terra illa nondum plene susceperat*, a piece of information which apparently led the compiler of the 1635 Office, printed by Colgan, to assume that Fridianus' parents were still pagans,[22] thus chronologically associating him with St. Cataldo, who according to the earliest tradition *totam insulam convertit.* The subsequent story told in the *Vita IV* of the sister of St. Fridianus will be considered in conjunction with the tradition of St. Silao.

The tradition of St. Silao[23] started with the miraculous discovery in 1180 of the Saint's tomb bearing an inscription containing the words: *in Hybernia Episcopus fuit.* Concerning his elevation to the episcopacy, his *Vita* tells us that he was first made abbot in his *monasterium sti. Brandani* (similarly, the later tradition associated St. Fursey with St. Brendan)![24]

> Cum ad episcopatum cuiusdam magnae civitatis praedictae insulae totius cleri plebisque pari voto et communi concordia peteretur extractus ex coenobio licet invitus Beatum Gregorium summae sedis praesulem ab eo considerandus reverenter petiit.

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[17] *Art. cit.*, 232 f.

[18] In Colgan's enumeration, no. II.

[19] While the *Aberdeen Breviary* says that St. Finnian of Moville was *ex scotica gente*, the *Nova Legenda Angliae* describes him as *de Ulidia* (*Ms* T; *Ms* E: *nudia*); see Kenney, *op. cit.*, no. 183.

[20] In monachorum itaque regulis et in sanctae scripturae paginis . . . instructus, apostolicum petere sedem decrevit . . . ad sacerdotii gradum ascendit (*Nova Legenda Angliae*, St. Finnianum).

[21] See 'St. Albert, Patron of Cashel . . .', note 68d.

[22] See also, a few years later, Ughelli *loc. cit.*, and, to this day, the Irish office (see 'The Literary Tradition of Irish Saints in the Order of Canons Regular of the Lateran', *Comparative Literature Studies* XVII/XVIII (1945), 20 ff.

[23] On the tradition of St. Silao, apart from M. Stokes (see *supra*, note 6), see Tommassini, *op. cit.*, pp. 378 ff. and L. Menzies, *The Saints in Italy* (London, 1924), p. 405 f. The latter refers to *Lucca* in Dent's series "Mediaeval Towns".

[24] See below p. 239.

Let us first compare this account of the election of St. Silao with similar accounts in Irish-Continental hagiography:[25]

> *St. Livinus:*
> palatinorum choro cum subaulicis totiusque regionis illius conclamante Rex beatum in cathedra archiepiscopatus debito honore collocavit, ut consuetudo est pastores Sanctae Ecclesiae consecrari.
> *St. Albartus:*
> Incole civitatis (Casselensis) sanctum A. unanimo voto sibi metropolitanum exceperunt.
> *St. Forannan:*
> A populorum caterva electus in civitate Domnachmor quae est metropolis totius Hiberniae.

Only in the *Vita II sti. Rumoldi* do we read that the election was carried out by the clergy exclusively *ut par erat Romano more.* It would be hard to marshall a similar array of accounts of episcopal elections from contemporary Irish records, and one is inclined to consider Irish-Continental hagiography not only as a reflection of Irish conditions in continental terms, but also as an expression of the tendency, naturally most prevalent among Irish clerics who were or had been on the Continent, to introduce in the Irish Church the *consuetudines* observed there. The reference to St. Gregory is spiritual rather than historical, as may be seen from the account given in the *Vita sti. Livini* of the presence at Livinus' baptism of (the successor of) Augustine: *a beato Gregorio Romanae sedis apostolico pontifice transmissus Angligenitarum primus antistes.*

How little Irish-Continental hagiography, even in its smaller geographical units, has been considered so far as a literary tradition of its own, can be seen from the following words of Tommassini:

> The name of Gregory in Irish hagiography is a stock name for the Pope, and its retention by the Italian 12th century composer of the nth redaction of the fabulous life of St. Sillan would suggest that the prototype had some core of substance in an Irish tradition.

The core of Irish substance in the tradition of St. Silao can be traced in many other points. Tommassini's suggestion that the only existing *Vita* of St. Silao is "the nth redaction" is a typical attempt to consider Irish-Continental hagiography as a direct source and to save its chronology. In reality, there is no evidence that the tradition of the existence of St. Silao is older than that of his Irish associations. Accordingly, Tommassini continued:

> The earlier 12th century text . . . has tacked on to it another part absolutely contradictory, which brings us back to the 5th century, and makes St. Silaus a disciple of St. Patrick.

This "tacked-on" part says that *de monte altissimo Hiberniae nomine Crusac, S. Sylaus iussu S. Patricii demones expulsit. Crusac* is of course Croagh Patrick. On the occasion of the Saint's ordination, St. Patrick convoked a synod at *villa Cluen in Ticamoria*[26] *ubi S. Cheranus nepos S. Silai monasterio praeerat.* The *Vita II sti. Fursaei* said that the Saint's father fled to *Esbren insula* where he had an uncle *nomine Brendanus antistes, qui in insula quae Clynne-Fearta vocatur monasterium construxerat.* The preface to the *Vita sti. Kadroe,* a summary of the mythical tradition of the invasion of Ireland, states that the invaders occupied in succession *Cloin urbs antiqua Hiberniae, super Synam fluvium,* Armagh Kildare, Cork and Bangor, standing for Sts. Kieran, Patrick, Brigid, Finbarr and Comgan. In the *Vita IV sti. Foillani* we have an account of St. Patricks' mission. In the *Vita sti. Wironis,* the Irish tradition of foreign missions is associated with Sts. Patrick, Columbanus and Cuthbert, *patriae columbae, terrae lucernae.*[27] Less directly, the tradition of St. Cataldo is associated with that of St. Carthage, and that of St. Albert with that of St. Ailbe. Adding the reference to *Ticamoria* (which, as the Office of St. Silao rightly recognised, is a mutilation of the Latin name of Tara), the tradition of St. Silao simultaneously establishes a connection with Irish *secular* history.

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[25] See 'St. Albert, Patron of Cashel . . .', 35 and 'St Cataldus Rachau . . .', 235.

[26] The Office published by Fiorentini corrected *Crusac* to *Cruach* and *Ticamoria* to *Tesmoria* (see below), an interesting illustration of the progress on Continental knowledge of Ireland.

These various degrees of directness in associations of continental lives of Hibernised Saints with the great Irish Saints has been studied just as little as the relationship between Irish-Continental hagiography and Irish hagiography in general.

How detailed is the information given by Irish-Continental hagiography on points in which only in the Twelfth Century Ireland adopted the *consuetudines* of the Roman Church, may be seen from the statement that at his first Mass *beatus Sylaus corpus Christi in Sacramento sicut est Ecclesiae consuetudo in tribus partibus fregit.* It was a particularity of the rite of the Holy Sacrifice described in the Stowe Missal Tract that the consecrated Host was broken into *five* parts.

The two closest points of resemblance between the traditions of St. Frediano and St. Silao are the accounts of (1) the difficulties the Saints had with secular rulers in Ireland; (2) the forced marriages of their sisters.

Discussing the account of the difficulties which St. Cataldo had in Ireland with secular rulers, I pointed out[28] that Petrus de Natalibus compiled it rather clumsily, saying that Cataldus was granted *ducatum ducis illius defuncti,* although this duke had not been mentioned before. Similarly, the *Vita sti. Silai* says:

> Emergebat illa controversia cum Rege civitatis, cui Deo auctore praesidebat, spiritualibus infulis decoratus, de quibusdam sanctis Ecclesiis propriae dioecesis, quas suae tyrannidi contra Ecclesiae instituta Rex ille tentans pertinaciter subiugare novis et indubitis exactionibus affligebat, gloriosus antistes Apostolicam Sedem adire constituit.

There is no antecedent to the word *illa,* and it seems quite obvious that the *Vita sti. Silai* is a derived compilation in very much the same sense as the account given by Petrus de Natalibus of St. Cataldo. Overlooking this fact, the Bollandists and Tommassini assumed that the account of the Saint's associations with St. Patrick was "tacked-on". I suggest that it is merely misplaced but belonged to the original conception of the tradition of St. Silao's Irish associations.

Both the words *rex and civitas* should be considered in the light of the whole tradition of Irish-Continental hagiography. Sts. Livinus and Rumold were described as sons of the king of the *Scoti,* the ecclesiastical equivalent being *Hibernensium Ecclesiae archiepiscopus* and *Dublinensis archiantistes.* Also in the tradition of St. Cataldo, the king is the ruler of the (whole) island of Ireland. On the other hand, in the tradition of St. Frediano we hear of the *rex Origiall,* who apparently was inferior to the *rex Ultoniae;* the latter might have been imagined to have been at that time High-king of Ireland. In the *Vita sti. Silai* we hear of a *rex civitatis,* apparently not much more than the wicked *dux*

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[27] See 'St. Albert, Patron of Cashel . . .', note 68d and the present-day Office of St. Wiro in the diocese of Roermond: Propositis sibi sancti Patricii, Cutberti et Columbae(!) piis vestigiis.

[28] See 'St. Cataldus Rachau . . .', 218.

Meltridis (of Rachau) in the tradition of St. Cataldo. *Civitas*[29] is the usual word for the episcopal see in the new organisation of the Irish Church, e.g., Lismore (*Vita sti. Carthagi,* 65 and St. Bernard's Life of St. Malachy), Armagh (Life of St. Malachy and *Vita sti. Albarti*) and the thirty-four episcopal sees mentioned in the introduction to the *Visio Tundali.*

The "exactions" with which the local chieftain afflicted the bishop were probably not so much new as the obvious reaction of a secular ruler to the attempt to raise the episcopacy in Ireland from its traditional inferiority. The reports in Irish-Continental hagiography of struggles between the ecclesiastical and secular rulers in Ireland illustrate continental reflection upon the Irish counterpart to the Investiture struggle.

Colgan and O'Hanlon devoted much attention to the early representations of St. Silao at Lucca, depicting the Saint with a pallium. Considering the importance of the pallium in Twelfth Century Irish relations with Rome and the extent and significance of the references to Irish archbishops in Irish-Continental hagiography of the time, it is surely remarkable that while described in his epitaph as "Bishop in Ireland", St. Silao should have been depicted with a pallium. The coordination with a king also seems to imply that he was really thought of as an archbishop.

The parallelism between the accounts of the forced marriages of the Saints' sisters in the traditions of St. Frediano and St. Silao is so striking that one cannot help being surprised that it has never been remarked. Studying Irish-Continental hagiography as a type of literature, we must devote special attention to such romantic elements which form the obvious bridge between hagiography and the secular epics. The disparity in the study of Ireland's place in these two fields of continental literature of the Middle Ages is both significant and distressing. In the hagiographical field studies continue to be centred around the question of what historicity is to be attributed to the texts, while with regard to secular literature, *Realienforschung* has completely been superseded by *Motivforschung.*[30] The study of Irish place-names shows that there exists a closer relationship between these two types of literature than has been recognised as far as Ireland's place therein is concerned. The accounts of the forced marriages of the sisters of Sts. Frediano and Silao are on the same level as the accounts of the romance of the parents of Sts. Fursey and Foillan and of St. Livinus, or the stories of Sts. Dympna and Modwenna fleeing from Ireland from the incestuous approaches of their royal fathers.

From the point of view of hagiography all these romantic elements would appear foreign matter. In the tradition of St. Fursey it can be shown quite clearly, as is obvious from the composition of the *Vitae* of Sts. Frediano and Silao, that these elements are additions, concessions to romantic fancy which gradually diluted hagiography. Colgan tried to save the story of St. Frediano's sister by interpreting the name of *Quarrair* as a corruption of *Corcaich.* The sister of St. Silao is given an honest continental name (*Mingarda*),[31] while the tradition of St. Livinus presents us with a number of Hellenising proper-names. In the traditions of Sts. Frediano and Silao, the Saints' sisters submit to compulsion, but eventually achieve their aim of chaste and religious life, an element scarcely in keeping with the tradition of Irish hagiography. In fact, the difference between traditional Irish hagiography and Irish-Continental hagiography (including hagiography rewritten in Twelfth and Thirteenth Century Ireland under the influence of continental ideas) can be illustrated by the different attitudes to the relations existing between the laity and the religious.

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[29] While, in the tradition of St. Silao, Clonmacois is called *villa,* in the tradition of St. Kieran it is known as *civitas* (VSH I, 211), and in Irish *cathair Chiaraich* (O' Grady, *Silva Gaedelica* I, p. 8 f.). See also Ryan, *op. cit.,* p. 88.

[30] See my 'Irish Saints in Early German Literature', *Speculum* XXXII (1947), 147-161 and 'Ireland's Place in the Chivalresque Literature of Mediaeval Germany', *Proc. Royal Irish Academy* LIII C, 279-298.

[31] It has never been noted that the name of Rumold (the Hibernised patron-Saint of Mechlin) occurs in the *Nibelungenlied.*

In this respect also one of the legends located in Ireland (and therefore discarded by the Bollandists) in the tradition of St. Silao is of interest:

> In Villa Hydrominii Hiberniae Rex dives naturae concessit relicta gravida Regina quae cum feminam peperisset praeter spem omnium misit eam Sancto Sylao sub interminatione exilii, nisi eam in marem mutaret. Et sic finita oratione factum fuit. Unde sui Clerici magnum deinde in illo habuerunt privilegium.

May we discover here a vague memory of the Irish folklore tradition of the changeling (little boys dressed as girls so that the fairies will not steal them)? The place-name of *Hydrominii* is of course just as fantastic as that of *Insula Trisseri quod interpretatur Insula Nuptae* in the account of still another of St. Silao's Irish miracles.

Irish-Continental hagiography must be studied as a specific type of hagiography and indeed of literature in general, reflecting an absorption of information from Ireland scarcely less curious than the "Celtic" influences in the great secular epics. The tradition of St. Frediano is the classical example of the Hibernisation of a continental patron-Saint. The tradition of St. Silao is an original and free creation. Devotional traditions are carriers of historical truth to a far greater extent than is generally admitted.[32] That the literary tradition not only of the Irish associations of St. Silao but of his very existence is very late indeed, is clearly recognised by the fact that devotion to him, if it was ever genuine and popular, never spread beyond one convent in Lucca and in fact has practically died out. Closely related as no doubt they are, the traditions of the Irish associations of St. Frediano and St. Silao are typical illustrations of the fact that as sources of Irish ecclesiastical history works of Twelfth Century Irish-Continental hagiography have an eminent, though indirect value, giving information on Ireland only for, or even through, contemporary continental eyes.

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VII. Did Robert Grosseteste Attribute the *Hexameron* of St. Venerable Bede to St. Jerome?

THERE are quite a few statements in the *Hexameron*[1] of Grosseteste which are supported by a reference to St. Jerome which I do not find in his works. But I do find about two-thirds[2] of them in the *Hexameron* of St. Venerable Bede. Let me give two examples:

> (a) Hieronymus quoque idem sentit dicens: dixit non more nostro per sonum vocis corporeum sed <*omnia*> verbum suum unigentum fecit.[3]

Compare this with Bede, *Hexameron*:

> Quod autem dixisse Deus, sive ut lux fieret, sive ut alia quaeque, perhibetur, non nostro more per sonum vocis corporeum credendus est,

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[32] In studies on Irish-Continental hagiography, the present writer may claim to have been the first to establish the historical significance of the present-day Offices of Saints associated with Ireland and venerated on the Continent as carriers of continental information of and interest in Ireland.

[1] I worked for several years towards the preparation of a critical edition of this work. Through my inability to secure a grant for its publication, I finally abandoned the project.

[2] Almost all the rest I find in the works of St. Isidore. It is quite possible that somewhere in the manuscript tradition the abbreviation for Isidore was misread for Hieronymus.

[3] British Museum *Ms* 6.E.V. fol. 145^{v}. C.2.

> sed altius intelligendum dixisse Deum ut fieret creatura, quia per Verbum suum omnia, id est, per unigenitum Filium fecit . . .[4]

> (b) Hieronymus ait: notandum sane est quod in celo et in terra quattuor sunt elementa intelligenda. Nam et aquarum mentio postea fit, et in terre visceribus ferrum et lapides detinentur in quibus ignis latitat. Aer vero in terra probatur esse dum humecta terra temperiem solis acceptans vapores exhalat largissimos.[5]

Compare this with Bede, *Hexameron*:

> Ubi notandum quod cum coelo in principio duo mundo hujus elementa, aquā videlicet et terra, nominatim facta memorantur, quibus tamen duo reliqua fuisse constat indita, ignem videlicet in ferro et lapidibus, quae terrae viscere jam tunc condita latebant, aerem vero in ipsa terra, cui esse permistus ex eo cognoscitur, quod cum fuerit humectata, et temperiem solis acceperit, mox vapores exhalat largissimos.[6]

Grosseteste, it will be noted, does not quote word for word although he uses the introductory words: *dicens, ait,* but synopsizes. This is quite customary with him. But the recurrence of words and phrases are proof that he either borrowed from Bede's *Hexameron* and thought it was Jerome's or Bede and Grosseteste used a common source.

Let us now take two texts in which Grosseteste links the names of Bede and Jerome (sometimes in inverse order). It will be seen that the doctrine is found both in Bede's *Hexameron* and in the corresponding place in the *Glossa ordinaria*[7] in a passage based on Bede's *Hexameron.*

> (a) Beda et Hieronymus asserunt: lux diurna tunc non fuit quantum nunc est clara sed illa lux corporalis talem praebuit terris illuminationem qualis nunc ante solis ortum solet esse . . .[8]

Compare this with Bede's *Hexameron.*

> Sin autem quaerit aliquis: quale poterit esse lumen diurnum ante creationem siderum, non ab re (*sic*) quod tale fuerit, quale videmus quotidie mane, approximante scilicet solis ortu . . .[9]

The corresponding passage in the *Glossa ordinaria* reads:

> Si quaeretur quale potuit esse lumen diurnum ante creationem siderum, respondemus quale videmus solis ortu . . .[10]

It is quite evident that the passage from the *Glossa* is based on that from Bede's *Hexameron.* Grosseteste uses the latter for Jerome and the former for Bede.

> (b) Ut dicunt Beda et Hieronymus: patet quod ante peccatum hominis nil noxium, nil sterile terra produxit, cum omnis herba lignaque omnia data sunt homini omnique animae super terram viventi in escam.[11]

In St. Jerome, *Contra Jovinianum* we read:

> Verum quid opus est argumentis cum manifestissime Scriptura doceat, omne quod movetur, sicut olera herbarum, data nobis in escam, . . .[12]

Compare this with Bede, *Hexameron*:

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[4] I; PL 91, 16D.

[5] B.M: *Ms* 6.E.V. fol. 145^r. C.2:

[6] I; PL 91, 15AB.

[7] At least one reference is found in Pseudo-Bede, *On the Pentateuch.*

[8] B. M: *Ms* 6.E.V. fol. 146^r. C.2.

[9] I; PL 91, 23D.

[10] PL 113, 76D.

[11] B.M: *Ms* 6.E.V. fol. 170^v C.2.

[12] II; PL 23, 304A.

> . . . . patet quod ante reatum hominis nihil noxium terra protulit, nullam herbam venenatam, nullam arborem sterilem cum manifeste dictum sit, quod omnis herba et universa ligna data hominibus ac volatilibus, terrae quoque animantibus cunctis in escam, ...[13]

Then in the *Glossa ordinaria* we read:

> Patet quod ante peccatum hominis terra nihil noxium protulit, non herbam venenatam, non arborem sterilem. Omnis enim herba et ligna data sunt hominibus, et volatilibus, et animantibus terrae in escam.[14]

This is an abridgment of the passage from the *Hexameron*. It appears that Bede developed the thought of Jerome and that the author of the *Glossa* abridged Bede. Grosseteste attributes to Jerome the passage from the *Hexameron* and uses the *Glossa* for a reference to Bede.

The evidence in these and a dozen or more other examples which could be adduced points to the conclusion that Grosseteste attributed the *Hexameron* of St. Venerable Bede to St. Jerome.

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VIII. *Ipsa Philosophia Christus.*

Le manuscrit 1484 de la Biblioteca nazionale Vittorio Emmanuele de Rome fait partie du fonds sessorien, venu de l'antique monastère cistercien Sainte-Croix de Jerusalem.[1] C'est un petit volume dont l'écriture est du XI^{e} siècle, mais dont la provenance originale n'est pas connue. Il contient le *Liber scintillarum* dont l'attribution à Defensor, moine de Ligugé au VII^{e} siècle, est aujourd'hui la plus probable.[2] Sur les trois derniers feuillets ont été ajoutés, d'une écriture contemporaine de l'ensemble du manuscrit, divers textes qui sont surtout de caractère ascétique: exhortations à la morale chrétienne[3] et au mépris du monde.[4] Parmi ces additions se trouve une lettre qui semble inédite, mais qui mérite d'être publiée, ne serait-ce que pour les trois mots qui en indiquent le thème: *ipsa philosophia Christus.* Tout le contexte en donne le commentaire: il s'agit de déterminer ce qu'est la vraie philosophie ou, comme dit l'auteur, la manière de "faire véritablement de la philosophie, *uere philosophari*".

La lettre est adressée par un certain Elie à un maître d'école, nommé Jean, et à ses élèves. On aimerait pouvoir identifier ces personnages avec certitude. Mais le texte ne fait allusion à aucun événement précis qui permette de le dater. Il consiste d'ailleurs, presque exclusivement, en un tissu de citations classiques, bibliques et patristiques, dont saint Jérôme fournit la trame: l'auteur s'efface devant les autorités qu'il invoque; tout son mérite est dans le choix et l'ordonnance, d'ailleurs habiles, des citations et des réminiscences. L'adresse, pourtant, suggère une conjecture que ne contredisent ni l'âge du manuscrit ni le contenu du texte: il s'agirait du Bienheureux Elie, abbé bénédictin de Saint-Martin des Ecossais à Cologne (d. 1042),[5] et de Jean, écolâtre au monastère bénédictin Saint-Mathias de Trèves, vers 1047.[6] La proximité de ces deux abbayes et ce qu'on sait de la grande piété d'Elie confèrent à cette hypothèse quelque vraisemblance. Et ne peut-on penser qu'il était naturel d'évoquer saint Jérôme aux yeux d'un moine écolâtre en cette ville de Trèves où avait vécu ce Docteur, cet exégète, ce moine lettré, qui restait le modèle de la culture chrétienne? La lecture de ses écrits devait entretenir son souvenir. Enfin relevons un dernier indice chronologique: à l'époque où la lettre fut rédigée, Aristote n'a pas encore, dans l'enseignement des écoles, la place prépondérante qu'on lui reconnaîtra de plus en plus au cours du XIIe siècle; les maîtres principaux de la pensée philosophique sont encore Socrate, Platon et Cicéron.

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[13] I; PL 91, 32A.

[14] PL 113, 81B.

[1] Il y portait la cote 112.

[2] Ainsi que je l'ai marqué dans un premier travail sur ce sujet: 'Le "Liber scintillarum" attribué à Defensor de Ligugé', *Revue bénédictine*, LVIII (1948), 77-83.

[3] Fols. 71-72^{v}: *Sermo s. Augustini. Attendamus fr. car. quare christiani sumus. . .* Je n'ai pu identifier ce texte, même à l'aide des *indices*, si riches, des deux ouvrages de Dom G. Morin, *S. Augustini sermones post Maurinos reperti* (Rome, 1930), et *S. Caesarii Arelatensis sermones* (Maredsous, 1937).

[4] Fols. 73^{v}-74. On a d'abord ces vers:
Ad mortem cursus brevis est non tamen recursus,
Thesaurizemus nobis dum tempus habemus.
Puis, avec des variantes nombreuses et importantes, le *De vanitate mundi* édité par G. M. Dreves, *Analecta hymnica medii aevi* XXXIII (Leipzig, 1899), p. 267, n. 244. Enfin un autre poème de 27 vers où il est rappelé qu'Aristote, Socrate et Platon seront de peu de secours au jugement dernier et dont voici le premier vers: Plus amat exilium miseri miser orbis amator. . .

C'est à leur doctrine que l'auteur oppose la vraie philosophie, celle du Christ. Les Pères de l'Eglise avaient maintes fois montré dans la vie chrétienne, et spécialement dans la vie monastique, la seule philosophie parfaite.[7] Le moyen âge devait rester fidèle à cette notion traditionnelle; dans les milieux monastiques, en particulier, on aimait proclamer que la connaissance du Christ est la seule vraie philosophie. Dans l'épitaphe d'Abélard, son ami, Pierre le Vénérable écrira ce vers admirable: *Ad Christi veram transivit philosophiam.*[8]

Cependant, désigner le Christ comme "la philosophie même", ainsi que le fait Elie, est d'une audace inattendue et insolite: s'il en existe d'autres témoignages, ils doivent être rares.[9]

Pour illustrer cette conception de la sagesse chrétienne, l'auteur fait appel à l'Ecriture Sainte et à son exégète le plus illustre au moyen âge. Il ne dédaigne pourtant point de recourir aux écrivains de l'antiquité classique: s'il se méfie de la logique et de la dialectique, son attitude envers les "belles lettres" est moins défavorable; elle est en tout cas plus complexe. Sans doute la littérature profane est-elle englobée dans la réprobation générale de toute oeuvre païenne. Mais s'il paraît la condamner, Elie ne la méprise pas au point de dédaigner les arguments qu'elle apporte à sa thèse: il cite Ovide, Horace et Cicéron, cet "orateur insigne", avec un naturel qui trahit une longue fréquentation. Et bien que la plupart des expressions dont il se sert ne soient point de son cru, leur agencement ne laisse pas d'être original: cette mosaïque de citations est dessinée avec beaucoup de goût.

Le développement est solidement charpenté. Dès le début est affirmé, presque sur un ton d'invective, l'impuissance à philosopher de tous ceux qui ont précédé l'Incarnation du Fils de Dieu: l'évocation ironique—et légèrement comique—de ces maîtres et de leurs élèves contraste avec l'éloge solennel de Celui qui est la sagesse et le seul maître véritable. A l'exemple du fils prodigue, ceux qui croient se passer de lui se condamnent à "bailler comme des affamés", à s'égarer bien loin de cette philosophie qu'ils cherchent. On objectera que les lectures profanes sont conciliables avec les Livres Saints. La réplique vient aussitôt, intransigeante: saint Jérôme, saint Paul, David et l'Evangile y sont pris à témoin. Sans doute, de l'aveu même du terrible Jérôme, l'étude des auteurs païens est permise aux enfants: elle demeurait au moyen âge, comme dans l'antiquité, la seule façon de bien apprendre le latin, c'est-à-dire la seule méthode pour enseigner ce qu'on appelait alors, en un sens large, la *grammatica*. Mais elle doit être évitée dès qu'elle n'est plus nécessaire. Du moins garde-t-on le souvenir de tout ce qu'on lui doit . . . Aussi, comme David tranchant le chef de Goliath abattu avec le propre glaive de sa victime, Elie cite les poètes païens qui mettent en garde contre eux-mêmes. Cependant, dira-t-on encore, les dialecticiens ne cherchent-ils pas la vérité? C'est l'un des grands philosophes antiques, Cicéron le stoïcien, qui répond et dénonce l'enfantillage de leurs procédés. Enfin, pour qu'il ne soit pas oublié, Aristote lui-même est remis à sa place: malgré ses arguments, il ne sera d'aucun secours au dernier Jugement. Il ne reste aux vrais amateurs de la véritable sagesse qu'une vraie solution; elle se résume en une formule scripturaire où les moines voyaient souvent le programme de toute leur vie: mettre en vacance toute autre occupation, pour contempler Dieu et lui seul: *Vacate et uidete . . .*

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[5] Son éloge a été consigné par Mabillon, *Acta sanctorum O.S.B.* VI, I, (Paris, 1701), pp. 468-470.

[6] J. Lelong, *Bibliotheca sacra* II (Paris, 1723), p. 796, lui attribue, d'après Trithème, un commentaire sur les épîtres de s. Paul. Le titre *archischola* qu'Elie décerne à Jean est l'un de ceux qui désignaient les *magistri scholarum*, cf. Du Cange, *s.v.*, et E. Lesne, *Les écoles de la fin du VIIIe siècle à la fin du XIIe* (Lille, 1940), pp. 459-461.

[7] Des textes sont indiqués dans L. Bouyer, *Vie de saint Antoine* (Saint-Wandrille, 1950), pp. 169-171: Monachisme et philosophie.

[8] PL 189, 1023; d'autres textes sont rassemblés par Dom J. Leclercq, *Pierre le Vénérable* (Saint-Wandrille, 1946), XIV: La vraie philosophie du Christ, pp. 255-279.

[9] L'expression "ipsa philosophia Christus" ne se trouve signalée ni au mot "Christus" dans l'*Onomasticon* du *Thesaurus linguae* ni dans l'*Index de nominibus Christi,* dans PL, 221, 475-484. Elle n'est pas non plus mentionnée dans les études d'Et. Gilson, *L'Esprit de la philosophie médiévale* (Première Série, Paris, 1932), Ch. II: *La notion de philosophie chrétienne,* pp. 21-44, et notes pp. 220-225; ni dans les *Notes bibliographiques pour servir à l'histoire de la notion de philosophie chrétienne, ibid.*, pp. 297-324, et Deuxième Série (Paris, 1932), pp. 279-290. Cependant, d'après la note 2, p. 298 de la Première Série, on trouve chez Erasme, *Enchiridion Militis Christiani* (Lyon, 1641), p. 84, lignes 8-9: *atque ipsa adeo sapientia Christus Iesus.* Egalement chez Erasme, l'expression "christiana philosophia". Voir aussi Pierre Mesnard, 'Un texte important d'Erasme touchant sa "Philosophie chrétienne",' *Revue Thomiste,* XLVII (1947), 524-549.

[10] *Analecta monastica* I (Studia Anselmiana XX, Rome, 1948), pp. 1-20: L'humanisme bénédictin du VIIIe au XIIIe siècle.

Jean l'écolâtre avait-il oublié les exigences de la vraie sagesse? Il restait, en tout cas, suffisamment sensible à la voix des auteurs sacrés, de saint Jérôme et des poètes antiques, pour qu'Elie pût se contenter de la lui faire entendre. Nous savons peu de chose de l'auteur de la lettre et du destinataire. Mais ce quasi-anonymat est lui-même significatif: Elie est le témoin d'une attitude qui fut celle d'un très grand nombre. Dans l'Introduction de ses *Analecta monastica,* Dom J. Leclercq a caractérisé la position qu'adoptèrent généralement les milieux monastiques dans le grand débat sur l'humanisme au moyen âge.[10] De cet "humanisme bénédictin", fait à la fois de méfiance à l'endroit de la dialectique, de sympathie profonde et mal dissimulée pour les lettres antiques, d'enthousiasme pour la Bible et les Pères de l'Eglise, Elie et Jean sont des représentants obscurs: ils méritent d'être connus.

* * *

Helias, seruorum Dei qualiscumque seruulus, Iohanni archischolae philosopho eiusque discipulis: uere philosophari.

Socrates et socratici, Plato et platonici, Tullius ac tulliani philosophari se putauerunt, sed euanuerunt in cogitationibus suis et obscuratum est insipiens cor eorum.[1] Denique ipsa philosophia Christus, Dei uirtus et Dei sapientia,[2] carnem nostram induit, terrigenas uisitauit, semitasque suas rectissimas nos docuit, quas qui sequuntur uere philosophantur. Caeteri caenicas meretriculas amplexantur, procul a laribus philosophiae, ieiuni et errabundi, uagantur. Ecce quanti mercenarii in domo patris uestri abundant panibus, et uos famelici oscitatis, in longinqua regione porcos pascitis, immo ipsi siliquos porcorum comeditis.[3] *Quare,* ut ait Isaias, *appenditis argentum non in panibus, et laborem non in saturitate?*[4] Quare uultis daemonum cibari furfure et non Christi similagine? Vt enim sanctus ait Ieronimus: *Daemonum cibus est carmen poetarum, saecularis sapientia, rhetoricorum pompa uerborum.*[5]

Fortasse aliquis e contra: Et sacras et gentiles litteras legimus. At contra Ieronimus: Quid facit cum Apostolo,[6] cum euangelio Cicero? Quae societas lucis ad tenebras? Quae conuentio Christi ad Belial?[7] *Non potestis mensae Domini*

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[1] Cf. *Rom.* i, 21.

[2] Cf. *I Cor.* i, 24.

[3] Cf. *Luc.* xv, 15-16.

[4] *Is.* lv, 2. La Vulgate porte: *laborem uestrum.*

[5] *Ep.* 21, 13, 4; éd. Hilberg I, p. 122, 5-6.

[6] Dans le manuscrit, après *Apostolo,* la place d'un mot est laissée en blanc.

[7] Cf. *Ep.* 22, 29, 7; éd. Hilberg I, p. 189, 1-3.

participes esse et mensae daemoniorum.[8] *Absit ut de ore christiani sonet: Iupiter omnipotens.*[9] *Perdes,* ait Dauid, *omnes qui loquuntur mendacium.*[10] De sermone otioso postulanda[11] ratio.[12] Quod si pueris, ut ait Ieronimus, haec legere permittuntur[13] causa necessitatis, in adultis tamen crimen est uoluptatis.[14] Figmenta etenim poetarum per oblectamenta inanium fabularum mentem excitant ad incentiua libidinum.[15] *Corrumpunt mores bonos colloquia mala.*[16]

Sicut Goliam mucrone proprio interficiam.[17] Quidam ex ipsis poetis ait: *Eloquar inuitus: teneros ne tange poetas.*[18] Item alius:

Nimirum sapere est abiectis utile nugis
Et tempestiuum pueris concedere ludum,
Ac non uerba sequi fidibus modulanda latinis,
Sed uerae numerosque modosque ediscere uitae.[19]

Notate, notate, et nostri et uestri uos arguunt. Cauete ergo ab anathemate Iericho,[20] ne recumbatis amplius in idolis.[21]

Sed fortasse dialetici non uidentur nugis intendere, sed uerum inquirere. Quos inclitus orator in Rhetoricis ita derisit: Dialetici infantissimi apud nos reperiuntur qui ita sunt timidi in loquendo quod uix nomen suum pronuntiare audeant. Moxque conclusit: Huius itaque infantiae garrulam disciplinam condemnamus[22] *Aristotili,* ut ait Ieronimus, in extremo examine *argumenta non proderunt.*[23]

Fugite ergo uenias[24] et fabulas. *Vacate et uidete.*[25] *Accedite et illuminamini.*[26] Illa sapientia est clara[27] quae non in uerbis uolat,[28] sed quae uirtutibus constat. Multo melius est sanctam habere rusticitatem quam eloquentiam peccatricem.[29] *Intellectus bonus omnibus facientibus eum.*[30] Valete

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IX. Two German Dominican Psalters.

THE *Census* of American manuscripts of de Ricci and Wilson[1] describes briefly two psalters, numbered *1* and *2,* which belong to the University of Notre Dame Library, as being Fifteenth Century German manuscripts. We propose to study here these two manuscripts in order to identify and locate them more accurately

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[8] *I Cor.* x, 21.

[9] S. Jérôme, *Ep.* 21, 13, 8; éd. Hilberg I, p. 123, 17-18.

[10] Cf. *Ps.* v 7.

[11] Le mot *erit* manque dans le manuscrit.

[12] Cf. *Mt.*, xii, 36.

[13] La première main avait écrit *permittantur.*

[14] Cf. *Ep.* 21, 13, 9; éd. Hilberg I, p. 124, 1-2.

[15] Cf. Isidore, *Sentences* III, 13, 1; PL 83, 685A.

[16] *I Cor.* xv, 33.

[17] Cf. *I Reg.* xvii, 51.

[18] Ovide, *Remèdes,* 757.

[19] Horace, *Ep.* II, 2, 141-144. Dans le manuscrit le premier vers porte: *magis* pour *nugis,* et le dernier porte: *modos* pour *modosque.*

[20] Cf. *Ios.*, vi, 17-19 et vii, 11-12.

[21] Cf. Jérôme, *Ep.* 21, 13, 7 et 9; éd. Hilberg I, p. 123, 4 et 1243. Expression tirée de *I Cor.*, viii, 10.

[22] Cf. Cicéron, *Ad Herennium* II, 11. Voici le passage; en italiques les expressions citées: Sunt, qui arbitrentur, ad hanc causam tractandam vehementer pertinere cognitionem amphiboliarum eam quae a *dialecticis* profertur. Nos vero arbitramur, non modo nullo adiumento esse, sed potius maximo impedimento: omnes enim illi amphibolias aucupentur, eas etiam, quae ex altera parte sententiam nullam possunt interpretari. Itaque et alieni sermonis molesti interpellatores, et scripti tum odiosi, tum obscuri interpretes sunt: et dum caute et expedite loqui volunt, *infantissimi reperiuntur.* Ita dum metuunt in dicendo, ne quid ambiguum dicant, *nomen suum pronuntiare* non possunt. Verum horum pueriles opiniones rectissimis rationibus, cum voles refellemus. In praesentia hoc interdicere non alienum fuit, ut *huius infantiae garrulam disciplinam* contemneremus.

[23] *Ep.* 14, 11, 2; éd. Hilberg I, p. 61, 8.

[24] *Veniae* est employé ici à tort pour *neniae;* d'autres exemples de cette confusion sont cités par *Du Cange, s.v. Veniae.*

[25] *Ps.* xlv, 11.

[26] Cf. *Ps.* xxxiii, 6.

[27] Cf. *Sap.* vi, 13.

[28] Rappelle Horace, *Ep.* I, 18, 71.

[29] Cf. Jérôme, *Ep.* 52, 9, 3; éd. Hilberg I, p. 431, 12-13.

[30] *Ps.* cx, 10.

[1] Seymour De Ricci and W. J. Wilson. *Census of Medieval and Renaissance Manuscripts in the United States and Canada* (New York, 1937), p. 714.

and to describe them in more detail than does the *Census* in order to facilitate their use by liturgical scholars.

Ms N° 1: The calendar of this manuscript was written by the same scribe who wrote all the manuscript except fols. 220-223ᵛ. A study of the calendar quickly reveals that the manuscript is Dominican. One finds such typical Dominican feasts as: Jan. 28: *Translatio sancti Thome. Totum duplex* (in red letters); Feb. 4: *Anniversarium patrum martyrum;* March 7: *Thome confessoris de ordine Predicatorum. Totum duplex* (in red letters); March 14: *Octava Sancti Thome. Memoria;* April 29: *Petri martyris de ordine predicatorum. Totum duplex* (in red letters); May 7: *Translatio sancti Petri martyris. Totum duplex* (in red letters); May 24: *Translatio beati Dominici. Totum duplex* (in red letters); July 12: *Anniversarium in cymiteriis nostris sepultorum;* Aug. 5: *Dominici confessoris patris nostri. Totum duplex* (in red letters); Aug. 12: *Octava sancti Dominici simplex;* Sept. 4: *Anniversarium familia et benefactorum ordinis nostri;* Oct. 10: *Anniversarium omnium fratrum et sororum ordinis nostri.*

The litanies (fols. 201ᵛ-205) confirm this evidence for among the confessors are: *Sancte Dominice, Sancte Dominice* and *Sancte Thoma.* They are followed by prayers to St. Dominic, St. Peter Martyr and St. Thomas (fols. 206ʳ-ᵛ).

The calendar and litanies likewise help us to date the manuscript more closely than one could date it on paleographical grounds alone. A comparison of the feasts in the calendar with the dates these feasts were officially adopted by the General Chapters of the Order as drawn up by Maurice Cailett,[2] Bonniwell,[3] or as found in Reichert[4] show that the manuscript was written after 1423. By observing the absence in the manuscript of feasts officially adopted by the order later we may reasonably conclude that the manuscript was written before 1456. The following feasts, included in the calendar, were officially adopted, or raised in importance by the order in the Fifteenth Century: July 2: *Visitatio sancte Marie. Totum duplex* (1401); July 11: *Procopii abbatis, III lectiones* (1401); October 21: *Undecim milium virginum. Totum duplex* (1410); May 8: *Apparitio sancti Michaelis archangeli. Totum duplex* (1423); Aug. 10: *Laurentii martyris. Duplex* (1423); Nov. 11: *Martini episcopi et confessoris. Duplex.* Dec. 4: *Barbare virginis et martyris. III lectiones* (1423). The calendar does not contain the feast of any saint adopted by the Dominicans after 1423, such as that of St. Vincent Ferrer (1456). Nor does the name of St. Vincent Ferrer appear after that of St. Thomas in the Litany, an insertion ordered by the General Chapter in 1456. We are entitled to conclude therefore that the manuscript was written between 1423 and 1456.

There seems to be sufficient evidence to permit us to identify the religious house where, or for which, the psalter was written. The script itself and an occasional German phrase clearly indicate a Germanic origin. One finds in the margin at the bottom of fol. 1: *Wo du in diser zal die sich an hebt Anthonii vindestu die gulden zal des iars so ist der nehst suntag darnach setuagesima.* Likewise in the lower margin of fol. 2: *Wo du in diser zal die wich an hebt Benedicti vindest die gulden zal des iars so ist der nehst suntag dar nach der Ostertag.* On fol. 220 the rubric is: *die teglichen Memorie* and on fol. 222 another reads: *So man IX lecten helt,* and on fol. 222ᵛ: *Son man capitl helt.*

If we turn to the calendar again we find the names of the following saints not normally found in the Dominican calendar: Jan. 8: *Erhardi episcopi,* Bishop of Regensburg; March 3: *Kunegundis virginis. Simplex* (in red letters). She was the wife of Henry II (1002-1024) and died in 1040. She passed the last sixteen years of her life in the convent of Kaffungen. Her relics are at Bamberg. July 4: *Udalrici episcopi,* Bishop of Augsburg who died in 973. July 13: *Henrici imperatoris et confessor. Simplex* (in red letters), Henry II. Aug. 19: *Sebaldi confessor. Simplex* (in red letters)—a hermit who died *ca.* 760. His relics are in the church of St. Sebald in Nuremburg. Sept. 9: *Translatio sancti Kunegundis. Simplex* (in red letters). Nov. 26: *Conradi episcopi,* Bishop of Constance who died in 976. The list of the *sancte virgines* in the litany ends with St. Katherine, mentioned twice, St. Margaret, St. Ursala and St. Kunegundi. All these saints are associated with places in Southern Germany. The mention of St. Sebaldus, a local saints, leads us to Nurnberg; the mention of St. Katherine twice in the litanies among the *sancte virgines* leads us to believe that the psalter was used at the well-known Dominican convent of St. Catherine's of Nurnberg.

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[2] Cf. Victor Leroquais, *Les bréviaires manuscrits des bibliothèques publiques de France* I (Paris, 1933), pp. c-cl.

[3] William R. Bonniwell, *A History of the Dominican Liturgy* (New York, 1944).

[4] Benoit-Marie Reichert, O.P., *Monumenta ordinis Predicatorum historica* VIII, *Acta capitulorum generalium* (vol. III) (1900).

Here is a more complete description of the manuscript than that given by de Ricci and Wilson:

fols. 1-6^{v}. Dominican calendar.
fols. 7-187. Psalter with hymns and antiphons. Incipit: Venite exultemus domino . . . Ps. I (fol. 8): Beatus vir . . . Explicit Ps. CL: omnis spiritus laudet dominum.
fol. 187. Canticles: Confitebor tibi; fol. 187^{v}: Ego dixi; fol. 188^{v}: Exaltavit; fol. 189^{v}: Cantemus Domino; fol. 191: Domine audivi; fol. 193: Audite celi; fol. 196^{v}: Benedicite omnia opera; fol. 193: Audite celi; fol. 196^{v}: Benedicite omnia opera; fol. 197^{v}: Te Deum laudamus; fol. 198^{v}: Benedictus dominus Deus; fol. 199: Magnificat; fol. 199^{v}: Nunc dimittis; fol. 199^{v}: Athanasian symbol: Quicumque vult . . . fol. 201^{v}: Deus in adiutorium.
fols. 202-206. Litanies: . . . Omnes sancti martyres: Sancte Silvester, S. Hylari, Martine, S. Augustine, S. Ambrose, S. Gregori, S. Nicolae, S. Dominice, S. Dominice, S. Thoma, S. Francisci, S. Jeronime, S. Benedicte, S. Bernharde, S. Anthoni. Omnes sancti confessores: S. Maria Magdalena, S. Martha, S. Felicitas, S. Perpetua, S. Agatha, S. Lucia, S. Agnes, S. Cecilia, S. Katerina, S. Katerina, S. Margaretha, S. Ursula cum sodalibus tuis, S. Kunegundis.
fols. 206-207. Prayers: Protege Domine; Concede quesumus (in honor of St. Dominic); preces quas (in honor of St. Peter Martyr); Deus qui (in honor of St. Thomas); Ineffabilem misericordiam; Pretende Domine; Ecclesie tue; Deus a quo.
fol. 207-219^{v}. Hymns—with musical notation unless otherwise noted.
fol. 207. In adventu ymnus: Verbum supernum (without music).
fol. 207^{v}. In 1° noctunro: Scientes quia (without music).
fol. 207^{v}. In 11° nocturno: Hora est iam.
fol. 208^{v}. Ymnus: Vox clara ecce. (without music).
fol. 209. Ad prima antiphona: Veni et libera nos Deus . . .
fol. 209^{v}. Ymnus: Summi largitor premii . . . (without music).
fol. 210. Iam Christi sol . . . (without music).
fol. 210^{v}. Ad prima antiphona: Vivo ego dicit . . .
fol. 211^{v}. Dominica in passione domini: In 1° nocturno: Quid molesti estis . . .
fol. 212. Ad prima antiphona: Anime impiorum.
fol. 212^{v}. Ad VI^{a} antiphona: Popule meus quid . . .
fol. 213. Dominica in tempore resurrectionis. Antiphona. Surrexit Christus . . .
fols. 214-217^{v}. Beatus vir . . . (first verse of *Ps.* I), first verse of the Magnificat and Luke I, 68: Benedictus Dominus Deus. These three verses are repeated six times.
fol. 218. Pange linqua . . . (without music).
fol. 218^{v}. Lustra sex . . . (without music).

fol. 219. Aurora lucis . . . (without music).
fol. 219ᵛ. Sermone blanco . . . (without music).
fols. 220-223ᵛ. Various short prayers in a separate gathering in another hand.

Parchment; fols. 223; 1 col.; 160 mm. x 110 mm. The initials of the verses of the psalms are in blue and red alternating. The first letters of the psalms on fols. 8, 32, 37ᵛ, 54ᵛ, 68ᵛ, 70ᵛ, 86ᵛ, 106ᵛ, 125, 127, 144ᵛ, 180 and 187 are large and blue with red scroll background encased in a yellowish framework with festoons and purple dots. Grotesque animals in white are frequently found within the thickness of the strokes of the letters. The initials of the verse accompanied by musical notation are in red and outlined in black. While carefully done the decorated letters are not particularly beautiful. The manuscript is bound in calf on wooden boards stamped with floriation and ancient Roman heads. Two brass clasps are on the front cover but the leather straps have been torn off. Inside the front cover there is the label of George A. Leavitt and Co., Auctioneers, New York, and the label of D. G. Francis, Bookseller, 17 Astor Place, New York. The manuscript was sold at the Rush C. Hawkins sale in New York, March 21, 1887, *item* no. 1568.

Ms N° 2: The calendar in this manuscript is of a different hand than that of the text, though the calendar and the text are of the second half of the Fifteenth Century. The agreement, however, of the feasts of the saints of the calendar with the names of the saints mentioned in the litanies and the prayers that follow them suggest that the calendar was made to go with the psalter. It contains the same feasts and of the same class that we gave above in analyzing manuscript *N° 1*. The litanies mention St. Dominic twice, then St. Thomas and are followed by prayers in honor of St. Dominic, St. Peter Martyr and St. Thomas. Therefore we have here another Dominican Psalter.

This is a later manuscript, however, for the calendar contains besides the feasts already mentioned as existing in *N° 1* the following: Feb. 7: *Dorothee virginis et martyris* (in red letters); March 17: *Gertrudis virginis;* April 5: *Vincentii confessoris et doctoris. Totum duplex* (in red letters); April 12: *Octava sancti Vincentii. Memoria;* Dec. 4: *Barbare virginis et martyris. Simplex.* The feast of St. Vincent Ferrer was adopted by the General Chapter in 1456. At the same time his name was ordered inserted after that of St. Thomas in the litany, where it appears in this manuscript. Therefore the manuscript was written after 1456. Our calendar, however, does not mention the feast of St. Denis the Areopagite adopted by the Dominicans in 1481. We conclude therefore that the manuscript was written between 1456 and 1481.

The script and German phrases: the same *Wo du in diser zal* etc. phrases appear on fols. 1 and 2 and indicate, like the script itself, a Germanic origin. The calendar contains the same German saints found in the other manuscript and not normally considered a part of the Dominican calendar, i. e. *Erhardus, Kunegundis,* Henry II, *Udalricus, Sebaldus* and Conrad which would place the origin of the manuscript once more in Southern Germany. The litany, which contains the name of St. Katherine twice adds however the names of St. Henry, St. Ludwig and St. Sebald to the list of confessors. The mention of St. Sebald and St. Katherine suggests that this manuscript also comes from the Dominican convent of St. Catherine of Nurnberg.

Here is a more detailed description of the manuscript than that given by de Ricci:

fol. I. blank.
fol. Iᵛ. *Disser Psaldterii gehort der Schwester Maria Angness Hueberin* (Sixteenth-Seventeenth Century hand)
fols. 1-6ᵛ. Dominican calendar.

fol. 7. Psalter with hymns and antiphons: Incipit: Venite exultemus . . . Ps. I.(fol. 8): Beatus vir . . .

fol. 184v. Expl. Ps. CL: spiritus laudet dominum.

fols. 184v-197. Canticles. fols. 184v. Confiteor tibi . . . Ego dixi . . . fol. 185v: Exultavit . . . fol. 186v: Cantemus Domino . . . fol. 187v: Domine audivi . . . fol. 189: Audite celi . . . fol. 192: Benedicite omnia . . . fol. 193: Te Deum laudamus . . . fol. 194: Benedictus Deus Domino . . . fol. 194v: Quicumque vult . . . fol. 196v: Deus in adiutorium

fols. 197-201. Litanies . . . S. Nicolae, S. Dominice, S. Dominice, S. Thoma, S. Vincenti, S. Francisce, S. Ieronimie, S. Benedicte, S. Anthoni, S. Bernhardi, S. Henrice, S. Ludwice, S. Sebalde, Omnes sancti confessores: S. Anna, S. M. Magalena, S. Martha, S. Felicitas, S. Perpetua, S. Agatha, S. Lucia, S. Agnes, S. Cecilia, S. Katherina, S. Katherina, S. Barbara, S. Margaretha, S. Ursula cum sodalibus tuis, S. Kunegundis, S. Elizabeth omnes sancte virgines

fols. 201-202. Prayers: Protege, Domine, famulos tuos . . . Concede quesumus . . . Preces quesumus . . . Deus qui (St. Thomas) . . . Deus qui (St. Vincent Ferrer) . . . fol. 201v: Ineffabilem . . . Pretende Domine . . . Ecclesie tue . . . fol. 202: Deus a quo . . .

fols. 202-210v. Hymns—with musical notation unless otherwise noted.

fol. 202. Ymnus: Verbum supernum (without music).

fol. 202v. In adventu Domini. In primo nocturno antiphona: Scientes quia . . . ii° nocturno antiphona: Hora est iam . . .

fol. 203v. Ymnus: Vox clara (without music), and several antiphons.

fol. 204v. Sumi largitor (without music).

fol. 205. Iam Christe sol . . . (without music).

fol. 205v. Ad .ia antiphona: Vivo ego . . .

fol. 206v. Dominica in passione: Quid molesti estis . . . (with antiphons).

fol. 208. Dominica in tempore resurrectionis: Surrexit Christus . . .

fol. 209. Pange lingua (without music).

fol. 209v. Lustra sex . . . (without music).

fol. 210. Aurora lucis . . . (without music).

fol. 210v. Sermone blando . . . (without music).

fols. 211v-212. blank.

Parchment. fols. I, 212; 1 column, 170 mm. x 120 mm. The initials of the verses of the psalms are in red and blue alternating. Initial *B* of first psalm (fol. 8) is large, blue, with goldleaf background around the outside of the letter and forming a square; the inside background of the *B* is mauve with curved leafed stem in light gold. Leafed stems starting from vertical stroke of the *B* go the length of the top margin and two-thirds of the inner side margin. The top looped stem is in green with gold leaf decoration. The stem in the inner margin is half mauve and half yellowish green with gold leaf decoration. The capitals on fol. 35r (*D*), fol. 100r (*E*) and fol. 136v (*D*) are made of gold leaf and blue. Most capitals however are of varied colors with red and black predominating. Grotesque heads and animals adorn these letters. The decoration is not very beautiful nor too carefully done. The manuscript is bound in red colored pigskin on boards, and stamped with floriation and lozenges, in irregular pattern, containing animals or the Blessed Virgin standing on a crescent. The manuscript originally had brass hinged catches and strap clasps. Only one strap remains. The inside of the front cover bears the label of George A. Leavitt and Co., Auctioneers, New York and one of D. G. Francis, Bookseller, 17 Astor Place, New York, The manuscript was at the Rush C. Hawkins sale, *item* no. 1562, New York, March 21, 1887.

These two manuscripts, then, are of St. Catherine's of Nurnburg, a

Dominican convent founded in the middle of the Thirteenth Century. John of Nider, prior of the Dominican monastery of Nurnburg, began in 1428 the reform of the convent where discipline had become lax in the Fourteenth Century. Ten nuns were transferred from Schönensteinbach in Alsace under the prioress Gertrud Gewichtmacherin (1428-1469). A relative, Barbara Gewichtmacherin, was an illuminator of manuscripts at St. Catherine's in the Fifteenth Century. She died there August 12, 1491. Under the new prioress the convent became well-known for its insistance on study and for the production of manuscripts. Konrad Foster, one of the first to press letters into the leather covers of manuscripts, was associated with St. Catherine's. According to Father Gabriel Aztrik,[5] the nuns took some of their manuscripts with them when they fled the convent during the Protestant Revolt of the Sixteenth Century. He has studied a number of manuscripts which came to the library of the University of Debrecen in Hungary from St. Catherine's of Nurnburg sometime after 1589. In the two Dominican psalters, now at the University of Notre Dame Library, we have no doubt two manuscripts written during the period of reform at St. Catherine's.

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[5] Gabriel Aztrik, *Nurnberger Handschriften in Ungarn* (Ostmitteleuropaische Bibliothek, 52, Budapest, 1944). Cf. also Karl Fisher, *Die Buchmalerei in den beiden Dominikanerklostern Nurnbergs* (Nurnberg, 1928).

The *Eulogium ad Alexandrum Papam tertium* of John of Cornwall

N. M. HARING S.A.C.

RIGHTLY regarded as the most informative treatise on the extremely fundamental christological controversy in the Twelfth Century, the *Eulogium*, addressed by John of Cornwall to Pope Alexander III (1159-1181), greatly deserves a critical edition. First edited by Martène and Durand,[1] it was "reprinted" in 1900 in the more widely used Migne collection,[2] but this second publication only added to the numerous omissions, errors, and contradictions of the first.[3] Since the manuscript used by Martène and Durand is lost,[4] it is no longer possible to check the accuracy of the transcriber who was obviously handicapped by a very faulty manuscript and, in addition, seems to have misread certain abbreviations.[5] For this reason the variants of the printed editions are not listed in our notes, the number of which would have been more than doubled without increasing their critical value.

In view of the common and well-founded assumption that John was a native of Cornwall,[6] it is to be expected that, of the five manuscripts known as still extant, four are preserved in English libraries and one in France. Their *sigla* used in this edition are as follows:

A = *Ms* London,[7] British Museum, *Royal* 7 F XIII, fols. 123^{r}-128^{v}.
B = *Ms* Oxford,[8] Balliol College, *Lat.* 65, fols. 44^{r}-52^{v}.
C = *Ms* Cambridge,[9] Corpus Christi College, *Lat.* 62, fols. 197^{r}-207^{v}.
D = *Ms* Durham,[10] Cathedral Library, A 11 21, fols. 2^{r}-8^{r}
P = *Ms* Paris,[11] Arsenal, *Lat.* 265, fols. 95^{r}-125^{r}

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[1] E. Martène and U. Durand, *Thesaurus novus anecdotorum* V (Paris, 1717), cols. 1657-1702.

[2] PL 199, 1043A-1086B.

[3] Robert F. Studeny, *John of Cornwall: An Opponent of Nihilianism* (Diss., Vienna, 1939), p. 5, tops his incorrect reference to the *Thesaurus* with the false assertion that the edition of Migne is "the faithful reproduction of that of Martène".

[4] It was preserved in the Benedictine library of Conches.

[5] To cite some examples: the familiar abbreviation for Ar(istotle) is transcribed as ar(gumentum); utrumque is repeatedly read as uterque; unitum as unicum; the definition: animus cuiusque is est quisque appears in the nonsensical form: usquecumque non est quis; obicitur appears as Ambrosius. Cf. PL 199, 1064B; 1067A; 1078D; 1072B; 1078C. The change from uerum to Christus (1071D) of which Studeny (p. 42) accuses John is due either to the manuscript of Conches or to a faulty transcription. All extant manuscripts read *uerum*.

[6] See E. Rathbone, 'John of Cornwall: A brief Biography', *Rech. de théol. anc. et méd.* 17 (1950), 46-60. C. L. Kingsford's *art.* on John in *Dict. of Nat. Biogr.* X (London, 1908), p. 875.

[7] Described by F. Pelster, 'Eine ungedrukte Einleitung zu einer zweiten Auflage des *Eulogium ad Alexandrum III Johannis Cornubiensis*', *Hist. Jahrb.* 54 (1934), 225. The date (*saec.* 13) given by Pelster seems too late. The scribal errors, especially omissions, in all four English manuscripts are truly amazing.

[8] Described by Pelster (225), its supposed date is the beginning of the Thirteenth Century. John died before or in the year 1200 and, unless we presuppose the existence of a very considerable number of manuscripts, all extant English ones were probably written in his lifetime, for they are all independent of one another and show only a limited and varying amount of the insertions which, as we shall see, John ordered to be made.

[9] According to Rathbone (53), it formerly belonged to the Cathedral priory of Rochester. It contains Alexander's decretal of May 28, 1170 to William, then Archbishop of Sens, added by a slightly different hand. In the second half of the *Eulogium*, the scribe decided to drop most of the names of John's *auctoritates*. Rathbone is not quite accurate in considering it "a copy of the second edition".

[10] Rathbone (53) observes that the manuscript was the gift of Bishop Hugh Puiset (1153-1195) and was therefore definitely written in John's time.

[11] Described by Pelster (224), it belonged to the library of St. Victor and was written in the Twelfth Century. Since it is the best and only complete manuscript, its folio numbers are given in the present edition.

We learn from the author's own *Retractatio*[12] that the *Eulogium* was written *breui nimis et celeri stilo* when the Lateran Council (1179) was "imminent", for it was his intention to impress upon Alexander III that both the second and the third of the three then current views on the Hypostatic Union should be solemnly condemned. Apparently no manuscript of the *Eulogium* is actually preserved in Rome, but one scribe remarks that the work was "confirmed" by Pope Alexander III.[13] In his *Retractatio* John lists a number of later insertions which he found necessary to clarify certain statements or quotations. Given in John's own order, these are his additions: (1) "At the request of some fellow men", he enlarged the fourth chapter with an explanation of two texts he had copied from a *magister Acardus.* (2) In the tenth chapter,[14] he inserted the pronoun *hec* in the sentence: *Quod si hec specifica differentia ei conuenit.* (3) In the eighteenth chapter, John once made the following addition introducing a text from St. Athanasius: (*Quod*) *autem totum aliquod ad tempus esse desierit,* (*uidetur Athanasius . . .*). (4) In the last chapter, he just added the word *hic* in the sentence: *Nec tamen hic dico simpliciter Filius Dei est creatura.* (5) At a more recent date, John inserted an explanation of a controversial text from St. Ambrose in the eighteenth chapter. (6) Finally, he increased the foreword by the transcription of Pope Alexander's (first) decretal to William, then Archbishop of Sens, issued at Veroli on May 28, 1170.

One may therefore speak of several editions or rather revisions of the *Eulogium* the final and complete form of which is preserved in *P* and now published for the first time. None of John's corrections occur in *B* which consequently represents the original, unrevised composition. Only the addition to the Athanasius quotation is found in *A* which appears to be the first correction he ever made. *C* presents a peculiar case. Although headed by the *Retractatio,* it contains none of the insertions listed above and thus constitutes the unrevised work with the exception of the papal decretal added at the end by a later hand with a marginal reference to its proper place in the foreword.[15] Hence the scribe knew of all additions and we may presume that the longer insertions did not reach his scriptorium and that he was not even interested in making the minor additions. The manuscripts of Durham (*D*) and Conches (in the printed editions) belong together inasfar as both contain only the Athanasius addition and the explanation of *magister Acardus.*[16] However, the scribe who wrote *D* added the papal decretal with its full title at the end of the treatise, but omitted all reference to its place in the foreword, while the decretal was (apparently) never added to the manuscript of Conches. All insertions listed by John are found right in the text of *P* where the longer additions, i.e., the explanations of Acardus and Ambrose, and the papal decretal are duly marked with *no . . . ta,* the dotted line running along the margin from the beginning to the end of the insertions.

The extant manuscripts offer sufficient evidence that the additions were made in the following order: John first improved a sentence introducing a citation from Athanasius. This he had done "a while ago" (*dudum*) to avoid ambiguity. Then, on special request, he "elucidated" the rather obscure Acardus passage. At a later date, he added the two pronouns (*hic, hec*), as indicated above. More recently (*nuper*), he ordered the insertion of his explanation of the Ambrosius text and gave instructions to enter Alexander's decretal of May 28, 1170 in the foreword of his *Eulogium*.[17] The Athanasius insertion never reached *B* and *C*, the Acardus elucidation never reached *A*, *B*, and *C*, the two pronouns (*hic, hec*) were never entered in *A*, *B*, *C*, *D* and the manuscript of Conches. In this last group, the Ambrose addition is also missing. The decretal is not added in *A*, *B*, and the manuscript of Conches. Finally, the *Retractatio* is missing in all manuscripts with the exception of *C* and *P*. In the seventh chapter (fol. 4^{va}), *C* contains three patristic quotations which are probably spurious. As the variants prove, none of the extant manuscripts is the autograph and none of them is directly copied from any of the extant exemplars, a fact which points to a fairly large number of interested readers.[18]

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[12] Transcribed (not without errors) and analyzed by F. Pelster (226), the *Retractatio* proves conclusively that the *Eulogium* was not begun before the fall of 1177. Saying that the Roman Council of 1179 *tunc temporis inminebat,* John clearly implies that the *Retractatio* was written at a time when this Council was no longer imminent, in other words, during or after the Council. Even at that time, John was still ignorant of Alexander's decretal issued on June 2, 1170, at Veroli, and of the more famous decretal of Feb. 18, 1177, issued at Vieste. Cf. Jaffé-Wattenbach, *Reg. Pont. Rom.* II (Leipzig, 1888), nn. 11809 and 12785. The manuscripts only contain the decretal of May 28, 1170, issued at Veroli (Jaffé-Wattenbach, n. 11806) and I can find no basis for Pelster's claim (229) that "in the second edition John knows the *littera decretalis* addressed to William in 1177".

[13] *B* fol. 48^{v}.

[14] F. Pelster (226) was right in his suspicion that the chapter division in Martène and Migne does not correspond to that of the original work.

[15] Compare *C* fols. 207^{va} and 197^{r}b.

[16] Either the scribe or the transcriber of the Conches manuscript inserted the explanation in the wrong place.

From our new edition of the *Elogium* John emerges as a conscientious, accurate, and generally well-informed scholar whose speculative abilities, however, hardly surpass the sterile formalism of grammatical logic. He avoids the crucial problem, namely the concept or definition of *persona*, and believes that Boethius sanctioned his indiscriminate use of *natura* and *substantia* which frequently results in a fog of "double-talk". The general plan of his work is plain. After an introduction stating the historical circumstances and the object of his treatise, he offers Lombard's brief, but classical, exposition of the three opinions on the Hypostatic Union and marks their specific differences. He then cites at length the patristic texts (Augustine, Hilary) commonly quoted in their own favour by the advocates of the second and third opinions against whom John's attack is directed. The next chapter presents the *magistri* claimed as favourable by the same group. John first mentions Gilbert de la Porrée but confesses that he has not read anything written by him on this matter. Some texts from Abelard follow which John does not consider conclusive. Peter Lombard, we are then told, only expressed an opinion, no definite view. The fourth chapter introduces the *magistri* in favour of the first opinion: St. Anselm of Canterbury, St. Bernard, Hugh of St. Victor, Acardus, Robert of Melun, and Maurice, bishop of Paris. The rest of the work is devoted to explanation and refutation. Scriptural and patristic *auctoritates* are followed by *rationes*, with an occasional text from Aristotle and Boethius or discussions of controversial passages in the writings of Sts. Hilary, Ambrose, Jerome, Augustine, and John Damascene. The *Eulogium* ends with an appeal to the Roman Pontiff to restore the unity of thought "by a general, everlasting decree."

Perhaps out of a sense of gratitude John tried to exonerate Lombard whose

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[17] John does not specify which of the three decretals (issued before the *retractatio*) he ordered to be inserted, but the manuscripts (*CDP*) contain only the decretal of May 28, 1170.

[18] E. Rathbone's suggestion (54) that John argued his case at the Roman Council in the spring of 1179 rests on extremely weak premises. It may be admitted that, if the writer of the *retractatio* knew that the matter was brought up and left undecided at the Council, he had good reasons not to be too explicit. But if he had been present, he would have been just as candid about it as he was concerning the debate at Tours in 1163, likewise inconclusive. The *argumentum et questio composita a magistro Johanne Cornubiensi recitata Rome* which Rathbone found in London, Lambeth Palace *Ms* 80, fols. 243^{v}-244^{v}, carries, to my mind, as much weight as the heading (by a later hand) of the *Eulogium* in the Durham manuscript calling it a *Tractatus in Concilio Turonensi compositus*. To the two manuscripts listed by Rathbone as containing the *argumentum*, I may add Troyes, *Ms* 276, fols. 150^{ra}-154^{vb} where it constitutes chapter 32 in the second half of the so-called *Summa* of Peter Cantor, only a small part of which stems from Cantor's own hand. Whoever the author of that rather motley collection of generally moral theological questions may be, style and contents prove that it was not John of Cornwall to whose *Eulogium* the *argumentum* bears no resemblance, a fact which did not escape Rathbone's attention.

Sentences and scriptural commentaries he rifled without acknowledgment in his fast search for *auctoritates.*[19] Admittedly writing in a hurry, he may have used some special compilation of appropriate texts.[20] Otherwise he must have been quite familiar with Augustine's *De Trinitate* and *Tractates* on St. John, with Boethius' *Opuscula sacra* and translation of the *Topics,* with St. Anselm, St. Bernard, Hugh of St. Victor, Abelard, Gratian, Acardus and others. The fact that the works of Gilbert de la Porrée, Robert of Melun and Maurice of Sully were not at his disposal suggests that he composed his work in England.

John wrote his *Eulogium* as a "convert" whose slow change of mind began in Paris where he listened to the attacks on Lombard in the lectures and disputations of both Robert of Melun and Maurice of Sully. Having turned to the first theory, he decided to refute what he himself had previously held and taught, a position similar to that of the great Pontiff, Alexander III. Unfortunately, he does not rise above the level of grammatical logic, gathering such expressions as *aliquis, aliquid, hic, ille,* etc., applied to Christ in scriptural and patristic sources, in a mistaken belief that this would convince others whose opposition was based on metaphysical rather than grammatical considerations. However, like Alexander III, he clearly perceived the dangerous trend or potentialities of the second and third theories which gradually came to an end under the weight of the decrees censuring the proposition: *Quod Christus secundum quod homo non est aliquid.* It was left to the theologians to find a way out of their impasse, but the *infiniti scolares hoc calice debriati* never returned to the theory which John of Cornwall so ardently defended.[21]

RETRACTATIO

CUM in prima *Eulogii* editione propter Romanum quod tunc temporis inminebat Concilium[1] breui nimis et celeri stilo functus necessaria quedam omisissem, postmodum eadem explanande dumtaxat uel confirmande ueritatis gratia prioribus adieci, sed nec unum iotha nec unum apicem subtraxi. In IIII^{to} siquidem capitulo, quod sic incipit: *Magister Anselmus Cantuarensis,* disputationem magistri Acardi quorundam sociorum desiderio elucidaui. In X capitulo quod sic incipit: *Substantiale est Christo hominem esse,* prope finem pro eo quod scriptum erat, *Quod si specifica differentia ei conuenit,* postea melius scriptum est, *Quod si hec specifica differentia ei conuenit.* In XVIII capitulo quod sic incipit: *Non est creatura per quem facta est omnis creatura,* post hec uerba, *Per multa etiam temporum curricula a gloria resurrectionis differuntur,* ubi scripseram, *Quod uidetur Athanasius de Christo sensisse,* ne qua esset relationis ambiguitas, dudum planius scripsi, *Quod autem totum aliquod ad tempus esse desierit, uidetur Athanasius de Christo sensisse.* In ultimo capitulo, ubi prius (95^{rb}) legebatur *Nec tamen dico simpliciter Filius Dei est creatura,* rectius hodie legitur *Nec tamen hic dico simpliciter Filius Dei est creatura.*

Preterea hec duo nuper exemplaribus meis inserenda putaui: in prohemio epistolam decretalem, que sola errorem de quo agebatur interimere sufficeret, et

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[19] For this reason, the references in our edition are made to John's proximate sources, because the remote or primary sources can easily be identified in the Quaracchi edition of the *Sentences.* To Lombard's scriptural commentaries, on the other hand, the primary source has been added whenever it was possible to identify it.

[20] We learn from the *Annales reicherspergenses* (MGH, SS XVII, 471) that the *homoassumptus* doctrine of Gerhoh of Reichersberg, allegedly approved by Alexander III, was supported by an array of more than 150 *auctoritates* collected for this purpose.

[21] Since *C* and *P* place the *Retractatio* before the title of the work, this order has been kept in the following edition. It may be noted again that it is not found in the other manuscripts.

[1] Promised to Frederic Barbarossa and proclaimed in the late summer of 1177, the Council was held in the spring of 1179. Cf. Hefele-Leclercq, *Hist. des conciles* V, 2 (Paris, 1913), pp. 1086-1112.

in XVIII capitulo disputationem Ambrosii, que uidetur probare quod Christus non est creatura, plenius discutiendam proposui, ut ex uerbis suis quid ipse in talibus senserit facillime queat intelligi. Hanc igitur epistolam pro foribus *Eulogii* nuper appinxi, ut ea inprimis breuiter inspecta sciat amicus et fidus lector, quid prime editioni defuerit, et nouis superuenientibus uetera nequaquam proiciat, sed prioribus illis et principalibus inmotis consequentia hec et accessoria libenter accipat. (95va)

EULOGIUM JOHANNIS CORNUBIENSIS AD ALEXANDRUM PAPAM TERTIUM

In Concilio Turonensi,[2] quod dudum conuocatis plerisque omnibus tam Anglicane quam Gallicane prelatis ecclesie autoritate uestra celebratum et presentia illustratum est, dogma quorundam asserentium quod *Christus non est aliquis homo* et quod *Christus secundum quod homo non est aliquid* disputando uentilari cepit. Utra uero pars disputantium in pugna uerborum preualuerit, nescio. Sed tam iniquam et fidei christiane inimicam falsitatem in tali ac tanto Christi auditorio nullis credo fuisse[3] ueritatis aut uictorie titulis insignitam. Noluit tamen tam[4] diues et copiosa mansuetudinis uestre clementia assertionem illam (95^{vb}) statim canonica ferire censura, ne eius auctores et defensores, qui forte non pertinacia sed ignorantia deliquerant, uel ipsa condempnatio tante prauitatis inuolueret uel perpetuam eis[5] infamie notam inpingeret. Ex eadem etiam[6] mansuetudine uestra multo postmodum tempore sustentationis elapso in quadam epistola decretali, que super abrogatione praue illius doctrine ad uenerabilem Willelmum,[7] tunc Senonensem,[8] hodie Remensem[9] archiepiscopum legitur directa, nequaquam exprimitur anathemate perculsos[10] uel etiam percellendos esse, qui errorem illum tenere seu docere presumerent. Post salutationem etenim uestro nomine radiantem ita scriptum est:[11]

> Cum in nostra esses olim presentia constitutus, tibi uiua uoce iniunximus, ut suffraganeis tuis Parisius (96ra) tibi accitis ad expugnationem praue doctrine Petri, quondam Parisiensis[12] episcopi, qua dicitur quod *Christus secundum quod homo non est aliquid,* omnino intenderes et efficaciter operam adhiberes. Inde siquidem[13] est quod fraternitati tue per apostolica scripta mandamus quatinus, quod tibi cum coram nobis presens esses precepimus, suffraganeos tuos Parisius conuoces et una cum illis et aliis religiosis ac prudentibus uiris prescriptam doctrinam studeas penitus abrogare et a magistris et scolaribus ibidem in theologia studentibus Christum sicut perfectum Deum sic et perfectum ac uerum hominem ex anima et corpore secundum quod homo consistentem precipias edoceri, uniuersis firmiter et districte iniungens quod doctrinam illam de cetero tenere seu docere nequaquam (96^{rb}) presumant, sed ipsam penitus detestentur.

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[2] It opened on May 19, 1163. Hefele-Leclercq, *op. cit.*, p. 969. No mention is made by John of Alexander's convocation of scholars at Sens on December 24, 1164 warning them not to overdo their speculations in theology. *Annal. reichersp.;* MGH, SS XVII, 471.

[3] *om. D.*

[4] *om. ACD.*

[5] eius *A.*

[6] enim *C.*

[7] Cf. J. R. Williams, 'William of the White Hands', *Anniversary Essays in Mediaeval History* (Boston, 1929), 365 ff.

[8] From 1168 to 1176, according to P. B. Gams, *Series episcoporum* (Leipzig, 1931), p. 608.

[9] Installed on August 8, 1176, he died on September 7, 1202. Gams, *op. cit.*, p. 629.

[10] percussos *AB.*

[11] Dated May 28, 1170. In both *C* and *D* the decretal is found at the end of the *Eulogium.* With a marginal reference to its place in the foreword, *C* introduces it with the words: Post salutationem. . . . In *D* no such reference is made and instead of John's introduction the full title is given: Alexander Episcopus, seruus seruorum Dei, uenerabili fratri Willelmo Senonensi Archiepiscopo, Apostolice Sedis legato, salutem et Apostolicam Benedictionem: *Cum in nostra,* etc.

[12] Parisiacensis *D.*

[13] *om. D.*

Quoniam itaque infiniti scolares hoc calice debriati[14] et in furorem uersi usque in hodiernum[15] patientia uestra contumaciter abutuntur, qui nequaquam misericordie uestre piam dispensationem laudant sed impium dogma uelud catholicum predicant, fiat tandem illud Prosperi quod in *Decretis*[16] legitur:

> In eis, inquid, qui diu portati et salubriter obiurgati corrigi noluerint, tamquam putride corporis partes debent ferro excommunicationis abscidi, ne sicut caro morbis emortua si abscissa non fuerit salutem relique carnis putredinis sue contagione corrumpit ita isti, qui emendari contempnunt et in suo morbo persistunt, alios exemplo sue perditionis inficiant.

Unde et Callistus[17] Papa:

> Iustum est ut, qui diuina (96va) contempnunt mandata et inobedientes paternis existunt iussionibus, seuerioribus corrigantur uindictis, quatinus ceteri committere talia caueant et omnes gaudeant[18] fraterna concordia et cuncti sumant seueritatis ac bonitatis exemplum.

Item Pelagius[19] Papa:

> Apostolice auctoritatis exemplo didicimus errantium et in errorem mittentium spiritus tradendos esse sathane, ut blasphemare dediscant.

Item Ieronimus:[20]

> Secande sunt putride carnes et scabiosa a caulis ouis repellenda, ne tota domus, massa, corpus et pecora ardeat, corrumpatur, putrescat, intereat.[21]

Hic est nimirum ecclesiastice rigor pietatis quo percutit ut sanet, destruit ut edificet, euellit ut plantet.[22] Ne deserat, queso, Pastor agnos, Pater (96^{vb}) filios, et si contradicentium error corrigi non potest uel sane fidei professionem in me et similibus indefessam[23] perire non sinat. Quod si et ego, cum sim cinis et puluis, recte sentio, auctoritas uestra roboret infirmitatem meam, sic ubi erro ad se reuocet simplicitatem meam.

Credo etenim[24] Christum esse aliquem hominem et ipsum[25] esse aliquid secundum humanitatem et, qui secundum deitatem incorporea substantia est, secundum humanitatem corpoream esse substantiam[26] et secundum alteram naturam rem simplicem, secundum alteram uero rem esse compositam.[27] Credo etiam quod idem ipse qui secundum deitatem increatus et infectus est, secundum humanitatem et creatus et factus est et, qui secundum alteram naturam Creator est, secundum alteram naturam creatura est (97ra).

Hec autem euidentissimis sanctorum testimoniis esse munita sequentia declarabunt. Sed ante hec omnia, quatinus singula repertu faciliora sint, prenotanda sunt ex more capitula. Mox etiam, ut que dicturi sumus lucidiora fiant firmiusque consistant, tres illas sententias quas magister Petrus Lumbardus scriptas reliquit breuiter proponendas arbitramur. Sic enim fiet ut, quia omnia contraria iuxta se posita magis apparent, ex collatione secunde et tertie ueritas prime fortius uigeat et amplius enitescat.

CAPITULA TOTIUS LIBELLI BREUITER PRENOTATA[28]

(I) Tres sententie de homine assumpto cum explanationibus suis.
(II) Auctoritates sanctorum quibus secunda et tertia[29] roborari uidentur.
(III) Auctoritates magistrorum pro illis duabus sententiis (97^{rb}).
(IV) Auctoritates magistrorum contra illas duas sententias.

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[14] delirati *D*.

[15] *add.* diem *AC*.

[16] Gratian, *Decretum* C. 24, qu. 3, c. 18.

[17] *Ibid.*, C. 23, qu. 3, c. 9.

[18] Gratian reads Deus (or omnis) gaudeat.

[19] *Ibid.* C. 24, qu. 3, c. 13.

[20] *Ibid.* C. 24, qu. 3, c. 16.

[21] Though all *Manuscripts* read intereant, the singular is found in Gratian and in Jerome himself: *In Gal.* v, 8; PL 26, 430C.

[22] Cf. *Jerem.* i, 10.

[23] indefensam *A*] indefunsam *C*.

[24] et ita *B*.

[25] illum *A*.

[26] *om.* esse substantiam *A*.

[27] *om.* et secundum . . . compositam *D*.

[28] *om.* *BCD*] *om.* breuiter prenotata *A*.

[29] prima et secunda *A*] sententia prima et secunda *C*.

(V) Auctoritates sanctorum quibus probatur quod Christus[30] est aliquis homo.
(VI) Rationes quibus idem probatur.
(VII) Auctoritates quibus probatur quod Christus secundum quod homo est aliquid.[31]
(VIII) Rationes quibus idem probatur.[32]
(IX) Rationes quibus probatur quod Christus essentialiter et substantialiter est homo.
(X) Que contra obici possunt dissoluuntur et Johannis Damasceni inuolucrum enodatur.
(XI) Auctoritates quibus probatur quod Christus est aliud et aliud.
(XII) Auctoritates que uidentur esse contrarie.
(XIII) Auctoritates quibus probatur quod Christus est animal[33] et corpus.
(XIV) Auctoritates quibus probatur quod Christus est aliquod totum siue compositum.
(XV) Rationes quibus idem probatur.
(XVI) Auctoritates quibus probatur quod Christus aliter[34] dicitur totum.
(XVII) Auctoritates quibus probatur quod Christus est factus et creatus et creatura.
(XVIII) Auctoritates que uidentur esse contrarie et solutiones non (97$^{\mathrm{va}}$) inutiles, ubi inter alia queritur de illo toto, utrum fuerit uel non fuerit in triduo sepulture.
(XIX) Auctoritates quibus probatur quod Christus non semper fuit.[35]
(XX) Auctoritates que uidentur contrarie et competentes contrarietatum solutiones et repetitio precedentium ad multa utilis.
(XXI) Conclusio ex premissis inferens que in exordio proposita sunt.

I

TRES SENTENTIE DE HOMINE ASSUMPTO CUM EXPLANATIONIBUS HORUM UERBORUM: DEUS EST HOMO ET HOMO EST DEUS, DEUS FACTUS EST HOMO ET HOMO FACTUS EST DEUS

PRIMA SENTENTIA

Prima[1] est illorum scilicet qui

dicunt in ipsa Uerbi incarnatione hominem quendam ex anima rationali et humana carne constitutum, ex quibus duobus omnis uerus homo constituitur. Et ille homo cepit esse Deus, non quidem natura (97$^{\mathrm{vb}}$) Dei sed persona Uerbi, et Deus cepit esse homo ille. Concedunt etiam hominem illum assumptum esse[2] a Uerbo et tamen esse Uerbum. Et ea ratione tradunt dictum esse Deum factum esse hominem uel esse hominem, quia Deus factus est i.e. cepit esse quedam substantia ex anima rationali et humana carne subsistens. Et illa substantia facta est i.e. cepit esse Deus. Non tamen demigratione nature in naturam sed utriusque nature seruata proprietate factum est, ut Deus esset illa substantia et illa substantia esset Deus. Unde uere dicitur: Deus factus est homo et homo factus est Deus, et Deus est homo et homo Deus, et Filius Dei Filius hominis, et econuerso.

SECUNDA SENTENTIA

Secunda[3] uero illorum est qui

dicunt hominem illum non ex anima rationali et carne tantum, sed ex humana et diuina natura uel ex tribus substantiis: diuinitate, carne et anima, constare. Hunc Christum fatentur et unam tantummodo personam, ante incarnationem uero solummodo simplicem sed per incarnationem (98ra) factam compositam ex diuinitate et humanitate. Nec est ideo alia persona quam prius. Sed, cum prius esset Dei tantum persona, in incarnatione facta est etiam hominis persona, non ut due essent persone sed ut una esset persona Dei et hominis. Persona ergo, que prius erat simplex et in una tantum natura existens, in duabus et ex duabus subsistit naturis. Et persona, que tantum Deus erat, facta est et uerus homo subsistens non tantum ex anima et carne sed etiam ex diuinitate. Nec tamen persona illa debet dici "facta persona", quamuis dicatur "facta persona hominis" (sicut: Uerbum factum est, i.e. cepit esse Uerbum humanatum. Non tamen: factum est uel cepit esse Uerbum). Facta est igitur illa persona—ut quibusdam illorum placet—aliquis subsistens ex anima et carne, sed non est facta persona uel substantia uel natura.

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[30] secundum homo est aliquid *A*.
[31] *om.* Auctoritates . . . aliquid *AD*.
[32] *om.* Rationes . . . probatur *AD*.
[33] anima *CD*.
[34] *add.* et aliter *D*.
[35] *om.* Auctoritates . . . fuit *D*.

[1] *Sent.* III, 6, 2 (574). The number in brackets indicates the page in the Quaracchi edition of 1916 whose pagination, as the reader knows, continues in the second volume.
[2] fuisse *C*.
[3] *Sent.* III, 6, 3 (576).

Secundum istos[4] cum dicitur "Deus factus est homo" intelligitur cepisse esse subsistens ex duabus naturis uel tribus substantiis. Et econuerso "homo factus est Deus", quia subsistens in duabus naturis cepit esse Deus. Uel potius "homo factus est Deus" et econuerso (98^{rb}) dicitur, quia Deus assumpsit hominem et homo assumptus est a Deo. Unde Augustinus[5] in libro *De Trinitate*: *Talis fuit illa susceptio que hominem faceret Deum et Deum hominem.*

TERTIA SENTENTIA

Tertia[6] uero illorum est sententia

qui in incarnatione Uerbi non solum personam ex naturis compositam negant, uerum etiam hominem aliquem siue etiam aliquam substantiam ibi ex anima et carne compositam uel factam diffitentur. Sed sic illa duo, scilicet animam et carnem, Uerbi persone uel nature unita esse aiunt, ut non ex illis duobus uel hiis tribus aliqua substantia uel persona fieret siue componeretur sed illis duobus uelut indumento Uerbum Dei uestiretur, ut mortalium oculis congruenter appareret. Qui ideo dicitur factus uerus homo, quia ueritatem carnis et anime accepit. Que duo etiam in singularitatem uel unitatem sue persone accepisse legitur, non quia illa duo uel aliqua res ex illis composita sit una persona cum Uerbo uel sit Uerbum, sed quia illis duobus accedentibus Uerbo non est (98va) personarum numerus auctus, ut fieret quaternitas in Trinitate, et quia ipsa persona Uerbi, que erat prius sine indumento, assumptione indumenti non est diuisa uel mutata sed una et eadem immutata permansit. Qui secundum habitum Deum hominem factum dicunt. Accipiendo enim hominem dictus est Deus factus homo. Et propter acceptum hominem dicitur Deus uere esse homo et propter assumentem Deum dicitur homo esse Deus. Nam si essentialiter, inquiunt illi, Deus esse homo uel homo esse Deus intelligeretur, tunc si Deus hominem assumpsisset in sexu muliebri, et mulier essentialiter Deus esset et econuerso. At potuit Deus assumpsisse hominem in sexu muliebri. Potuit igitur Deus esse mulier et econuerso.

In hac igitur sententia[7] sic dicitur Deus factus homo, quia hominem accepit. Et sic dicitur esse homo, quia hominem habet uel quia est hominem habens. Et homo factus Deus, quia assumptus est a Deo. Et homo esse[8] Deus, quia habens hominem est Deus.[9] Cum ergo dicitur "Deus est homo", uel habitus predicatur uel persona, sed humanata. Et quod persona (98^{vb}) predicetur, Cassiodorus[10] ostendere uidetur dicens: *Factus est, ut ita dixerim, humanatus Deus qui etiam in assumptione carnis Deus esse non destitit.*

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[4] *Sent.* III, 7, 1 (583).

[5] *De Trinitate* I, 13, 28; PL 42, 840.

[6] *Sent.* III, 6, 4 (578).

[7] *Sent.* III, 7, 2 (587).

[8] est *AC*.

[9] *om.* quia assumptus . . . Deus *D*.

[10] Cf. Lombard, *In Rom.* i, 1; PL 191, 1306B.

Illa autem istorum ratiocinatio: *Nam si essentialiter Deus esse homo uel homo esse Deus intelligeretur,* etc., quid habeat falsitatis, quid etiam impietatis, sequentia propalabunt. Falsitatem dixi, quia ex ueris falsum concludit. Impietatem addidi, quia pie fidei obstrepit, dum Christum, cui solam hominis uestem donat, uera hominis essentia spoliare laborat.

Notandum etiam quod hec tertia sententia commune habet cum secunda quod Christus non est aliqua substantia constans ex carne et anima et quod Christus secundum quod homo non est aliquid. Hoc habet diuersum quod persona Christi non est ex duabus naturis siue tribus substantiis composita. Unde primo inducende sunt auctoritates utrique sententie communes, ut solutionibus siue rationibus eisdem competenter subsecutis eadem falsitas utriusque reueletur. De illo[11] uero in quo dissentiunt, (99ra) cum ad illam questionem uentum fuerit, utrum Christus sit aliquod totum siue compositum, suo loco disputabitur.

II

AUCTORITATES SANCTORUM QUIBUS SECUNDA ET TERTIA IN EO QUOD COMMUNE HABENT ROBORARI UIDENTUR[1]

Augustinus tractans illud uerbum Apostoli *Habitu inuentus ut homo*[2] in libro *LXXXIII Questionum*:

> Habitus in ea re dicitur que nobis ut habeatur accedit. Uerumtamen hoc interest, quia[3] quedam eorum que accedunt, ut habitum faciant, non mutantur. Sed ipsa mutant in se integra et inconcussa manentia sicut sapientia accedens homini non ipsa mutatur, sed hominem mutat quem[4] de stulto sapientem facit. Quedam uero sic accedunt, ut mutent et mutentur, ut cibus qui amittens speciem suam in corpus uertitur et nos cibo refecti ab exilitate atque langore in robur atque ualentiam mutamur. Tertium genus est, cum ea que accedunt nec mutant ea quibus accedunt nec ab eis ipsa mutantur sicut annulus (99^{rb}) positus in digito. Quod genus rarissime reperitur. Quartum genus est, cum ea que accedunt non mutantur sed aliam speciem et formam accipiunt ut est uestis que deiecta atque deposita non habet eam formam quam sumit induta. Induta enim membris accipit formam quam non habebat exuta.[5] Quod genus congruit huic comparationi.
>
> Deus enim *Filius semetipsum exinaniuit,* non formam suam mutans sed *formam serui accipiens,*[6] neque conuersus aut transmutatus in hominem amissa stabilitate sed in *similitudine*[7] *hominum* est ipse susceptor uerum hominem accipiendo *et habitu inuentus est ut homo,* i.e., habendo hominem inuentus est ut homo,[8] non sibi sed eis quibus in homine apparuit. Quod autem dicit *ut homo,* ueritatem exprimit.
>
> Nomine ergo habitus satis significauit Apostolus qualiter dixerit *in similitudine*[9] *hominum factus,* quia non transfiguratione in hominem sed habitu (99va) factus est, cum indutus est hominem, quem sibi uniens quodammodo atque conformans immortalitati eternitatique sociaret. Non ergo oportet intelligi mutatum esse Uerbum susceptione hominis sicut nec membra ueste induta mutantur, quamuis illa susceptio ineffabiliter susceptum suscipienti copularet.

Hiis uerbis aperte innuere uidetur Augustinus Deum dici factum hominem secundum habitum. Qui etiam ipsius incarnationis modum uolens exprimere querentibus in quarto libro *De Trinitate*[10] ait:

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[11] secundo illo *C.*

[1] *om.* Auctoritates . . . uidentur *C.*

[2] *Phil.* ii, 7. *Sent.* III, 6, 5, (580).

[3] quod *CD.*

[4] quoniam *BDP.*

[5] exutam *D.*

[6] *Phil.* ii, 7.

[7] similitudinem *BCD.*

[8] *om.* i. e. habendo...homo *C.*

[9] similitudinem *ABP.*

[10] *Sent.* III, 6, 6 (581).

> Si queritur, ipsa incarnatio quomodo facta sit, ipsum Uerbum Dei dico carnem factum, i.e., hominem factum, non tamen in hoc quod factum est conuersum atque mutatum sed carne, ut carnalibus congruenter appareret,[11] indutum. Ita sane factum, ut ibi non sit tantum Uerbum Dei et hominis caro sed etiam rationalis hominis anima atque hoc totum et Deus dicatur propter Deum et homo propter hominem. Quod (99$^{\text{vb}}$) si difficile intelligitur, mens fide purgetur, a peccatis abstinendo et bona operando. Difficilia enim sunt hec.

Idem in libro *De Fide ad Petrum:*[12]

> Dei Filius, cum sit Deus eternus et uerus, pro nobis factus est homo uerus et plenus. In eo uerus, quia ueram habet Deus ille humanam naturam. In eo uero plenus, quia et carnem humanam suscepit et animam rationalem.

Item:[13]

> Non fuit aliud[14] illa Dei summi exinanitio nisi forme seruilis, i.e. nature humane, susceptio. Utraque igitur in Christo est forma, quia utraque uera et plena est in Christo substantia, diuina scilicet et humana.

Idem in libro *Contra Maximinum:*[15]

> Cum esset per seipsum inuisibilis, uisibilis[16] in homine apparuit quem de femina suscepit, de qua natus est.

Item in eodem:[17]

> Nos Christum Dominum uerum hominem suscepisse credimus et in ipso uisibiliter[18] inuisibilem hominibus apparuisse, in ipso inter homines conuersatum fuisse, in ipso ab hominibus (100$^{\text{ra}}$) humana pertulisse, in ipso homines docuisse.

Hylarius quoque in libro decimo *De Trinitate* ait:[19]

> Quomodo Dei Filius natus ex Maria est, nisi quod Uerbum caro factum est, scilicet quod Filius Dei, cum in forma Dei esset, formam serui accepit? Unum tamen eundemque, non Dei defectione sed hominis assumptione, profitemur et in forma Dei per naturam diuinam et in forma serui ex conceptione Spiritus sancti secundum hominis habitum repertum fuisse. Non fuit habitus ille tamen[20] hominis sed ut hominis, neque caro illa caro peccati sed in similitudine[21] carnis peccati.

Hoc autem quod dicitur *non hominis,* ita accipiendum est "non peccatoris" sicut ibi: *Ego sum uermis et non homo.*[22] *Uermis,* quia sine uirili semine natus de Uirgine.[23] *Et non homo,* i.e. non peccator. Unde etiam hic explanando subditur, *neque caro,* etc. Addant,[24] si placet, *In Ydumeam extendam calceamentum meum.*[25] Item, *Uenit ad nos calciata diuinitas.*[26] Item, *Induebar* (100$^{\text{rb}}$) *cilicio.*[27]

Hee et omnes huiusmodi auctoritates, ut asserunt, hoc docent quod Christus non sit aliquid[28] secundum quod homo et quod assumens non sit aliquid[29] quod assumptum est. Miror autem quod inter alia sanctorum testimonia, que pro illis premissa sunt, uel unum illud Augustini documentum totam hanc falsitatem suam[30] penitus subuertere non intelligunt:

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[11] Augustine, *Ep. ad Rom. inchoata expositio*, n. 4; PL 35, 2090.

[12] *Sent.* III, 6, 6 (581).

[13] *Sent.* III, 6, 6 (582). Fulgentius, *De Fide ad Petrum* 2, 10; PL 40,756.

[14] aliquod *A.*

[15] Maximum *C*] *Sent.* III, 6, 6 (582).

[16] *om. C.*

[17] *Sent.* III, 6, 6 (582).

[18] inuisibiliter *P.*

[19] *Sent.* III, 6, 6 (582).

[20] non tamen *C*] tantum *B.*

[21] similitudinem C.

[22] *Ps.* xxi, 7.

[23] See Lombard, *In Ps.* xxi, 6; PL 191, 229A. Cf. Augustine, *Ep. CXL* 8, 21; CSEL 44, 171.

[24] *add.* aduersarii etiam *C.*

[25] *Ps.* cvii, 10.

[26] Gregory, *In Evang. Hom.* VII, 3; PL 76, 1101C.

[27] *Ps.* xxxiv, 13.

[28] aliquis *C.*

[29] aliud *C.*

[30] *om. P.*

> Non ergo oportet[31] intelligi[32] mutatum esse Uerbum susceptione hominis sicut nec membra induta ueste mutantur, quamuis illa susceptio ineffabiliter susceptum suscipienti copularet.

Si quod de similitudine uestis dicitur aduertunt, cur[33] ab eo quod de personali unione subditur faciem mentis auertunt? Que est enim[34] ista ineffabilis copulatio, nisi Dei assumentis et hominis assumpti personalis unio? Que unio nichil est, si homo non est una persona cum Deo. Quod si homo factus est una persona cum Deo, aliquid factum (100va) est una persona cum Deo.[35] Illud etiam Augustini: *Difficilia sunt hec,* parum attendunt. Que est enim hec difficultas intelligentie, si nichil est aliud Deum esse hominem quam habere humane forme ac similitudinis uestem? Et si hoc est Deum factum esse hominem, i.e. accepisse tantummodo huiusmodi indumentum, quid hic mirum, quid ineffabile dicendum? Nonne quelibet persona siue hominis siue angeli, que suscepit indumentum, manet eadem persona que prius erat? Hoc potius nouum et mirum esset, si acceptio uel mutatio uestis personam mutaret. Quod[36] si diligentius que scripta sunt de habitu hominis et de huiusmodi aliis inspicere uelint, facile intelligunt[37] nec per uerba sanctorum nec per explanationes uerborum doceri quod Christus secundum quod homo non sit aliquid, sed hoc potius quod diuinitas in carne uelud sub ueste latuit et quod absque (100^{vb}) sui mutatione carnem accepit. Est itaque Deus homo non modo uestimentaliter sed essentialiter, quod in sequentibus suo loco demonstrabitur. Illud enim quo[38] uelut firmissimo argumento probatum putant, quod Deus non sit essentialiter homo—"Potuit Deus assumpsisse hominem in sexu muliebri; potuit igitur mulier esse Deus et econuerso"[39]—manifeste falsum est. Non enim, si Deus potest aliquid facere, illud potest esse. Deus enim multa potest facere que fieri non possunt, quia impossibilia sunt. Respondeant et ipsi, an potuerit Deus humanam naturam in sexu muliebri assumpsisse, quod negare non possunt. Ergo et eis concluditur[40] quod potuit Deus esse mulier. Hoc enim secundum subtile[41] illud iudicium suum negare non debent: Deus potuit esse mulier. Sed istud: Deus potuit esse *aliqua* mulier[42] sicut potuit esse homo, sed non potuit esse *aliquis* homo, magnorum etiam magistrorum nos mole (101ra) premunt quos laudare solent auctores.

III

AUCTORITATES MAGISTRORUM PRO ILLIS DUABUS SENTENTIIS[1]

Magister Gilebertus Porretanus, ut multi perhibent, ea docuit que in secunda sententia premissa sunt, scilicet quod Christus et sit et factus sit persona composita ex duabus naturis siue tribus substantiis. Et tamen non est factus aliqua persona nec est factus aliqua substantia nec aliquid omnino nec est aliqua substantia nec aliquid secundum quod homo. Sed quia de iis aliquod eius scriptum non legi et auditores sui etiam a se inuicem dissentiunt, ad alios transeo quorum scriptis falsitas eadem quam et ipse docuisse creditur, quod scilicet Christus secundum quod homo non sit aliquid, firmata et munita uidetur.

Magister Petrus Abailardus in *Theologia*[2] sua sic disserit:

> Quid est dicere Deum fieri hominem, nisi diuinam substantiam que spiritualis

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[31] *om. A.*

[32] intelligere *D.*

[33] cum *A.*

[34] *om. B.*

[35] *om.* Quod si...Deo *D.*

[36] Quid *B.*

[37] intelligerent *A*] intelligent *BD.*

[38] quod *BCD.*

[39] *Sent.* III, 6, 4 (579).

[40] concludatur *AC.*

[41] substantiale *A.*

[42] *om.* Sed istud...mulier *A.*

[1] *om.* Auctoritates...sententiis *C*] *add.* ut doctrina magistri Gileberti Porrectani *B*] Auctoritates magistrorum que pro illis facere uidentur *AD.*

[2] *Introd. ad theol.* III, 6; PL 178, 1106C.

> est humanam que corporea est sibi unire in personam unam? (101^{rb}) Non enim quod spirituale est corporeum fieri potest. Sed in illa unione persone Christi, in qua simul[3] diuinitas Uerbi, caro et anima conueniunt, unaquaque harum substantiarum propriam retinet naturam, ut nulla illorum in aliam commutetur, ut nec caro nec anima diuinitas fiat sicut[4] nec caro umquam anima esse potest, quamuis in singulis hominibus una persona sit anima et caro.

Et post pauca:[5]

> Mutatio, inquit, in aliud esse non potest, nisi[6] esse desinat quod prius erat. Spiritualis autem essentia nunc quoque sicut prius spiritualis permanet nec corporea facta est. Cum ergo spiritus sit Deus nec umquam quod spiritus est corporeum fiat aut partes recipiat, quomodo proprie uel Uerbum dicitur fieri caro uel Deus homo? cum Uerbum ipsum etiam nunc sit spiritus, quia est Deus, sicut et ante incarnationem fuerat. Homo quippe corporea res est et membris composita ac dissolubilis. Deus uero incorporea res est[7] nec partibus constat, ut solui possit. Deus igitur nec caro nec homo proprie dicendus est. Alioquin (101^{va}) homo econuerso[8] Deus proprie dicendus esset. Unde aliquod creatum uel quod non semper fuit concedi oporteret Deum esse, cum uidelicet constet hominem creaturam esse atque initium habere. Absit autem, ut aliquam rem Deum esse ponamus, que non semper extiterit aut non semper Deus fuerit. Hoc quippe est Deum nouum recentemque[9] confiteri.
>
> Sic[10] igitur accipiendum est, cum dicitur Deus caro fieri uel esse homo, ut diuina substantia humane in unam personam sociari intelligatur. Alia[11] quippe est substantia que assumpta est, licet non sit alia persona. Sicut enim in uno Deo tres sunt persone, una substantia, ita econtrario in homine Christo due substantie sunt, sed in duabus substantiis uel naturis una persona. Non[12] est autem Deus in aliud mutatus quam fuit, licet aliud sibi in personalem unionem coniunxit. Nam nec anime nostre, cum resumptis corporibus eis[13] in unam personam sociabuntur, ideo aliud quam erant efficientur, quamuis (101^{vb}) corpus animando inmutent et de animato ad animationem promoueant, ut ex hoc potius corpus per animam quam ipsam per corpus inmutari dicendum sit. Corpus enim ex anima, non ipsa ex corpore, in quendam proficit statum, cum ipsa in se persistat immobilis. Multo minus igitur Deus homini unitus ob hoc aliud fieri dicendus est, cui nichil conferre creatura potest. Unde ab omni mutabilitate Deum penitus immunem esse profitemur.[14]

Si quis autem disputationem istam diligentius inspiciat, reperiet illud primo loco improbari diuinam[15] substantiam factam esse humanam. Similiter de diuina substantia dicit, quod non possit fieri res composita uel res corporea uel aliqua creatura. Illud etiam quod ait: *Absit, ut aliquam rem Deum esse ponamus, que non semper extiterit,* si Dei nomine non diuina persona sed substantia intelligatur, sicut ipse ab initio questionis interpretatus fuerat,[16] nichil habet erroneum. Quod si ante solutionem (102^{ra}) more disputantium uera et falsa permiscet, hoc lectorem perturbare non debet. Que enim in ipsa solutione dicuntur, que ibi incipit: *Sic igitur accipiendum est,* catholica sunt et nobiscum, non contra nos, faciunt usque ad illud: *Multo minus igitur Deus homini unitus ob hoc aliud fieri dicendus est.* Sed et illud etiam quod nobis aduersari uidetur, si de essentia intelligatur, nec impium est nec nobis contrarium. Uel forte "aliud fieri" ita intelligit, acsi diceretur "mutari". Unde statim subdit: *Ab omni mutabilitate Deum penitus immunem esse profitemur.*

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[3] similis *A.*

[4] sic *A.*

[5] PL 178, 1107A (abbreviated).

[6] nec *A.*

[7] *om.* et membris...res est *D.*

[8] equus proprie dicendus esset *D.*

[9] Cf. *Ps.* lxxx, 10.

[10] *margine* solutio eiusdem *ABP.*

[11] PL 178, 1108A.

[12] PL 178, 1108D.

[13] eius *A.*

[14] *add.* Quomodo hec sane possunt intelligi *ABDP.*

[15] primam *D.*

[16] Cf. *Introductio ad theol.* III, 3; PL 178, 1091B.

Uerumtamen[17] catholicum quemlibet mouere potest quod ait:

> Cum ergo spiritus sit Deus nec umquam quod spiritus est corporeum fiat aut partes recipiat, quomodo proprie uel Uerbum dicitur caro fieri uel Deus homo, cum Uerbum ipsum etiam nunc[18] sit spiritus, etc.

Uidetur enim hoc sentire et asserere uelle, quod Filius Dei non dicitur proprie, i.e. essentialiter, homo sed solo habitu, nisi quis dicat quod non proprie dicitur Deus homo uel Uerbum homo, quia pleraque nomina (102^{rb}) quibus de Deo loquimur a creaturis ad Creatorem transumpta sunt. Sed non hoc querebatur, quid de Deo proprie dicatur uel non, sed quid hoc sit: Deum fieri hominem. Hac etiam transumptionis ratione perspecta posset similiter dicere, quod nec Uerbum[19] proprie dicitur Uerbum nec Deus proprie dicitur Deus. Ecce si sana est magistri Petri Abailardi doctrina, praue assertioni patrocinari non ualet.[20] Si praua est, catholice professioni preiudicare non debet.[21]

Quod uero a magistro Petro Abailardo hanc opinionem suam magister Petrus Lumbardus accepit,[22] eo magis suspicatus sum, quia librum illum[23] frequenter pre manibus habebat et forte minus diligenter singula perscrutans ut qui ex usu magis quam ex arte disputandi peritiam haberet falli poterat. "Opinionem suam" dixi. Quod enim hec fuerit eius opinio, certum est. Quod uero non fuerit eius assertio, hoc ipse testatur in capitulo illo:[24]

> Satis[25] diligenter iuxta (102va) diuersorum sententias supra positam[26] absque assertione et preiudicio tractauimus questionem. Uerumtamen nolumus in re tanta tamque ad cognoscendum difficili putare lectorem istam sibi nostram sufficere debere disputationem. Sed legat et alia melius forte considerata atque tractata. Et ea que hic mouere possunt uigilantiore atque intelligentiore, si potest, mente discutiat hoc firmiter tenens "quod Deus hominem assumpsit, homo in Deum transiuit, non nature uersibilitate sed Dei dignatione, ut nec Deus mutaretur in humanam[27] substantiam assumendo hominem, nec homo in diuinam, glorificatus in Deum, quia mutatio uel uersibilitas nature diminutionem et abolitionem substantie facit".[28]

Pretera[29] paulo ante quam electus esset in episcopum Parisiensem, michi et omnibus auditoribus suis qui tunc aderant protestatus est, quod hoc non esset assertio sua sed opinio sola, quam a magistris acceperat. Hec etiam uerba subiecit (102^{vb}): *Nec umquam Deo uolente erit assertio mea nisi que fuerit fides catholica.* Postea uero per quosdam homines loquaces magis quam perspicaces que nec in cubiculis essent audienda[30] usque hodie predicantur[31] super tecta. Nunc igitur, quoniam aduersarii nostri de magistris gloriantur, et nos aliqua pro nobis magistrorum producamus testimonia, ut fortissimis sanctorum cuneis etiam doctorum huius temporis leuior armatura preludat.

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[17] Uerum *AB.*
[18] non *D.*
[19] uerbis *D.*
[20] debet *C.*
[21] deberet *A.*
[22] acceperit *C.*
[23] *marg.* uel glosam *C.*
[24] *marg.* Unde presumitur quod non (*om. DP*) fuit assertio magistri Petri *BDP.*
[25] *Sent.* III, 7, 3 (589).
[26] positas *C.*
[27] *add.* naturam uel *A.*
[28] Gennadius, *Liber sive definitio eccl. dogmatum,* c. 2; ed. C. H. Turner, *Journ. of Theol. Stud.* 7 (1905/6), 89.
[29] *add.* Alia de eodem presumptio *ABDP.*
[30] audiendi *C.*
[31] predicant *D.*

IV

AUCTORITATES MAGISTRORUM CONTRA ILLAS DUAS SENTENTIAS[1]

Magister Anselmus Cantuarensis in *Epistola ad Urbanum Papam:*[2]

> Suscepit Deus hominem in unitatem[3] persone, ut sint due nature, diuina scilicet et humana, una persona. Dicunt quidam: "Quomodo dicimus[4] in Christo non esse duas personas sicut duas naturas? Nam Deus et ante assumptionem hominis persona erat nec, postquam hominem assumpsit, persona esse destitit. Et homo assumptus persona est, quia omnis (103ra) homo indiuiduus[5] persona esse cognoscitur. Quare alia est persona Dei, que fuit ante incarnationem, alia hominis assumpti.[6] Sicut igitur Christus est Deus et homo, ita due in illo uidentur esse persone." Sed non est ita. Sicut enim in Deo una natura est plures persone[7] et plures persone sunt una natura, ita in Christo una persona est plures nature et plures nature sunt una persona. Non enim alius est Deus, alius homo, in Christo, quamuis aliud sit Deus, aliud homo.[8] Sed idem ipse est Deus qui est homo.

Et post pauca:

> In assumpto uero homine uel in nomine[9] "Ihesu" intelligitur cum natura, i.e. cum homine, collectio proprietatum que est eadem assumpto[10] homini et Uerbo. Unde eadem sunt persona.

Ecce quod Christus est due nature siue substantie et quod aliud et aliud, sed non alius et alius.

Bernardus abbas Clareuallensis (103^{rb}) in libro *De Consideratione:*[11]

> Decuit quippe familiarius similiusque cum hominis conuenire contitutione quod pro homine constitutum est sacramentum.[12] Decuit et cum summa, que in Deo est et Deus est, unitate congruere ut, quomodo ibi tres persone una essentia, ita hic conuenientissima quadam contrarietate tres essentie sint una persona.

Tres essentias dicit Uerbum, animam et carnem. Et utique sicut in Uerbo intelligit diuinitatem, ita in carne et anima totum hominem intelligi uoluit, Augustinum sequens qui sepe pro toto homine carnem et animam ponere consueuit.

Magister Hugo de Sancto Uictore:[13]

> Uerbum persona eterna fuit neque tunc persona esse cepit, quando animam et carnem in personam accepit. Accepit animam et carnem, ut in (103va) se persona essent, non ut se[14] personam facerent. Quia ergo caro et anima in eo personam esse acceperunt quod Uerbo persone[15] uniri ceperunt, semper quidem cum Uerbo una et eadem persona permanserunt,[16] quia numquam postea a Uerbo[17] uel inter se diuisa recesserunt.

Hic[18] nimirum per animam et carnem totum hominem intelligit qui cepit esse illa persona. Unde et post pauca subditur:

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[1] *om.* Auctoritates...sententias *C*] Magistrorum auctoritates contra illos *D*] *add.* Orthodoxorum (magistrorum) *A.*

[2] *Ep. de Incarnatione Verbi,* c. 10 f.; ed. F. S. Schmitt, *Flor. patr. fasc* 28 (Bonn, 1931), p. 20 f. Cf. Abelard, *Introductio ad theol. III*, 6; *PL* 178, 1108A.

[3] unitate *D.*

[4] Deus *A.*

[5] indiuiduis *B.*

[6] consumpti *A.*

[7] *om.* Sed non...plures persone *D.*

[8] *om.* in Christo...homo *D.*

[9] homine *D.*

[10] assumptio *D.*

[11] *De Consideratione* V, 9; PL 182, 800BC.

[12] *add.* incarnationis misterium *A.*

[13] *De Sacramentis* II, 1, 11; PL 176, 401CD.

[14] *om.* persona essent non ut se *D.*

[15] *om. A.*

[16] esse ceperunt *A.*

[17] *om.* una et eadem...Uerbo *D.*

[18] Sic ergo *D.*

> Propterea partes hominis due sunt, quia in natura hominis duo sunt, anima scilicet et caro. Ubi hec duo sunt, totus homo est. Ubi alterum horum, pars hominis est. Propter hoc igitur Uerbum totum hominem assumpsit, quia totum quod hominis erat assumpsit, (103^{vb}) animam scilicet et carnem.

Si partes hominis Christi sunt anima et caro, quomodo non est aliquod totum? Et si partes habet secundum humanitatem, qua ratione negari potest eum aliquid esse secundum humanitatem?[19] Hee etiam partes, anima et caro, non possunt esse partes nisi alicuius substantie.[20] Quare secundum humanitatem Christus est aliqua substantia.

Magister Acardus[21] in libro suo *De Trinitate*:

> In Christo due nature sunt quarum utraque persona dici potest per se. Nec tamen due sunt persone[22] sed una in naturis duabus: In Deo assumente hominem, i.e. in Uerbo, ex ipsius natura; in homine assumpto ex assumentis Uerbi beneficio et gratia.

Item:

> Quamuis in Uerbo assumente et homine assumpto alterum sit ex altero, homo[23] scilicet a[24] Uerbo, non tamen duas ibi esse personas uel unam (104ra) a seipsa consequens est eo, quod homo alterius nature est a Uerbo secundum quam potest esse ab eo. Et ideo propter pluralitatem naturarum iam non ibi exigitur pluralitas personarum. Etsi enim alterum non sit ab altero secundum personam alteram, potest tamen ab eo esse secundum eam que ibi est naturam alteram. Si uero altera ibi non esset natura, necessario, cum personalitatem ibi esse constet et utrumque personam dici per se, persona ibi esset altera. Aut[25] neutrum esset ab altero aut persona una prorsus[26] a seipsa.

Hec[27] disputatio magistri Acardi in principio sui asserit duas esse naturas in Christo quarum utraque est persona et utique non alia quam Christus. Cetera uel modicam explanationem efflagitant ut hoc: *Quarum utraque persona dici potest per se.* Hoc (104^{rb}) modo scilicet: Uerbum assumens est persona, homo assumptus est persona. Unde uideretur pluralitas esse personarum. In alio enim quolibet homine hee due nature, anima et caro, simul dicuntur unus homo siue una persona. Sed neutra per se est homo uel persona. Unde *propter* huiusmodi *pluralitatem naturarum* in quolibet homine nulla *exigitur pluralitas personarum.* In Christo uero secus est quia sunt[28] due nature quarum utraque est persona. Unde uideri posset quod sicut due nature ita etiam due essent in eo persone. Quod sic infringitur: *Nec tamen due sunt persone,* etc. Quod uero sequitur: *In Uerbo ex ipsius natura,* etc., illi auctoritati nititur: *Quod habet Filius Dei per naturam, hoc habet Filius* (104va) *hominis per gratiam.*[29] Item: *Quamuis in Uerbo assumente,* etc. Hic geminam expugnat falsitatem. Quia enim Uerbum assumens est persona et homo assumptus est persona et homo est a Uerbo, uideretur quod altera persona esset ab altera uel eadem a seipsa sicut in Trinitate Pater est persona, Filius est persona et Filius est a Patre. Unde cum sint due persone, altera est ab altera. Et si una essent persona, eadem esset a seipsa. Sed non est[30] similis utrobique necessitas. In Christo enim sunt due nature, quarum altera est ab altera. In Patre uero et Filio eadem natura sed personalitates una et altera. Et hoc est: *Quamuis in Uerbo* (104^{vb}) *assumente,* etc. Quod uero hec eius disputatio sic intelligenda sit, ibi subtiliter et breuiter innuit: *Si uero altera non esset ibi*

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[19] *om.* qua ratione...humanitatem *D.*

[20] *add.* scilicet corporee *A.*

[21] corrected to Ricardus with marginal note M. Ric. de s. Uictore *P.* Concerning Acardus see J. Chatillon, 'Achard de Saint-Victor,' *Mél. F. Cavallera* (Toulouse, 1948), 317-337.

[22] *add.* in eo *A.*

[23] *om. D.*

[24] ex. *D.*

[25] uel *D.*

[26] *add.* esset *ACD.*

[27] *om.* Hec disputatio...aut eadem a seipsa *ABC.*

[28] est *D.*

[29] *Summa Sent.* I, 18; PL 176,76D.

[30] *om. P.*

natura, etc. Quia enim[31] utraque per se dicitur persona, si non esset ibi natura altera, aut nec homo esset a Uerbo nec Uerbum ab homine aut persona ibi esset altera ab altera aut eadem a seipsa.

Duos[32] etiam uenerabiles magistros quos in theologia certissimum est nichil hereticum docuisse, Robertum scilicet Melodinensem et Mauricium hodie Parisiensem episcopum, silentio preterire non debeo. Eorum utique super hiis questionibus scripta non legi, sed multis eorum lectionibus (105ra) et disputationibus interfui, in quibus et de homine assumpto et de aliis quibusdam magistri Petri Lumbardi doctrinam falsitatis arguebant, ne dicam erroris. Michi tamen non facile nec cito potuerunt auellere quod diu tenueram. Sed ex tunc meum cepit fluctuare iudicium, usquequo per doctorum etiam aliorum sanctorumque testimonia ueritas ipsa, de qua querebatur, uelud per speculum et per enigma tandem intimauerit.

Hiis breuiter decursis, quatinus dicendorum notitia plenior haberetur, restat ea que in exordio demonstranda proposuimus firmissimis sanctorum testimoiis et rationibus fidei consentaneis roborare, ut quasi post quedam preludia[33] iam nunc ad seria ueniatur.

V

AUCTORITATES SANCTORUM QUIBUS PROBATUR QUOD CHRISTUS EST ALIQUIS HOMO[1]

In Psalmis hec omnia leguntur de Christo: *Beatus quem elegisti et assumpsisti.* Item, *Quid est homo, quod memor es eius aut Filius hominis?* Item, *Dies super dies regis adicies annos eius.* (105^{rb}) Item, *Fiat manus tua super uirum dextere tue et super Filium hominis quem confirmasti tibi.*[2] Item, *Iste pauper clamauit ad Dominum*, etc. Item, *Ego autem mendicus sum et pauper.* Item, *Tu es sacerdos in eternum.* Item, *Quis est homo qui uiuet et non uidebit mortem, eruet animam suam de manu inferi?*[3]

Si[4] Christus non est aliquis homo, quis est ille *homo beatus*, quis est ille *Filius hominis*, quis est ille *rex*, quis est ille *uir dextere*, quis est iste *pauper*, quis est iste *sacerdos*, quis est *homo qui eruet animam suam de manu inferi?* Utique nullus. Quod si Christus est homo ille de quo ista dicuntur, Christus est aliquis homo. Item, super primum psalmum legitur istud Cassiodori:[5] *Hec omnia non omni beato uiro conueniunt, sed soli Christo.* Potius dicendum erat: Nulli beato uiro conueniunt. Nulli enim alio uiro conueniunt. Et Christus, cui soli conueniunt, non est aliquis uir. Item, ibidem legitur: (105va) *Hec est plena diffinitio beati uiri.*[6] Sed quomodo est diffinitio[7] beati uiri, que nulli beato uiro conuenit? Nec Christus enim nec alius est aliquis *beatus uir*, cui conueniat ipsa. Item, Apostolus: *Si in unius delicto multi mortui sunt, multo magis gratia Dei et donum in gratia unius hominis Ihesu Christi in plures habundauit.*[8]

Item, Augustinus *De Trinitate*:[9]

> *Sicut per unum hominem peccatum*, etc. Apostolus de duobus hominibus prolixius disputat: uno eodemque[10] primo Adam per cuius peccatum et mortem eius posteri obligati sumus, altero autem secundo Adam qui non homo tantum sed etiam Deus est.

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[31] uero *D.*

[32] *add.* Quid super hiis senserint magister Robertus Melud(in)ensis et magister Mauritius *BDP.*

[33] colludia *B.*

[1] *om.* sanctorum *A*] Quod est aliquis homo auctoritate sanctorum *D.*

[2] *om.* Item, fiat...tibi *B.*

[3] *Pss.* lxiv, 5; viii, 5; lx, 7; lxxix, 18; xxxvii, 7; xxxix, 24; cix, 4; lxxxviii, 49.

[4] *add.* epilogatio *BCDP.*

[5] Lombard, *In Ps.* i, 3; PL 191, 63A.

[6] *Ibid.*

[7] *om.* est diffinitio *B.*

[8] *Rom.* v, 15.

[9] Lombard, *In Rom.* v, 12; PL 191, 1387BC. Augustine, *De Trin.* XIII, 16, 21; PL 42,1031.

[10] *add.* modo *D.*

Item, Augustinus *Super Johannem:*[11]

> Cecidit primus homo. Et omnes qui ab illo nati sunt de illo traxerunt concupiscentiam carnis. Oportebat, ut nasceretur alius homo qui nullam traxit concupiscentiam. Homo et homo. Homo ad mortem et homo ad uitam. Sic dicit Apostolus: *Quoniam quidem per hominem mors et per hominem resurrectio. Per quem hominem mors, per quem* (105^{vb}) *resurrectio? Sicut enim in Adam omnes moriuntur, ita et in Christo omnes iustificabuntur.*[12]

Item, Augustinus in libro *De Predestinatione*[13] *sanctorum:*[14]

> Preclarissimum lumen predestinationis et gratie est ipse *mediator Dei et hominum, homo Christus Ihesus.* Ille homo ut[15] a Uerbo Patri coeterno in unitatem persone assumptus Filius Dei unicus esset, unde hoc meruit, quod eius bonum qualecumque precessit, ut ad hanc ineffabilem excellentiam perueniret? Faciente ac suscipiente Deo Uerbo ipse homo, ex quo esse cepit, Filius Dei unicus esse cepit.

Item:[16]

> Ita ab initio fidei sue homo quicumque gratia fit christianus sicut gratia homo ille ab initio factus est Christus.

Item, Augustinus *De Bono perseuerantie:*[17]

> Qui fecit illum hominem sine ullis precedentibus eius meritis nullum, quod ei dimitteretur, uel origine[18] uel uoluntate perpetrare peccatum, ipse nullis eorum meritis precedentibus facit credentes in eum quibus dimittat omne peccatum.

Item:[19]

> Et illum[20] ergo et nos predestinauit, quia et in illo, ut (106ra) esset caput nostrum, et in nobis, ut eius corpus essemus, non precessura merita nostra sed opera sua futura presciuit.

Item, Augustinus *De Littera et spiritu:*[21]

> Deus humilis descendit per misericordiam, gratiam claram manifestamque, commendans in ipso homine quem[22] tanta pre participibus suis caritate suscepit. Neque enim ita Uerbo Dei coniunctus, ut ipsa coniunctione unus Filius Dei et idem ipse unus Filius hominis[23] fieret, precedentibus sue uoluntatis meritis fecit.

Item, *Mons in quo beneplacitum est Domino habitare in eo,*[24] Augustinus:[25]

> Uerbum habitauit eum, scilicet hominem Christum, usque in finem[26] quia personaliter[27] unitus est ei, *in quo habitat omnis plenitudo diuinitatis corporaliter.*[28] Sic erat itaque Uerbum in carne, ut *Uerbum* etiam *caro factum* solum diceretur, i.e. homo Uerbo in unam Christi personam copularetur.

Item, Augustinus *Super Johannem:*[29]

> *Primitie*[30] homo et homo. Homo ad uitam, homo ad mortem. Homo ille non[31] Deus, iste[32] Deus et homo.

Item, *Mater Syon dicet homo,* Augustinus:[33]

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[11] *In Joh. Tr.* III, 12; PL 35, 1901.

[12] uiuificabuntur *C.*

[13] Presentatione *B.*

[14] Lombard, *In Rom.* i, 3; PL 191, 1307C. Abbrev. from Augustine, *De Praedest. sanctorum,* c. 15, 30; PL 44, 981. Cf. *Sent.* III, 6, 2 (575).

[15] autem *C.*

[16] Lombard, *In Rom.* i, 3; PL 191, 1309C or *Sent.* III, 6, 2 (575).

[17] Lombard, *In Rom.* i, 3; PL 191, 1309C. Augustine, *De Bono persev.*, 24,66; PL 45, 1034.

[18] originale *D.*

[19] Lombard, *ibid.;* Augustine, *ibid.*

[20] illud *A.*

[21] Augustine, *De Peccatorum meritis* II, 17, 27; PL 44, 168.

[22] qui *D.*

[23] *om.* et idem...hominis *D.*

[24] *Ps.* lxvii, 17.

[25] Lombard, *In Ps.* lxvii, 17; PL 191, 610D. Augustine, *Enarr. in Ps.* lxvii, 17, n. 23; PL 36. 328.

[26] *add.* i.e. plenarie *A.*

[27] spiritualiter *A.*

[28] *Col.* ii, 9.

[29] Lombard, *In I Cor.* xv, 20; PL 191, 1678A. Augustine, *In Joh. Tr.* III, 12 f.; PL 35, 1401 f.

[30] *add.* sunt *D.*

[31] *add.* est *D.*

[32] homo iste *A*] ille et *C.*

[33] Lombard, *In Ps.* lxxxvi, 5; PL 191, 807C. Augustine, *Enarr. in Ps.* lxxxvi, 5, n. 7; PL

> Ecce est quidam homo, i.e. Christus, qui dicit: *Syon*, i.e. synagoga, est *mater* mea secundum carnem. Et (106^{rb}) quis est homo ille? Homo qui in ea natus est, etc.

Item, Augustinus in *Omelia de simbolo:*[34]

> Hec fuit natura hominis, qui factus[35] est ex Uirgine, que[36] natura Uirginis ex qua Christus formatus et natus est, quemadmodum eiusdem est nature cum Patre secundum deitatem.

Item, Haimo: *Qui predestinatus est:*[37]

> Non de Uerbo loquitur hic Apostolus sed de homine, qui non erat antequam factus esset.

Item, Johannes Crisostomus:[38]

> *Et adorent eum* hominem qui passus est et mortuus. Non enim de Deo Uerbo[39] ista dicuntur sed de homine suscepto. *Adorent*, inquam,[40] *omnes angeli Dei.*

Item, in euangelio Cayphas per Spiritum sanctum ait: *Expedit ut unus homo moriatur pro populo et non tota gens pereat.*[41] Item, ministri Phariseis responderunt: *Numquam locutus est homo sicut hic homo.*[42] Centurio etiam clamat: *Uere hic homo Filius Dei erat.*[43]

Si Christus[44] secundum Apostolum est unus homo, si secundum Augustinum est alter duorum hominum de quibus disputat Apostolus, si est homo (106va) alius a primo Adamo, si est quidam homo qui dicit: Syon est mater mea, si—ut legitur in euangelio—est unus homo qui moriturus erat pro populo, patet quod Christus est aliquis homo. Item, omnes ille auctoritates quibus de Christo legitur "hic homo", "iste homo", "ille homo", uel aliquid huiusmodi, si Christus nec fuit nec est nec erit aliquis homo, incongrue sunt et propter incompetentem demonstrationem siue[45] relationem aut nullum aut cassum faciunt intellectum, nisi forte dicant eodem tropo dici de Christo "hic et ille homo" quo de ydolo dicitur "hic et ille Deus", ubi non attenditur nature[46] participatio sed nuncupatio sola. Sicut ergo[47] ydolum solo nomine est Deus ita et Christus solo nomine est homo. Absit. Ecce hiis et aliis infinitis auctoritatibus edocemur[48] quod Christus sit aliquis homo. Idem etiam firmissimis probari potest rationibus.

VI

RATIONES QUIBUS IDEM PROBATUR[1]

Hominum[2] enim alius est Christus, alius non est Christus. Ergo quidam homo est Christus et quidam homo[3] non est Christus. (106^{vb}) Item, Christus est unus[4] aliquorum hominum. Ergo est aliquis homo. Item, unus solus homo est Christus et multi homines sunt. Ergo unus hominum est Christus. Quare aliquis homo est Christus. Item, in hiis locutionibus: *omnes declinauerunt, omnes in Adam peccauerunt, omnis homo mendax,*[5] in hiis, inquam, et similibus omnes catholici expositores Christum excipiunt. Quod si nullus alius homo a Christo excipiendus est et Christus non est aliquis homo, ut uel ipse excipi debeat, nullus homo

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37, 1106.

[34] *Sermo CCXXXVIII*, 3; PL 39, 2185. Cf. *Apologia de Verbo Incarnato*, qu. 15; PL 177, 311D.

[35] natus est de *A.*

[36] quia *A.*

[37] Lombard, *In Rom.* i, 1; PL 191, 1314A. Haimo, *In Rom.* i, 1; PL 117, 366D.

[38] Lombard, *In Heb.* i, 6; PL 192, 409C. Cf. St. Chrysostom, *In Heb.* i, 6; PG 63, 27.

[39] uerba *ACD.*

[40] *add.* eum *D.*

[41] *John* xi, 50.

[42] *John* vii, 46.

[43] *Mark* xv, 39.

[44] *marg.* epilogatio *BP.*

[45] uel *AC.*

[46] persone *D*] nec *A.*

[47] quoque *A.*

[48] edocentur *D.*

[1] *om.* Rationes . . . probantur *C*] probant *A*] Rationes quibus probatur quod Christus est aliquis homo *AD*

[2] Dominum *A.*

[3] *om.* est Christus . . . homo *CD.*

[4] quidam *D.*

[5] *Rom.* iii, 12; v. 12; *Ps.* cxv, 11.

excipiendus est. Que ergo sic dicuntur, sine exceptione uera sunt. Item, Christus est sanctissimus hominum, beatissimus hominum.[6] Hec et huiusmodi omnia falsa sunt, si Christus non est aliquis homo. Item, si quis[7] est habens naturam humanam, est homo. Et quia est aliquis habens naturam humanam, est aliquis homo. Item, est aliquis animatus anima humana.[8] Ergo est aliquis homo.[9] Item, aliquis est filius Habrahe, cui facte sunt promissiones. Christus non est aliquis filius Habrahe. Quare alii quam Christo facte sunt promissiones. Item, nullus homo redemit nos, quia nec alius homo redimere potuit. (107ra) Nec aliquis homo est uel fuit Christus qui redemit. Item, cum Christo crucifixi sunt duo latrones. Duo illi homines tunc crucifixi sunt. Et nullus alius homo tunc crucifixus est. Ergo soli latrones tunc crucifixi sunt. Absit. Quod si tunc alius homo crucifixus est, quis est ille alius homo, cum Christus non sit aliquis homo? Item, ubi duodecim Apostoli erant cum Domino, ibi erant duodecim homines. Et non soli duodecim, quia Christus ibi erat. Ergo si preter duodecim aliquis homo ibi erat et hic erat Christus, aliquis homo erat Christus.[10] Quod si non erat ibi aliquis homo preter duodecim, soli homines duodecim ibi erant. Item, Christus fuit aliquis uir. Ergo fuit aliquis homo.

Sed forte, qua ratione asserunt eum non fuisse aliquem hominem, istud etiam fateri coguntur ipsum non fuisse aliquem[11] infantem, aliquem puerum uel aliquem iuuenem uel aliquem uirum. Si enim, inquiunt, Christus fuit[12] aliquis homo, cum non ab eterno fuerit homo,[13] in tempore factus est aliquis homo. Sed si in tempore factus est aliquis homo, in tempore factus est aliquid. Concedant ergo simili ratione, quod non (107^{rb}) fuerit aliquis infans quia, si ex tempore cepit esse aliquis infans, ex tempore cepit esse aliquid. Quod ipsi absurdum esse dicunt et impossibile. Numquid ergo beata Uirgo non peperit aliquem infantem? Numquid Symeon iustus Christum accipiens in ulnas suas non uidit nec tenuit aliquem infantem? Numquid Apostoli et alii uidentes et audientes Christum non uidebant nec audiebant aliquem hominem?

Miror autem quod non attendunt huius falsitatis assertores, quam modicum distent a Manicheis. Illi dogmatizauerunt: Christus uidebatur homo et non erat homo. Isti hoc dogmatizant[14] unde necesse habent confiteri:[15] Christus uidebatur homo et non erat aliquis homo. Nam si erat et uidebatur homo, uidebatur utique homo sed non erat aliquis homo. Quare uidebatur homo et non erat aliquis homo. Similiter uidebatur infans et non erat aliquis infans. Uidebatur homo uiuens et (107va) non erat aliquis homo qui uiueret. Uisus est homo moriens et non erat aliquis homo qui moreretur. Uisus est postea homo resuscitatus a morte et non fuit aliquis homo resuscitatus a morte. Uisus est homo ille ascendere in celum sed non fuit aliquis homo qui in celum ascenderet.

Et quia in huiusmodi errores decidunt qui negant Christum secundum humanitatem aliquid fuisse, nos huic falsitati contrariam ueritatem auctoritatibus et rationibus munitam esse demonstremus.[16]

VII

AUCTORITATES QUIBUS PROBATUR QUOD CHRISTUS SECUNDUM QUOD HOMO EST ALIQUID[1]

Augustinus *De Trinitate:*[2]

Caput Christi Deus.[3] Si Deus omnia simul[4] tria hic intelligitur, quomodo

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[6] *om.* beatissimus hominum *A.*
[7] Sed quia *A*] Si quia *CD.*
[8] *om.* anima humana *D.*
[9] *om.* Item, est . . homo *A.*
[10] *om.* aliquis homo esset Christus *D.*
[11] *om.* hominem . . . aliquem *D.*
[12] *add.* non *A.*
[13] *add.* aliquis *A.*
[14] dogmatizauerunt *A.*
[15] fateri *A.*
[16] demonstramus *C.*

[1] *om.* Auctoritates . . . aliquid *C*] Quod Christus secundum quod homo est aliquid, auctoritates Augustini *D.*
[2] Lombard, *In I Cor.* xi, 3; PL 191, 1629D. Cf. Augustine, *De Trin.* VI, 9, 10; PL 42, 930.
[3] *I Cor.* xi, 3.
[4] similis *A.*

> Christi caput est Deus, i.e. caput Christi est Trinitas, cum in Trinitate sit Christus? An quod[5] Pater est cum Filio et Spiritu sancto ei caput est quod[6] est solus Filius? Cum Patre enim et Spiritu sancto Filius est Deus. Filius[7] autem solus homo factus est.

Item, Augustinus *Super Johannem:*[8]

> Ipse est homo[9] qui Deus, (107^vb^) quia Deus factus est homo. Sed factus quod non erat, non amittens quod erat.

Item:[10]

> Creator hominis homo esse dignatus est. Factus est quod fecerat, ne periret quem fecerat.

Item:[11]

> Angelus ad Mariam Uirginem: *Quod nascetur ex te sanctum, uocabitur Filius Dei.*

Item, super illum locum in euangelio Johannis: *Nunc autem queritis me interficere hominem,* etc., legitur illud Augustini:[12]

> Non dicit, ut poterat, "Dominum Habrahe," ne sit occasio calumpnie, nec "Filium Dei", sed quod uident, quod possunt occidere.

Item, Augustinus:[13]

> *Ne sileas a me,* i.e. ne unitatem Uerbi tui separes ab eo quod homo sum.

Item, Augustinus super Psalmum illum, *Domine refugium:*[14]

> Incepit esse quod non erat. Seruata substantiarum[15] proprietate, quod creabile mansit creabile, quod increabile increabile.

Item, Augustinus *De Trinitate:*[16]

> *Nam si ego non abiero, aduocatus non ueniet ad uos.* Oportebat ergo ut auferretur ab oculis forma serui quam intuentes hoc solum esse Christum putabant quod uidebant.

Item, Augustinum *De Trinitate:*[17]

> Et quid tam grate offerri et suscipi (108^ra^) posset quam caro sacrificii nostri ut (quoniam quatuor considerantur in omni sacrificio: cui offeratur, a quo offeratur, quid offeratur, pro quibus offeratur) idem ipse unus uerusque mediator per sacrificium pacis reconcilians nos Deo unum maneret cum illo cui offerebatur, unum in se faceret pro quibus offerebat, unus ipse esset qui offerebat et quod[18] offerebatur.

Item, Augustinus *Super Johannem:*[19]

> *Noli me tangere,* quid est hoc? Hoc solum me putas quod uides. Noli sic credere, hoc est. *Noli me tangere.*

Item, Ambrosius:[20]

> *Homo* Christus *quid est,* scilicet quam magnum quid et dignum per hoc *quod memor es eius* faciendo eum immunem a peccato *aut,* i.e. et *Filius hominis,* scilicet idem ipse Christus, homo de homine[21] ut Deus de Deo. Quid est, scilicet quam excellentissimum quid per hoc *quod uisitas eum* resuscitando?

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[5] qui *A.*

[6] qui *A.*

[7] *om.* est Deus Filius *A.*

[8] Augustine, *In Joh. Tr.* XXI, 7; PL 35, 1568.

[9] *om. CD.*

[10] Augustine, *In Joh. Tr.* XXXVI, 4; PL 35, 1664.

[11] *Luke* i, 35.

[12] Cf. *In Joh. Tr.* XLII, 4; PL 35, 1701.

[13] Lombard, *In Ps.* xxvii, 1; PL 191, 277D. Augustine, *Enarr. in Ps.* xxvii, 1; PL 36, 211.

[14] *Ps.* lxxxix, 1. Lombard, *In Ps.* lxxxix, 1; PL 191, 835C. Cf. *Apologia,* qu. 5; PL 177, 298CD. Robert of Melun, *Summa* II, 54; ed. F. Anders, *Die Christologie des Robert von Melun* (Paderborn, 1927), p. 107.

[15] *om. A.*

[16] *De Trin.* I, 9, 18; PL 42, 833. *John* xvi, 7.

[17] Lombard, *In Heb.* vi, 4; PL 192, 458B. Augustine, *De Trin.* IV, 14, 19; PL 42, 901.

[18] qui *A.*

[19] *In Joh. Tr.* XXVI, 3; PL 35, 1608.

[20] Lombard, *In Heb.* ii, 6; PL 192, 417B. *Ps.* viii, 5.

[21] *om.* aut . . . homine *D.*

Item, Augustinus *De Trinitate,* libro II:[22]

> Forma suscepti hominis Filii persona est.

Idem, libro XV, capite XV:[23]

> Mistica et inuisibili unctione tunc intelligendus est Christus unitus, quando *Uerbum caro factum est,* i.e. quando humana natura sine ullis precedentibus meritis Deo Uerbo est in utero Uirginis copulata ita ut cum illo fieret una persona.[24]

Item, Isidorus *De Summo bono:*[25]

> Soli igitur Trinitas nota est et humanitati Christi, que est tertia in Trinitate persona.

Ecce[26] secundum humanitatem Filius est aliquid quod non est Pater nec Spiritus sanctus. Et est quod non[27] erat, factus est quod fecerat. Et secundum eandem naturam est hoc[28] quod ex Uirgine natum est et quod Iudei uidebant et occidere poterant. (108^{rb}) Et secundum quod homo erat id cui Uerbum unitum erat et id quod creabile erat, id quod offerebatur, id quod uidebatur, et magnum quid et dignum et quiddam excellentissimum. Quomodo ergo secundum quod homo non erat aliquid? Ex hiis et aliis infinitis auctoritatibus elucescit quod Christus secundum quod homo erat et est aliquid. Quod ut firmius sit, etiam rationibus comprobetur.[29]

VIII

RATIONES QUIBUS IDEM PROBATUR[1]

Christus[2] secundum quod homo habet humanitatem. Ergo secundum quod homo habet aliquam substantialem qualitatem. Ergo secundum quod homo est aliquid. Item, Christus secundum humanitatem est homo. Sed esse hominem est esse aliquid. Ergo Christus secundum humanitatem est aliquid. Item, Christus secundum duas naturas est gemine substantie et secundum utramque naturam est alicuius substantie. Ergo secundum utramque naturam est aliquid. Item, Christus secundum quod homo est homousios, i.e. consubstantialis, matri. Ergo secundum quod homo habet aliquid substantiale commune cum matre. Quare secundum quod homo[3] est aliquid. Item, Christus secundum humanitatem est homo uel aliud. Ergo secundum humanitatem (108va) est aliquid. Item, secundum quod homo est caput nostrum. Ergo secundum quod homo est aliquid quod supra nos est. Item, secundum quod homo est pretium quo redempti sumus. Ergo secundum quod homo est aliquod pretium. Quare secundum quod homo est aliquid. Item, secundum quod homo est[4] sacrificium quo expiati sumus. Ergo secundum quod homo est aliquod sacrificium. Quare secundum quod homo est[5] aliquid. Item, Christus, Enoch et Helias sunt tres homines. Ergo sunt tria. Christus secundum quod homo est unus illorum trium. Ergo secundum quod homo est unum aliquorum. Item, Christus aut solo nomine est homo aut nomine et re. Si solo nomine est homo, non uere est homo. Quod si nomine et re est homo,[6] cum sit aliqua ratio substantie data secundum hoc nomen que omni homini conuenit, illa conuenit Christo. Ratio autem illa est substantialis differentia que conuertitur cum diffinito. Quod si secundum quod homo suscipit aliquam substantialem diffinitionem, secundum quod homo habet aliqua substantialia. Ergo cum Christus et nomine et re sit homo, secundum quod homo habet aliqua substantialia. Quare[7] secundum quod homo[8] est aliquid.

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[22] *De Trin.* II, 5, 9; PL 42, 850. *Apologia,* qu. 5; PL 177, 298D. Note that these last three *auctoritates* occur only in *D* and are probably spurious.

[23] Cf. *De Trin.* XIII, 17, 22 or XIII, 19, 24; PL 42, 1031.

[24] Cf. *Apologia,* qu. 5; PL 177, 299A.

[25] Isidore, *Sent.* I, 3, 1; PL 83, 543A. Cf. *Apologia,* qu. 5; PL 177, 298C. Robert of Melun, *Summa* II, 54; ed. Anders, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

[26] *add.* epilogatio *ABDP.*

[27] *om. B.*

[28] homo qui *A.*

[29] comprobatur *C.*

[1] *om.* Rationes . . . probatur *C*] Rationes quibus probatur quod secundum quod homo est aliquid *D.*

[2] Spiritus *A.*

[3] *om.* habet aliquid . . . quod homo *D.*

[4] *om.* aliquid. Item . . . est *D.*

[5] *om.* aliquod . . . homo est *D.*

[6] *om.* Quod si . . . homo *D.*

Item, (108^{vb}) si humanitas conuenit homini illi non substantialiter, nobis uero substantialiter, non propter humanitatem est eiusdem nature nobiscum uel eiusdem substantie. Sicut enim ignis substantialiter calidus et aqua accidentaliter calida non sunt eiusdem nature uel substantie ita nec nos, qui substantialiter homines sumus, cum illo sumus unius nature uel substantie, qui non est substantialiter homo sed uel accidentaliter uel nec substantialiter nec accidentaliter. Quod si substantialiter est homo, cum hoc predicabile "homo" non in quale sed in quid habeat predicari, secundum quod homo est aliquid. Item, aliqua accidentia[9] erant in homine Christo. Ergo Christus erat[10] aliqua, in quibus erant illa accidentia, uel aliquid in quo erant illa accidentia.[11] Sed non erat[12] aliqua in quibus essent.[13] Ergo aliquid.[14] Item, pueritia Christi fuit in aliquo subiecto. Si Christus secundum humanitatem fuit illud subiectum, Christus secundum humanitatem fuit aliquid. Quod si corpus uel anima fuit illud subiectum, corpus uel anima fuit puer uel puella. Quare corpus uel anima fuit aliquis homo uel aliqua femina. Item, si Christus secundum quod homo non erat (109ra) aliquid, crucifixio et tristitia Christi non fuerunt in aliquo subiecto, quia corpus tantum crucifigebatur, anima sola tristabatur, nec ex illis duobus aliquid constabat quod crucifigeretur et tristaretur. Nec aliud aliquid ibi crucifigebatur et tristabatur. Ergo nichil unum[15] ibi crucifigebatur et tristabatur.[16] Hac etiam ratione Christus nichil fuit quod sederet et aliquid sciret nec fuit aliquid quod uerba proferret et ea intelligeret nec fuit aliquid quod moreretur et Deo frueretur, quia sedere, proferre, mori, huius corporis sunt; scire, intelligere, frui, huius anime sunt. Christus uero nec illa duo nec aliquid compositum ex illis erat nec aliquid[17] cui illa conuenirent.[18]

Rursus in hac assertione sua parum distant a Manicheis. Illi dicebant: Christus uidebatur homo et non erat homo, uidebatur crucifigi et non crucifigebatur, uidebatur mori et non moriebatur. Isti dicunt: Christus homo uidebatur et non erat aliquid quod uidebatur; Christus loquebatur et non erat aliquid quod loquebatur; crucifigebatur et non erat aliquid quod crucifigebatur. Item, post ressurectionem (109^{rb}) Apostoli uiderunt Christum sed non uiderunt aliquod quod[19] esset Christus. Credebant se uidere et audire Christum sed non uidebant nec audiebant aliquid quod esset Christus. Quando etiam uidentibus Apostolis Christus ascendit in celum, nichil quod esset Christus ascendit. Diuina enim substantia que sola,[20] ut asserunt, Christus est localiter ascendere uel descendere non potest. Quia[21] uero condiscipuli mei et alii innumerabiles negant Christum essentialiter siue substantialiter esse hominem, illud hoc loco demonstretur et que contra dici solent dissoluantur.

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[7] *om.* *C.*

[8] *om.* *C.*

[9] accidentalia *C.*

[10] Christo (in) erant *C.* The preposition *in* was later added.

[11] accidentalia *C*] *om.* uel aliquid...accidentia *P.*

[12] erant *C.*

[13] esset genus aliquod *C.*

[14] Not one scribe managed to copy the argument accurately. *D:* Item, aliqua accidentia erant illa accidentia. Sed non erant aliqua in quibus non essent. Ergo aliquid. *B* reads: Item, aliqua accidentia uel aliquid in quo erant illa accidentia. Sed non erat aliqua in quibus essent. Ergo aliquid.

[15] uiuum *D.*

[16] *om.* et tristabatur...tristabatur *A.*

[17] aliqui *P.*

[18] conueniret *A.*

[19] *om.* *B.*

[20] *om.* que sola *A.*

[21] quod *B*] qui *A.*

IX

RATIONES QUIBUS PROBATUR QUOD CHRISTUS ESSENTIALITER ET SUBSTANTIALITER EST HOMO[1]

Si Christus solo habitu est homo, i.e. quia habet hominem ut indumentum et non quia[2] sit aliquid quod sit homo, non sunt hec uera: Deus est homo et homo est Deus, Deus factus est homo et homo factus est Deus. Si enim Deus habet tantummodo hominem et non est aliquid quod sit homo, Deus non est homo. Et si tantummodo habens hominem est Deus et non aliquid quod essentialiter sit homo est Deus, homo non est Deus. Item, si Deus factus est homo et homo factus est Deus, cum nec prius nec posterius factus sit Deus (109va) homo quam homo factus est Deus, quando[3] Deus factus est homo, homo factus est Deus. Sed hoc stare non potest, si uera est traditio illorum contra quos nobis sermo est. Non enim quando Deus factus est homo, i.e. habens naturam humanam, uel ipse uel alius humanam naturam habens factus est Deus. Sicut enim homo hodie fit tunicatus nec tamen tunicatus fit homo, ita secundum quod illi sentiunt dicendum esset quod tunc Deus factus est[4] homo sed non homo factus est Deus. At, inquiunt illi, Deus factus est homo, i.e. habens humanam naturam sibi personaliter unitam; et homo factus est Deus, i.e. ipse Deus habens humanam naturam factus est Deus ens homo. Quod si uerum dicerent, in huiusmodi uiolentis et ridiculis expositionibus non laborarent.[5] Item, si ideo dicitur Christus siue Deus assumpsisse hominem in unitatem persone, quia manens una et eadem persona que prius fuerat accepit sibi tamquam indumentum carnem et animam que prius non habuerat,—ita tamen, ut nec illa duo nec aliquid ex illis fieret illa persona—eadem ratione dici potest quod Spiritus sanctus assumpsit (109^{vb}) columbam in unitatem persone. Nam et ipse Spiritus sanctus,[6] assumpta columba in qua appareret, mansit una et eadem persona que prius fuerat. Hac etiam ratione dicendum est de angelis, quotiens apparuerint in corporibus undecumque assumptis, quod[7] corpora illa assumpserunt in unitatem persone. Quod si dixerint naturam assumptam a Christo esse naturam Christi, sed naturam a Spiritu sancto siue ab angelo non ita assumi ut sit natura Dei assumentis uel angeli, sciant hoc ideo esse quia homo assumptus cum Deo assumente una est persona, cuiusmodi unio inter Spiritum sanctum et columbam fieri non posset, nisi Spiritus sanctus uere columba et ipsa columba uere Spiritus sanctus fieret. Et similiter de angelo et assumpta creatura sentiendum[8] est[9].

Item, si corpus Christi sub specie panis essentialiter corpus Christi est, quanto fortius ipse Christus in propria specie essentialiter homo est. Et utique, quia species illa in altari tantummodo ut uelamentum est, ideo nec species est illius nature, cuius est ipsum corpus nec corpus illius nature, cuius est ipsa species (110ra). Quare similiter et Deus, si habet hominem tantummodo ut uelamentum, nec homo est illius[10] nature cuius est Deus nec econuerso. Quod si Christus essentialiter est homo, cum omnis homo qui uere et proprie dicitur "homo" sit substantialiter homo, et Christus substantialiter est homo. Aut non uere et proprie dicitur homo. Sed, ut dicunt, Christus non uere et proprie[11] dicitur homo, quia etsi uere non tamen proprie. Solo enim habitu et non essentia dicitur homo. quod, ut puto, iam improbatum est et adhuc amplius per sequentia improbabitur.

Item, Christus secundum naturam humanam consubstantialis est matri et natura humana substantialiter[12] matri conuenit. Ergo et Christo. Item, si

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[1] *om.* Rationes...homo *C*] Rationes quibus idem probatur *B*.

[2] *om. A*.

[3] quoniam *D*.

[4] *om. ABP*.

[5] laborant *C*] laborent *D*.

[6] *om.* Spiritus sanctus *C*.

[7] quia *ABDP*.

[8] dicendum *A*.

[9] *add.* est *C*]. Cf. Augustine, *De Trin.* II, 6, 11; PL 42, 851.

[10] ipsius *A*.

[11] uere et non proprie *D*.

[12] consubstantialiter *A*.

Christus non habet humanitatem tamquam sibi substantialem sicut habet beata Uirgo, Christus secundum humanitatem cum beata Uirgine non est eiusdem substantie uel nature. Ille enim habet solummodo tamquam uestimentum, illa habet tamquam substantialem formam siue naturam. Item, nichil est substantiale beate Uirgini quod sit substantiale Christo. Ergo non est Filius homousios matri. Ergo Filius et mater non sunt eiusdem nature uel substantie. Quod si auctores efflagitant, audiant (110^{rb}) illud Ieronimi in sermone illo *Cogitis me:*[13]

> Unus idemque manens[14] Filius unigenitus indisseparatus[15] in utrisque naturis conspicitur.[16] Et que sunt utriusque substantie, naturaliter operabatur secundum unicuique insitam essentialem qualitatem.

Si Christus habuerit essentialem qualitatem humane substantie uel nature, essentialiter fuit homo. Dionysius uero ad Thimotheum episcopum *De Mistica Theologia*[17] ait: *Superessentialis Ihesus humanis naturalibus ueritatibus essentia*[18] *factus est. Augustinus*[19] in libro *De Fide ad Petrum*: *Qui essentialiter natus est de Patre, essentialiter conceptus est et natus de Uirgine.* Item, grecum illud et authenticum nomen "homousios" manifeste declarat quod Christus essentialiter sit homo, cum dicitur a catholicis homousios, i.e. coessentialis siue unius essentie, i.e. nature, cum matre.[20] Quod si Christus non est essentialiter et substantialiter[21] homo, nec secundum quod homo est animal nec corpus nec substantia. Quod uero secundum quod homo sit substantia, quod sit corpus, quod sit animal, sequentia declarabunt.[22] Contra hoc uero quod Christum essentialiter et substantialiter hominem dicimus, multiphariam disputatur (110va).

X

QUE CONTRA OBICI POSSUNT DISSOLUUNTUR ET JOHANNIS DAMASCENI INUOLUCRUM ENODATUR[1]

Substantiale[2] est Christo esse hominem. Ergo destructo homine destruitur Christus. Quod[3] si a nobis simile expetitur, respondemus: Natura humana est natura Christi. Ergo ea destructa destruitur Christus. Non sequitur. Solus enim Christus est *gigas gemine substantie*[4] gemineque[5] nature. Et ideo sicut, antequam mundus fieret, sine natura assumpta extitit ita etiam hodie sine ea existere posset. Aut non tota Trinitas, destructa qualibet[6] creatura, existeret. Similiter et omnibus illis, que ei secundum quod homo substantialia[7] sunt, destructis nichilominus existeret. Aut non existentibus quibusdam creaturis Deus esse desineret. Hoc autem uidemur dicere contra illud Aristotilis:[8]

> Non uidetur secundum quid genus participari, nam non est homo secundum quid animal neque grammatica secundum quid est[9] disciplina.

Et alibi:[10]

> Secundum quid et non simpliciter inesse in[11] solo accidente contingit.

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[13] Abelard, *Sic et Non*, c. 75; PL 178, 1449C. Ps—Jerome, *Ep. IX*, 12; PL 30, 139CD.

[14] *om. D.*

[15] *add.* indiuisus *A*] corrected to inseparatus *C*] insorsparatus *P*.

[16] conspicuus *D*.

[17] *De Mystica Theol.*, c. 3; PL 122, 1174CD.

[18] *om. C.*

[19] *De Fide ad Petrum*, c. 18, 56; PL 40, 771.

[20] Cf. Cassian, *De Incarnatione Christi* IV, 13; PL 50, 171A. Ambrose, *De Fide contra Arianos*, c. 3; PL 17, 586B. Augustine, *Contra Maxim.* II, 3; PL 40, 772. Leo I, *Sermo XXX*, 6; PL 54,233C.

[21] *om.* et substantialiter *C*.

[22] declarabitur *A*.

[1] *om.* Que . . . enodatur *C*] Que contra obici possunt et solent *AD*.

[2] *add.* Obiectio *P*] Obiecta *D*.

[3] *add.* Responsio *DP*.

[4] Augustine, *Contra serm. Arianorum* I, 8, 6; PL 42, 689.

[5] biformisque *B*. Cf. *Sent. III*, 21, 2 (649).

[6] quelibet et *C*.

[7] substantialiter *D*.

[8] *Topic.* IV, 5 (Boethio interpr.); PL 64, 950A.

[9] *om.* secundum quid est *ABP*] *om.* est *C*.

[10] Cf. *Topic.* I, 4; PL 64, 913BC.

[11] *om. D.*

Unde non uidetur dicendum quod aliquid sit substantiale Christo secundum humanam (110^{vb}) naturam, nisi simpliciter sit substantiale. Sed si simpliciter est substantiale, destructum destruitur.[12]

Ad[13] quod dicimus quod stultam facit Deus sapientiam huius mundi. Hec enim omnia philosophica:[14] "Si Uirgo est, numquam peperit; si cecus semel factus est, numquam postea uidit; si est Deus, non est homo; si est uisibilis, non est inuisibilis; si est eternus, non est temporalis"; et huiusmodi infinita, que philosophis uidebantur uerissima, catholicis omnibus constat[15] esse falsissima.[16] Habeant itaque philosophorum documenta locum suum in hiis que secundum naturam se habent, non in hiis que[17] contra naturam mirabiliter fiunt et facta sunt.

Item,[18] obici potest: Hec species homo est substantialis Christo secundum quod homo et non sunt paria. Ergo est aliquid quod est superius Christo. Sed si[19] hec species homo[20] siue aliud aliquid[21] uniuersale est superius Christo, aut non omnia uniuersalia sunt creature aut aliqua creatura est aliquid superius Christo. Item, si aliquod predicabile[22] est superius Christo, aliquid quod non est Deus nec Deo personaliter unitum (111ra) est superius Christo. Simile: Hec predicabilia[23] anima et corpus sunt superiora anima et corpore Christi. Ergo aut hec predicabilia[24] non sunt creature aut alique creature sunt aliqua superiora anima et corpore Christi. Aliud simile: Si hec uniuersalia sunt superiora anima et corpore Christi, aliqua[25] que non sunt Deus nec Deo personaliter unita sunt superiora anima et corpore Christi.

Possem hic nominum[26] equiuocationem distinguere. Dicitur enim superius uel inferius loco, ordine, tempore, dignitate, et forte aliis modis. Ordine quidem, siue descendendi a generalissimis usque[27] ad indiuidua siue ascendendi ab indiuiduis usque ad generalissima, superius est hoc predicabile[28] homo quolibet suo singulari, sed non[29] loco uel dignitate. Sed illud potius existimo et dico, quotiens de Christo uel de qualibet persona in Trinitate siue de ipsa diuina essentia, quotiens etiam de sacramentis et de articulis fidei disputatur: hiis, que logicorum propria sunt, omnino[30] supersedendum est[31] aut si aliquando, ne penitus absint, admittuntur, si tamen[32] perstrepere uelint, statim (111^{rb}) eliminentur tum quia rerum[33] maiestati huiusmodi uerba non competunt, que naturale iudicium rationis non transcendunt, tum etiam quia plerique logice[34] professores molesti sunt interpretes[35] uerborum et aucupes sillabarum.[36] *Aque uero Syloes fluunt cum silentio et in domo Domini non est auditus malleus neque securis audita.*[37]

Preterea[38] illud obicitur Johannis Damasceni:[39]

> Cum unam hominum naturam dicimus, sciendum[40] est quod non considerantes ad anime et corporis rationem hoc dicimus. Impossibile enim est unius nature dicere corpus et animam ad inuicem comparata. Sed quia plurime persone hominum sunt, omnes autem eandem suscipiunt rationem nature— omnes enim ex anima et corpore compositi sunt et omnes naturam anime[41]

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[12] destruit *ABCP.*

[13] *add.* Responsio *BDP.*

[14] *add.* sunt *D.* Cf. *Quaest. in Ep. ad Col.*, qu. 8; PL 175, 583C.

[15] constant *C.*

[16] *om.* catholicis...falsissima *D.*

[17] *add.* autem ubi alique nature *C.*

[18] *add.* Obiectiones *P*] Alie obiectiones *D.*

[19] siue *A.*

[20] om. *ABCP.*

[21] *om.* aliud aliquid *C*] aliquod *C.*

[22] possibile *A*] personale *C.*

[23] possibilia *A.*

[24] possibilia *A.*

[25] *om. C.*

[26] nominis *C.*

[27] *om. C.*

[28] possibile *A*] *om.* homo quolibet suo singulari *C.*

[29] *om. A.*

[30] nomina *C.*

[31] *om. ABDP.*

[32] si quid *C.*

[33] regulariter *BP.*

[34] logices *A.*

[35] interpellatores *D.*

[36] siluarum *A*] litterarum *B.*

[37] *Is.* viii, 6; *III Kings* vi, 7.

[38] *add.* Item, alia ex uerbis Johannis Damasceni admodum inuolutis *D.*

[39] *Sent.* III, 2, 1 (554).

[40] dicendum *D.*

[41] corrected to humanam *C.*

> participant[42] et substantiam corporis possident—communem[43] speciem plurimarum et differentium personarum unam speciem dicimus, uniuscuiusque scilicet persone duas naturas habentis et in duabus perfecte naturis existentis, anime scilicet et corporis. In Domino autem Ihesu Christo non est communem speciem accipere. Neque (111va) enim factus est nec est nec[44] aliquando fiet alius. Sed Christus ex deitate et humanitate in deitate et humanitate Deus perfectus est idem et homo perfectus.[45]

Hic[46] Johannem Damascenum id[47] dicere et sentire putant quod Christo non conuenit hec species homo. Unde confidentius dicunt quod non erat substantialiter homo nec aliquid secundum quod homo. Sed si diligentius totam seriem auctoritatis huius inspicerent, hoc solum hic doceri liquido comperirent quod sicut communis species siue una natura est in omnibus et in singulis hominibus,—eo quod omnes et singuli in duabus et ex duabus perfecte naturis existunt, anime scilicet et corporis—*non* ita *est in Christo communem speciem* siue unam naturam *accipere,* secundum quod ex deitate et humanitate consistit. Unde subdit: *Neque enim factus est,* etc. Quibus uerbis ostendit, quod Christus est Deus et homo,[48] non esse ei commune cum aliis. Alioquin si hoc dicere et probare uoluit quod hec species homo non conuenit Christo, hac ratione qua illud probat probari similiter posset, quod diuinitas non conuenit[49] Christo. Sicut (111^{vb}) enim non est tantum homo ita nec est tantum Deus, sed perfectus homo et perfectus Deus.

Uidetur autem potius contra hereticos disputare qui dicebant esse unam speciem siue naturam in Christo ex duabus compositam.[50] Unde idem Johannes:[51]

> Inconuerse et inalterabiliter unite sunt ad inuicem nature, neque diuina distante a propria simplicitate neque humana aut[52] conuersa in deitatis naturam aut in non-existentiam[53] diuisa neque ex duabus una facta composita natura. Composita enim natura neutri earum, ex quibus componitur naturis, homousia, i.e. consubstantialis,[54] esse potest, ex altero perficiens[55] alterum, ut corpus ex quatuor elementis compositum nec ignis nominatur nec terra nec aer nec aqua nec horum alicui homousion dicitur. Si igitur secundum hereticos Christus unius composite nature post unionem extitit,[56] ex simplici natura[57] conuersus est in compositam, et neque Patri simplicis nature existenti[58] neque matri est homousios et neque Deus neque homo denominabitur,[59] sed Christus solum. Et (112ra) erit hoc nomen, scilicet Christus, non persone ipsius nomen sed unius, secundum eos, composite nature.[60] Nos autem Christum[60] non unius composite nature dogmatizamus et hoc nomen, scilicet Christus, persone dicimus non monotropos, i.e. non uno modo dictum, sed duarum naturarum esse significatiuum, scilicet deitatis et humanitatis. Ex deitate autem[61] et humanitate Deum perfectum et hominem perfectum eundem et esse et dici ex duabus et in duabus naturis confitemur.

Ecce hic plane ostendit quod hoc nomen Christus non significat unam compositam naturam sed duas naturas, i.e. unam personam duarum naturarum. Unde supra dixit: *In Domino Ihesu Christo non est communem speciem accipere,* scilicet[62] unam compositam naturam ex deitate et humanitate. Aut forte ideo dixit: *In Christo non est communem speciem accipere,* species enim est totum esse[63] indiuiduorum et commune omnibus suis indiuiduis. Hec uero species homo non est totum esse Christi, quia Deus est et homo, quod non est ei commune cum aliis. Et hoc est: *Neque enim factus est,* etc.

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[42] percipiant *A.*
[43] cum ueram *A.*
[44] *om.* nec est *ACD.*
[45] *add.* est *B.*
[46] Sic *A.*
[47] non idem *C.*
[48] *om.* et homo *D.*
[49] esset in *C.*
[50] *add.* naturis *D.*
[51] *Sent.* III, 7, 2 (585).
[52] ut *C.*
[53] (in) existentia *CD.*
[54] i.e. qualis *C.*
[55] proficiens *A.*
[56] existit *CD.*
[57] simplicitate nature *B.*
[58] existendi *A.*
[59] dinoscitur *C.*
[60] *om. C.*
[61] *om. C.*

Boetius[64] uero *Contra Euticen et Nestorium*[65] duas (112^{rb}) naturas in Christo duas dicit specificas differentias, acsi diceret substantiales. Nec enim Deus species est nec diuinitas specifica[66] differentia, nec etiam proprie differentia, cum sit substantia. Humanitas uero multo rectius specifica differentia siue substantialis qualitas quam substantia dici potest, quod tamen illi asserunt qui humanitatem[67] in Christo non naturam uel proprietatem, que sit ei[68] communis cum aliis hominibus, sed uel animam uel carnem uel hec duo simul intelligunt. Sed de hiis suo loco disputabitur.

Ecce Boetius specificam differentiam, scilicet humanitatem, dicit conuenire Christo. Quod si hec[69] specifica differentia ei conuenit, et ipsa species eidem conuenit. Quoniam itaque omnia que proposite ueritati repugnare uidentur facillime dissoluuntur, confidenter asserendum est quod Christus essentialiter et substantialiter est homo sicut[70] essentialiter et substantialiter est Deus. Et ita secundum quod Deus est aliquid et secundum quod homo est aliud.[71] Quod autem secundum has naturas[72] sit aliud et aliud, sacris (112va) auctoritatibus, solidissimis scilicet[73] fundamentis, innititur.

XI

AUCTORITATES QUIBUS PROBATUR QUOD CHRISTUS EST ALIUD ET ALIUD[1]

Augustinus *Super Johannem:*[2]

> Aliud est Uerbum Dei, aliud homo. Sed *Uerbum caro factum est,* i.e. homo. Non itaque alia Uerbi, alia hominis persona, quoniam utrumque Christus et una persona.[3]

Idem *Ad Felicianum:*[4] *Aliud Dei Filius, aliud hominis Filius, sed non alius.*
Item,[5] *Dei Filius aliud de Patre, aliud de matre.* Item Leo Papa:[6] Christus

> etsi unum manet ab eternitate, aliud tamen cepit esse a tempore. Que tamen in unitatem conuenerunt, nec separationem possunt habere nec finem.

Item, Augustinus *De Trinitate:*[7]

> Forma Dei accepit formam serui, utrumque Deus, utrumque homo, sed utrumque Deus propter accipientem Deum, utrumque homo[8] propter acceptum hominem.

Idem in libro *De Trinitate:*[9]

> Cum legitur *Uerbum caro factum,* in Uerbo[10] intelligo uerum Dei Filium, in carne agnosco uerum hominis Filium,[11] utrumque simul unam personam, Deum et hominem, ineffabilis gratie largitate coniunctum.

Idem *Super Johannem*[12] (112^{vb}):

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[62] sed. *D.*

[63] *add.* Christi *B.*

[64] Bonus *A.*

[65] *Contra Eutychen et Nestorium* c. 4; ed. Stewart-Rand, *Boethius, The Theol. Tractates* (London, 1926), p. 92.

[66] specificata *B.*

[67] *om.* qui humanitatem *C.*

[68] eis *D.*

[69] *om. ABCD.*

[70] sic *B.*

[71] aliquid *D.*

[72] *add.* diuersas *C.*

[73] *add.* est iudicandum *C.*

[1] *om.* Auctoritates...aliud *C*] *om.* Auctoritates quibus probatur *ADP.*

[2] *Sent.* III, 7, 2 (584).

[3] *om.* quoniam...persona *D.*

[4] *Sent.* III, 7, 2 (584).

[5] Cf. *Ysagoge* II; ed. Landgraf, *Ecrits théol. de l'école d'Abélard* (Louvain, 1934), p. 162.

[6] *Sermo XXX,* 6; PL 54, 234A.

[7] *om.* Augustinus De Trinitate *C.* Augustine, *De Trin.* I, 7, 14; PL 42, 829.

[8] *om.* sed utrumque...homo *A.*

[9] *Sent.* III, 6, 2 (574).

[10] Uerbum *D.*

[11] *om.* in carne...Filium *A.*

[12] *In Joh. Tr.* XXXVII, 10; PL 35, 1675.

> Utrumque[13] nouimus in Christo: et unde equalis est Patri et unde illo maior est Pater.[14] Illud Uerbum est, illud[15] caro; illud Deus est, illud homo. Sed unus est Christus, Deus et homo.

Idem *Super Johannem:*[16]

> *Qui credit in me,* etc. Quia homo apparebat, Deus in homine latebat, ne putarent eum hoc tantum esse quod uidebant. Uult se credi talem et tantum qualis et quantus est Pater.

Item, super Psalmum illum: *Exaltabo te, Domine, quoniam suscepisti me:*[17]

> Christus nec Deus tantum nec homo tantum est, sicut diuersi heretici dogmatizauerunt, sed uerus Deus et uerus homo.[18] Non duo tamen sed unus est Christus.

Item, in *Encheridion:*[19]

> Christus Ihesus Deus de Deo[20] est. Homo autem natus est de Spiritu sancto ex Maria Uirgine, utraque substantia, diuina scilicet et humana, Filius unicus Dei Patris omnipotentis, ex quo procedit. Utrumque unus, sed aliud propter Uerbum, aliud propter hominem. Non duo filii Deus et homo, sed unus Dei Filius, Deus sine initio, homo a certo initio.

Idem *Super Johannem:*[21]

> Agnoscamus geminam substantiam Christi, diuinam scilicet qua equalis[22] est Patri et humanam qua maior est Pater.[23] Utrumque enim simul non duo sed unus est Christus.

Idem in libro *De Fide ad Petrum:*[24]

> Firmissime tene et nullatenus dubites Dei *Uerbum* quod *caro factum est* duas naturas inconfusibiliter[25] permanere: unam diuinam quam habet communem[26] cum Patre, alteram humanam secundum quam dicit: *Pater maior me est*[27] (113^{ar}).

Idem in libro *De Trinitate:*[28]

> Cum Filius sit Deus et homo, alia substantia Deus, alia[29] homo.

Idem *Super Johannem:*[30]

> Anima et corpus due res sunt, sed unus est homo. Uerbum et homo due res sunt sed unus Christus.

Item, Boetius *Contra Euticen et Nestorium:*[31]

> Si hominem Christum intelligas, idem homo atque Deus, quoniam homo ex natura, Deus autem ex assumptione. Si uero Deum intelligas, idem Deus est atque homo, quoniam natura[32] Deus est, homo assumptione. Suntque in eo gemina natura geminaque substantia, quoniam homo et Deus una persona est, quoniam idem homo atque Deus.

Sed hic insurgunt qui contra nos sunt, quia dicit Boetius: Deus *est Deus natura, homo assumptione,* acsi dictum sit[33] quod Christus sit[34] natura Deus, homo uero non natura sed assumptione. Quod non est uerum. Ideo enim ita distinxit Boetius, quia Deus est Deus natura et non ex assumptione, homo uero ita est natura quod assumptione, sicut dicitur "Deus est Deus natura, Saluator est[35] gratia," quia quod Deus est, hoc est solius nature, quod Saluator est, hoc est nature[36] ita quod gratie. Sed respondeant ipsi,[37] quomodo homo Christus (113$^{\mathrm{rb}}$) est homo ex natura, Deus autem ex assumptione. Non enim homo Christus, i.e. Christus habens hominem, est habens hominem[38] ex natura et Deus[39] ex assumptione. Immo potius est Deus ex natura, homo ex assumptione. Quanto igitur uerius est quod nos cum Boetio sentimus, quia homo ille homo est ex natura sua, sed Deus ex assumptione, i.e. quia a Deo in unitatem persone assumptus est. Et idem ipse Deus ex propria natura, sed homo ex assumptione, i.e. quia hominem assumpsit. Assumptio autem non excludit naturam, sed modum insinuat habendi naturam, quia qui per naturam eternam Deus est, per naturam ex tempore assumptam homo est.

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[13] uterque *A.*

[14] unde ille maior Patre *C.*

[15] illa *C.*

[16] *In Joh. Tr.* LIV, 2; PL 35, 1781. *John* xii, 44.

[17] *Ps.* xxix, 2; Lombard, *In Ps.* xxix, 2; PL 191, 292B. Cf. Augustine, *Enarr. in Ps.* xxix, 2; PL 36, 217.

[18] *add.* est *C.*

[19] *Sent.* III, 6, 2 (574).

[20] eodem *B.*

[21] *Sent.* III, 6, 2 (575).

[22] equalem *A.*

[23] qua minor est Patre *C.*

[24] Fulgentius, *De Fide ad Petrum,* c. 16, 59; PL 40, 772.

[25] inconuersibilis *A.*

[26] communionem *A.*

[27] *om.* Idem in...me est *C.*

[28] *Sent.* III, 7, 2 (584).

[29] *add.* quam *C.*

[30] *In Joh. Tr.* XLVII, 12; PL 35, 1739.

[31] *Contra Eutychen,* c. 7; ed. Stewart-Rand, *op. cit.,* p. 118.

[32] natura homo est, Deus ex assumptione *D.*

[33] diceret *D.*

[34] *om.* quod Christus sit *A.*

[35] *om. D.*

Ex premissis liquido demonstratur quod Christus est aliud et aliud et quod[40] alia et alia substantia. Unde patet quod secundum quod homo est aliquid et secundum quod Deus est aliud. Similiter secundum quod homo est aliqua[41] substantia et secundum quod Deus est alia[42] substantia. Alioquin si Christus non est aliud,[43] et aliud,[44] Christus non est Deus (113$^{\mathrm{va}}$) et homo. Si enim Christus est Deus et non aliud,[45] Christus[46] est tantum Deus. Item, si Christus est homo et non aliud,[47] Christus est tantum homo. Ergo[48] si Christus est Deus[49] et non aliud uel homo[50] et non aliud, Christus non est Deus et homo. Sed[51] Christus est Deus et homo. Ergo Christus est Deus et aliud et est[52] homo et aliud. Quare Christus est aliud et aliud.

XII

AUCTORITATES QUE HIIS CONTRARIE UIDENTUR[1]

Augustinus in *Encheridion:*[2]

> Que bona uoluntas, que bona opera precesserunt, quibus mereretur ille homo fieri una persona cum Deo? Numquid antea fuit homo et hoc ei singulare beneficium prestitum est, ut singulariter promereretur Deum? Nempe ex quo homo esse cepit, non aliud cepit esse homo quam Dei Filius et hoc unicus et propterea Dei Uerbum, quia ab illo suscepta[3] caro facta est[4] utique Deus, ut quemadmodum est una persona quilibet homo,[5] anima scilicet rationalis et caro, ita sit Christus una persona, Deus et homo.

Item, Hylarius in libro *De Trinitate:*[6]

> Quero an Filius hominis idem sit[7] et Filius Dei et, cum aliud non sit Filius hominis neque aliud Filius Dei, *Uerbum caro factum,*[8] et cum qui (113$^{\mathrm{vb}}$) Filius Dei est ipse et hominis sit Filius, requiro quis in hoc Filio hominis qui et Filius Dei est glorificatus sit.

Hoc autem absque preiudicio ita solui posse conicimus ut, sicut Augustinus[9] alibi de personis[10] dicit "tria" pro "tres", ita et hic "aliud"[11] ponatur pro

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[36] *om.* quod Saluator...nature *D.*

[37] Christi *A.*

[38] *om.* est habens hominem *C.*

[39] *add.* autem *A.*

[40] *om. C.*

[41] alia *D.*

[42] aliqua *A.*

[43] aliquid *C.*

[44] *om.* aliud et aliud *C.*

[45] *om.* et non aliud *C*] *add.* Christus non est aliquid *C.*

[46] *om. C.*

[47] aliquid *C.*

[48] *C* reads as follows: Ergo si Christus est Deus et homo, Christus est Deus et homo, Christus est Deus et aliquid et est homo et aliquid. Quare Christus aliud et aliud.

[49] homo *A.*

[50] Deus *A.*

[51] Si *BP.*

[52] *om. BDP.*

[1] *om.* Auctoritates...uidentur *C*] Quedam que hiis contraria uidentur *ADP.*

[2] *Sent.* III, 6, 2 (575).

[3] suscepto *AC.*

[4] Augustine wrote: quod illo suscepto caro facta est. Lombard reads: quod illa suscepta caro facta est *or* quod ab illo suscepta...

[5] *om. C.*

[6] Cf. *Sent.* III, 7, 2 (585). Hilary, *De Trin.* IX, 40; PL 10, 313A.

[7] Deus *D.*

[8] *add.* est *D.*

[9] Cf. *Sent.* I, 23, 1 (148).

[10] propriis *C.*

[11] aliquid *C.*

"alius",[12] quod patet in prosecutione. Augustinus enim ita concludit sententiam: *Una persona, Deus et homo.* Non dicit: una substantia uel una natura. Similiter accipiatur illud Hylarii, uel quia non dicit[13] Hylarius simpliciter: *Cum aliud non sit Filius hominis neque aliud Filius Dei,* sed mox addit: *Uerbum caro factum.* Non negat quin aliud sit Filius hominis, aliud Filius Dei, sed dicit quod non est aliud homo Christus, aliud Deus homo. Cum enim dicitur Deus homo siue Uerbum caro, ita[14] persone unitas exprimitur, ut utraque natura designetur. Unde non est dicendum: *Aliud Filius hominis,*[15] *aliud Filius Dei,*[16] *Uerbum caro,* ne preter diuinam[17] et humanam tertia[18] natura intelligatur in Christo. Uel ideo dicitur: *Non est aliud Filius Dei, aliud Filius*[19] *hominis,* quia nichil est Filius Dei quod non sit Filius hominis, et econuerso,[20] licet Filius Dei sit unum et (114ra) aliud et Filius hominis sit unum et aliud; sicut non est alterius nature Filius Dei *quam* Filius hominis, cum tamen et Filius Dei et Filius hominis sit unius et alterius nature. Quod uero alibi dicitur:[21] *Aliud* est *Filius Dei, aliud Filius hominis,* ita accipiendum est: *Aliud*[22] *Filius Dei* secundum quod Filius Dei, *aliud*[23] *Filius hominis* secundum quod Filius hominis. Non quod aliquid sit Filius Dei quod non sit Filius hominis,[24] uel econuerso. Uel ita: *Aliud est Filius Dei, aliud*[25] *Filius hominis,* i.e. alia est hec natura, alia est illa. Sepe enim essentialia pro personalibus et personalia pro essentialibus posita reperiuntur.

Item, Ieronimus in epistola illa: *Cogitis me, o Paula et Eustochium* ait:[26]

> Altitudinem tanti misterii diligenter intelligere et uidere non potuerunt, qui aut duos filios certe aut aliud Christum quam Dei Filium existimauere.

Hic uidetur Ieronimus cum illis sentire, qui dicunt quod Christus nichil aliud est quam Deus, nichil aliud quam Dei Filius. Et ita non est Christus aliud et aliud. Possumus et hic dicere quod genus pro specie[27] posuit. Unde et quidam libri planius habent "alium, non "aliud". Uel quia hec auctoritas duas (114^{rb}) hereses percutit: unam illorum qui dicunt duas personas secundum duas naturas esse in Christo et ideo asserunt duos esse filios, alium Dei Filium,[28] alium hominis filium; alteram illorum qui Christum tantum creaturam esse credunt,[29] illud sic intelligendum uidetur: *Aliud Christum quam Dei Filium existimauere,* aliud omnino quam Dei Filium, i.e. disparatum, scilicet hoc solummodo quod non est Dei Filius. Creaturam enim tantum et non Filium Dei putauerunt. Contra quos[30] illud promulgatum est:[31] *Filius a Patre solo est, non factus, nec creatus, sed genitus.*

Idem in eadem epistola:[32]

> Sciuit Deus ac[33] potuit[34] in utero Uirginis sine sui corruptione misceri atque uniri, ut unus esset Christus, Deus et homo, una persona unaque subsistentia.[35]

Ubi notandum quod multi hodie corrupte scribunt et legunt[36] pro subsistentia substantia,[37] cum ipse Ieronimus sic accipiat subsistentiam sicut greci ypostasim, substantiam uero siue essentiam sicut illi usiam, quod[38] ex ipsa lectione totius epistole cuilibet legenti manifestum est. Uerumtamen (114va) si quis librorum multitudini credendum existimat quod Ieronimus ita scripserit: "una persona unaque substantia", substantiam[39] pro subsistentia, i.e. pro persona, secundum greci sermonis ydioma incunctanter accipiat. Unde Augustinus in quinto libro *De Trinitate:*[40]

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[12] aliis *C.*
[13] *add.* illud *A.*
[14] ibi *B.*
[15] *om. A*] Dei *C.*
[16] hominis *C.*
[17] *add.* naturam *A.*
[18] altera *C.*
[19] *om.* Dei aliud Filius *CD.*
[20] nec conuerso *C.*
[21] *Sent.* III, 7, 2 (584)
[22] *add.* est *D.*
[23] *add.* est *CP.*
[24] *om.* Non quod...hominis *A.*
[25] *add.* est *CD.*
[26] *Ep.* IX, 10: PL 30, 137C
[27] genere *ABDP.* John intends to say that *aliud* expresses the genus 'substance', while *alius* designates the species 'man'.
[28] *om. BP.*
[29] dicunt. Credunt *C.*
[30] quod *D.*
[31] *Symbolum 'Quicunque'.*
[32] Ps-Jerome, *Ep. IX*, 5; PL 30, 131C.
[33] aut *C*] et *D.*
[34] potius *A.*
[35] substantia *ABDP* and Migne (PL 30, 131C).
[36] *om.* et legunt *D.*
[37] The reading *subsistentia,* required by John's context, is also found in Walter of St. Victor, *Contra IV Labyr. Franciae* II; ed. B. Geyer, *Beiträge* 7 (1909), 187*.

> Plerique nostrorum qui greco tractant eloquio dicere consueuerunt "mian usian, tres ypostases", quod est latine: unam essentiam, tres substantias. Sed quia nostra loquendi consuetudo iam optinuit, ut hoc intelligatur cum dicimus "essentiam" quod intelligitur cum dicimus "substantiam", non audemus dicere "unam essentiam et tres substantias", sed "unam substantiam uel essentiam, tres autem personas."

Idem in VII:[41]

> Loquendi causa de ineffabilibus ut fari aliquo modo possemus dictum est a grecis "una essentia, tres substantie" (i.e. una usia, tres ypostases. Aliter enim greci accipiunt substantiam quam latini). A latinis uero dictum est "una essentia uel substantia, tres persone", quia[42] non aliter in sermone nostro, i.e. latino, essentia quam substantia solet[43] intelligi (114^{vb}).

Quod si Ieronimus unam solam[44] in Christo substantiam assereret, i.e. naturam siue essentiam, non modo aliis catholicis sed etiam sibi contrarius esset. Ait enim in *Expositione catholice fidei:*[45]

> Sic confitemur in Christo unam Filii esse personam, ut dicamus duas perfectas et integras esse substantias, i.e. deitatis et humanitatis, que ex anima continetur et corpore.

Cui auctoritati miror magistrum Petrum Lumbardum istud subscripsisse:[46]

> Ecce aperte ostendit humanitatis nomine animam et corpus intelligi. Errant igitur qui nomine humanitatis non substantiam sed proprietatem quandam, a qua homo nominatur, significari contendunt.

Hoc uero si Ieronimus sentiret, non duas diceret sed tres substantias. Humanitas enim, quam dixit ex anima contineri et corpore, si[47] non est aliqua natura, i.e. substantialis proprietas, sed substantia, *uel* corpus est *uel* anima, cum ex hiis, ut aiunt, in Christo aliquid constare non possit. Sed nec corpus nec anima ex corpore continetur et anima. Unde dicimus hanc auctoritatem ita potius intelligendam: Sic confitemur in Christo unam Filii esse personam, ut dicamus duas (115ra) perfectas et integras esse substantias, i.e. deitatis et humanitatis, hoc est Dei et hominis, qui homo ex anima continetur et corpore. Uel aliter: duas substantias, scilicet duas naturas, i.e. deitatis et humanitatis, intransitiue, i.e. que sunt deitas et humanitas, que humanitas ex anima continetur et corpore, i.e. ex natura anime et ex natura corporis. Humanitas enim est natura composita ex natura corporis et natura anime. Que est autem illa substantia, quam magister Petrus dicit humanitatis nomine significari? Qua enim ratione animam magis quam corpus aut corpus magis quam animam significat? Quod si hec duo significat, non substantiam sed substantias potius significat. Quare humanitas Christi non est aliquid sed aliqua.

Item, cum dicitur humanitas Christi est anima, humanitas Christi est[48] corpus,[49] humanitas Christi[50] est corpus et anima, idem est corpus quod anima et idem est corpus quod corpus et anima.[51] Si[52] hee locutiones uere sunt et in eis idem supponitur, idem est corpus quod anima et idem est corpus quod corpus et anima et idem est anima quod corpus et anima. Sed humanitas Christi est unum numero. Ergo si ipsa est anima, non est corpus et si ipsa est corpus, non est anima. Item, humanitas Christi est una sola substantia. Ergo ipsa non est anima et corpus. Quod si aliud hic subicitur: "humanitas (115^{rb}) Christi est corpus", et aliud hic: "humanitas Christi est anima", et non est una humanitas nec[53] unum aliquid quod sit corpus Christi et anima uel ex illis constans, potius dicendus esset Christus trium[54] naturarum quam duarum.[55] Tres enim sunt nature: natura diuina, natura anime, natura corporis. Et dicendus esset trine substantie potius quam gemine. Errant ergo potius illi qui nomine humanitatis substantialem proprietatem, a qua homo nominatur, significari negant. Sed sicut prediximus, que uel in scriptis suis uel in disputationibus[56] asseruisse magister Petrus credebatur, postea nobis non asserenda sed studiosius discutienda reliquit.

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[38] quia *A.*

[39] *om. B*] substantia *A.*

[40] *De Trin.* V, 8, 10; PL 42, 917

[41] *Sent.* I, 23, 2 (148).

[42] quod *B.*

[43] *add.* accipiet *A.*

[44] *om. D.*

[45] *Sent.* III, 2, 1 (554). Ps-Pelagius, *Libellus fidei,* n. 9; PL 48, 489D.

[46] *Sent.* III, 2, 1 (554)

[47] *om. D*] *Humanitas,* he argues, is a composite nature, not one or two substances, for, if it is but one substance, it is either the body or the soul, not both body *and* soul. Otherwise Christ would consist of three substances.

[48] *om.* anima...est *A.*

[49] *om.* humanitas...corpus *C.*

[50] *om.* est anima...Christi *D.*

Est ergo Christus aliud et aliud, et alia et alia substantia. Alioquin, si tantum esset diuina[57] substantia, non esset animal nec corpus.

XIII

AUCTORITATES QUIBUS PROBATUR QUOD CHRISTUS EST ANIMAL ET CORPUS[1]

Quod autem Christus sit animal,[2] dicit Beda super Marchum, *Aliud non manifactum edificabo:*[3] *Dominus dixit,*[4] *Suscitabo uiuum animal*[5] *significans et spirans templum.* Item, quod sit corpus, i.e. corporea (115^{va}) substantia, dicit Ieronimus super illum locum in euangelio Matthei,[6] *Et descendens Petrus de nauicaula,* etc.:

> Ecce[7] Petrus super aquas ambulauit. Ne ergo dubites Christum uerum corpus esse, etsi super aquas ambulauit.

Item, Augustinus:[8]

> Tristitiam sic assumpsit quomodo carnem, (sed uoluntate, non necessitate). Fuit enim tristis, ut euangelium dicit. Si enim tristis non[9] fuit, cum euangelium dicat, *Tristis est anima mea usque ad mortem,*[10] ergo et quando dicit: Dormiuit Ihesus, non dormiuit, uel cum dicit manducasse, non manducauit. Et ita nichil sanum relinquitur ut etiam dicatur quia corpus non erat uerum.

Item, super Lucam legitur:[11]

> Corpus Christi granum sinapis quod[12] accipiens Ioseph in orto sepeliuit, quod postea in resurrectione et ascensione creuit et expandit ramos, predicatores[13] per totum mundum mittens.

Hic autem corpus Christi non uidetur accipiendum de parte hominis que cum anima constituit hominem. Illa enim non misit predicatores, sed illud totum, illa scilicet corporea substantia, que est quoddam totum siue compositum (115^{vb}) quod est Christus. Nemo autem sanctis doctoribus insultet propter illud documentum Aristotelis:[14]

> Latent autem quandoque et totum in partem ponentes ut animal corpus

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[51] *om.* idem est corpus quod anima...anima *ABCP.*

[52] Sed *DP.*

[53] uero *B.*

[54] duarum *A.*

[55] trium *A.*

[56] *add.* de homine assumpto *C.*

[57] una *A*] diuna *D.*

[1] *om.* Auctoritates...corpus *AC*] Quod Christus est animal et corpus *DP.*

[2] anima *D.*

[3] *Mark* xiv, 58. Bede, *In Marc.;* PL 92, 280C.

[4] dicit *D*] *add.* super Johannem *B.*

[5] *om.* uiuum animal *C.*

[6] *Matth.* xiv, 29.

[7] *Glossa ordinaria;* PL 114, 137A. Bede, *In Matth.* xiv, 29; PL 91, 73C.

[8] *Sent.* III, 15, 2 (617).

[9] *om. A.*

[10] *Mark* xiv, 34.

[11] *marg.* Beda *P.* Luke xvii, 6. Bede, *In Matth.* xiii, 31; PL 92, 68AB.

[12] quia *ABP.*

[13] *add.* ecclesie *C.*

[14] *Topic.* IV, 5; PL 64, 950B.

> sensibile. Nullo enim modo pars de toto predicatur. Quare non erit corpus genus animalis eo quod pars est.

Hinc enim garriunt multi quod nullus homo sit corpus, acsi melius ista intelligant quam Porfirius et Boetius et alii omnes siue interpretes Aristotelis siue expositores. Nec attendunt quod corpus multipliciter accipitur. Aliquando enim significat quandam continuam quantitatem, aliquando idem quod corporea substantia, aliquando partem animalis que cum anima constituit animal,[15] aliquando cadauer, aliquando collectionem quandam, ut cum dicitur: Populus est unum corpus. Contra illos loquitur Aristoteles, qui partem animalis dicebant genus animalis. Fuerunt enim qui dicerent quod animal nichil aliud esset[16] quam corpus animalis.[17] Alii uero dicebant quod animal nichil aliud esset quam anima animalis.[18] Unde *Animus cuiusque is est quisque.*[19] Cui erat contraria sententia: Corpus cuiusque hoc est quisque. Et utique, (116ra) sicut ab eruditis accepimus, apud grecos manifestum est quod in illa diffinitione "corpus sensibile", prout eam reprehendit Aristoteles, primo uocabulo non totum omnium corporum sed pars tantummodo animalis intelligenda sit. Quod uero Christus secundum humanitatem sit quoddam totum, tam auctoritatibus quam rationibus comprobatur.

XIV

AUCTORITATES QUIBUS PROBATUR QUOD CHRISTUS EST ALIQUOD TOTUM SIUE COMPOSITUM[1]

Augustinus *Super Johannem:*[2]

> Dominus Ihesus Christus totum quod uidebatur et tenebatur et crucifigebatur? Num[3] totum hoc ipse est? Ipse est quidem, sed non totus. Illud quod uiderunt Iudei, non hoc totus Christus. Et quid est? *In principio erat Uerbum.*

Idem in eodem:[4]

> Quia homo constat ex carne et anima, totus autem homo in Christo. Non enim partem deteriorem suscepisset et partem meliorem deseruisset. Pars quippe hominis melior est anima quam corpus. Quia ergo totus homo in Christo, quid est Christus? Uerbum, inquam, et homo. Quid est Uerbum et homo? Uerbum, anima et caro.

Item, Johannes Crisostomus:[5]

> Quia ergo pueri communicauerunt carni et sanguini,[6] et ipse[7] similiter participauit[8] eisdem, i.e. pueris, quia (116^{rb}) factus est puer constans ex carne et anima.

Item, Augustinus *Super Johannem:*[9]

> *Uerbum caro factum est,* i.e. Deus homo factus est in anima rationali et carne.

Usus namque scripture est[10] aliquando per solam animam totum significare hominem, aliquando per solam carnem.[11] Per solam animam ut: *Descendit Iacob in Egiptum in LXX animabus.* Per solam carnem ut Ysaias: *Et uidebit omnis caro salutare Dei.*[12] Sic ergo dictum est *Uerbum caro factum est*, quasi diceretur: Deus homo factus est.

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[15] *om.* que cum...animal *D.*

[16] est *C.*

[17] *om.* Fuerunt...animalis *D.*

[18] Cf. Seneca, *Ep. CVI*, 4. Chalcidius, *In Tim. Platonis;* ed. F. G. A. Mullach, *Fragm. phil. graec.* II (Paris, 1867), pp. 224 and 229.

[19] Cicero, *Somnium Scipionis* II, 12, 7; ed. F. E. Rockwood (Boston, 1903), p. 17. Macrobius, *Comm. in Somnium Scipionis* II, 12, 7; ed. F. Eyssenhardt (Leipzig, 1893), p. 625 ascribes the doctrine to Plotinus. Cf. Hugh of St. Victor, *De Sacramentis* II, 1, 11; PL 176, 408A.

[1] *om.* Auctoritates...compositum *CD*] *om.* Auctoritates quibus probatur *AP.*

[2] *In Joh. Tr.* III, 4; PL 35, 1397.

[3] Non *C.*

[4] *In Joh. Tr.* XLVII, 9; PL 35, 1737.

[5] Lombard, *In Heb.* ii, 13; PL 192, 421A.

[6] Quia ergo piam communicauerunt carnem et sanguinem *C.*

[7] ipsi *D.*

[8] participant *CD.*

[9] Cf. *Enchiridion* 35, 10; PL 40, 249.

[10] *om.* scripture est D.

[11] Cf. Augustine, *Ep. CXL*, 4, 12; CSEL 44, 163. Fulgentius, *Ep. XVII*, 9; PL 65, 461A.

[12] *Gen.* xxiv, 26; *Is.* xxxii, 10.

Idem:[13]

> Accedit[14] homo ad Deum et fit una persona, ut non sit demi-Deus, quasi ex parte Dei Deus et ex parte hominis homo, sed totus Deus et totus homo.

Item, Hylarius:[15] *Homini adquirebatur, ut Deus esset.* Numquid diuinitati eius? Numquid anime uel carni? Non utique, sed homini constanti ex utroque.[16]

Idem:[17]

> Christum[18] non ambigimus esse Deum Uerbum. Neque[19] rursum Filium hominis ex anima et corpore constitisse[20] ignoramus.

Ieronimus in *Expositione catholice fidei:*[21]

> Sic[22] confitemur in Christo unam Filii esse personam, ut dicamus duas perfectas et integras esse substantias, i.e. deitatis et (116va) humanitatis, que[23] ex anima continetur et corpore.

Item, Athanasius:[24]

> Maledictus qui totum hominem quem assumpsit Dei Filius denuo assumptum uel liberatum tertia die a mortuis resurrexisse non confitetur.[25] Fiat, fiat.

Idem:[26]

> Perfectus Deus, perfectus homo, ex anima rationali et humana carne subsistens.

XV

RATIONES QUIBUS IDEM PROBATUR[1]

Christus habet corpus humanum. Illud constat ex partibus suis. Ergo ille partes sunt partes Christi uel alicuius quod est Christus. Item, Christus habet membra humana, caput, brachia, etc. Illa sunt membra Christi. Ergo sunt partes Christi. Item, cum Christus sit homo, aut est homo habens partes aut non habens. Si nullas habet partes, cum naturale sit homini habere partes, Christus caret partibus. Si caret omnibus partibus hominis, caret anima et corpore, quod absit. Item, aliqua[2] est[3] statura Christi, que non est nec esse potest rei simplicis. Ergo Christus est aliqua res composita. Item, Christus maior est secundum tres dimensiones corporis aliquo[4] composito. Ergo aut aliquod simplex secundum has (116^{vb}) tres dimensiones maius est aliquo[5] composito aut Christus est aliquod compositum. Item, si Christus sine incremento membrorum suorum non creuit, sine incremento partium suarum non creuit. Ergo aliqua pars eius creuit. Ergo erat aliquod totum siue aliquod compositum. Mira autem hebetudo hominum, qui non attendunt quod nec oculus nec digitus hominis possit esse, quin sit aliquod compositum. Quanto minus totus homo et integer potest[6] esse, quin sit aliquod compositum. Nec nos preterit Christum aliter dici totum siue compositum.

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[13] Ideo *C*] *add.* Augustinus *D*] *om.* Accedit ...Deus et *D*.

[14] Lombard, *In Gal.* iii, 20; PL 192,130B. Augustine, *Sermo CCXCIII*, 7; PL 38, 1332.

[15] *om. C.* Hilary, *De Trin.* IX, 39; PL 10, 310A.

[16] *marg.* ex utrisque *C*.

[17] *Sent.* III, 6, 2 (576).

[18] *om. A.*

[19] *om. D.*

[20] *add.* non *D*.

[21] *Sent.* III, 2, 1 (554).

[22] Si *C*.

[23] qui *C*.

[24] *om. C. Sent.* III, 21, 1 (646).

[25] *om.* non confitetur *A*.

[26] *Symbolum 'Quicunque'.*

[1] *om.* Rationes...probatur *CD*.

[2] aut *C*.

[3] *add.* natura uel *D*.

[4] alio *D*.

[5] alio *D*.

[6] possit *D*.

XVI

AUCTORITATES QUIBUS PROBATUR QUOD CHRISTUS ALITER DICITUR TOTUM[1]

Augustinus in libro *Sententiarum Prosperi:*[2]

> Christi persona constat et conficitur ex Deo et homine, cum ipse Christus uerus sit Deus et uerus homo.

Idem in libro *De Trinitate:*[3]

> Ex utraque substantia diuinitatis et humanitatis unus atque idem est[4] Deus, Dei et hominis Filius, Ihesus Christus, ut Deus uerus ita et homo uerus.

Item:[5]

> Sic Deo coniungi potuit humana natura, ut ex duabus substantiis fieret una persona. Ac per hoc constat ex tribus: Deo, anima et carne.

Item, Johannes Damascenus:[6]

> In Domino nostro Ihesu Christo duas naturas cognoscimus, (117ra) unam autem ypostasim ex utrisque compositam. Incarnatus est igitur Christus ex Uirgine assumens primitias nostre masse, ut ipsa extiterit in[7] carne ypostasis, que Dei Uerbi ypostasis et composita facta fuerit que prius simplex erat Uerbi ypostasis; composita uero ex duabus perfectis naturis, deitate et humanitate.

Idem:[8]

> Confitemur has duas naturas unitas inuicem in unam ypostasim compositam Filii Dei.

Idem:[9]

> Ex deitate et humanitate Deum perfectum et hominem perfectum eundem et esse et dici ex duabus et in duabus naturis confitemur.

Item, Augustinus[10]

> Sic[11] est Christus ueritas, ut uerum totum accipias. Uerum est Uerbum, uera anima, uera caro, uerus Deus, uerus homo.

Idem:[12]

> Non tantum Uerbum Dei et hominis caro, sed etiam rationalis hominis anima atque hoc totum et Deus propter Deum et homo propter hominem.

Item, Boetius in libro *Contra Euticen et Nestorium:*[13]

> Si Dei atque hominis diuersa substantia est unumque in utrisque Christi nomen nec diuersarum coniunctio substantiarum[14] unam creditur fecisse personam, equiuocum est[15] nomen Christi et nulla potest diffinitione concludi (117^{rb}). Quibus autem scripturis[16] umquam Christi nomen geminatur? Quid ergo noui per aduentum Saluatoris effectum est? Nam catholicis[17] fidei ueritas et raritas[18] miraculi constat. Quam enim magnum est quamque[19] nouum, quod semel et nullo alio seculo possit euenire, ut ea que solus Deus est natura cum humana que ab ea diuersissima erat conueniret atque ita ex distantibus naturis una fieret copulatione persona. Secundum uero Nestorii sententiam quid contigit noui? "Seruat, inquit, proprias diuinitas humanitasque personas." Quando enim non fuit diuinitatis propria humanitatisque persona? Quando uero non erit?

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[1] *om.* Auctoritates....totum *CD*] Quod Christus aliter totum *A*] *marg.* Rationes quibus idem probatur *A*.

[2] *Sent.* III, 6, 3 (577).

[3] *Sent.* III, 6, 3 (578).

[4] *om. C.*

[5] Augustinus *D*]. *Sent.* III, 6, 3 (578).

[6] *Sent.* III, 6, 3 (577).

[7] *om. BD*] carnis *P.*

[8] *Sent.* III, 6, 3 (577).

[9] *Sent.* III, 7, 2 (585).

[10] *om. C.* Augustine, *In Joh. Tr.* VIII, 5; PL 35, 1453.

[11] Sicut *DP.*

[12] *Sent.* III, 6, 6 (581).

[13] *Contra Eutychen*, c. 4; ed. Stewart-Rand, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

[14] personarum *C.*

[15] *om. A.*

[16] scriptis *A.*

[17] catholicus *D.*

[18] claritas *D.*

[19] quamquam *D.*

Et post pauca:[20]

> Quod si nulla ex homine atque Deo una persona coniuncta est, ergo omnes sanctos scilicet homines ita ueros Christos arbitramur ut hunc qui ex Uirgine genitus creditur.

In hiis, ut dixi, longe aliter accipitur totum siue compositum quam supra. Ibi enim dicitur Christum esse totum et constare et compositum esse sicut ex partibus, et hoc secundum humanitatem solam. Hic uero non sicut ex partibus sed sicut ex naturis, quia non significat (117va) hic alicuius rei integralem constitutionem, sicut frequentius, sed diuersarum naturarum[21] personalem solummodo unionem. Quod Augustinus dedit intelligere in illa auctoritate:[22] *Christi persona constat et conficitur ex Deo et homine.* Mox enim subiecit: *Cum ipse Christus uerus sit Deus et uerus homo,* acsi diceret: Hoc ideo dicimus quia una persona Christi est duarum naturarum.

Nunc quia illi, aduersus quos nobis sermo est, impium putant et hereticum, quicumque qualibet ratione dixerit Christum factum esse[23] uel creatum uel creaturam, aliqua super his sanctorum patienter audiant[24] testimonia omni exceptione[25] et contradictione maiora.

XVII

AUCTORITATES QUIBUS PROBATUR QUOD CHRISTUS EST FACTUS ET CREATUS ET CREATURA[1]

Apostolus: *Qui factus est ei ex semine Dauid.*[2] Item, *Factum ex muliere.*[3] Item, *Induite nouum hominem qui secundum Deum creatus est,*[4] quod Haimo[5] de Christo exponit. Item, Haimo:[6] *Non de Uerbo loquitur Apostolus sed de homine, qui non erat antequam esset factus.* Leo in sermone illo, *Exultemus in Domino:*[7] *Natiuitatem,* inquit, *pueri in salutem humani generis procreati.*

Augustinus, *Contra Maximinum:*[8] Deus Domini nostri Ihesu Christi Christus secundum hominem de (117^{vb}) Uirgine natus est, ut non solum illi[9] Pater esset, qui eum genuit, sed etiam Deus esset, quem de uentre matris hominem creauit.

Idem *Super Johannem:*[10]

> Quomodo creauit Mariam et creatus est per Mariam, sic dedit baptismum Johanni et baptizatus est a Johanne.

In eodem:[11]

> Magna misericordia Domini nostri Ihesu Christi factum eum esse[12] in tempore propter nos per quem[13] facta sunt tempora, factum esse[14] inter omnia per quem facta sunt omnia: factum esse[15] quod fecit. Factus est enim homo qui hominem fecerat, ne periret quod fecerat.[16]

Ieronimus[17] super Ieremiam, *Creauit Dominus nouum super terram:*[18]

> Nota, inquit, quod natiuitas Saluatoris et conceptio Dei dicitur creatio in libro Sapientie, *primum omnium creata est sapientia,*[19] (quod sic exponitur): Creata secundum humanitatem in consilio Dei, Patris scilicet, pro salute humani generis predestinata est incarnari. (Ubi mox subditur): Notandum autem quia propter unitatem persone aliquando Christus dicitur genitus, aliquando creatus.

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[20] *Ibid.*, p. 96.

[21] personarum *C.*

[22] *Sent.* III, 6, 3 (577).

[23] *om. C.*

[24] uideant *C.*

[25] expectatione *C.*

[1] *om.* Auctoritates...creatura *CD*] *om.* Auctoritates quibus probatur *AP*.

[2] *Rom.* i, 3.

[3] *Gal.* iv, 4.

[4] *Eph.* iv, 24.

[5] Haimo, *In Rom.* i, 3; PL 117, 366D.

[6] *om. C.* Lombard, *In Rom.* i, 3; PL 191, 1314A.

[7] *Sermo XXII*, 4; PL 54, 197A.

[8] *Contra Maximinum* I, 7; PL 42, 749.

[9] ille *C.*

[10] *In Joh. Tr.* V, 4; PL 35, 1416.

[11] *In Joh. Tr.* XXXI, 5; PL 35, 1638.

[12] est *AC.*

[13] ea que *D.*

[14] est *AD.*

[15] est *A.*

[16] *om.* ne . . . fecerat *C.*

[17] *om. C.*

[18] *Jer.* xxxi, 22. Jerome, *In Jerem.* vi, 31, 22; PL 24, 518.

[19] *Ecclesiasticus* 1, 4.

Augustinus *De Trinitate:*[20]

> Est ergo Deus, i.e. diuina essentia uel Trinitas, caput Christi secundum quod homo, quia diuinitas, utpote creatrix, caput est creature assumpte. Hac interpretatione non potestas[21] Filii minuitur, sed misericordia predicatur (118ra).

Item, super hec uerba Apostoli, *Attendite uobis, ne quis seducat uos per philosophiam et inanem fallaciam,*[22] Ambrosius:[23]

> Tradiderunt namque philosophi Deum non posse fieri creaturam, hominem non posse nasci de Uirgine uel mortuum reuiuiscere.

Leo in aliqua *Omelia:*[24]

> O mira et exquisita propago, o noua et inaudita coniunctio. Deus qui est et qui erat Creator fit[25] creatura. Qui immensus est capitur, diuites constituens pauper efficitur, incorporeus[26] uestitur.

Item, Augustinus in libro *De Trinitate:*[27]

> Factum[28] quippe creaturam, per quem omnis creatura facta est, omnem creaturam testem habere oportebat.

Item, in libro *De Trinitate:*[29]

> Pertinebat ad iustitiam bonitatemque Creatoris, ut per eandem rationalem[30] creaturam superaretur diabolus, quam[31] se superasse gaudebat, et de ipso genere uenientem, quod genus origine uitiata per unum[32] tenebat uniuersum.

Idem:[33]

> *In ipso habitat omnis plenitudo diuinitatis corporaliter.*[34] *Omnis,* i.e. omni modo habitandi, ut etiam personaliter sit unita. Quod non est in alia creatura.

Idem, *Pater maior me est:*[35]

> Non carni sue solum sed etiam menti quam gerebat humane Deum Patrem preferebat, que tota sine dubio agnoscitur forma serui, quoniam (118^{rb}) seruit tota creatura Creatori.

Idem, in libro *De Trinitate:*[36]

> *Qui in me credit, non in me credit.*[37] Quomodo in ipsum? Quomodo non in ipsum? Quomodo tam contrarium sibique aduersum potest intelligi? *Qui in me credit,* non in hoc quod uidet credit, ne sit spes[38] nostra in creatura sed in illo qui suscepit creaturam, in qua humanis oculis appareret.

Ieronimus[39] super Marcum,[40] *Mansit super eum Spiritus:*

> Hec est unctio Christi secundum carnem de qua: *Unxit te Deus, Deus tuus, oleo letitie,* etc.[41] Oleum non potest esse sub aqua, nec Creator sub creatura.

Ecce comparat hic Ieronimus Spiritum oleo, hominem Christum[42] aque. Unde uult ostendere conuenienter dictum, *Mansit super eum Spiritus,* non sub eo, quia sicut non potest oleum esse sub aqua ita nec Spiritus Creator sub Christo creatura.

Item, Augustinus[43] in sermone *De Prophetis:*[44]

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[20] Lombard, *In I Cor.* xi, 3; PL 191, 163A. Paraphrase of Ambrose, *De Fide* IV, 3; PL 16, 648BC.

[21] pietas *ABP.*

[22] *Col.* ii, 8.

[23] Lombard, *In Col.* ii, 8; PL 192,271C.

[24] Ps-Augustine, *Sermo in nat. Domini;* PL 39, 1998. Gregory Nazianzen, *De Epiphaniis;* CSEL 46, 101.

[25] fuit *D.*

[26] in corpore *AP.*

[27] *De Trin.* IV, 19, 25; PL 42, 905.

[28] factam *D.*

[29] *De Trin.* XIII, 17, 22; PL 42, 1032.

[30] rationem *C.*

[31] per quam *D.*

[32] uim *C.*

[33] Lombard, *In Col.* ii, 9; PL 192, 272C.

[34] *Col.* ii, 9.

[35] Lombard, *In Heb.* ii, 10; PL 192, 419A. *John* xiv, 28. Augustine, *Contra Max.* II, 24, PL 42, 803.

[36] *De Trin.* I, 12, 27; PL 42, 839.

[37] *John* xii, 44.

[38] species *D.*

[39] Idem *C.*

[40] *Exp. in Marc.;* PL 30, 614B.

[41] *Ps.* xliv, 8.

[42] *om. A.*

[43] Lombard, *In Gal.* iv, 5; PL 192, 137A ("serm. de Trinitate").

[44] propheticis *BP.*

> Non te offendat quod ait "factum", cum confiteamur "natum". Factum enim non confitemur nisi hominem. Deus autem semper faciens est, fieri nescit ut sit, sed fit ut aliquid alicui sit, sicut dicitur, *Domine, refugium factus es nobis.*[45] Quando factus est qui numquam factus est? Dominus autem Ihesus Christus factus est homo ut esset, ut qui Creator (118va) semper erat creatura esset. Manens[46] enim Deus factus est homo, ut fieret quod non erat, non ut periret quod erat. Factum ergo dicitur propter[47] susceptionem creature.

Idem super Johannem,[48] *Cum tradiderit regnum Deo et Patri:*[49] *Deo Creatori inquantum est homo, et Patri suo inquantum est Deus.*

Item, Ysaias,[50] *Rorate celi desuper,* etc. usque *Ego Dominus creaui eum.*

Item, Augustinus:[51]

> *Unxit te Deus, Deus tuus,* ex greco patet ita intelligendum: O Deus, Deus tuus, i.e. Creator tuus.

Idem:[52]

> *Et pro eis sanctifico meipsum,*[53] i.e. ego me hominem sanctifico in me Uerbo quod est ab initio creationis sue, quando *Uerbum caro factum est.*

Hee omnes auctoritates manifeste declarant quod Christus sit factus siue creatus siue creatura, licet aliqua scripturarum testimonia superficietenus inspecta contrarietatem quandam pretendant.

XVIII

AUCTORITATES QUE UIDENTUR ESSE CONTRARIE ET SOLUTIONES NON INUTILES, UBI INTER ALIA QUERITUR DE TOTO ILLO UTRUM FUERIT UEL NON FUERIT IN TRIDUO[1]

Augustinus:[2] *Non est creatura per quem facta est omnis creatura.* Idem[3] *In principio erat Uerbum, non in principio fecit Deus Uerbum quomodo celum et terram* (118^{vb}). Ecce quia non est creatura. Item, in primo libro *De Trinitate:*[4]

> *Omnia per ipsum facta sunt.* Liquido apparet ipsum factum non esse per quem facta sunt omnia. Et si factus est, creatura non est, etc.

Item, *Non assumes nomen Dei in uanum.*[5] Nomen eius non debet in uanum accipi, ut putemus eum factum per quem facta sunt omnia.[6]

Item, Ambrosius in primo libro *De Trinitate:*[7]

> Probemus, inquit, creaturam non[8] esse Dei Filium. Ubi sunt qui creaturam Christum appellant? Nam si creatura esset, subiectus esset uanitati quia, testante Apostolo, *omnis creatura subiecta est uanitati.*[9] Non igitur Christus creatura est.

Item, Athanasius:[10] *Non factus, non creatus, sed genitus.*

Hanc autem contrarietatem, ut[11] uidetur, facile est soluere secundum regulam illam Augustini[12] in libro *De Trinitate:*[13]

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[45] *Ps.* lxxxix, 1.

[46] Augustine, *Sermo* CXXVII, 6, 9; PL 38, 710.

[47] *om. C*] susceptione *C.*

[48] Lombard, *In I Cor.* xv, 24; PL 191, 1678D.

[49] *I Cor.* xv, 24.

[50] *Is.* xlv, 8.

[51] Cf. Lombard, *In Heb.* i, 9; PL 192, 411B. *Ps.* lxiv, 8.

[52] *In Joh. Tr.* CVIII, 5; PL 35, 1916.

[53] *John* xvii, 19.

[1] *om.* Auctoritates . . . triduo *CD*] Quedam que hiis contraria uidentur *AP.*

[2] Bede, *Hom.* I, 7; PL 94, 40A. Abelard, *Sic et Non,* c. 67; PL 178, 1437A.

[3] *De Diversis quaest.,* qu. 67, 2; PL 40, 67.

[4] *Sent.* III, 11, 1 (597).

[5] *Exod.* xx, 7.

[6] Cf. *Sent. III,* 37, 2 (717). *Glossa ord. in Deut.* v, 11; PL 113, 458A. *Ysagoge* II, ed. A. Landgraf, *op. cit.,* p. 135. Robert of Melun, *Summa* I, 2, 7; ed. R. M. Martin (Louvain, 1947), p. 287.

[7] *Sent.* III, 11, 1 (598).

[8] *om. AP.*

[9] *Rom.* viii, 20.

[10] *Symbolum 'Quicunque'.*

[11] que *ABCP.*

[12] *om. C.*

[13] *De Trin* I, 11, 12; PL 42, 836.

> Quapropter, inquit, cognita ista regula intelligendarum scripturarum de Filio Dei, ut intelligamus quid in eis sonet secundum formam Dei, in qua equalis est Patri, et quid secundum formam serui quam accepit, in qua minor est Patre, non conturbabimur tamquam contrariis ac repugnantibus inter se sanctorum librorum sententiis. Nam secundum formam Dei equalis est Patri et (119ra) Filius et Spiritus sanctus, quia neuter eorum est creatura. Secundum autem formam serui minor est Patre quia ipse dixit, *Pater maior me est.*[14] Minor est seipso quia *seipsum exinaniuit.*[15] Minor est Spiritu sancto quia ipse dixit, *In Spiritu Dei eicio demonia;*[16] et iterum, *Spiritus Domini,* inquit, *super me.*[17] Secundum formam Dei *omnia per ipsum facta sunt.*[18] Secundum formam serui ipse *factus est ex muliere, factus sub lege,* etc.[19]

Hanc utique tam ueram quam utilem regulam sequentes dicimus, quia omnes auctoritates, quibus affirmatur Christum creatum siue creaturam esse, ad humanitatem eius referende sunt. Quibuscumque uero huiusmodi aliquid negatur, ad diuinitatem[20] ipsius referri non dubitetur. Unde ipse Augustinus[21] in eodem:[22]

> Quid tamen de eo[23] propter quid, et quid secundum quid dicatur, adiuuante Domino prudens et diligens et pius lector (119^{rb}) intelligat.

Hinc etiam Gregorius:[24]

> *Surrexit, non est hic.*[25] *Non est hic,* inquit, per presentiam carnis, qui tamen nusquam deest per presentiam maiestatis.

Ecce et ibi erat secundum diuinitatem, et ibi non erat secundum humanitatem. Si quis hanc regulam diligenter inspiciat, uidebit in talibus nullam esse contrarietatem siue contradictionem. Maxime autem et auctoritates et rationes, quibus probant sancti doctores Christum siue Dei Filium non esse creaturam, contra Arianos faciunt qui dicunt Christum Filium Dei esse adoptiuum, non genitum, sed factum et creatum.

Magister Hugo de Sancto Uictore aliam reddit rationem quare Christus non sit creatura:[26]

> Hoc est, inquit, creaturam esse: aliquid de nichilo esse, hoc est,[27] esse aliquid et nichil fuisse. Non autem omnis qui (119va) aliquid esse incipit, ideo esse incipit[28] quia aliquid esse incipit. Sicut qui aliquid esse desinit, non ideo desinit, quia aliquid esse desinit. Non enim ita aliquid esse desinit, ut nichil sit, sed solum ut id quod esse desinit iam non sit. Sicut non semper qui aliquid esse incipit, ita aliquid esse incipit, quasi esse incipiat ut aliquid sit, sed ut aliquid quod prius non fuit esse incipiat, ut iam sit. Ita Christus, quando homo esse incepit, aliquid esse incepit. Nec tamen ita aliquid esse incepit, quasi prius non fuisset aliquid, quia priusquam hoc fuit quod aliquando esse cepit fuit aliquid[29] quod semper[30] fuit et numquam cepit.[31]

Et circa finem capituli subdit:[32]

> Paulus, inquit Ambrosius in libro quem *De Trinitate*[33] scripsit, prohibet me creature seruire et Christo admonet seruiendum. Non ergo creatura[34] Christus (119^{vb}).

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[14] *John* xiv, 28.
[15] *Phil.* ii, 7.
[16] *Matth.* xii, 28.
[17] *Is.* lxi, 1.
[18] *John* i, 3.
[19] *Gal.* iv, 4.
[20] deitatem *C.*
[21] *om. C.*
[22] *Sent.* III, 11, 1 (597).
[23] Deo *C.*
[24] *om. C. Hom. XXI,* 4; PL 76, 1171.
[25] *Luke* xxiv, 6.
[26] *De Sacramentis* II, 1, 9; PL 176, 397AB.
[27] *add.* et *D.*
[28] *om.* ideo esse incipit *D.*
[29] aliud *P.*
[30] *add.* non *D.*
[31] *om.* fuit aliquid . . . cepit *C.*
[32] PL 176, 399A.
[33] Ambrose, *De Fide* I, 16, 104; PL 16, 575B.
[34] *add.* est *AD.*

Et post pauca:[35]

> Uide ergo, quomodo Christum et factum et[36] creatum secundum aliquid affirmat quem tamen creaturam[37] esse negat.

In hoc capitulo uenerabilis ille magister testatur quod Christus in tempore cepit esse aliquid quod prius non fuit et quod Christus sit factus et[38] creatus. Aliam autem ab ea quam premisimus assignat rationem, quare[39] Christus non sit dicendus creatura. Sed quia idem ipse Ambrosius, cuius auctoritate nititur sicut supra in proximo[40] capitulo ostensum est, alibi asserit Christum creaturam esse et Augustinus et alii quilibet sancti doctores in hac assertione conueniunt, prior illa solutio secundum regulam Augustini preferenda uidetur.

Alicui autem forte uidebitur quod magister Hugo premissam disputationem Ambrosii,[41] *Probemus creaturam non esse Filium Dei,* minus intelligenter inspexerit, si hoc probatum putat (120ra) quod Christus nullo modo dicendus sit creatura. In fine enim eiusdem capituli subicit Ambrosius:[42]

> Postea uero secundum carnem homo factus est ex Maria. Si michi non credunt, credant Apostolo, *Postquam uenit plenitudo temporis, misit Deus Filium suum factum ex muliere,* etc.[43]

In sequenti etiam capitulo sacris auctoritatibus probat, quod Christus est factus et creatus et creatura:[44] *Et Dominum,* inquit, *eum et Christum fecit Deus, hunc Ihesum quem crucifixistis.*[45] Huic auctoritatis explanande eleganter subicit: *Hoc utique fieri potuit quod potuit crucifigi.* Item, *Non dixit Pater creauit me, sed Dominus.*[46] *Caro Dominum agoscit, creatura Dominum confitetur.* Denique competenter distinguendo concludit:[47]

> Dicant ergo genitum ex Patre ex Uirgine procreatum, aut dicant quomodo Deus Filius et genitus est et creatus. Una (120^{rb}) natura, et maxime Deus, diuersitatem non recipit.

Ecce hic manifeste ostendit quod de Christo secundum duas naturas diuersa et uelut sibi inuicem aduersa dicuntur. Unde et ipse et alii sancti doctores multa in hunc modum scripsisse reperiuntur: Christus est passus et Christus non est passus. Christus est mortuus et Christus non est mortuus. Christus in passione timuit et tristis fuit, Christus in passione nec timuit nec tristis fuit. In quibus omnibus affirmationes et negationes non secundum idem accipiende sunt sed huiusmodi quelibet diuersa ad diuersitatem naturarum in una persona tacite intellectam referenda sunt. Quod garruli quidam minus intelligentes sanctis expositoribus de elenchi ignorantia insultare solent. Sicut ergo Christus uere passus est, licet aliqua ratione (120va) scriptum sit, Christus passus non est, ita etiam Christus uere creatura est, licet aliqua ratione scriptum sit, Christus creatura non est. Hiis itaque et similibus sane fidei non obstantibus nichilominus constabit quod Christus est aliquod creatum, aliquod totum Deo personaliter unitum, sicut in prioribus demonstratum est.[48]

Sed ad hec obicitur: Si Christus est aliquid creatum, ergo est aliquid posterius et minus Patre. Quod est contra illud:[49] *In Trinitate nichil prius aut posterius, nichil maius aut minus.* Item, si Christus est aliquid creatum, est aliquid differens a Patre. In Trinitate autem nulla est differentia, nulla diuersitas, sed summa conuenientia et prima unitas. Simile: Christus est alicuius[50] nature create. Ergo est posterioris et minoris (120^{vb}) nature quam Pater. Item, est alicuius nature create. Ergo est alterius nature quam Pater.[51] Uel sic: Natura Filii est creata, que non est[52] Patris. Ergo natura Filii est differens a natura Patris.

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[35] PL 176, 399B.

[36] non *C.*

[37] creatum *C.*

[38] non *C.*

[39] quod *BP.*

[40] primo *A.*

[41] *De Fide* I, 14, 86; PL 16, 571C.

[42] *Ibid.,* 93; PL 16, 573A.

[43] *Gal.* iv, 4.

[44] *De Fide* I, 15, 95; PL 16, 573BC.

[45] *Acts* ii, 36.

[46] *Prov.* viii, 22.

[47] *De Fide* I, 16, 102; PL 16, 575A.

[48] *om.* Alicui autem forte . . . demonstratum est *ABCD.*

[49] *Symbolum 'Quicunque'.*

Hec ergo et omnia huiusmodi facile soluuntur secundum predictam regulam Augustini.[53] Quia enim Christus gemine nature est, refert[54] quid de eo et secundum quid dicatur. Item, obicitur: "Si Christus fuit aliquid Deo personaliter unitum, mortuo Christo aut fuit aut non. Si mortuo Christo fuit, cum illud non esset nisi quoddam totum ex anima et carne[55] compositum, illud[56] totum siue compositum tunc fuit. Quod si illud unitum tunc non fuit per fruitionem Dei, et personalem unionem quam habuerat amisit. Hec autem bona sine peccato demereri non potuit. Ergo aut illud unitum peccauit[57] aut Deus iniuste tali et (121ra) tanto bono ipsum priuauit." Possem hic dicere quod illud totum mirabiliter fuit in partibus etiam separatis, sicut hodie totum corpus Christi est in locis a se inuicem ualde disparatis.[58] Sicut etiam localiter separatis singulis hominibus nichilominus est unus populus, et disgregatis singulis capitibus nichilominus est unus[59] grex. Sicut et panis incisus non perit, sed in partibus suis totus existit. Uino etiam unius uasis in diuersa transfuso manet idem uinum quod prius. Quid autem mirum si Christus, diuisis[60] partibus hominis, totus homo erat, quandoquidem[61] et mortuus uiuebat et in morte sicut ante perfectus Deus et perfectus homo erat. Uerisimilius est tamen, quod secundum integralitatem et totalitatem suam ad tempus esse desiit sed in meliori statu tertia die resurrexit. Et hoc eadem iustitia qua post[62] bona merita nichilominus sancti, resolutis corporum et animarum uinculis, per multa etiam temporum curricula a gloria resurrectionis differuntur.

Quod autem totum aliquod ad tempus esse desierit,[63] uidetur Athanasius de Christo sensisse qui ait:[64]

> Maledictus qui totum hominem, quem assumpsit Dei Filius, denuo assumptum uel liberatum tertia die a mortuis (121^{vb}) resurrexisse non confitetur.

Totum dicit *denuo assumptum* quod in morte fuerat depositum uel *denuo assumptum* ideo dicit in resurrectione. Tunc enim quem assumpserat in personam assumpsit in gloriam. Unde est illud pro assumptione[65] matutina, i.e. pro resurrectione mane facta.

Legitur etiam super illud in euangelio Johannis, *Ego pono animam meam,* etc.,[66] illud Augustini:[67]

> Uerbum ex quo suscepit hominem, i.e. carnem et animam, numquam deposuit animam, ut esset anima a Uerbo separata. Sed caro animam posuit quando expirauit, qua redeunte resurrexit. Mors itaque ad tempus carnem et animam separauit sed neutrum a Uerbo Dei.

Ideo forte, cum dixisset, *suscepit hominem,* statim ita exposuit,[68] *i.e. carnem et animam,* ne hoc quod sequitur, scilicet *numquam deposuit,* de composito ex carne et anima intelligeretur quod in triduo illo non fuit, nisi[69] tropice dicatur fuisse in partibus, quia partes eius etsi ab inuicem separate interim tamen fuerunt. Quid autem in talibus proprie, quid etiam tropice dici possit aut debeat (121va), *prudens*

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[50] *add.* creature uel *C.*
[51] *om.* Item, est . . . Pater *A.*
[52] *om. DP.*
[53] *om. C.*
[54] referunt *A.*
[55] corpore *ABP.*
[56] aliud *A.*
[57] peccatum *A.*
[58] desparatis *A.*
[59] *om.* populus . . . unus *D.*
[60] diuersis *C.*
[61] quandoque *C.*
[62] prius *A.*
[63] *om.* autem . . . desierit *BC.*
[64] *Sent.* III, 21, 1 (646).
[65] susceptione *C.*
[66] *John* x, 17.
[67] *Sent.* III, 21, 1 (647).
[68] disposuit *A.*
[69] nec *A.*

et diligens lector intelligat. Potest etiam simplicius illud intelligi, *suscepit hominem, i.e. carnem et animam,* ut hac expositione diuerse hereses percellantur. Quidam enim dixerunt Deum tantum humanam animam accepisse, alii uero tantum humanam carnem. Sed procul dubio, qui totum hominem fecit, ut totum reficeret, totum suscepit. Ideo cum dixisset, *Uerbum suscepit hominem,* ne quis nomine hominis audito partem tantum hominis acciperet, addit, *i.e. carnem et animam,* non carnem sine anima nec animam sine carne quia, sicut ait Augustinus:[70]

> factus est pro nobis uerus homo et plenus. In eo uerus, quia ueram habet humanam naturam. In eo uero plenus, quia carnem humanam suscepit et rationalem animam.

Relinquitur ergo firmum illud et indissolubile:[71] Christum ex tempore factum et creatum esse. Unde et legitur quod Christus siue homo ille non semper fuit.[72]

XIX

AUCTORITATES QUIBUS PROBATUR QUOD CHRISTUS SIUE HOMO ILLE NON SEMPER FUIT[1]

Super illum Psalmum, *Exaudiat te Deus,*[2] legitur auctoritas illa:[3] *Dum*[4] *ait "letabimur", "magnificabimur", ostendit propheta se unum esse*[5] *de ecclesia tanto tempore ante Christum* (121^{vb}). Item, Augustinus et alii sancti scriptores[6] unanimiter docent quod quedam membra caput, i.e. Christum, precesserunt, quedam secuta sunt, iuxta illud, *Et qui preibant et qui sequebantur clamabant: Osanna Filio Dauid.*[7] Si antiqui iusti tempore[8] Christum[9] precesserunt, ante Christum fuerunt. Item, Augustinus[10] *Super Johannem:*[11]

> Habuit aliquando Dei Filius quod nondum habuit idem ipse hominis Filius, quia nondum erat homo. Non prius fuit[12] hominis filius et postea cepit habere quod habuit Dei Filius. Sed ex quo fuit, totum habuit quod Dei Filius. Non semper autem habuit hominis filius quod Dei Filius. Ergo non semper fuit hominis filius quando fuit Dei Filius.

Idem:[13]

> Sic nos electi quomodo ille clarificatus, quia priusquam mundus esset nec nos eramus nec ipse *mediator Dei et hominum, homo Christus Ihesus.*[14]

Item, Haimo:[15]

> Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus unus est Deus et rex omnium seculorum, scilicet preteritorum, presentium et futurorum. Homo uero assumptus a Uerbo ex eo tempore rex est futurorum, ex quo assumptus est a Uerbo. Nam preteritorum seculorum non fuit rex homo ille, quia non erat.

Item, Augustinus:[16] *Christus noster, etsi forte homo recens est, tamen est eternus Deus.* Si est homo recens, est homo[17] qui non semper fuit (122ra).

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[70] *Sent.* III, 6, 6 (581): Fulgentius, *De Fide ad Petrum* 2, 10; PL 40, 756.

[71] *add.* scilicet *C.*

[72] Cf. *Sent.* III, 11, 3 (600).

[1] *om.* Auctoritates . . . fuit *CD*] *om.* Auctoritates quibus probatur *AP.*

[2] *Ps.* xix, 1.

[3] Lombard, *In Ps.* xix, 5; PL 191, 217C.

[4] cum *AD.*

[5] *om. ABCP.*

[6] Cf. Bede, *In Marc.* xi, 9; PL 92, 242A. *Ysagoge* I; ed. Landgraf, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

[7] *Mark* xi, 9.

[8] tempori *P.*

[9] *om. D.*

[10] *om. C.*

[11] *Sent.* III, 11, 3 (600).

[12] erat *A.*

[13] Lombard, *In Rom.* i, 3; PL 192, 1313A. Augustine, *In Joh. Tr.* CV, 7; PL 35, 1907.

[14] *I Tim.* ii. 5.

[15] om. *C.* Lombard, *In I Tim.* i, 17; PL 192, 334B. Haimo, *In I Tim.* i, 17; PL 117,787B.

[16] *Sent.* III, 11, 3 (600).

[17] *om.* tamen . . . homo *D.*

Item, Augustinus:[18] *Ex quo homo esse cepit, ex illo est et Deus.* Idem:[19] *Creauit Uirginem creandus ex Uirgine.* Si *creauit,* erat. Si *creandus,* nondum erat. Idem:[20] *Ita ab initio fidei sue homo quicumque gratia fit christianus sicut gratia homo ille ab initio* (Homo ille non ab initio temporis, non ab initio mundi, sed ab initio suo, hominis scilicet,) *factus est Christus.* Ergo homo ille habuit initium ex tempore. Quare homo ille non semper fuit.

XX

AUCTORITATES QUE UIDENTUR CONTRARIE ET COMPETENTES CONTRARIETATUM SOLUTIONES ET REPETITIO PRECEDENTIUM AD MULTA UTILIS[1]

Augustinus *Super Johannem:*[2]

> Quomodo de mundo per quem factus est mundus. Omnes de mundo post mundum facti sunt[3] quia prius mundus. Et sic homo de mundo, prius autem Christus. Deinde mundus[4] quoniam ante mundum Christus, ante Christum nichil, quia *in principio erat Uerbum.*

Item, Isidorus:[5]

> Pauliani a Paulo Samosatheno exorti sunt, qui dicunt non semper fuisse Christum, sed a Maria sumpsisset principium.

Alibi etiam legitur:[6] *Puer ille creauit stellas.* Et ipse Christus: *Ego principium, qui et loquor uobis.*[7]

Harum[8] contrarietatum similis est solutio ac precedentium secundum regulam Augustini ut auctoritates que dicunt Christum siue hominem illum non semper fuisse (122^{rb}) ad personam illam secundum humanitatem referantur, ille uero que dicunt semper fuisse de eadem persona secundum diuinitatem accipiantur. Potest etiam dici quod aliquando per hoc nomen "Christus" siue per hunc sermonem "homo ille" significatur persona, aliquando substantia siue natura ipsius persone. Quando ergo dicitur "Christus siue homo ille non semper fuit", substantia illa siue natura supponitur. Quando uero dicitur "Christus siue homo ille semper fuit", non natura humana uel diuina sed persona subicitur.

Ad explanationem etiam[9] horum uerborum: Deus est homo et homo est Deus, Deus est Deus et homo, homo est homo et Deus, Deus factus est homo, et homo factus est Deus, huiusmodi consideratio non erit inutilis. Utrumque enim horum nominum "Deus" et "homo" aliquando personam, aliquando naturam siue substantiam significat. Cum ergo dicitur: Deus est homo, hoc dicitur quod[10] persona diuina est substantia humana. Econuerso, cum dicitur: Homo est Deus,[11] hoc dicitur quod[12] substantia humana est persona diuina. Cum uero[13] dicitur: Deus est Deus et homo, uni persone due nature attribuuntur. Similiter cum dicitur: Homo est homo et Deus, eidem persone eedem[14] due nature attribuuntur. Item, cum dicitur: Deus factus est homo, hoc[15] dicitur quod (122va) diuina persona facta est[16] substantia humana. Cum uero dicitur: Homo factus est Deus, hoc dicitur quod substantia humana facta est persona diuina.

Non tamen nego frequenter hiis locutionibus unionem siue habitum siue assumptionem figurate significari. Nunc uero,[17] sequestrata paulisper huiusmodi figura, proprios liceat distinguere intellectus. Quando enim Deus factus est homo, aut substantia siue natura diuina facta est[18] substantia siue natura humana, aut persona diuina facta est persona humana que ipsa prius non fuerat, aut natura siue substantia diuina facta est persona humana que non semper fuerat, aut persona diuina[19] facta est natura siue substantia humana. Similiter quando homo factus est Deus, aut quedam persona humana facta est persona diuina, aut natura siue substantia humana facta est natura siue substantia diuina, aut quedam persona humana facta est natura siue substantia diuina, aut natura siue substantia humana facta est persona diuina. Cum ergo impossibile sit utramque istarum naturarum siue alteram factam esse aliam, (hoc enim fieri non posset sine conuersione uel confusione substantie, quod esset contra illud Athanasii:[20]

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[18] *om. C. Sent.* III, 6, 2 (575).

[19] Lombard, *In Rom.* i, 1; PL 191, 1307B. Fulgentius, *De Fide*, 2, 14; PL 40, 752.

[20] Lombard, *In Rom.* i, 3; PL 191, 1309C.

[1] *om.* Auctoritates . . . fuit *CD*] Quedam que hiis uidentur contraria *AP*.

[2] *In Joh. Tr.* XXXVIII, 4; PL 35, 1677.

[3] *om.* facti sunt *ABDP*.

[4] *om.* Deinde mundus *A*.

[5] *om. C. Etymol.* VIII, v, 29.

[6] *Sent.* III, 11, 3 (600).

[7] *John* viii, 25.

[8] *marg.* solutio *AP*.

[9] *marg.* repetitio prime explanationis *D*.

[10] quia *A*.

[11] Deus est homo *A*.

[12] quia *ABP*.

[13] ergo *C*.

[14] esse *A*] *om. C*] hee *D*.

[15] hic *D*.

[16] *om. D*.

> Unus autem, non conuersione diuinitatis in carnem (122^{vb}), sed assumptione humanitatis in Deum, unus omnino, non confusione substantie, sed unitate persone);

cum etiam impossibile sit personam diuinam et[21] personam humanam uel alteram earum esse aliam, (hoc enim nullatenus fieri posset nisi permixtione quadam utraque in alteram transiret uel altera prorsus esse desineret); cum hec etiam impossibilia sint quod natura diuina in Christo facta sit aliqua persona et quod illa persona facta sit[22] natura diuina, (hoc enim fieri non posset quin Christus unus et alius esset contra illud Athanasii:[23] *Cum sit Deus et homo, non duo tamen, sed unus est Christus*); cum hec, inquam, omnia impossibilia sint, hec duo uere et catholice professioni relinquuntur quod persona diuina facta est natura siue substantia humana et quod natura siue substantia humana facta est persona diuina. Et sic una persona est due substantie et due substantie sunt una persona. Alioquin nec Deus factus est homo et homo Deus,[24] nec unus Christus est Deus et homo.

Quod uero in hac disputatione naturam et substantiam indifferenter accipimus, quemquam mouere non debet. Boetius enim *Contra Euticen et Nestorium*[25] naturam quadrupliciter describit. Prima descriptio sic assignatur: *Natura est earum rerum que cum sint quoquo modo intellectu capi possunt.* Hanc ait (123^{ra}) omnes res que sunt includere.[26] Secunda sic:

> Natura est uel quod facere uel quod pati possit. Habes, inquit, diffinitionem eius significationis nature, que tantum substantiis applicatur.[27] Qua in re substantie quoque reddita est diffinitio. Nam si nomen[28] nature substantiam monstrat, cum naturam descripsimus, substantie quoque est assignata descriptio.

Tertia proponitur hoc modo: *Natura est motus principium secundum se, non per accidens.* Hic uero, ut ipse ait,

> nature nomen, relictis incorporeis substantiis, ad corporales usque contrahitur, ut corporee tantum substantie naturam habere uideantur.

Quarta etiam[29] subditur:

> Natura est unamquamque rem informans specifica differentia. Cum ergo tot modis dicatur uel diffiniatur natura,[30] tam catholici quam Nestorius secundum

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[17] *mar.* Probatio prime explanationis *D.*

[18] *om.* *C.*

[19] *om.* facta est persona humana que ipsa . . . diuina *D.*

[20] *om.* Anastasii *C.* *Symbolum 'Quicunque'.*

[21] esse *B.*

[22] *add.* persona et quod illa persona facta sit *D.*

[23] *Symbolum 'Quicunque'.*

[24] *om.* et homo Deus *D.*

[25] *Contra Eutychen,* c. 1; ed. Stewart-Rand, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

[26] inducere *D.*

[27] copulatur *ABDP.*

[28] nomine *D.*

[29] enim *C.*

[30] *add.* diuina *D.*

> ultimam diffinitionem duas in Christo esse naturas constituunt. Neque enim easdem dicunt in Deum atque in hominem differentias conuenire.

Ecce, teste Boetio, aliquando nomine nature intelligitur substantia. Augustinus[31] etiam super illum locum Psalmi, *Infixus sum in limo profundi et non est substantia:*[32] *Substantia intelligitur id quod sumus a Deo.* Nature ipse substantie dicuntur ut homo, pecus, terra, celum, et huiusmodi omnia. Unde in (123^{rb}) libro *De Trinitate*[33] formam, i.e. naturam, humanam dicit esse personam Filii:

> Forma, inquit, illa suscepti[34] hominis Filii persona est, non etiam Patris. Quapropter Pater inuisibilis una cum Filio secum inuisibili[35] eundem Filium uisibilem faciendo eum misisse dictus est.

Ecce formam sine dubio ita accipit acsi diceret naturam. Unde idem in libro *De Fide ad Petrum:*[36]

> Cum de Christo audis quia in forma Dei erat, oportet te agnoscere firmissimeque tenere in illo forme nomine naturalem plenitudinem debere intelligi. In forma igitur Dei erat, quia in natura Dei Patris semper erat, de quo natus erat.

Idem:[37]

> Non aliud fuit illa Dei summi exinanitio nisi forme seruilis, i.e. nature humane susceptio. Utraque ergo in Christo est forma, quia utraque uera[38] et plena est in Christo substantia, diuina scilicet et humana.

Et hic pro eodem accipit formam et naturam siue substantiam. Hilarius quoque in libro *De Trinitate*[39] ait: *Esse in forma Dei non alia intelligentia est quam in Dei manere natura.* Quod autem Christus[40] sit diuina (123va) natura, nemo catholicus negat. Quod etiam[41] sit natura humana, premissis et aliis auctoritatibus multis comprobatur. Quare Christus est due nature? Quia est due substantie.[42] Et est duarum naturarum, quia duas habet secundum Boetium specificas siue substantiales differentias, diuinitatem et humanitatem, que et secundum naturam semper a se inuicem longe differunt et contra naturam in unitatem persone inseparabiliter conuenerunt. Utrum autem proprie uel improprie Boetius specificas differentias[43] dixerit, supra diximus. Illud etiam[44] quod Boetius ait: *Neque easdem in Deum et hominem differentias conuenire,* si utroque nomine, Dei scilicet et hominis, persona significatur, stare non potest. Omnia enim que conueniunt Christo, conueniunt persone Dei et hominis. Una enim et eadem est persona Dei et hominis, que a seipsa non differt.[45] Sed hiis[46] nominibus[47] due substantie hic significantur quibus eedem differentie non conueniunt. Alibi uero, sicut iam diximus et iterare non piget, utrumque nomen personam, non naturam, significat ut cum dicitur: Deus passus est, et similia, nichil de diuinitate (123^{vb}) dicitur, sed de diuina persona. Et cum dicitur: Homo seipsum suscitauit, et similia, nichil humanitati attribuitur, sed persone hominis, scilicet Christi, que non est alia persona quam Dei.[48] Una est enim persona Dei et hominis, licet una et alia natura.

Si qui autem mirantur, quod duplicem huiusmodi significationem in hiis nominibus haberi[49] contendimus, quid in hiis dicent: Deus genuit, Deus genitus est, Deus procedit siue processit? Nonne in singulis de persona sermo est? Non de substantia. Sed[50] tamen hee tres proprietates hiis tribus uerbis personis tantum[51] attribuuntur, ut quidam ex illa auctoritate Johannis Damasceni[52] coniciunt:

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[31] *om. C.*

[32] Lombard, *In Ps.* lxviii, 2; PL 191, 627B. Cf. Augustine, *Enarr. in Ps.* lxviii, 3; PL 36, 844.

[33] *De Trin.* II, 5, 9; PL 42, 850.

[34] Persona, inquit illa suscepta *D.*

[35] uisibilia *B.*

[36] *De Fide ad Petrum* 2, 19; PL 40, 759.

[37] *Sent.* III, 6, 6 (582).

[38] natura *C.*

[39] *De Trin.* XII, 6; PL 10, 436.

[40] *om. A.*

[41] cum *A.*

[42] Quod Christus diuine nature et due substantie *C.*

[43] *add.* conuenire *C.*

[44] autem *A.*

[45] differunt *A.*

[46] aliis *C.*

[47] *add.* Deus, homo *D.*

[48] Deus *C.*

[49] habere *ABDP.*

> Non differunt ab inuicem ypostases secundum substantiam sed secundum caracteristica idiomata, i.e. determinatiuas proprietates. Caracteristica uero, i.e. determinatiua, sunt ypostaseon[53] et non nature; etenim ypostases[54] determinant.

Hic tamen non dicitur quod hee proprietates diuine nature non conueniant, sed hoc potius quod non naturam a seipsa sed personas a se inuicem distinguant. Hanc autem questionem, utrum una substantia siue natura genuerit et genita sit et procedat, perplexam (124ra) non credit quisquis existimat, quod non[55] unus et idem Deus genuit et genitus est et procedit. Uel qui econtrario sentit quod una et eadem res et gignens est in Patre et genita in Filio et procedens in Spiritu sancto. Sed de hiis, Deo uolente, alias disputabitur.

Nunc ad propositum reuertamur. Quid etiam de hiis dicent: Deus est unus, Deus est trinus siue Trinitas, Deus est Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus? Nonne de substantia sermo est? Non de personis siue de persona. Audiant etiam unde magis mirari possunt. Augustinus[56] enim in *Expositione simboli*[57] ait: *Si quis dixerit atque crediderit hominem*[58] *Ihesum Christum a Filio Dei assumptum non fuisse, anathema sit.* Hic sine dubio Ihesus Christus non pro persona accipitur sed pro substantia. Persona enim non est assumpta sed substantia.[59] Alibi uero personam potius significat, ut cum dicitur: Homo Ihesus Christus equalis est Deo et coeternus Patri, uel creauit omnia, et similia. Hec de persona que assumpsit, non de natura uel substantia, que assumpta est, intelligenda fore nemini sapientum ambigere licet.[60]

Non timent condiscipuli mei, sed timeo ego, ne illos anathema (124^{rb}) illud inuoluat: *Si quis dixerit atque crediderit,* etc., quia nec dicunt nec credunt aliquem hominem a Filio Dei assumptum fuisse. Hanc uero distinctionem gemine significationis siue acceptionis utriusque horum nominum Deus et homo, hereticos omnes aut omnino latuisse aut in erroris sui periculo subterfugisse non dubito, qui uel duas personas uel unam solam substantiam siue naturam Christum esse dogmatizauerunt ut Nestorius, qui Christum confitens Deum esse et hominem hiis duobus nominibus duas in Christo personas intelligendas putauit. Eutices uero[61] Deum factum hominem confitens in una persona manere[62] duas naturas non credidit, id falso arbitratus quod si in Christo essent due rationales nature, due necessario essent persone. Quorum miseram stultitiam stultum et miserum est tot greges scolarum hiis etiam temporibus in hac tanta luce et gloria christiane fidei siue magistrorum amore siue qualibet alia causa (124va) blandiente pertinaciter imitari. Me uero non metuo uel ingratitudinis uel leuitatis dampnari, si que iunior accepi uel tradidi nunc tandem senior et sanior grauiori et saniori iudicio inmutauerim. Non est[63] hoc culpa leuitatis, nisi leues iudicandi sunt[64] omnes peccatores uel qui sero penitent; non ingratitudinis, nisi hec gratia debeatur magistris, ut eorum sequamur errores, cum unus sit magister noster qui in celis est, contra quem quicquam sentire uel cuiquam consentire[65] non licet.

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[50] Si *CD.*
[51] *om. D.*
[52] *Sent.* I, 27, 3 (173).
[53] ypostasios *C*] ypostases *D*
[54] ypostaseos *A.*
[55] *om. D.*
[56] Ieronimus *C*
[57] *Sent.* III, 5, 3 (572).
[58] *add.* illum *D.*
[59] *om.* Persona...substantia *B.*
[60] Cf. *Sent.* III, 11, 3 (600).
[61] *om. C*] *add.* Nec *C.*
[62] *om. C.*
[63] *om. D.*
[64] sint *D.*
[65] *om.* uel cuiquam consentire *D.*

XXI

CONCLUSIO EX PREMISSIS INFERENS QUE IN EXORDIO PROPOSITA SUNT[1]

Quoniam itaque que in exordio proposuimus, prout capiebant bonitas operis et paruitas opificis, auctoritatibus et rationibus roborata sunt, sanctos Patres et institutores fidei sequens audeo credere et confiteri quod Christus est aliquis homo et utique sanctissimus et beatissimus hominum; et quod Christus secundum humanitatem est aliquid et utique uerus homo, uerum animal, uerum corpus, uera substantia, uerum totum; et quod idem (124^{rb}) ipse secundum alteram naturam increatus et Creator, secundam alteram[2] et creatus est[3] et creatura. Nec tamen hic[4] dico simpliciter: Filius Dei est creatura uel etiam Christus est creatura, sed hoc addito:[5] secundum humanitatem, sicut ait Apostolus, *Qui factus est ei ex semine Dauid secundum carnem.*[6] Unde Augustinus:[7]

> Hoc dicit Apostolus, ne putetur homo tantum. Dicendo namque eum factum secundum carnem innuit esse alteram naturam secundum quam est infectus, scilicet diuinam, ubi occurritur impietati hereticorum qui obtuso corde hoc capitulum intelligentes Christum tantum hominem esse accipiunt, diuinitatem uero in eo non intelligunt. Addendo enim "secundum carnem" seruauit diuinitati suam dignitatem, qua Christus Uerbum Dei Patris est per quod facta sunt omnia. Non enim est factus secundum id quod Uerbum Dei est. Ideoque Apostolus, cum factum diceret Christum, addidit "secundum carnem", ut secundum Uerbum quod est Filius Dei non factum a Deo sed natum esse monstraret.

Quotiens autem uerba sanctorum uel ipsius Domini huiusmodi determinationes non habent ut est illud, *Pater maior me est, Spiritus Domini super me, Ab initio et ante secula creata sum, Ego Dominus creaui eum, Minuisti eum paulo minus ab angelis,* et similia tunc recurrendum est ad (125ra) premissam regulam Augustini,[8] qua monemur distinguere, cum de Christo agitur, quid de eo et secundum quid dicatur.

Ut ergo, sicut a principio ita etiam[9] in fine huius *Eulogii* de pauperie mea glorie uestre destinati,[10] licet sim nouissimus in ecclesia, totius ecclesie Principem sed Patrem, Iudicem sed Pastorem, alloquar, hoc est desiderium meum, hec est petitio mea, ut sicut Romani Pontificatus apicem decet generali decreto et in perpetuum ualituro Sublimitas Uestra precipiat omnes nos in unum de homine assumpto recta sapere et hoc amplius de assumptione hominis quam de assumptione uestis sentire: quod Deus qui assumpsit est homo qui assumptus est, sicut Deus qui creauit est homo qui creatus est, Deus qui suscitauit et clarificauit est homo qui suscitatus et glorificatus est. Eadem etiam auctoritate Uestra, quam nulli hominum contempnere licet, omnes inuiolabilis precepti necessitatem siue spontanei siue inuiti suscipiamus, ut simul et similiter confiteamur et contra Euticen unam personam Christi duas esse substantias; et contra Nestorium duas substantias unam esse personam (125^{rb}); et contra Apellen et Manicheum Deum non in fantasia hominem apparuisse sed uere et essentialiter hominem extitisse; et contra Apollinarem non solum[11] corpus sed corpus simul et animam assumpsisse, in quibus et ex quibus perfectus homo dinoscitur; et contra Alogios Christum non modo hominem esse sed hominem, qui ex tempore cepit, et Uerbum, quod erat in principio; et contra Paulianos

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[1] *om.* Conclusio...sunt *BCD.*
[2] *add.* naturam *C.*
[3] *om. C.*
[4] *om. ABCD.*
[5] *add.* secundum alteram naturam *P.*
[6] *Rom.* i, 3.
[7] Lombard, *In Rom.* i, 3; PL 191, 1305D.
[8] *om. C.*
[9] essentia *D.*
[10] destinaui *D.*
[11] *add.* hominem *A.*

Christum Dei Filium semper fuisse, non a Maria sumpsisse initium, quia idem ipse et secundum diuinitatem Creator fuit ante creandam Uirginem et secundum humanitatem creatura factus est post creatam Uirginem.

Hec et hiis consentanea quelibet catholica sunt et, ut credantur in ecclesia Dei, non moneri tantum sed iuberi etiam possunt. Credere namque necesse est que nisi quisque fideliter firmiterque crediderit saluus esse non poterit.[12]

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[12] *add.* Finis *C*] *add.* Explicit Eulogium magistri Johannis Cornubiensis auctoritate Alexandri Pape tertii confirmatum *B*] *add.* (without marginal reference) Alexander Episcopus, seruus seruorum Dei, uenerabili fratri Willelmo Senonensi Archiepiscopo, Apostolice Sedis legato, salutem et Apostolicam Benedictionem: *Cum in nostra...D*] *add.* (with marginal reference to foreword) Post salutationem etenim uestro nomine radiantem ita scriptum est: *Cum in nostra* etc. *C*.

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